[PATCH 6.6 230/267] xfs: fix imprecise logic in xchk_btree_check_block_owner

[PATCH 6.6 230/267] xfs: fix imprecise logic in xchk_btree_check_block_owner

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>

commit c0afba9a8363f17d4efed22a8764df33389aebe8 upstream.

A reviewer was confused by the init_sa logic in this function.  Upon
checking the logic, I discovered that the code is imprecise.  What we
want to do here is check that there is an ownership record in the rmap
btree for the AG that contains a btree block.

For an inode-rooted btree (e.g. the bmbt) the per-AG btree cursors have
not been initialized because inode btrees can span multiple AGs.
Therefore, we must initialize the per-AG btree cursors in sc->sa before
proceeding.  That is what init_sa controls, and hence the logic should
be gated on XFS_BTREE_ROOT_IN_INODE, not XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS.

In practice, ROOT_IN_INODE and LONG_PTRS are coincident so this hasn't
mattered.  However, we're about to refactor both of those flags into
separate btree_ops fields so we want this the logic to make sense
afterwards.

Fixes: 858333dcf021a ("xfs: check btree block ownership with bnobt/rmapbt when scrubbing btree")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/btree.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/scrub/btree.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/btree.c
@@ -385,7 +385,12 @@ xchk_btree_check_block_owner(
 	agno = xfs_daddr_to_agno(bs->cur->bc_mp, daddr);
 	agbno = xfs_daddr_to_agbno(bs->cur->bc_mp, daddr);
 
-	init_sa = bs->cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_LONG_PTRS;
+	/*
+	 * If the btree being examined is not itself a per-AG btree, initialize
+	 * sc->sa so that we can check for the presence of an ownership record
+	 * in the rmap btree for the AG containing the block.
+	 */
+	init_sa = bs->cur->bc_flags & XFS_BTREE_ROOT_IN_INODE;
 	if (init_sa) {
 		error = xchk_ag_init_existing(bs->sc, agno, &bs->sc->sa);
 		if (!xchk_btree_xref_process_error(bs->sc, bs->cur,

[PATCH 6.6 231/267] xfs: fix scrub stats file permissions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>

commit e610e856b938a1fc86e7ee83ad2f39716082bca7 upstream.

When the kernel is in lockdown mode, debugfs will only show files that
are world-readable and cannot be written, mmaped, or used with ioctl.
That more or less describes the scrub stats file, except that the
permissions are wrong -- they should be 0444, not 0644.  You can't write
the stats file, so the 0200 makes no sense.

Meanwhile, the clear_stats file is only writable, but it got mode 0400
instead of 0200, which would make more sense.

Fix both files so that they make sense.

Fixes: d7a74cad8f451 ("xfs: track usage statistics of online fsck")
Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/stats.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/scrub/stats.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/stats.c
@@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ xchk_stats_register(
 	if (!cs->cs_debugfs)
 		return;
 
-	debugfs_create_file("stats", 0644, cs->cs_debugfs, cs,
+	debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, cs->cs_debugfs, cs,
 			&scrub_stats_fops);
-	debugfs_create_file("clear_stats", 0400, cs->cs_debugfs, cs,
+	debugfs_create_file("clear_stats", 0200, cs->cs_debugfs, cs,
 			&clear_scrub_stats_fops);
 }
 

[PATCH 6.6 232/267] xfs: fix SEEK_HOLE/DATA for regions with active COW extents

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>

commit 4b2f459d86252619448455013f581836c8b1b7da upstream.

A data corruption problem was reported by CoreOS image builders
when using reflink based disk image copies and then converting
them to qcow2 images. The converted images failed the conversion
verification step, and it was isolated down to the fact that
qemu-img uses SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA to find the data it is supposed to
copy.

The reproducer allowed me to isolate the issue down to a region of
the file that had overlapping data and COW fork extents, and the
problem was that the COW fork extent was being reported in it's
entirity by xfs_seek_iomap_begin() and so skipping over the real
data fork extents in that range.

This was somewhat hidden by the fact that 'xfs_bmap -vvp' reported
all the extents correctly, and reading the file completely (i.e. not
using seek to skip holes) would map the file correctly and all the
correct data extents are read. Hence the problem is isolated to just
the xfs_seek_iomap_begin() implementation.

Instrumentation with trace_printk made the problem obvious: we are
passing the wrong length to xfs_trim_extent() in
xfs_seek_iomap_begin(). We are passing the end_fsb, not the
maximum length of the extent we want to trim the map too. Hence the
COW extent map never gets trimmed to the start of the next data fork
extent, and so the seek code treats the entire COW fork extent as
unwritten and skips entirely over the data fork extents in that
range.

Link: https://github.com/coreos/coreos-assembler/issues/3728
Fixes: 60271ab79d40 ("xfs: fix SEEK_DATA for speculative COW fork preallocation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iomap.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ xfs_seek_iomap_begin(
 	if (cow_fsb != NULLFILEOFF && cow_fsb <= offset_fsb) {
 		if (data_fsb < cow_fsb + cmap.br_blockcount)
 			end_fsb = min(end_fsb, data_fsb);
-		xfs_trim_extent(&cmap, offset_fsb, end_fsb);
+		xfs_trim_extent(&cmap, offset_fsb, end_fsb - offset_fsb);
 		seq = xfs_iomap_inode_sequence(ip, IOMAP_F_SHARED);
 		error = xfs_bmbt_to_iomap(ip, iomap, &cmap, flags,
 				IOMAP_F_SHARED, seq);
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ xfs_seek_iomap_begin(
 	imap.br_state = XFS_EXT_NORM;
 done:
 	seq = xfs_iomap_inode_sequence(ip, 0);
-	xfs_trim_extent(&imap, offset_fsb, end_fsb);
+	xfs_trim_extent(&imap, offset_fsb, end_fsb - offset_fsb);
 	error = xfs_bmbt_to_iomap(ip, iomap, &imap, flags, 0, seq);
 out_unlock:
 	xfs_iunlock(ip, lockmode);

[PATCH 6.6 233/267] xfs: shrink failure needs to hold AGI buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>

commit 75bcffbb9e7563259b7aed0fa77459d6a3a35627 upstream.

Chandan reported a AGI/AGF lock order hang on xfs/168 during recent
testing. The cause of the problem was the task running xfs_growfs
to shrink the filesystem. A failure occurred trying to remove the
free space from the btrees that the shrink would make disappear,
and that meant it ran the error handling for a partial failure.

This error path involves restoring the per-ag block reservations,
and that requires calculating the amount of space needed to be
reserved for the free inode btree. The growfs operation hung here:

[18679.536829]  down+0x71/0xa0
[18679.537657]  xfs_buf_lock+0xa4/0x290 [xfs]
[18679.538731]  xfs_buf_find_lock+0xf7/0x4d0 [xfs]
[18679.539920]  xfs_buf_lookup.constprop.0+0x289/0x500 [xfs]
[18679.542628]  xfs_buf_get_map+0x2b3/0xe40 [xfs]
[18679.547076]  xfs_buf_read_map+0xbb/0x900 [xfs]
[18679.562616]  xfs_trans_read_buf_map+0x449/0xb10 [xfs]
[18679.569778]  xfs_read_agi+0x1cd/0x500 [xfs]
[18679.573126]  xfs_ialloc_read_agi+0xc2/0x5b0 [xfs]
[18679.578708]  xfs_finobt_calc_reserves+0xe7/0x4d0 [xfs]
[18679.582480]  xfs_ag_resv_init+0x2c5/0x490 [xfs]
[18679.586023]  xfs_ag_shrink_space+0x736/0xd30 [xfs]
[18679.590730]  xfs_growfs_data_private.isra.0+0x55e/0x990 [xfs]
[18679.599764]  xfs_growfs_data+0x2f1/0x410 [xfs]
[18679.602212]  xfs_file_ioctl+0xd1e/0x1370 [xfs]

trying to get the AGI lock. The AGI lock was held by a fstress task
trying to do an inode allocation, and it was waiting on the AGF
lock to allocate a new inode chunk on disk. Hence deadlock.

The fix for this is for the growfs code to hold the AGI over the
transaction roll it does in the error path. It already holds the AGF
locked across this, and that is what causes the lock order inversion
in the xfs_ag_resv_init() call.

Reported-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Fixes: 46141dc891f7 ("xfs: introduce xfs_ag_shrink_space()")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ag.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ag.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_ag.c
@@ -979,14 +979,23 @@ xfs_ag_shrink_space(
 
 	if (error) {
 		/*
-		 * if extent allocation fails, need to roll the transaction to
+		 * If extent allocation fails, need to roll the transaction to
 		 * ensure that the AGFL fixup has been committed anyway.
+		 *
+		 * We need to hold the AGF across the roll to ensure nothing can
+		 * access the AG for allocation until the shrink is fully
+		 * cleaned up. And due to the resetting of the AG block
+		 * reservation space needing to lock the AGI, we also have to
+		 * hold that so we don't get AGI/AGF lock order inversions in
+		 * the error handling path.
 		 */
 		xfs_trans_bhold(*tpp, agfbp);
+		xfs_trans_bhold(*tpp, agibp);
 		err2 = xfs_trans_roll(tpp);
 		if (err2)
 			return err2;
 		xfs_trans_bjoin(*tpp, agfbp);
+		xfs_trans_bjoin(*tpp, agibp);
 		goto resv_init_out;
 	}
 

[PATCH 6.6 234/267] xfs: ensure submit buffers on LSN boundaries in error handlers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>

commit e4c3b72a6ea93ed9c1815c74312eee9305638852 upstream.

While performing the IO fault injection test, I caught the following data
corruption report:

 XFS (dm-0): Internal error ltbno + ltlen > bno at line 1957 of file fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c.  Caller xfs_free_ag_extent+0x79c/0x1130
 CPU: 3 PID: 33 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-next-20230825-00001-g7f8666926889 #214
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/dm-0 xfs_inodegc_worker
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x70
  xfs_corruption_error+0x134/0x150
  xfs_free_ag_extent+0x7d3/0x1130
  __xfs_free_extent+0x201/0x3c0
  xfs_trans_free_extent+0x29b/0xa10
  xfs_extent_free_finish_item+0x2a/0xb0
  xfs_defer_finish_noroll+0x8d1/0x1b40
  xfs_defer_finish+0x21/0x200
  xfs_itruncate_extents_flags+0x1cb/0x650
  xfs_free_eofblocks+0x18f/0x250
  xfs_inactive+0x485/0x570
  xfs_inodegc_worker+0x207/0x530
  process_scheduled_works+0x24a/0xe10
  worker_thread+0x5ac/0xc60
  kthread+0x2cd/0x3c0
  ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
  </TASK>
 XFS (dm-0): Corruption detected. Unmount and run xfs_repair

After analyzing the disk image, it was found that the corruption was
triggered by the fact that extent was recorded in both inode datafork
and AGF btree blocks. After a long time of reproduction and analysis,
we found that the reason of free sapce btree corruption was that the
AGF btree was not recovered correctly.

Consider the following situation, Checkpoint A and Checkpoint B are in
the same record and share the same start LSN1, buf items of same object
(AGF btree block) is included in both Checkpoint A and Checkpoint B. If
the buf item in Checkpoint A has been recovered and updates metadata LSN
permanently, then the buf item in Checkpoint B cannot be recovered,
because log recovery skips items with a metadata LSN >= the current LSN
of the recovery item. If there is still an inode item in Checkpoint B
that records the Extent X, the Extent X will be recorded in both inode
datafork and AGF btree block after Checkpoint B is recovered. Such
transaction can be seen when allocing enxtent for inode bmap, it record
both the addition of extent to the inode extent list and the removing
extent from the AGF.

  |------------Record (LSN1)------------------|---Record (LSN2)---|
  |-------Checkpoint A----------|----------Checkpoint B-----------|
  |     Buf Item(Extent X)      | Buf Item / Inode item(Extent X) |
  |     Extent X is freed       |     Extent X is allocated       |

After commit 12818d24db8a ("xfs: rework log recovery to submit buffers
on LSN boundaries") was introduced, we submit buffers on lsn boundaries
during log recovery. The above problem can be avoided under normal paths,
but it's not guaranteed under abnormal paths. Consider the following
process, if an error was encountered after recover buf item in Checkpoint
A and before recover buf item in Checkpoint B, buffers that have been
added to the buffer_list will still be submitted, this violates the
submits rule on lsn boundaries. So buf item in Checkpoint B cannot be
recovered on the next mount due to current lsn of transaction equal to
metadata lsn on disk. The detailed process of the problem is as follows.

First Mount:

  xlog_do_recovery_pass
    error = xlog_recover_process
      xlog_recover_process_data
        xlog_recover_process_ophdr
          xlog_recovery_process_trans
            ...
              /* recover buf item in Checkpoint A */
              xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2
                xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer
                /* add buffer of agf btree block to buffer_list */
                xfs_buf_delwri_queue(bp, buffer_list)
            ...
            ==> Encounter read IO error and return
    /* submit buffers regardless of error */
    if (!list_empty(&buffer_list))
      xfs_buf_delwri_submit(&buffer_list);

    <buf items of agf btree block in Checkpoint A recovery success>

Second Mount:

  xlog_do_recovery_pass
    error = xlog_recover_process
      xlog_recover_process_data
        xlog_recover_process_ophdr
          xlog_recovery_process_trans
            ...
              /* recover buf item in Checkpoint B */
              xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2
                /* buffer of agf btree block wouldn't added to
                   buffer_list due to lsn equal to current_lsn */
                if (XFS_LSN_CMP(lsn, current_lsn) >= 0)
                  goto out_release

    <buf items of agf btree block in Checkpoint B wouldn't recovery>

In order to make sure that submits buffers on lsn boundaries in the
abnormal paths, we need to check error status before submit buffers that
have been added from the last record processed. If error status exist,
buffers in the bufffer_list should not be writen to disk.

Canceling the buffers in the buffer_list directly isn't correct, unlike
any other place where write list was canceled, these buffers has been
initialized by xfs_buf_item_init() during recovery and held by buf item,
buf items will not be released in xfs_buf_delwri_cancel(), it's not easy
to solve.

If the filesystem has been shut down, then delwri list submission will
error out all buffers on the list via IO submission/completion and do
all the correct cleanup automatically. So shutting down the filesystem
could prevents buffers in the bufffer_list from being written to disk.

Fixes: 50d5c8d8e938 ("xfs: check LSN ordering for v5 superblocks during recovery")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c
@@ -3203,11 +3203,28 @@ xlog_do_recovery_pass(
 	kmem_free(hbp);
 
 	/*
-	 * Submit buffers that have been added from the last record processed,
-	 * regardless of error status.
+	 * Submit buffers that have been dirtied by the last record recovered.
 	 */
-	if (!list_empty(&buffer_list))
+	if (!list_empty(&buffer_list)) {
+		if (error) {
+			/*
+			 * If there has been an item recovery error then we
+			 * cannot allow partial checkpoint writeback to
+			 * occur.  We might have multiple checkpoints with the
+			 * same start LSN in this buffer list, and partial
+			 * writeback of a checkpoint in this situation can
+			 * prevent future recovery of all the changes in the
+			 * checkpoints at this start LSN.
+			 *
+			 * Note: Shutting down the filesystem will result in the
+			 * delwri submission marking all the buffers stale,
+			 * completing them and cleaning up _XBF_LOGRECOVERY
+			 * state without doing any IO.
+			 */
+			xlog_force_shutdown(log, SHUTDOWN_LOG_IO_ERROR);
+		}
 		error2 = xfs_buf_delwri_submit(&buffer_list);
+	}
 
 	if (error && first_bad)
 		*first_bad = rhead_blk;

[PATCH 6.6 235/267] xfs: allow sunit mount option to repair bad primary sb stripe values

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>

commit 15922f5dbf51dad334cde888ce6835d377678dc9 upstream.

If a filesystem has a busted stripe alignment configuration on disk
(e.g. because broken RAID firmware told mkfs that swidth was smaller
than sunit), then the filesystem will refuse to mount due to the
stripe validation failing. This failure is triggering during distro
upgrades from old kernels lacking this check to newer kernels with
this check, and currently the only way to fix it is with offline
xfs_db surgery.

This runtime validity checking occurs when we read the superblock
for the first time and causes the mount to fail immediately. This
prevents the rewrite of stripe unit/width via
mount options that occurs later in the mount process. Hence there is
no way to recover this situation without resorting to offline xfs_db
rewrite of the values.

However, we parse the mount options long before we read the
superblock, and we know if the mount has been asked to re-write the
stripe alignment configuration when we are reading the superblock
and verifying it for the first time. Hence we can conditionally
ignore stripe verification failures if the mount options specified
will correct the issue.

We validate that the new stripe unit/width are valid before we
overwrite the superblock values, so we can ignore the invalid config
at verification and fail the mount later if the new values are not
valid. This, at least, gives users the chance of correcting the
issue after a kernel upgrade without having to resort to xfs-db
hacks.

Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c |   40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.h |    5 +++--
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ xfs_validate_sb_common(
 	}
 
 	if (!xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(mp, XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_unit),
-			XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_width), 0, false))
+			XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, sbp->sb_width), 0,
+			xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR, false))
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 
 	/*
@@ -1319,8 +1320,10 @@ xfs_sb_get_secondary(
 }
 
 /*
- * sunit, swidth, sectorsize(optional with 0) should be all in bytes,
- * so users won't be confused by values in error messages.
+ * sunit, swidth, sectorsize(optional with 0) should be all in bytes, so users
+ * won't be confused by values in error messages.  This function returns false
+ * if the stripe geometry is invalid and the caller is unable to repair the
+ * stripe configuration later in the mount process.
  */
 bool
 xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(
@@ -1328,20 +1331,21 @@ xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(
 	__s64			sunit,
 	__s64			swidth,
 	int			sectorsize,
+	bool			may_repair,
 	bool			silent)
 {
 	if (swidth > INT_MAX) {
 		if (!silent)
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "stripe width (%lld) is too large", swidth);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 
 	if (sunit > swidth) {
 		if (!silent)
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "stripe unit (%lld) is larger than the stripe width (%lld)", sunit, swidth);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 
 	if (sectorsize && (int)sunit % sectorsize) {
@@ -1349,21 +1353,21 @@ xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "stripe unit (%lld) must be a multiple of the sector size (%d)",
 				   sunit, sectorsize);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 
 	if (sunit && !swidth) {
 		if (!silent)
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "invalid stripe unit (%lld) and stripe width of 0", sunit);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 
 	if (!sunit && swidth) {
 		if (!silent)
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "invalid stripe width (%lld) and stripe unit of 0", swidth);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 
 	if (sunit && (int)swidth % (int)sunit) {
@@ -1371,9 +1375,27 @@ xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(
 			xfs_notice(mp,
 "stripe width (%lld) must be a multiple of the stripe unit (%lld)",
 				   swidth, sunit);
-		return false;
+		goto check_override;
 	}
 	return true;
+
+check_override:
+	if (!may_repair)
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * During mount, mp->m_dalign will not be set unless the sunit mount
+	 * option was set. If it was set, ignore the bad stripe alignment values
+	 * and allow the validation and overwrite later in the mount process to
+	 * attempt to overwrite the bad stripe alignment values with the values
+	 * supplied by mount options.
+	 */
+	if (!mp->m_dalign)
+		return false;
+	if (!silent)
+		xfs_notice(mp,
+"Will try to correct with specified mount options sunit (%d) and swidth (%d)",
+			BBTOB(mp->m_dalign), BBTOB(mp->m_swidth));
+	return true;
 }
 
 /*
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.h
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ extern int	xfs_sb_get_secondary(struct x
 				struct xfs_trans *tp, xfs_agnumber_t agno,
 				struct xfs_buf **bpp);
 
-extern bool	xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(struct xfs_mount *mp,
-		__s64 sunit, __s64 swidth, int sectorsize, bool silent);
+bool	xfs_validate_stripe_geometry(struct xfs_mount *mp,
+		__s64 sunit, __s64 swidth, int sectorsize, bool may_repair,
+		bool silent);
 
 uint8_t xfs_compute_rextslog(xfs_rtbxlen_t rtextents);
 

[PATCH 6.6 236/267] xfs: dont use current->journal_info

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>

commit f2e812c1522dab847912309b00abcc762dd696da upstream.

syzbot reported an ext4 panic during a page fault where found a
journal handle when it didn't expect to find one. The structure
it tripped over had a value of 'TRAN' in the first entry in the
structure, and that indicates it tripped over a struct xfs_trans
instead of a jbd2 handle.

The reason for this is that the page fault was taken during a
copy-out to a user buffer from an xfs bulkstat operation. XFS uses
an "empty" transaction context for bulkstat to do automated metadata
buffer cleanup, and so the transaction context is valid across the
copyout of the bulkstat info into the user buffer.

We are using empty transaction contexts like this in XFS to reduce
the risk of failing to release objects we reference during the
operation, especially during error handling. Hence we really need to
ensure that we can take page faults from these contexts without
leaving landmines for the code processing the page fault to trip
over.

However, this same behaviour could happen from any other filesystem
that triggers a page fault or any other exception that is handled
on-stack from within a task context that has current->journal_info
set.  Having a page fault from some other filesystem bounce into XFS
where we have to run a transaction isn't a bug at all, but the usage
of current->journal_info means that this could result corruption of
the outer task's journal_info structure.

The problem is purely that we now have two different contexts that
now think they own current->journal_info. IOWs, no filesystem can
allow page faults or on-stack exceptions while current->journal_info
is set by the filesystem because the exception processing might use
current->journal_info itself.

If we end up with nested XFS transactions whilst holding an empty
transaction, then it isn't an issue as the outer transaction does
not hold a log reservation. If we ignore the current->journal_info
usage, then the only problem that might occur is a deadlock if the
exception tries to take the same locks the upper context holds.
That, however, is not a problem that setting current->journal_info
would solve, so it's largely an irrelevant concern here.

IOWs, we really only use current->journal_info for a warning check
in xfs_vm_writepages() to ensure we aren't doing writeback from a
transaction context. Writeback might need to do allocation, so it
can need to run transactions itself. Hence it's a debug check to
warn us that we've done something silly, and largely it is not all
that useful.

So let's just remove all the use of current->journal_info in XFS and
get rid of all the potential issues from nested contexts where
current->journal_info might get misused by another filesystem
context.

Reported-by: syzbot+cdee56dbcdf0096ef605@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <mark.tinguely@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/scrub/common.c |    4 +---
 fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c     |    7 -------
 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c   |    8 +++++---
 fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h    |    9 +--------
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/scrub/common.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/common.c
@@ -978,9 +978,7 @@ xchk_irele(
 	struct xfs_scrub	*sc,
 	struct xfs_inode	*ip)
 {
-	if (current->journal_info != NULL) {
-		ASSERT(current->journal_info == sc->tp);
-
+	if (sc->tp) {
 		/*
 		 * If we are in a transaction, we /cannot/ drop the inode
 		 * ourselves, because the VFS will trigger writeback, which
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c
@@ -502,13 +502,6 @@ xfs_vm_writepages(
 {
 	struct xfs_writepage_ctx wpc = { };
 
-	/*
-	 * Writing back data in a transaction context can result in recursive
-	 * transactions. This is bad, so issue a warning and get out of here.
-	 */
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->journal_info))
-		return 0;
-
 	xfs_iflags_clear(XFS_I(mapping->host), XFS_ITRUNCATED);
 	return iomap_writepages(mapping, wbc, &wpc.ctx, &xfs_writeback_ops);
 }
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c
@@ -2031,8 +2031,10 @@ xfs_inodegc_want_queue_work(
  *  - Memory shrinkers queued the inactivation worker and it hasn't finished.
  *  - The queue depth exceeds the maximum allowable percpu backlog.
  *
- * Note: If the current thread is running a transaction, we don't ever want to
- * wait for other transactions because that could introduce a deadlock.
+ * Note: If we are in a NOFS context here (e.g. current thread is running a
+ * transaction) the we don't want to block here as inodegc progress may require
+ * filesystem resources we hold to make progress and that could result in a
+ * deadlock. Hence we skip out of here if we are in a scoped NOFS context.
  */
 static inline bool
 xfs_inodegc_want_flush_work(
@@ -2040,7 +2042,7 @@ xfs_inodegc_want_flush_work(
 	unsigned int		items,
 	unsigned int		shrinker_hits)
 {
-	if (current->journal_info)
+	if (current->flags & PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS)
 		return false;
 
 	if (shrinker_hits > 0)
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h
@@ -277,19 +277,14 @@ static inline void
 xfs_trans_set_context(
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp)
 {
-	ASSERT(current->journal_info == NULL);
 	tp->t_pflags = memalloc_nofs_save();
-	current->journal_info = tp;
 }
 
 static inline void
 xfs_trans_clear_context(
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp)
 {
-	if (current->journal_info == tp) {
-		memalloc_nofs_restore(tp->t_pflags);
-		current->journal_info = NULL;
-	}
+	memalloc_nofs_restore(tp->t_pflags);
 }
 
 static inline void
@@ -297,10 +292,8 @@ xfs_trans_switch_context(
 	struct xfs_trans	*old_tp,
 	struct xfs_trans	*new_tp)
 {
-	ASSERT(current->journal_info == old_tp);
 	new_tp->t_pflags = old_tp->t_pflags;
 	old_tp->t_pflags = 0;
-	current->journal_info = new_tp;
 }
 
 #endif	/* __XFS_TRANS_H__ */

[PATCH 6.6 237/267] xfs: allow cross-linking special files without project quota

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com>

commit e23d7e82b707d1d0a627e334fb46370e4f772c11 upstream.

There's an issue that if special files is created before quota
project is enabled, then it's not possible to link this file. This
works fine for normal files. This happens because xfs_quota skips
special files (no ioctls to set necessary flags). The check for
having the same project ID for source and destination then fails as
source file doesn't have any ID.

mkfs.xfs -f /dev/sda
mount -o prjquota /dev/sda /mnt/test

mkdir /mnt/test/foo
mkfifo /mnt/test/foo/fifo1

xfs_quota -xc "project -sp /mnt/test/foo 9" /mnt/test
> Setting up project 9 (path /mnt/test/foo)...
> xfs_quota: skipping special file /mnt/test/foo/fifo1
> Processed 1 (/etc/projects and cmdline) paths for project 9 with recursion depth infinite (-1).

ln /mnt/test/foo/fifo1 /mnt/test/foo/fifo1_link
> ln: failed to create hard link '/mnt/test/testdir/fifo1_link' => '/mnt/test/testdir/fifo1': Invalid cross-device link

mkfifo /mnt/test/foo/fifo2
ln /mnt/test/foo/fifo2 /mnt/test/foo/fifo2_link

Fix this by allowing linking of special files to the project quota
if special files doesn't have any ID set (ID = 0).

Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn <aalbersh@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catherine Hoang <catherine.hoang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
@@ -1239,8 +1239,19 @@ xfs_link(
 	 */
 	if (unlikely((tdp->i_diflags & XFS_DIFLAG_PROJINHERIT) &&
 		     tdp->i_projid != sip->i_projid)) {
-		error = -EXDEV;
-		goto error_return;
+		/*
+		 * Project quota setup skips special files which can
+		 * leave inodes in a PROJINHERIT directory without a
+		 * project ID set. We need to allow links to be made
+		 * to these "project-less" inodes because userspace
+		 * expects them to succeed after project ID setup,
+		 * but everything else should be rejected.
+		 */
+		if (!special_file(VFS_I(sip)->i_mode) ||
+		    sip->i_projid != 0) {
+			error = -EXDEV;
+			goto error_return;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!resblks) {