From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [18.85.46.34]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B372B6EFF for ; Sat, 14 May 2011 01:23:24 +1000 (EST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering From: Peter Zijlstra To: Eric Paris In-Reply-To: <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> <20110512130104.GA2912@elte.hu> <20110513121034.GG21022@elte.hu> <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:01 +0200 Message-ID: <1305300181.2466.72.camel@twins> Mime-Version: 1.0 Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, Frederic Weisbecker , Heiko Carstens , Oleg Nesterov , David Howells , Paul Mackerras , "H. Peter Anvin" , sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Russell King , x86@kernel.org, James Morris , Linus Torvalds , Ingo Molnar , Ingo Molnar , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steven Rostedt , Tejun Heo , Thomas Gleixner , kees.cook@canonical.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Michal Marek , Michal Simek , Will Drewry , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle , Paul Mundt , Martin Schwidefsky , linux390@de.ibm.com, Andrew Morton , agl@chromium.org, "David S. Miller" List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 11:10 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > Then again, I certainly don't see a > reason that this syscall hardening patch should be held up while a whole > new concept in computer security is contemplated...=20 Which makes me wonder why this syscall hardening stuff is done outside of LSM? Why isn't is part of the LSM so that say SELinux can have a syscall bitmask per security context? Making it part of the LSM also avoids having to add this prctl().