From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: cem@kernel.org, amir73il@gmail.com, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xfs: don't call remap_verify_area with sb write protection held
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 22:55:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250122065510.GA1611770@frogsfrogsfrogs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250122054321.910578-1-hch@lst.de>
On Wed, Jan 22, 2025 at 06:43:21AM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> The XFS_IOC_EXCHANGE_RANGE ioctl with the XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF flag
> operates on a range bounded by the end of the file. This means the
> actual amount of blocks exchanged is derived from the inode size, which
> is only stable with the IOLOCK (i_rwsem) held. Do that, it currently
> calls remap_verify_area from inside the sb write protection which nests
> outside the IOLOCK. But this makes fsnotify_file_area_perm which is
> called from remap_verify_area unhappy when the kernel is built with
> lockdep and the recently added CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS
> option.
>
> Fix this by always calling remap_verify_area before taking the write
> protection, and passing a 0 size to remap_verify_area similar to
> the FICLONE/FICLONERANGE ioctls when they are asked to clone until
> the file end.
>
> (Note: the size argument gets passed to fsnotify_file_area_perm, but
> then isn't actually used there).
>
> Fixes: 9a64d9b3109d ("xfs: introduce new file range exchange ioctl")
> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
I shudder to think of what happens if security_file_permission tries
to take i_rwsem in the old _TO_EOF case -- that sounds like a livelock
vector. How about:
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.10
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
--D
> ---
> fs/xfs/xfs_exchrange.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_exchrange.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_exchrange.c
> index f340a2015c4c..0b41bdfecdfb 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_exchrange.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_exchrange.c
> @@ -329,22 +329,6 @@ xfs_exchrange_mappings(
> * successfully but before locks are dropped.
> */
>
> -/* Verify that we have security clearance to perform this operation. */
> -static int
> -xfs_exchange_range_verify_area(
> - struct xfs_exchrange *fxr)
> -{
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = remap_verify_area(fxr->file1, fxr->file1_offset, fxr->length,
> - true);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> -
> - return remap_verify_area(fxr->file2, fxr->file2_offset, fxr->length,
> - true);
> -}
> -
> /*
> * Performs necessary checks before doing a range exchange, having stabilized
> * mutable inode attributes via i_rwsem.
> @@ -355,11 +339,13 @@ xfs_exchange_range_checks(
> unsigned int alloc_unit)
> {
> struct inode *inode1 = file_inode(fxr->file1);
> + loff_t size1 = i_size_read(inode1);
> struct inode *inode2 = file_inode(fxr->file2);
> + loff_t size2 = i_size_read(inode2);
> uint64_t allocmask = alloc_unit - 1;
> int64_t test_len;
> uint64_t blen;
> - loff_t size1, size2, tmp;
> + loff_t tmp;
> int error;
>
> /* Don't touch certain kinds of inodes */
> @@ -368,24 +354,25 @@ xfs_exchange_range_checks(
> if (IS_SWAPFILE(inode1) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode2))
> return -ETXTBSY;
>
> - size1 = i_size_read(inode1);
> - size2 = i_size_read(inode2);
> -
> /* Ranges cannot start after EOF. */
> if (fxr->file1_offset > size1 || fxr->file2_offset > size2)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - /*
> - * If the caller said to exchange to EOF, we set the length of the
> - * request large enough to cover everything to the end of both files.
> - */
> if (fxr->flags & XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF) {
> + /*
> + * If the caller said to exchange to EOF, we set the length of
> + * the request large enough to cover everything to the end of
> + * both files.
> + */
> fxr->length = max_t(int64_t, size1 - fxr->file1_offset,
> size2 - fxr->file2_offset);
> -
> - error = xfs_exchange_range_verify_area(fxr);
> - if (error)
> - return error;
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * Otherwise we require both ranges to end within EOF.
> + */
> + if (fxr->file1_offset + fxr->length > size1 ||
> + fxr->file2_offset + fxr->length > size2)
> + return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -401,15 +388,6 @@ xfs_exchange_range_checks(
> check_add_overflow(fxr->file2_offset, fxr->length, &tmp))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - /*
> - * We require both ranges to end within EOF, unless we're exchanging
> - * to EOF.
> - */
> - if (!(fxr->flags & XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF) &&
> - (fxr->file1_offset + fxr->length > size1 ||
> - fxr->file2_offset + fxr->length > size2))
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> /*
> * Make sure we don't hit any file size limits. If we hit any size
> * limits such that test_length was adjusted, we abort the whole
> @@ -747,6 +725,7 @@ xfs_exchange_range(
> {
> struct inode *inode1 = file_inode(fxr->file1);
> struct inode *inode2 = file_inode(fxr->file2);
> + loff_t check_len = fxr->length;
> int ret;
>
> BUILD_BUG_ON(XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_ALL_FLAGS &
> @@ -779,14 +758,18 @@ xfs_exchange_range(
> return -EBADF;
>
> /*
> - * If we're not exchanging to EOF, we can check the areas before
> - * stabilizing both files' i_size.
> + * If we're exchanging to EOF we can't calculate the length until taking
> + * the iolock. Pass a 0 length to remap_verify_area similar to the
> + * FICLONE and FICLONERANGE ioctls that support cloning to EOF as well.
> */
> - if (!(fxr->flags & XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF)) {
> - ret = xfs_exchange_range_verify_area(fxr);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> - }
> + if (fxr->flags & XFS_EXCHANGE_RANGE_TO_EOF)
> + check_len = 0;
> + ret = remap_verify_area(fxr->file1, fxr->file1_offset, check_len, true);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + ret = remap_verify_area(fxr->file2, fxr->file2_offset, check_len, true);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
>
> /* Update cmtime if the fd/inode don't forbid it. */
> if (!(fxr->file1->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME) && !IS_NOCMTIME(inode1))
> --
> 2.45.2
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-22 6:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-22 5:43 [PATCH] xfs: don't call remap_verify_area with sb write protection held Christoph Hellwig
2025-01-22 6:55 ` Darrick J. Wong [this message]
2025-01-28 10:57 ` Carlos Maiolino
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