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Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] KVM: PPC: Add support for IOMMU in-kernel handling
From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 08:39:03 +1000
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Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org,
 Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>, Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
 Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
 David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
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On Wed, 2013-06-05 at 16:11 +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> +long kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce_iommu(struct kvm *kvm,
> +               struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_iommu *args)
> +{
> +       struct kvmppc_spapr_tce_table *tt = NULL;
> +       struct iommu_group *grp;
> +       struct iommu_table *tbl;
> +
> +       /* Find an IOMMU table for the given ID */
> +       grp = iommu_group_get_by_id(args->iommu_id);
> +       if (!grp)
> +               return -ENXIO;
> +
> +       tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(grp);
> +       if (!tbl)
> +               return -ENXIO;

So Alex Graf pointed out here, there is a security issue here, or are we
missing something ?

What prevents a malicious program that has access to /dev/kvm from
taking over random iommu groups (including host used ones) that way?

What is the security model of that whole iommu stuff to begin with ?

Cheers,
Ben.