From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org (mail.linuxfoundation.org [140.211.169.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3yBVV93krtzDqlv for ; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 08:24:01 +1100 (AEDT) Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 14:23:56 -0700 From: Andrew Morton To: Laurent Dufour Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, peterz@infradead.org, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, mhocko@kernel.org, dave@stgolabs.net, jack@suse.cz, Matthew Wilcox , benh@kernel.crashing.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, paulus@samba.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , hpa@zytor.com, Will Deacon , Sergey Senozhatsky , Andrea Arcangeli , Alexei Starovoitov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, haren@linux.vnet.ibm.com, khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com, npiggin@gmail.com, bsingharora@gmail.com, Tim Chen , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 19/20] x86/mm: Add speculative pagefault handling Message-Id: <20171010142356.b33f8a8fee3427fbdf0708e3@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <1507543672-25821-20-git-send-email-ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1507543672-25821-1-git-send-email-ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1507543672-25821-20-git-send-email-ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Mon, 9 Oct 2017 12:07:51 +0200 Laurent Dufour wrote: > +/* > + * Advertise that we call the Speculative Page Fault handler. > + */ > +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_SMP) > +#define __HAVE_ARCH_CALL_SPF > +#endif Here's where I mess up your life ;) It would be more idiomatic to define this in arch/XXX/Kconfig: config SPF def_bool y if SMP then use CONFIG_SPF everywhere. Also, it would be better if CONFIG_SPF were defined at the start of the patch series rather than the end, so that as the patches add new code, that code is actually compilable. For bisection purposes. I can understand if this is too much work and effort - we can live with things the way they are now. This patchset is a ton of new code in very sensitive areas and seems to have received little review and test. I can do a merge-and-see-what-happens but it would be quite a risk to send all this upstream based only on my sketchy review and linux-next runtime testing. Can we bribe someone?