From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 21:26:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201707261927.v6QJR228008075@mail.zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ed6d4ce7-97a6-f664-d7d7-4ff48bc6f06a@amd.com>
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
From: hpa@zytor.com
Message-ID: <AF533772-BD88-4EDA-AD26-7EFA2878F123@zytor.com>
On July 26, 2017 9:24:45 PM GMT+02:00, Brijesh Singh <brijesh=2Esingh@amd=
=2Ecom> wrote:
>
>Hi Arnd and David,
>
>On 07/26/2017 05:45 AM, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 11:51 AM, David Laight
><David=2ELaight@aculab=2Ecom> wrote:
>>> From: Brijesh Singh
>>>> Sent: 24 July 2017 20:08
>>>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas=2Elendacky@amd=2Ecom>
>>>>
>>>> Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) does not support string I/O,
>so
>>>> unroll the string I/O operation into a loop operating on one
>element at
>>>> a time=2E
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas=2Elendacky@amd=2Ecom>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh=2Esingh@amd=2Ecom>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>>> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh b/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2E=
h
>>>> index e080a39=2E=2E2f3c002 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh
>>>> @@ -327,14 +327,32 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int
>port) \
>>>> =20
> \
>>>> static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned
>long count) \
>>>> {
>>=20
>> This will clash with a fix I did to add a "memory" clobber
>> for the traditional implementation, see
>> https://patchwork=2Ekernel=2Eorg/patch/9854573/
>>=20
>>> Is it even worth leaving these as inline functions?
>>> Given the speed of IO cycles it is unlikely that the cost of calling
>a real
>>> function will be significant=2E
>>> The code bloat reduction will be significant=2E
>>=20
>> I think the smallest code would be the original "rep insb" etc, which
>> should be smaller than a function call, unlike the loop=2E Then again,
>> there is a rather small number of affected device drivers, almost all
>> of them for ancient hardware that you won't even build in a 64-bit
>> x86 kernel, see the list below=2E The only user I found that is
>actually
>> still relevant is drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen=2Ec, which uses it for the
>early
>> console=2E
>
>
>There are some indirect user of string I/O functions=2E The following
>functions
>defined in lib/iomap=2Ec calls rep version of ins and outs=2E
>
>- ioread8_rep, ioread16_rep, ioread32_rep
>- iowrite8_rep, iowrite16_rep, iowrite32_rep
>
>I found that several drivers use above functions=2E
>
>Here is one approach to convert it into non-inline functions=2E In this
>approach,
>I have added a new file arch/x86/kernel/io=2Ec which provides non rep
>version of
>string I/O routines=2E The file gets built and used only when
>AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is
>enabled=2E On positive side, if we don't build kernel with
>AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support
>then we use inline routines, when AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is built then we make
>a function
>call=2E Inside the function we unroll only when SEV is active=2E
>
>Do you see any issue with this approach ? thanks
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh b/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh
>index e080a39=2E=2E104927d 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io=2Eh
>@@ -323,8 +323,9 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port) =20
> \
> unsigned type value =3D in##bwl(port); \
> slow_down_io(); \
> return value; \
>-} =20
>\
>- =20
>\
>+}
>+
>+#define BUILDIO_REP(bwl, bw, type) =20
>\
>static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>count) \
>{ =20
>\
> asm volatile("rep; outs" #bwl \
>@@ -335,12 +336,31 @@ static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr,
>unsigned long count) \
>{ =20
>\
> asm volatile("rep; ins" #bwl \
> : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) : "d"(port)); \
>-}
>+} =20
>\
> =20
> BUILDIO(b, b, char)
> BUILDIO(w, w, short)
> BUILDIO(l, , int)
> =20
>+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>+extern void outsb_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>count);
>+extern void insb_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>+extern void outsw_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>count);
>+extern void insw_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>+extern void outsl_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>count);
>+extern void insl_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>+#define outsb outsb_try_rep
>+#define insb insb_try_rep
>+#define outsw outsw_try_rep
>+#define insw insw_try_rep
>+#define outsl outsl_try_rep
>+#define insl insl_try_rep
>+#else
>+BUILDIO_REP(b, b, char)
>+BUILDIO_REP(w, w, short)
>+BUILDIO_REP(l, , int)
>+#endif
>+
> extern void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys);
> extern void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr);
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>index a01892b=2E=2E3b6e2a3 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ CFLAGS_irq=2Eo :=3D -I$(src)/=2E=2E/include/asm/trace
> =20
> obj-y :=3D process_$(BITS)=2Eo signal=2Eo
> obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) +=3D signal_compat=2Eo
>+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) +=3D io=2Eo
>obj-y +=3D traps=2Eo irq=2Eo irq_$(BITS)=2Eo
>dumpstack_$(BITS)=2Eo
> obj-y +=3D time=2Eo ioport=2Eo dumpstack=2Eo nmi=2Eo
> obj-$(CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL) +=3D ldt=2Eo
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/io=2Ec b/arch/x86/kernel/io=2Ec
>new file mode 100644
>index 0000000=2E=2Ef58afa9
>--- /dev/null
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/io=2Ec
>@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
>+#include <linux/types=2Eh>
>+#include <linux/io=2Eh>
>+#include <asm/io=2Eh>
>+
>+void outsb_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned char *value =3D (unsigned char *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ outb(*value, port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; outsb" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
>+
>+void insb_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned char *value =3D (unsigned char *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ *value =3D inb(port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; insb" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
>+
>+void outsw_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned short *value =3D (unsigned short *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ outw(*value, port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; outsw" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
>+void insw_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned short *value =3D (unsigned short *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ *value =3D inw(port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; insw" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
>+
>+void outsl_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned int *value =3D (unsigned int *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ outl(*value, port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; outsl" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
>+
>+void insl_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>+{
>+ if (sev_active()) {
>+ unsigned int *value =3D (unsigned int *)addr;
>+ while (count) {
>+ *value =3D inl(port);
>+ value++;
>+ count--;
>+ }
>+ } else {
>+ asm volatile("rep; insl" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>"d"(port));
>+ }
>+}
What the heck?
--=20
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail=2E Please excuse my brevity=2E
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-26 20:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 5:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 8:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 4:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28 8:47 ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31 8:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02 4:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07 3:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 9:51 ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2017-07-26 20:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 7:45 ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02 3:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03 2:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=201707261927.v6QJR228008075@mail.zytor.com \
--to=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com \
--cc=David.Laight@aculab.com \
--cc=airlied@redhat.com \
--cc=arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=labbott@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=paulus@samba.org \
--cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
--cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).