From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 832F5C2BB55 for ; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:16:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 08F3A20732 for ; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:16:15 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 08F3A20732 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48zTmY61f0zDrGq for ; Sat, 11 Apr 2020 06:16:13 +1000 (AEST) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=nayna@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48zTjw4M4mzDr6L for ; Sat, 11 Apr 2020 06:13:53 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 03AK3PJR031269 for ; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 16:13:50 -0400 Received: from e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.99]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 30920bac5e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 16:13:50 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 10 Apr 2020 21:13:30 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 03AKDhSw54132968 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:13:43 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18D02AE04D; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:13:43 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D51E4AE045; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:13:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.160.47.14]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 10 Apr 2020 20:13:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/ima: fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2020 16:13:38 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 20041020-0012-0000-0000-000003A22E08 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 20041020-0013-0000-0000-000021DF5C38 Message-Id: <1586549618-6106-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138, 18.0.676 definitions=2020-04-10_08:2020-04-09, 2020-04-10 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 priorityscore=1501 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 clxscore=1015 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2004100146 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Nayna Jain , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc IMA secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1). This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead. Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules") Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index e34116255ced..957abd592075 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. * * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA - * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG * is not enabled. */ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = { "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL -- 2.25.1