From: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@sandeen.net>
To: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>, xfs <linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
john.haxby@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] xfs: don't generate selinux audit messages for capability testing
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 11:21:00 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e97b6ef6-dc48-c49b-a98e-6d404dc79a59@sandeen.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220301025052.GF117732@magnolia>
On 2/28/22 8:50 PM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
>
> There are a few places where we test the current process' capability set
> to decide if we're going to be more or less generous with resource
> acquisition for a system call. If the process doesn't have the
> capability, we can continue the call, albeit in a degraded mode.
>
> These are /not/ the actual security decisions, so it's not proper to use
> capable(), which (in certain selinux setups) causes audit messages to
> get logged. Switch them to has_capability_noaudit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
> Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Thanks Darrick. This looks technically correct to me as well.
You might want to add a:
Fixes: 7317a03df703f ("xfs: refactor inode ownership change transaction/inode/quota allocation idiom")
because I /think/ that's the commit that moved the capable() checks out
from under quota tests, and made the problem more visible.
And maybe:
Fixes: ea9a46e1c4925 ("xfs: only return detailed fsmap info if the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN")
as well?
It's not strictly fixing the former; AFAICT the problem existed when quota was
enabled already, so I'll leave all that to your discretion.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Thanks,
-Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-03 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-01 2:50 [PATCH RESEND] xfs: don't generate selinux audit messages for capability testing Darrick J. Wong
2022-03-01 15:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-03-01 15:48 ` Darrick J. Wong
2022-03-02 14:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-03-02 11:01 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2022-03-03 17:21 ` Eric Sandeen [this message]
2022-03-04 0:30 ` Darrick J. Wong
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