From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Benjamin Herrenschmidt" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 14:07:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170724190757.11278-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The walk_iomem_res_desc(), walk_system_ram_res() and walk_system_ram_range()
functions each have much of the same code. Create a new function that
consolidates the common code from these functions in one place to reduce
the amount of duplicated code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
kernel/resource.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
index 9b5f044..7b20b3e 100644
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -397,9 +397,30 @@ static int find_next_iomem_res(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
res->start = p->start;
if (res->end > p->end)
res->end = p->end;
+ res->desc = p->desc;
return 0;
}
+static int __walk_iomem_res_desc(struct resource *res, unsigned long desc,
+ bool first_level_children_only,
+ void *arg, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
+{
+ u64 orig_end = res->end;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ while ((res->start < res->end) &&
+ !find_next_iomem_res(res, desc, first_level_children_only)) {
+ ret = (*func)(res->start, res->end, arg);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ res->start = res->end + 1;
+ res->end = orig_end;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Walks through iomem resources and calls func() with matching resource
* ranges. This walks through whole tree and not just first level children.
@@ -418,26 +439,12 @@ int walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start,
u64 end, void *arg, int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
{
struct resource res;
- u64 orig_end;
- int ret = -1;
res.start = start;
res.end = end;
res.flags = flags;
- orig_end = res.end;
-
- while ((res.start < res.end) &&
- (!find_next_iomem_res(&res, desc, false))) {
-
- ret = (*func)(res.start, res.end, arg);
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- res.start = res.end + 1;
- res.end = orig_end;
- }
- return ret;
+ return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, desc, false, arg, func);
}
/*
@@ -451,22 +458,13 @@ int walk_system_ram_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(u64, u64, void *))
{
struct resource res;
- u64 orig_end;
- int ret = -1;
res.start = start;
res.end = end;
res.flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
- orig_end = res.end;
- while ((res.start < res.end) &&
- (!find_next_iomem_res(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true))) {
- ret = (*func)(res.start, res.end, arg);
- if (ret)
- break;
- res.start = res.end + 1;
- res.end = orig_end;
- }
- return ret;
+
+ return __walk_iomem_res_desc(&res, IORES_DESC_NONE, true,
+ arg, func);
}
#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_WALK_MEMORY)
@@ -508,6 +506,7 @@ static int __is_ram(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, void *arg)
{
return 1;
}
+
/*
* This generic page_is_ram() returns true if specified address is
* registered as System RAM in iomem_resource list.
--
2.9.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-24 19:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-07-28 15:23 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
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