From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [112.213.38.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D0122C9EC7C for ; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:27:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4dqWpg415Sz30Lt; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 23:27:07 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=217.140.110.172 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=lists.ozlabs.org; s=201707; t=1768220827; cv=none; b=aGhp0YmSAuq4S9gW4q6Gfv2d0U0UDA4V9liiJfAUH22FuO0ovOMeVcw2B19DPOKOTZJOpWIGJZjh4zZTA/775XItZ1p87hRQzIgKUvVtP19UQC7OUTAz3DU3oLZAfip6v8iZXwdhRjQVZq3uxbJGCkCnFaJcowxGncsuchLjeQES6aIO/Hs+J5Kg4VouKASA7OBSFZS9C94zUIy+slsvbHOULlrC8KTSPSRVXGt0ksLJCgxVqAiRFBDm9XTIfIhs03Fg8XfyfEX4xkOs9Htax/9C8W6RjbJGBDVJ80ej+5M13H2GOBVCfsHBbBk7eXu/2s5H4gK1zxe8wWKInt58pA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=lists.ozlabs.org; s=201707; t=1768220827; c=relaxed/relaxed; bh=1NByF4KBwn5Wl03L5TAReJyDFw2mFLa47LsnRyfC4To=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=cS4AKrYKA22Y+xfzbfHpgBk9JIvOkwhBieplVYGoJSFAjYv2dbcbrIMRKMsUcCFHETkRcafyYNlHgThjuqYU1uJmRhDgWuOj3P4LpHrlvMuNjCxufKRJE1DkwC7t8JeY3ctZQwL/njZscbUmNbbslmpyCSKFPXJvw5fcdV7NA8lnFVOOmpnMGJBaLws5hIZk121Awo6HJVQJLYB4lt55ON+egelIhfdw0UJm58OkFqvbqkKacOAqvr/P21DIacEiakWKjG6lDHe058pIkyFCLEoTSH3U2/15M239Wd0UrOg351bRmgqjRMEKJKJoJRIvLT5djMsza9qmjwqLOMOrlA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com; spf=pass (client-ip=217.140.110.172; helo=foss.arm.com; envelope-from=ryan.roberts@arm.com; receiver=lists.ozlabs.org) smtp.mailfrom=arm.com Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=arm.com (client-ip=217.140.110.172; helo=foss.arm.com; envelope-from=ryan.roberts@arm.com; receiver=lists.ozlabs.org) Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4dqWpf2H8sz30HQ for ; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 23:27:04 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D88E497; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 04:26:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.57.95.123] (unknown [10.57.95.123]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E6C913F59E; Mon, 12 Jan 2026 04:26:27 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <09de87bc-d952-41e7-9657-852c2924aaa7@arm.com> Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 12:26:26 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org List-Id: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Archive: , List-Subscribe: , , List-Unsubscribe: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches Content-Language: en-GB To: David Laight Cc: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Huacai Chen , Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , Kees Cook , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Arnd Bergmann , Mark Rutland , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Linton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org References: <20260102131156.3265118-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com> <20260102131156.3265118-4-ryan.roberts@arm.com> <20260104230136.7aaf8886@pumpkin> <20260107140533.2b3c46a1@pumpkin> From: Ryan Roberts In-Reply-To: <20260107140533.2b3c46a1@pumpkin> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 07/01/2026 14:05, David Laight wrote: > On Sun, 4 Jan 2026 23:01:36 +0000 > David Laight wrote: > >> On Fri, 2 Jan 2026 13:11:54 +0000 >> Ryan Roberts wrote: >> >>> Previously different architectures were using random sources of >>> differing strength and cost to decide the random kstack offset. A number >>> of architectures (loongarch, powerpc, s390, x86) were using their >>> timestamp counter, at whatever the frequency happened to be. Other >>> arches (arm64, riscv) were using entropy from the crng via >>> get_random_u16(). >>> >>> There have been concerns that in some cases the timestamp counters may >>> be too weak, because they can be easily guessed or influenced by user >>> space. And get_random_u16() has been shown to be too costly for the >>> level of protection kstack offset randomization provides. >>> >>> So let's use a common, architecture-agnostic source of entropy; a >>> per-cpu prng, seeded at boot-time from the crng. This has a few >>> benefits: >>> >>> - We can remove choose_random_kstack_offset(); That was only there to >>> try to make the timestamp counter value a bit harder to influence >>> from user space. >>> >>> - The architecture code is simplified. All it has to do now is call >>> add_random_kstack_offset() in the syscall path. >>> >>> - The strength of the randomness can be reasoned about independently >>> of the architecture. >>> >>> - Arches previously using get_random_u16() now have much faster >>> syscall paths, see below results. >>> >>> There have been some claims that a prng may be less strong than the >>> timestamp counter if not regularly reseeded. But the prng has a period >>> of about 2^113. So as long as the prng state remains secret, it should >>> not be possible to guess. If the prng state can be accessed, we have >>> bigger problems. >> >> If you have 128 bits of output from consecutive outputs I think you >> can trivially determine the full state using (almost) 'school boy' maths >> that could be done on pencil and paper. >> (Most of the work only has to be done once.) >> >> The underlying problem is that the TAUSWORTHE() transformation is 'linear' >> So that TAUSWORTHE(x ^ y) == TAUSWORTHE(x) ^ TAUSWORTHE(y). >> (This is true of a LFSR/CRC and TOUSWORTH() is doing some subset of CRCs.) >> This means that each output bit is the 'xor' of some of the input bits. >> The four new 'state' values are just xor of the the bits of the old ones. >> The final xor of the four states gives a 32bit value with each bit just >> an xor of some of the 128 state bits. >> Get four consecutive 32 bit values and you can solve the 128 simultaneous >> equations (by trivial substitution) and get the initial state. >> The solution gives you the 128 128bit constants for: >> u128 state = 0; >> u128 val = 'value returned from 4 calls'; >> for (int i = 0; i < 128; i++) >> state |= parity(const128[i] ^ val) << i; >> You don't need all 32bits, just accumulate 128 bits. >> So if you can get the 5bit stack offset from 26 system calls you know the >> value that will be used for all the subsequent calls. > > Some of the state bits don't get used, so you only need 123 bits. > The stack offset is 6 bits - so you need the values from 19 calls. > >> Simply changing the final line to use + not ^ makes the output non-linear >> and solving the equations a lot harder. >> >> I might sit down tomorrow and see if I can actually code it... > > Finally done: > > #include > #include > #include > > typedef unsigned int u32; > typedef unsigned long long u64; > typedef unsigned __int128 u128; > > struct rnd_state { u32 s1; u32 s2; u32 s3; u32 s4; }; > u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state) > { > #define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b) > state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6U, 13U, 4294967294U, 18U); > state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2U, 27U, 4294967288U, 2U); > state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13U, 21U, 4294967280U, 7U); > state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3U, 12U, 4294967168U, 13U); > > return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4); > } > > #define X(n, hi, lo) [n] = (u128)0x##hi << 64 | 0x##lo > u128 map[128] = { > X( 1, 23acb122e4a76, e206c3f6fe435cb6), > ... > X(127, 00d3276d8a76a, e560d1975675be24) }; > > u128 parity_128(u128 v) > { > return __builtin_parityll(v) ^ __builtin_parityll(v >> 64); > } > > int main(int argc, char **argv) > { > struct rnd_state s = {}; > u128 s0, v, r = 0; > > read(open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY), &s, sizeof s); > // Remove low bits that get masked by the (s & c) term. > s.s1 &= ~1; s.s2 &= ~7; s.s3 &= ~15; s.s4 &= ~127; > s0 = (((u128)s.s4 << 32 | s.s3) << 32 | s.s2) << 32 | s.s1; > v = prandom_u32_state(&s); > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 32; > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 64; > v |= (u128)prandom_u32_state(&s) << 96; > > for (int n = 0; n < 128; n++) > r |= parity_128(v & map[n]) << n; > > printf("%016llx%016llx\n", (u64)(s0 >> 64), (u64)s0); > printf("values%s match\n", r == s0 ? "" : " do not"); > > return r != s0; > } > > I've trimmed the initialiser - it is very boring. > The code to create the initialiser is actually slightly smaller than it is. > Doable by hand provided you can do 128bit shift and xor without making > any mistakes. > > I've just done a quick search through the kernel sources and haven't found > many uses of prandom_u32_state() outside of test code. > There is sched_rng() which uses a per-cpu rng to throw a 1024 sized die. > bpf also has a per-cpu one for 'unprivileged user space'. > net/sched/sch_netem.c seems to use one - mostly for packet loss generation. > > Since the randomize_kstack code is now using a per-task rng (initialised > by clone?) that could be used instead of all the others provided they > are run when 'current' is valid. > > But the existing prandom_u32_state() needs a big health warning that > four outputs leak the entire state. > That is fixable by changing the last line to: > return state->s1 + state->s2 + state->s3 + state->s4; > That only affects the output value, the period is unchanged. Hi David, This all seems interesting, but I'm not clear that it is a blocker for this series. As I keep saying, we only use 6 bits for offset randmization so it is trival to brute force, regardless of how easy it is to recover the prng state. Perhaps we can decouple these 2 things and make them independent: - this series, which is motivated by speeding up syscalls on arm64; given 6 bits is not hard to brute force, spending a lot of cycles calculating those bits is unjustified. - Your observation that that the current prng could be improved to make recoving it's state harder. What do you think? Thanks, Ryan > > David > >