From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: with ECARTIS (v1.0.0; list xfs); Wed, 14 May 2008 00:05:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from larry.melbourne.sgi.com (larry.melbourne.sgi.com [134.14.52.130]) by oss.sgi.com (8.12.11.20060308/8.12.11/SuSE Linux 0.7) with SMTP id m4E755fn021436 for ; Wed, 14 May 2008 00:05:09 -0700 Message-ID: <482A8F49.6050003@sgi.com> Date: Wed, 14 May 2008 17:05:45 +1000 From: Timothy Shimmin MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] kill attr_capable callbacks References: <20080430112213.GA16966@lst.de> In-Reply-To: <20080430112213.GA16966@lst.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: xfs-bounce@oss.sgi.com Errors-to: xfs-bounce@oss.sgi.com List-Id: xfs To: Christoph Hellwig Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com Hi Christoph, Looks reasonable to me - comparing xattr_permission() with attr_user_capable() and attr_trusted_capable(). Also the xattr_permission() makes more sense with its MAY_WRITE testing otherwise it looks like we'd be doing some unfair tests in the getxattr case. I'll run thru qa and check in soon. --Tim Christoph Hellwig wrote: > No need for addition permission checks in the xattr handler, > fs/xattr.c:xattr_permission() already does them, and in fact slightly > more strict then what was in the attr_capable handlers. > > > Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig > > Index: linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c > =================================================================== > --- linux-2.6-xfs.orig/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c 2008-04-29 21:32:56.000000000 +0200 > +++ linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c 2008-04-29 21:33:30.000000000 +0200 > @@ -747,15 +747,11 @@ xfs_vn_setxattr( > char *attr = (char *)name; > attrnames_t *namesp; > int xflags = 0; > - int error; > > namesp = attr_lookup_namespace(attr, attr_namespaces, ATTR_NAMECOUNT); > if (!namesp) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > attr += namesp->attr_namelen; > - error = namesp->attr_capable(vp, NULL); > - if (error) > - return error; > > /* Convert Linux syscall to XFS internal ATTR flags */ > if (flags & XATTR_CREATE) > @@ -777,15 +773,11 @@ xfs_vn_getxattr( > char *attr = (char *)name; > attrnames_t *namesp; > int xflags = 0; > - ssize_t error; > > namesp = attr_lookup_namespace(attr, attr_namespaces, ATTR_NAMECOUNT); > if (!namesp) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > attr += namesp->attr_namelen; > - error = namesp->attr_capable(vp, NULL); > - if (error) > - return error; > > /* Convert Linux syscall to XFS internal ATTR flags */ > if (!size) { > @@ -825,15 +817,12 @@ xfs_vn_removexattr( > char *attr = (char *)name; > attrnames_t *namesp; > int xflags = 0; > - int error; > > namesp = attr_lookup_namespace(attr, attr_namespaces, ATTR_NAMECOUNT); > if (!namesp) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > attr += namesp->attr_namelen; > - error = namesp->attr_capable(vp, NULL); > - if (error) > - return error; > + > xflags |= namesp->attr_flag; > return namesp->attr_remove(vp, attr, xflags); > } > Index: linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c > =================================================================== > --- linux-2.6-xfs.orig/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c 2008-04-29 21:32:25.000000000 +0200 > +++ linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c 2008-04-29 21:32:51.000000000 +0200 > @@ -2622,43 +2622,6 @@ attr_lookup_namespace( > return NULL; > } > > -/* > - * Some checks to prevent people abusing EAs to get over quota: > - * - Don't allow modifying user EAs on devices/symlinks; > - * - Don't allow modifying user EAs if sticky bit set; > - */ > -STATIC int > -attr_user_capable( > - bhv_vnode_t *vp, > - cred_t *cred) > -{ > - struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp); > - > - if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) > - return -EPERM; > - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && > - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > - return -EPERM; > - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && > - (current_fsuid(cred) != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER)) > - return -EPERM; > - return 0; > -} > - > -STATIC int > -attr_trusted_capable( > - bhv_vnode_t *vp, > - cred_t *cred) > -{ > - struct inode *inode = vn_to_inode(vp); > - > - if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) > - return -EPERM; > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > - return -EPERM; > - return 0; > -} > - > STATIC int > attr_system_set( > bhv_vnode_t *vp, char *name, void *data, size_t size, int xflags) > @@ -2709,7 +2672,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_system = { > .attr_get = attr_system_get, > .attr_set = attr_system_set, > .attr_remove = attr_system_remove, > - .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr, > }; > > struct attrnames attr_trusted = { > @@ -2719,7 +2681,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_trusted = { > .attr_get = attr_generic_get, > .attr_set = attr_generic_set, > .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, > - .attr_capable = attr_trusted_capable, > }; > > struct attrnames attr_secure = { > @@ -2729,7 +2690,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_secure = { > .attr_get = attr_generic_get, > .attr_set = attr_generic_set, > .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, > - .attr_capable = (attrcapable_t)fs_noerr, > }; > > struct attrnames attr_user = { > @@ -2738,7 +2698,6 @@ struct attrnames attr_user = { > .attr_get = attr_generic_get, > .attr_set = attr_generic_set, > .attr_remove = attr_generic_remove, > - .attr_capable = attr_user_capable, > }; > > struct attrnames *attr_namespaces[] = > Index: linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.h > =================================================================== > --- linux-2.6-xfs.orig/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.h 2008-04-29 21:33:38.000000000 +0200 > +++ linux-2.6-xfs/fs/xfs/xfs_attr.h 2008-04-29 21:33:52.000000000 +0200 > @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ typedef int (*attrset_t)(bhv_vnode_t *, > typedef int (*attrget_t)(bhv_vnode_t *, char *, void *, size_t, int); > typedef int (*attrremove_t)(bhv_vnode_t *, char *, int); > typedef int (*attrexists_t)(bhv_vnode_t *); > -typedef int (*attrcapable_t)(bhv_vnode_t *, struct cred *); > > typedef struct attrnames { > char * attr_name; > @@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ typedef struct attrnames { > attrset_t attr_set; > attrremove_t attr_remove; > attrexists_t attr_exists; > - attrcapable_t attr_capable; > } attrnames_t; > > #define ATTR_NAMECOUNT 4 >