From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from NAM01-SN1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-sn1nam01on0086.outbound.protection.outlook.com [104.47.32.86]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3xGWB159K2zDrJy for ; Tue, 25 Jul 2017 05:08:41 +1000 (AEST) From: Brijesh Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H . Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Tony Luck , Piotr Luc , Tom Lendacky , Fenghua Yu , Lu Baolu , Reza Arbab , David Howells , Matt Fleming , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Laura Abbott , Ard Biesheuvel , Andrew Morton , Eric Biederman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Jonathan Corbet , Dave Airlie , Kees Cook , Paolo Bonzini , =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= , Arnd Bergmann , Tejun Heo , Christoph Lameter , Brijesh Singh Subject: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 14:07:48 -0500 Message-Id: <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , From: Tom Lendacky EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed encrypted. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c index 12e8388..1ecb3f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -369,7 +370,10 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages) * as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away * from memory allocators anyway. */ - if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) { + pf = _PAGE_RW; + if (sev_active()) + pf |= _PAGE_ENC; + if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) { pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n"); return 1; } @@ -412,6 +416,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va) if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)) flags |= _PAGE_PCD; + if (sev_active()) + flags |= _PAGE_ENC; + pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags)) pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", @@ -511,6 +518,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf) pgd_t *pgd = efi_pgd; int err1, err2; + if (sev_active()) + pf |= _PAGE_ENC; + /* Update the 1:1 mapping */ pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf); @@ -589,6 +599,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) (md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)) pf |= _PAGE_RW; + if (sev_active()) + pf |= _PAGE_ENC; + efi_update_mappings(md, pf); } } -- 2.9.4