From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF8BAC3F2CD for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:55:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8FFC32080C for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:55:22 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8FFC32080C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48WNVJ4NRdzDqcW for ; Tue, 3 Mar 2020 01:55:20 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=zohar@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48WNLx6XcTzDqYK for ; Tue, 3 Mar 2020 01:48:57 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 022EjVfU138323 for ; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 09:48:55 -0500 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2yfk5kxfnw-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 02 Mar 2020 09:48:53 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:48:48 -0000 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 022EmkZv56623236 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:48:46 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF63A11C05C; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:48:46 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 840F811C052; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:48:45 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.229.179]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:48:45 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies From: Mimi Zohar To: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 09:48:44 -0500 In-Reply-To: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 20030214-0016-0000-0000-000002EC4F1B X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 20030214-0017-0000-0000-0000334F9204 Message-Id: <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138, 18.0.572 definitions=2020-03-02_05:2020-03-02, 2020-03-02 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 phishscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 clxscore=1015 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 malwarescore=0 priorityscore=1501 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2001150001 definitions=main-2003020108 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Martin Schwidefsky , Philipp Rudo , Ard Biesheuvel , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 14:10 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific > functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA > include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch > defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing > the different architectures to select it. > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > Cc: Martin Schwidefsky > Cc: Philipp Rudo > Cc: Michael Ellerman > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-- > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index 497b7d0b2d7e..b8ce1b995633 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ config PPC > select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE > select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK > select VIRT_TO_BUS if !PPC64 > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if PPC_SECURE_BOOT > # > # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically. > # > @@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > prompt "Enable secure boot support" > bool > depends on PPC_POWERNV > - depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > help > Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security > policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > index 8abe77536d9d..90ff3633ade6 100644 > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390 > select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > select SWIOTLB > select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > > config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index beea77046f9b..cafa66313fe2 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86 > select VIRT_TO_BUS > select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS > select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI Not everyone is interested in enabling IMA or requiring IMA runtime policies.  With this patch, enabling IMA_ARCH_POLICY is therefore still left up to the person building the kernel.  As a result, I'm seeing the following warning, which is kind of cool. WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT   Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && IMA [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=n]   Selected by [y]:   - X86 [=y] && EFI [=y] Ard, Michael, Martin, just making sure this type of warning is acceptable before upstreaming this patch.  I would appreciate your tags. thanks! Mimi > > config INSTRUCTION_DECODER > def_bool y > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index 1659217e9b60..aefe758f4466 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > #endif > > -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ > - || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); > extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); > #else > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > index 3f3ee4e2eb0d..d17972aa413a 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > @@ -327,3 +327,12 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS > depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > default y > + > +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > + bool > + depends on IMA > + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > + default n > + help > + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or > + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies.