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From: sergeh@kernel.org
To: cem@kernel.org
Cc: jack@suse.cz, djwong@kernel.org, hch@lst.de, serge@hallyn.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] capability: Add new capable_noaudit
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 13:49:00 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <anTXHNBNPeGQ0oWb@AUS2MQ6190Y76.amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804094602.84766-3-cem@kernel.org>

On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 11:45:52AM +0200, cem@kernel.org wrote:
> From: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
> 
> In some situations (quota enforcement bypass in this case) we'd like to
> check for a specific capability without triggering spurious audit
> messages from security modules like selinux.
> 
> Add a new helper so we don't need to use ns_capable_noaudit() directly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>

> ---
> 
> V4: Mention capable_noaudit check for process effective capabilities
> V3: remove the extern declaration
> 
>  include/linux/capability.h |  5 +++++
>  kernel/capability.c        | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 37db92b3d6f8..f8532d92fcad 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
>  extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
>  				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool capable(int cap);
> +bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
>  extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>  extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> @@ -167,6 +168,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
>  {
>  	return true;
>  }
> +static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
> +{
> +	return true;
> +}
>  static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  {
>  	return true;
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 829f49ae07b9..f4a7f1963c9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -416,6 +416,24 @@ bool capable(int cap)
>  	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> +
> +/**
> + * capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior
> + * capability in effect by checking the process's effective
> + * capabilities (unaudited).
> + * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> + *
> + * This is the same as capable(), except it uses CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT as to prevent
> + * issuing spurious audit messages.
> + *
> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> + */
> +bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
> +{
> +	return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
>  
>  /**
> -- 
> 2.55.0
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-06 18:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-04  9:45 [PATCH v4 0/5] Fix quota evasion on xfs and add capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-04  9:45 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] xfs: fix capability check in xfs cem
2026-08-04 14:08   ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-08-06 17:22   ` sergeh
2026-08-04  9:45 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] capability: Add new capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-06 18:49   ` sergeh [this message]
2026-08-04  9:45 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] quota: Don't issue audit messages on quota enforcing cem
2026-08-04  9:45 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] xfs: replace ns_capable_noaudit cem
2026-08-04 14:09   ` Christoph Hellwig
2026-08-06 21:11   ` sergeh
2026-08-07 10:04     ` Carlos Maiolino
2026-08-04  9:45 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] capability: unexport has_capability_noaudit cem
2026-08-06 18:54   ` sergeh
2026-08-07  9:56     ` Carlos Maiolino
2026-08-06 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 0/5] Fix quota evasion on xfs and add capable_noaudit sergeh

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