From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
To: Lukas Herbolt <lukas@herbolt.com>
Cc: zlang@kernel.org, fstests@vger.kernel.org,
linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] lib/random.c fix undefined behavior on signed integer overflow.
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 08:17:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261008151731.GN2705364@frogsfrogsfrogs> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d000ae8abba884b0a58be93e6e63f486@herbolt.com>
On Thu, Oct 08, 2026 at 10:23:59AM +0200, Lukas Herbolt wrote:
> On 2026-10-07 19:00, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 06, 2026 at 03:51:52PM +0200, Lukas Herbolt wrote:
> > > The random.c now expects that signed integer to overflow and
> > > triggers the ^MASK branch. But signed int overflow is undefined
> > > behavior and GCC can optimize this branch out with certain
> > > CFLAGS/LDFLAGS.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Lukas Herbolt <lukas@herbolt.com>
> > > ---
> > > lib/random.c | 13 +++++++------
> > > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/lib/random.c b/lib/random.c
> > > index d5c81be817c8..f767ed1d1337 100644
> > > --- a/lib/random.c
> > > +++ b/lib/random.c
> > > @@ -186,14 +186,15 @@ _random (int32_t is [2])
> > > int32_t
> > > _irandm (int32_t is [2])
> > > {
> > > - int32_t it, leh, nit;
> > > -
> > > + int32_t it, leh, nit, apply_mask;
> > > it = is [0];
> > > leh = is [1];
> > > - if (it <= 0)
> > > - it = (it + it) ^ MASK;
> > > - else
> > > - it = it + it;
> > > +
> > > +/* evaluate on original value — no UB here */
> > > + apply_mask = (it <= 0);
> > > +/* double via unsigned shift — well-defined */
> > > + it = (unsigned)it << 1;
> > > + if (apply_mask) it ^= MASK;
> >
> > Doesn't _random suffer the same flaw?
> >
> > Oh. It's dead code, maybe it should go away?
> Good point.
> >
> > Also, what about converting all the variables to unsigned?
>
> It would break two signed checks: `it <= 0` (LFSR feedback -
> only fires at zero instead of when MSB set) and `leh < 0`
> (output folding — never fires). The `it` register degenerates
> to 33 repeating values after 64 calls. Reducing the pool of
> random numbers.
Ah. Well in that case I'm satisfied, so
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
--D
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-08 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 13:51 [PATCH 0/1] Fix random.c UB on int overflow Lukas Herbolt
2026-10-06 13:51 ` [PATCH 1/1] lib/random.c fix undefined behavior on signed integer overflow Lukas Herbolt
2026-10-07 17:00 ` Darrick J. Wong
2026-10-08 8:23 ` Lukas Herbolt
2026-10-08 15:17 ` Darrick J. Wong [this message]
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