From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp.outflux.net (smtp.outflux.net [198.145.64.163]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.outflux.net", Issuer "CA Cert Signing Authority" (verified OK)) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EFF1BB6F7C for ; Thu, 12 May 2011 19:37:23 +1000 (EST) Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 02:24:24 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Ingo Molnar Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering Message-ID: <20110512092424.GO28888@outflux.net> References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra , Frederic Weisbecker , Heiko Carstens , Oleg Nesterov , David Howells , Paul Mackerras , Eric Paris , "H. Peter Anvin" , sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Russell King , x86@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, Linus Torvalds , Ingo Molnar , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" , Peter Zijlstra , microblaze-uclinux@itee.uq.edu.au, Steven Rostedt , Martin Schwidefsky , Thomas Gleixner , Roland McGrath , Michal Marek , Michal Simek , Will Drewry , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ralf Baechle , Paul Mundt , Tejun Heo , linux390@de.ibm.com, Andrew Morton , agl@chromium.org, "David S. Miller" List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Hi, On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 09:48:50AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > 1) We already have a specific ABI for this: you can set filters for events via > an event fd. > > Why not extend that mechanism instead and improve *both* your sandboxing > bits and the events code? This new seccomp code has a lot more > to do with trace event filters than the minimal old seccomp code ... Would this require privileges to get the event fd to start with? If so, I would prefer to avoid that, since using prctl() as shown in the patch set won't require any privs. -Kees -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team