From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] powerpc/64s: implement probe_kernel_read/write without touching AMR
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 14:01:18 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1586230235.0xvc3pjkcj.astroid@bobo.none> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1585911072.njtr9qmios.astroid@bobo.none>
Nicholas Piggin's on April 3, 2020 9:05 pm:
> Christophe Leroy's on April 3, 2020 8:31 pm:
>>
>>
>> Le 03/04/2020 à 11:35, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
>>> There is no need to allow user accesses when probing kernel addresses.
>>
>> I just discovered the following commit
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4
>>
>> This commit adds probe_kernel_read_strict() and probe_kernel_write_strict().
>>
>> When reading the commit log, I understand that probe_kernel_read() may
>> be used to access some user memory. Which will not work anymore with
>> your patch.
>
> Hmm, I looked at _strict but obviously not hard enough. Good catch.
>
> I don't think probe_kernel_read() should ever access user memory,
> the comment certainly says it doesn't, but that patch sort of implies
> that they do.
>
> I think it's wrong. The non-_strict maybe could return userspace data to
> you if you did pass a user address? I don't see why that shouldn't just
> be disallowed always though.
>
> And if the _strict version is required to be safe, then it seems like a
> bug or security issue to just allow everyone that doesn't explicitly
> override it to use the default implementation.
>
> Also, the way the weak linkage is done in that patch, means parisc and
> um archs that were previously overriding probe_kernel_read() now get
> the default probe_kernel_read_strict(), which would be wrong for them.
The changelog in commit 75a1a607bb7 makes it a bit clearer. If the
non-_strict variant is used on non-kernel addresses, then it might not
return -EFAULT or it might cause a kernel warning. The _strict variant
is supposed to be usable with any address and it will return -EFAULT if
it was not a valid and mapped kernel address.
The non-_strict variant can not portably access user memory because it
uses KERNEL_DS, and its documentation says its only for kernel pointers.
So powerpc should be fine to run that under KUAP AFAIKS.
I don't know why the _strict behaviour is not just made default, but
the implementation of it does seem to be broken on the archs that
override the non-_strict variant.
Thanks,
Nick
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-07 4:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-03 9:35 [PATCH v2 1/4] powerpc/64s: implement probe_kernel_read/write without touching AMR Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-03 9:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] powerpc/64s: use mmu_has_feature in set_kuap() and get_kuap() Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-03 9:35 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] powerpc/uaccess: evaluate macro arguments once, before user access is allowed Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-03 9:35 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] powerpc/uaccess: add more __builtin_expect annotations Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-03 10:35 ` Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-04 14:56 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 10:31 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] powerpc/64s: implement probe_kernel_read/write without touching AMR Christophe Leroy
2020-04-03 11:05 ` Nicholas Piggin
2020-04-07 4:01 ` Nicholas Piggin [this message]
2020-04-07 9:09 ` Daniel Borkmann
2020-06-10 12:41 ` Christophe Leroy
2020-06-14 9:28 ` Nicholas Piggin
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