From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 06/14] x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 14:01:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
This moves seccomp after ptrace on x86 to that seccomp can catch changes
made by ptrace. Emulation should skip the rest of processing too.
We can get rid of test_thread_flag because there's no longer any
opportunity for seccomp to mess with ptrace state before invoking
ptrace.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index df56ca394877..81c0e12d831c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
struct thread_info *ti = pt_regs_to_thread_info(regs);
unsigned long ret = 0;
+ bool emulated = false;
u32 work;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
@@ -80,11 +81,19 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
work = ACCESS_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
+ if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
+ emulated = true;
+
+ if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
+ tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+ return -1L;
+
+ if (emulated)
+ return -1L;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
/*
- * Do seccomp first -- it should minimize exposure of other
- * code, and keeping seccomp fast is probably more valuable
- * than the rest of this.
+ * Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes.
*/
if (work & _TIF_SECCOMP) {
struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -117,13 +126,6 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
#endif
- if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
- ret = -1L;
-
- if ((ret || test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
- tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
- ret = -1L;
-
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax);
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-09 21:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-09 21:01 [PATCH 00/14] run seccomp after ptrace Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 01/14] seccomp: add tests for ptrace hole Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 02/14] seccomp: Add a seccomp_data parameter secure_computing() Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 03/14] x86/entry: Get rid of two-phase syscall entry work Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 04/14] seccomp: remove 2-phase API Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 05/14] seccomp: recheck the syscall after RET_TRACE Kees Cook
2016-06-09 22:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-06-09 22:52 ` [PATCH 06/14] x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-10 2:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-14 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:01 ` [PATCH 09/14] MIPS/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 11/14] s390/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-10 10:51 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 12/14] powerpc/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 13/14] tile/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-09 21:02 ` [PATCH 14/14] um/ptrace: " Kees Cook
2016-06-13 20:50 ` [PATCH 00/14] " Kees Cook
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