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From: bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org
To: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Bug 208827] [fio io_uring] io_uring write data crc32c verify failed
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 01:50:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-208827-201763-NO4VXTaqCh@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bug-208827-201763@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/>

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208827

--- Comment #8 from Jens Axboe (axboe@kernel.dk) ---
On 8/10/20 7:15 PM, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 8/10/20 3:08 AM, Dave Chinner wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 05:08:07PM +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
>>> [cc Jens]
>>>
>>> [Jens, data corruption w/ io_uring and simple fio reproducer. see
>>> the bz link below.]
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 01:56:05PM +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Aug 10, 2020 at 10:09:32AM +1000, Dave Chinner wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Aug 07, 2020 at 03:12:03AM +0000,
>>>>> bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org wrote:
>>>>>> --- Comment #1 from Dave Chinner (david@fromorbit.com) ---
>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 06, 2020 at 04:57:58AM +0000,
>>>>>> bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208827
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>             Bug ID: 208827
>>>>>>>            Summary: [fio io_uring] io_uring write data crc32c verify
>>>>>>>                     failed
>>>>>>>            Product: File System
>>>>>>>            Version: 2.5
>>>>>>>     Kernel Version: xfs-linux xfs-5.9-merge-7 + v5.8-rc4
>>>>>
>>>>> FWIW, I can reproduce this with a vanilla 5.8 release kernel,
>>>>> so this isn't related to contents of the XFS dev tree at all...
>>>>>
>>>>> In fact, this bug isn't a recent regression. AFAICT, it was
>>>>> introduced between in 5.4 and 5.5 - 5.4 did not reproduce, 5.5 did
>>>>> reproduce. More info once I've finished bisecting it....
>>>>
>>>> f67676d160c6ee2ed82917fadfed6d29cab8237c is the first bad commit
>>>> commit f67676d160c6ee2ed82917fadfed6d29cab8237c
>>>> Author: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
>>>> Date:   Mon Dec 2 11:03:47 2019 -0700
>>>>
>>>>     io_uring: ensure async punted read/write requests copy iovec
>>>
>>> ....
>>>
>>> Ok, I went back to vanilla 5.8 to continue debugging and adding
>>> tracepoints, and it's proving strangely difficult to reproduce now.
>>
>> Which turns out to be caused by a tracepoint I inserted to try to
>> narrow down if this was an invalidation race. I put this in
>> invalidate_complete_page:
>>
>>
>> --- a/mm/truncate.c
>> +++ b/mm/truncate.c
>> @@ -257,8 +257,11 @@ int invalidate_inode_page(struct page *page)
>>         struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page);
>>         if (!mapping)
>>                 return 0;
>> -       if (PageDirty(page) || PageWriteback(page))
>> +       if (PageDirty(page) || PageWriteback(page)) {
>> +               trace_printk("ino 0x%lx page %p, offset 0x%lx\n",
>> +                       mapping->host->i_ino, page, page->index *
>> PAGE_SIZE);
>>                 return 0;
>> +       }
>>         if (page_mapped(page))
>>                 return 0;
>>         return invalidate_complete_page(mapping, page);
>>
>>
>> And that alone, without even enabling tracepoints, made the
>> corruption go completely away. So I suspect a page state race
>> condition and look at POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED, which fio is issuing
>> before running it's verification reads. First thing that does:
>>
>>      if (!inode_write_congested(mapping->host))
>>              __filemap_fdatawrite_range(mapping, offset, endbyte,
>>                                         WB_SYNC_NONE);
>>
>> It starts async writeback of the dirty pages. There's 256MB of dirty
>> pages on these inodes, and iomap tracing indicates the entire 256MB
>> immediately runs through the trace_iomap_writepage() tracepoint.
>> i.e. every page goes Dirty -> Writeback and is submitted for async
>> IO.
>>
>> Then the POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED code goes and runs
>> invalidate_mapping_pages(), which ends up try-locking each page and
>> then running invalidate_inode_page() on the page, which is where the
>> trace debug I put in on pages under writeback gets hit. So if
>> changing the invalidation code for pages under writeback makes the
>> problem go away, then stopping invalidate_mapping_pages() from
>> racing with page writeback should make the problem go away, too.
>>
>> This does indeed make the corruption go away:
>>
>> --- a/mm/fadvise.c
>> +++ b/mm/fadvise.c
>> @@ -109,9 +109,8 @@ int generic_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
>> loff_t len, int advice)
>>         case POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE:
>>                 break;
>>         case POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED:
>>                 if (!inode_write_congested(mapping->host))
>> -                       __filemap_fdatawrite_range(mapping, offset, endbyte,
>> -                                                  WB_SYNC_NONE);
>> +                       filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
>> endbyte);
>>  
>>                 /*
>>                  * First and last FULL page! Partial pages are deliberately
>>
>> by making the invalidation wait for the pages to go fully to the
>> clean state before starting.
>>
>> This, however, only fixes the specific symptom being tripped over
>> here.  To further test this, I removed this writeback from
>> POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED completely so I could trigger writeback via
>> controlled background writeback. And, as I expected, whenever
>> background writeback ran to write back these dirty files, the
>> verification failures triggered again. It is quite reliable.
>>
>> So it looks like there is some kind of writeback completion vs page
>> invalidation race condition occurring, but more work is needed to
>> isolate it further. I don't know what part the async read plays in
>> the corruption yet, because I don't know how we are getting pages in
>> the cache where page->index != the file offset stamped in the data.
>> That smells of leaking PageUptodate flags...
> 
> The async read really isn't doing anything that you could not do with
> separate threads. Unfortunately it's not that easy to have multiple
> threads working on the same region with fio, or we could've reproduced
> it with a job file written to use that instead.
> 
> I'll dig a bit here...

Have we verified that the actual page cache is inconsistent, or is that
just an assumption? I'm asking since I poked a bit on the fio side, and
suspiciously the failed verification was a short IO. At least
originally, fio will retry those, but it could be a bug in the io_uring
engine for fio.

I'll poke some more.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-11  1:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-06  4:57 [Bug 208827] New: [fio io_uring] io_uring write data crc32c verify failed bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-07  2:42 ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-07  3:12 ` [Bug 208827] " bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-10  0:09   ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-10  3:56     ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-10  7:08       ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-10  9:08         ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-11  1:15           ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  1:50             ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  2:01               ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  3:01                 ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11 20:56                 ` Jeff Moyer
2020-08-11 22:09                   ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-12 15:13                     ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-12 15:24                       ` Jeff Moyer
2020-08-12 15:26                         ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  2:00           ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-11  2:19             ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  5:53               ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-11  7:05               ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-11 13:10                 ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11 21:59                   ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-11 23:00                     ` Dave Chinner
2020-08-12 15:19                       ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-11  1:07         ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-10  0:09 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-10  3:56 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-10  7:08 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-10  9:09 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  1:07 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  1:15 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  1:50 ` bugzilla-daemon [this message]
2020-08-11  2:00 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  2:01 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  2:20 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  3:01 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  5:53 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11  7:05 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 13:10 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 16:16 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 20:56 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 21:59 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 22:09 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-11 23:00 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-12  3:15 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-12 15:14 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-12 15:19 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-12 15:24 ` bugzilla-daemon
2020-08-12 15:26 ` bugzilla-daemon

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