* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 4:48 [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Paul Mackerras
@ 2018-01-09 8:28 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
2018-01-09 9:18 ` Paul Mackerras
2018-01-09 8:39 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Suraj Jitindar Singh @ 2018-01-09 8:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras, kvm, linuxppc-dev; +Cc: kvm-ppc, David Gibson
On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information
> about
> the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown and
> Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to
> assist software to work around the vulnerabilities.
>
> Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the machine is
> vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the
> machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are
> available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>
> The capabilities are:
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine to
> attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache which
> should not be addressable. The workaround provided by hardware is an
> instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache.
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the
> machine
> to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted
> bounds
> checks. The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction that
> acts as a speculation barrier.
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the
> machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch predictor.
> No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the current
> hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
> ---
> Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add
> H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman,
> available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ .
>
> Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 36 +++++++
> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 202
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +
> 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none
> This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set
> the
> AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and
> allows
> to discover this without having to create a flic device.
> +
> +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack. Its value is a
> +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1 indicates
> the
> +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around the
> +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache flush
> +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +
> +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the
> Spectre
> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
> +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides
> +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by
> providing
> +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2 indicates
> +that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +
> +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the
> Spectre
> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
> +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software
> +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that needs
> +software changes.)
> +
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> index 1915e86..58e863b 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
> #include <asm/iommu.h>
> #include <asm/switch_to.h>
> #include <asm/xive.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> +#include <asm/hvcall.h>
> +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
> +#endif
>
> #include "timing.h"
> #include "irq.h"
> @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> +/*
> + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
> + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies
> + * instructions for use in workarounds. The information comes from
> + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or
> + * from an hcall on pseries platforms.
> + *
> + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a return
> + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but workaround
> + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no
> workaround
> + * is needed).
> + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2 means
> + * not vulnerable.
> + */
> +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
> + const char *state, const char *name)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np;
> + bool r = false;
> +
> + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
> + if (np) {
> + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
> + of_node_put(np);
> + }
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (!(c.behavior &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
s/H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV/H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR
> + r = 2;
> + else if ((c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
s/H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE/H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV
> + ((c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
s/H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH/H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30
> + (c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
s/H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH/H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2
etc.
> + r = 1;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (!(c.behavior &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR)
> + r = 1;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL)
> + r = 2;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +static int check_safe_cache(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_cache(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
> + "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1"))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "fw-l1d-thread-split") &&
> + (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-l1d-flush-trig2") ||
> + have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-l1d-flush-
> ori30,30,0")))
> + r = 1;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_safe_bounds_check(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
> + "needs-spec-barrier-for-bound-
> checks"))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-spec-barrier-
> ori31,31,0"))
> + r = 1;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_safe_indirect_branch(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "fw-bcctrl-serialized"))
> + r = 2;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
> {
> int r;
> @@ -646,6 +837,17 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm
> *kvm, long ext)
> r = hv_enabled &&
> (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 &
> PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_COMP);
> break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE:
> + r = check_safe_cache();
> + break;
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK:
> + r = check_safe_bounds_check();
> + break;
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
> + r = check_safe_indirect_branch();
> + break;
> +#endif
> default:
> r = 0;
> break;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 496e59a..0a480e9 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
> #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2 148
> #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX 149
> #define KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION 150
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE 151
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK 152
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH 153
>
> #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 8:28 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
@ 2018-01-09 9:18 ` Paul Mackerras
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Paul Mackerras @ 2018-01-09 9:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Suraj Jitindar Singh; +Cc: kvm, linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, David Gibson
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 07:28:35PM +1100, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
[snip]
> > + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> > + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> > + if (!(c.behavior &
> > H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
>
> s/H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV/H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR
Yes, somehow I managed to post an old version of the patch. New
version coming.
Paul.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 4:48 [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Paul Mackerras
2018-01-09 8:28 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
@ 2018-01-09 8:39 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
2018-01-09 11:57 ` Michal Suchánek
2018-01-09 12:44 ` [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Alexey Kardashevskiy
2018-01-09 11:54 ` kbuild test robot
2018-01-09 13:48 ` kbuild test robot
3 siblings, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Suraj Jitindar Singh @ 2018-01-09 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras, kvm, linuxppc-dev; +Cc: kvm-ppc, David Gibson
On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information
> about
> the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown and
> Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to
> assist software to work around the vulnerabilities.
>
> Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the machine is
> vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the
> machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are
> available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>
> The capabilities are:
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine to
> attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache which
> should not be addressable. The workaround provided by hardware is an
> instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache.
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the
> machine
> to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted
> bounds
> checks. The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction that
> acts as a speculation barrier.
>
> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the
> machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch predictor.
> No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the current
> hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
> ---
> Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add
> H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman,
> available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ .
>
> Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 36 +++++++
> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 202
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +
> 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none
> This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set
> the
> AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and
> allows
> to discover this without having to create a flic device.
> +
> +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack. Its value is a
> +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1 indicates
> the
> +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around the
> +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache flush
> +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +
> +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the
> Spectre
> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
> +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides
> +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by
> providing
> +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2 indicates
> +that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +
> +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH
> +
> +Architectures: ppc
> +
> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the
> Spectre
> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
> +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software
> +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that needs
> +software changes.)
> +
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> index 1915e86..58e863b 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
> #include <asm/iommu.h>
> #include <asm/switch_to.h>
> #include <asm/xive.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> +#include <asm/hvcall.h>
> +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
> +#endif
>
> #include "timing.h"
> #include "irq.h"
> @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> +/*
> + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
> + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies
> + * instructions for use in workarounds. The information comes from
> + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or
> + * from an hcall on pseries platforms.
> + *
> + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a return
> + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but workaround
> + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no
> workaround
> + * is needed).
> + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2 means
> + * not vulnerable.
> + */
> +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
> + const char *state, const char *name)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np;
> + bool r = false;
> +
> + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
> + if (np) {
> + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
> + of_node_put(np);
> + }
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (!(c.behavior &
s/behavior/behaviour
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
> + r = 2;
> + else if ((c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
> + ((c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
> + (c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
> + r = 1;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (!(c.behavior &
s/behavior/behaviour
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (c.character &
> H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR)
> + r = 1;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp)
> +{
> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> + unsigned long rc;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> + return false;
> +
> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> + if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL)
> + r = 2;
> + }
> + *rp = r;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +static int check_safe_cache(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_cache(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
> + "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1"))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "fw-l1d-thread-split") &&
> + (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-l1d-flush-trig2") ||
> + have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-l1d-flush-
> ori30,30,0")))
> + r = 1;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_safe_bounds_check(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled",
> + "needs-spec-barrier-for-bound-
> checks"))
> + r = 2;
> + else if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "inst-spec-barrier-
> ori31,31,0"))
> + r = 1;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_safe_indirect_branch(void)
> +{
> + struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
> + int r = 0;
> +
> + if (check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(&r))
> + return r;
> +
> + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
> + if (np) {
> + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-
> features");
> + of_node_put(np);
> + if (!fw_features)
> + return 0;
> + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled",
> + "fw-bcctrl-serialized"))
> + r = 2;
> + of_node_put(fw_features);
> + }
> +
> + return r;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
> {
> int r;
> @@ -646,6 +837,17 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm
> *kvm, long ext)
> r = hv_enabled &&
> (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_user_features2 &
> PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_COMP);
> break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE:
> + r = check_safe_cache();
> + break;
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK:
> + r = check_safe_bounds_check();
> + break;
> + case KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
> + r = check_safe_indirect_branch();
> + break;
> +#endif
> default:
> r = 0;
> break;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> index 496e59a..0a480e9 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
> @@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
> #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2 148
> #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX 149
> #define KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION 150
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE 151
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK 152
> +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH 153
>
> #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 8:39 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
@ 2018-01-09 11:57 ` Michal Suchánek
2018-01-09 12:20 ` [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds^[ joserz
2018-01-09 12:44 ` [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Alexey Kardashevskiy
1 sibling, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Michal Suchánek @ 2018-01-09 11:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
On Tue, 09 Jan 2018 19:39:14 +1100
Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> s/behavior/behaviour
Nope. Either is valid and the shorter American spelling is actually
more common.
If you must nickpick choose something actually broken :p
Thanks
Michal
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds^[
2018-01-09 11:57 ` Michal Suchánek
@ 2018-01-09 12:20 ` joserz
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: joserz @ 2018-01-09 12:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michal Suchánek; +Cc: linuxppc-dev
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 12:57:26PM +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> On Tue, 09 Jan 2018 19:39:14 +1100
> Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > s/behavior/behaviour
>
> Nope. Either is valid and the shorter American spelling is actually
> more common.
>
> If you must nickpick choose something actually broken :p
Suraj is right:
struct h_cpu_char_result {
u64 character;
u64 behaviour;
};
>
> Thanks
>
> Michal
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 8:39 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
2018-01-09 11:57 ` Michal Suchánek
@ 2018-01-09 12:44 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2018-01-09 12:54 ` Greg Kurz
2018-01-10 0:59 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
1 sibling, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy @ 2018-01-09 12:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Suraj Jitindar Singh, Paul Mackerras, kvm, linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, David Gibson
On 09/01/18 19:39, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
>> This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information
>> about
>> the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown and
>> Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to
>> assist software to work around the vulnerabilities.
>>
>> Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the machine is
>> vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the
>> machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are
>> available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>>
>> The capabilities are:
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine to
>> attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache which
>> should not be addressable. The workaround provided by hardware is an
>> instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache.
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the
>> machine
>> to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted
>> bounds
>> checks. The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction that
>> acts as a speculation barrier.
>>
>> KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the
>> machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch predictor.
>> No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the current
>> hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
>> ---
>> Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add
>> H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman,
>> available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ .
>>
>> Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 36 +++++++
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 202
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +
>> 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
>> @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none
>> This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to get/set
>> the
>> AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute and
>> allows
>> to discover this without having to create a flic device.
>> +
>> +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack. Its value is a
>> +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1 indicates
>> the
>> +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around the
>> +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache flush
>> +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +
>> +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the
>> Spectre
>> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
>> +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides
>> +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by
>> providing
>> +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2 indicates
>> +that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +
>> +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH
>> +
>> +Architectures: ppc
>> +
>> +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
>> +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the
>> Spectre
>> +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is
>> +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
>> +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software
>> +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that needs
>> +software changes.)
>> +
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> index 1915e86..58e863b 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
>> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
>> #include <asm/iommu.h>
>> #include <asm/switch_to.h>
>> #include <asm/xive.h>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
>> +#include <asm/hvcall.h>
>> +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
>> +#endif
>>
>> #include "timing.h"
>> #include "irq.h"
>> @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
>> module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
>> +/*
>> + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
>> + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies
>> + * instructions for use in workarounds. The information comes from
>> + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or
>> + * from an hcall on pseries platforms.
>> + *
>> + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a return
>> + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but workaround
>> + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no
>> workaround
>> + * is needed).
>> + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2 means
>> + * not vulnerable.
>> + */
>> +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
>> + const char *state, const char *name)
>> +{
>> + struct device_node *np;
>> + bool r = false;
>> +
>> + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
>> + if (np) {
>> + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
>> + of_node_put(np);
>> + }
>> + return r;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
>> +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
>> +{
>> + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
>> + unsigned long rc;
>> + int r = 0;
>> +
>> + if (!machine_is(pseries))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
>> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
>> + if (!(c.behavior &
>
> s/behavior/behaviour
Why?
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/behavior
--
Alexey
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 12:44 ` [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Alexey Kardashevskiy
@ 2018-01-09 12:54 ` Greg Kurz
2018-01-09 14:36 ` Michael Ellerman
2018-01-10 0:59 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
1 sibling, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kurz @ 2018-01-09 12:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy
Cc: Suraj Jitindar Singh, Paul Mackerras, kvm, linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc,
David Gibson
On Tue, 9 Jan 2018 23:44:56 +1100
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> wrote:
> On 09/01/18 19:39, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
[...]
> >> + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> >> + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> >> + if (!(c.behavior &
> >
> > s/behavior/behaviour
>
> Why?
> https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/behavior
>
Behavior is US English while behaviour is UK (and US)... Matter of taste ? :)
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 12:44 ` [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Alexey Kardashevskiy
2018-01-09 12:54 ` Greg Kurz
@ 2018-01-10 0:59 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Suraj Jitindar Singh @ 2018-01-10 0:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy, Paul Mackerras, kvm, linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, David Gibson
On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 23:44 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 09/01/18 19:39, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 15:48 +1100, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> > > This adds three new capabilities that give userspace information
> > > about
> > > the underlying machine's level of vulnerability to the Meltdown
> > > and
> > > Spectre attacks, and what instructions the hardware implements to
> > > assist software to work around the vulnerabilities.
> > >
> > > Each capability is a tri-state, where 0 indicates that the
> > > machine is
> > > vulnerable and no workarounds are implement, 1 indicates that the
> > > machine is vulnerable but workaround assist instructions are
> > > available, and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> > >
> > > The capabilities are:
> > >
> > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE reports the vulnerability of the machine
> > > to
> > > attacks based on using speculative loads to data in L1 cache
> > > which
> > > should not be addressable. The workaround provided by hardware
> > > is an
> > > instruction to invalidate the entire L1 data cache.
> > >
> > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK reports the vulnerability of the
> > > machine
> > > to attacks based on using speculative loads behind mispredicted
> > > bounds
> > > checks. The workaround provided by hardware is an instruction
> > > that
> > > acts as a speculation barrier.
> > >
> > > KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH reports the vulnerability of the
> > > machine to attacks based on poisoning the indirect branch
> > > predictor.
> > > No workaround that requires software changes is provided; the
> > > current
> > > hardware fix is to prevent speculation past indirect branches.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
> > > ---
> > > Note: This patch depends on the patch "powerpc/pseries: Add
> > > H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags & wrapper" by Michael Ellerman,
> > > available at http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856914/ .
> > >
> > > Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 36 +++++++
> > > arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 202
> > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 +
> > > 3 files changed, 241 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> > > b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> > > index 57d3ee9..8d76260 100644
> > > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> > > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
> > > @@ -4369,3 +4369,39 @@ Parameters: none
> > > This capability indicates if the flic device will be able to
> > > get/set
> > > the
> > > AIS states for migration via the KVM_DEV_FLIC_AISM_ALL attribute
> > > and
> > > allows
> > > to discover this without having to create a flic device.
> > > +
> > > +8.14 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_CACHE
> > > +
> > > +Architectures: ppc
> > > +
> > > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> > > +vulnerability or otherwise to the Meltdown attack. Its value is
> > > a
> > > +tristate, where 0 indicates the machine is vulnerable, 1
> > > indicates
> > > the
> > > +hardware is vulnerable but provides assistance to work around
> > > the
> > > +vulnerability (specifically by providing a fast L1 data cache
> > > flush
> > > +facility), and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> > > +
> > > +8.15 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_BOUNDS_CHECK
> > > +
> > > +Architectures: ppc
> > > +
> > > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> > > +vulnerability or otherwise to the bounds-check variant of the
> > > Spectre
> > > +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine
> > > is
> > > +vulnerable, 1 indicates the hardware is vulnerable but provides
> > > +assistance to work around the vulnerability (specifically by
> > > providing
> > > +an instruction that acts as a speculation barrier), and 2
> > > indicates
> > > +that the machine is not vulnerable.
> > > +
> > > +8.16 KVM_CAP_PPC_SAFE_INDIRECT_BRANCH
> > > +
> > > +Architectures: ppc
> > > +
> > > +This capability gives information about the underlying machine's
> > > +vulnerability or otherwise to the indirect branch variant of the
> > > Spectre
> > > +attack. Its value is a tristate, where 0 indicates the machine
> > > is
> > > +vulnerable and 2 indicates that the machine is not vulnerable.
> > > +(1 would indicate the availability of a workaround that software
> > > +needs to implement, but there is currently no workaround that
> > > needs
> > > +software changes.)
> > > +
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> > > b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> > > index 1915e86..58e863b 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
> > > @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
> > > #include <asm/iommu.h>
> > > #include <asm/switch_to.h>
> > > #include <asm/xive.h>
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> > > +#include <asm/hvcall.h>
> > > +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
> > > +#endif
> > >
> > > #include "timing.h"
> > > #include "irq.h"
> > > @@ -488,6 +492,193 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> > > module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
> > > }
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> > > +/*
> > > + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe
> > > + * against the Meltdown/Spectre attacks and whether it supplies
> > > + * instructions for use in workarounds. The information comes
> > > from
> > > + * firmware, either via the device tree on powernv platforms or
> > > + * from an hcall on pseries platforms.
> > > + *
> > > + * For check_safe_cache() and check_safe_bounds_check(), a
> > > return
> > > + * value of 0 means vulnerable, 1 means vulnerable but
> > > workaround
> > > + * instructions are provided, and 2 means not vulnerable (no
> > > workaround
> > > + * is needed).
> > > + * For check_safe_indirect_branch(), 0 means vulnerable and 2
> > > means
> > > + * not vulnerable.
> > > + */
> > > +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features,
> > > + const char *state, const char
> > > *name)
> > > +{
> > > + struct device_node *np;
> > > + bool r = false;
> > > +
> > > + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name);
> > > + if (np) {
> > > + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state);
> > > + of_node_put(np);
> > > + }
> > > + return r;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
> > > +static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
> > > +{
> > > + struct h_cpu_char_result c;
> > > + unsigned long rc;
> > > + int r = 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (!machine_is(pseries))
> > > + return false;
> > > +
> > > + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
> > > + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> > > + if (!(c.behavior &
> >
> > s/behavior/behaviour
>
Mainly because that's what it's called in the struct and so needs to be
that if you want it to compile :)
Also, straya
> Why?
> https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/behavior
>
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 4:48 [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Paul Mackerras
2018-01-09 8:28 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
2018-01-09 8:39 ` Suraj Jitindar Singh
@ 2018-01-09 11:54 ` kbuild test robot
2018-01-09 13:48 ` kbuild test robot
3 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: kbuild test robot @ 2018-01-09 11:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras
Cc: kbuild-all, kvm, linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, David Gibson,
Suraj Jitindar Singh
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5487 bytes --]
Hi Paul,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on kvm/linux-next]
[also build test ERROR on v4.15-rc7 next-20180109]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Paul-Mackerras/KVM-PPC-Book3S-Add-capabilities-for-Meltdown-Spectre-workarounds/20180109-165503
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git linux-next
config: powerpc-defconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: powerpc64-linux-gnu-gcc (Debian 7.2.0-11) 7.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make.cross ARCH=powerpc
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_cache':
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:527:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:534:7: error: implicit declaration of function 'plpar_get_cpu_characteristics' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:536:22: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:536:22: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:538:27: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV'?
else if ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:539:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE'?
((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:540:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH'?
(c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:527:27: error: unused variable 'c' [-Werror=unused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_bounds_check':
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:549:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:558:22: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:560:26: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK'?
else if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:549:27: error: unused variable 'c' [-Werror=unused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch':
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:569:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:578:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:569:27: error: unused variable 'c' [-Werror=unused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
vim +/c +527 arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
523
524 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
525 static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
526 {
> 527 struct h_cpu_char_result c;
528 unsigned long rc;
529 int r = 0;
530
531 if (!machine_is(pseries))
532 return false;
533
534 rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
535 if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
536 if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
537 r = 2;
538 else if ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
> 539 ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
540 (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
541 r = 1;
542 }
543 *rp = r;
544 return true;
545 }
546
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds
2018-01-09 4:48 [PATCH] KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add capabilities for Meltdown/Spectre workarounds Paul Mackerras
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2018-01-09 11:54 ` kbuild test robot
@ 2018-01-09 13:48 ` kbuild test robot
3 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: kbuild test robot @ 2018-01-09 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras
Cc: kbuild-all, kvm, linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, David Gibson,
Suraj Jitindar Singh
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Hi Paul,
I love your patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on kvm/linux-next]
[also build test ERROR on v4.15-rc7 next-20180109]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Paul-Mackerras/KVM-PPC-Book3S-Add-capabilities-for-Meltdown-Spectre-workarounds/20180109-165503
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git linux-next
config: powerpc-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: powerpc64-linux-gnu-gcc (Debian 7.2.0-11) 7.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make.cross ARCH=powerpc
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_cache':
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:527:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:534:7: error: implicit declaration of function 'plpar_get_cpu_characteristics' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:536:22: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:536:22: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:538:27: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV'?
else if ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:539:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE'?
((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:540:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH'?
(c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:527:27: warning: unused variable 'c' [-Wunused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_bounds_check':
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:549:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:558:22: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:560:26: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK'?
else if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:549:27: warning: unused variable 'c' [-Wunused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c: In function 'check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch':
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:569:27: error: storage size of 'c' isn't known
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
>> arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:578:21: error: 'H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL' undeclared (first use in this function)
if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:569:27: warning: unused variable 'c' [-Wunused-variable]
struct h_cpu_char_result c;
^
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +527 arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
523
524 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
525 static bool check_pseries_safe_cache(int *rp)
526 {
> 527 struct h_cpu_char_result c;
528 unsigned long rc;
529 int r = 0;
530
531 if (!machine_is(pseries))
532 return false;
533
> 534 rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
535 if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> 536 if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_L1_FLUSH_LOW_PRIV))
537 r = 2;
> 538 else if ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_L1D_PRIVATE) &&
> 539 ((c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI30_L1_FLUSH) ||
> 540 (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_MTTRIG2_L1_FLUSH)))
541 r = 1;
542 }
543 *rp = r;
544 return true;
545 }
546
547 static bool check_pseries_safe_bounds_check(int *rp)
548 {
> 549 struct h_cpu_char_result c;
550 unsigned long rc;
551 int r = 0;
552
553 if (!machine_is(pseries))
554 return false;
555
556 rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
557 if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> 558 if (!(c.behavior & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_BEHAV_SPEC_BAR_BNDS_CHK))
559 r = 2;
> 560 else if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_ORI31_SPEC_BAR)
561 r = 1;
562 }
563 *rp = r;
564 return true;
565 }
566
567 static bool check_pseries_safe_indirect_branch(int *rp)
568 {
569 struct h_cpu_char_result c;
570 unsigned long rc;
571 int r = 0;
572
573 if (!machine_is(pseries))
574 return false;
575
576 rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c);
577 if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
> 578 if (c.character & H_GET_CPU_CHAR_CHAR_BCCTR_SERIAL)
579 r = 2;
580 }
581 *rp = r;
582 return true;
583 }
584
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread