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From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
To: npiggin@gmail.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/mm/hash: Hand user access of kernel address gracefully
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 20:05:04 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181126143504.30996-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> (raw)

With commit 2865d08dd9ea ("powerpc/mm: Move the DSISR_PROTFAULT sanity check")
we moved the protection fault access check before vma lookup. That means we
hit that WARN_ON when user space access a kernel address.  Before the commit
this was handled by find_vma() not finding vma for the kernel address and
considering that access as bad area access.

Avoid the confusing WARN_ON and convert that to a ratelimited printk.
With the patch we now get

for load:
[  187.700294] a.out[5997]: User access of kernel address (c00000000000dea0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
[  187.700344] a.out[5997]: segfault (11) at c00000000000dea0 nip 1317c0798 lr 7fff80d6441c code 1 in a.out[1317c0000+10000]
[  187.700429] a.out[5997]: code: 60000000 60420000 3c4c0002 38427790 4bffff20 3c4c0002 38427784 fbe1fff8
[  187.700435] a.out[5997]: code: f821ffc1 7c3f0b78 60000000 e9228030 <89290000> 993f002f 60000000 383f0040

for exec:
[  225.100903] a.out[6067]: User access of kernel address (c00000000000dea0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
[  225.100938] a.out[6067]: segfault (11) at c00000000000dea0 nip c00000000000dea0 lr 129d507b0 code 1
[  225.100943] a.out[6067]: Bad NIP, not dumping instructions.

Fixes: 2865d08dd9ea ("powerpc/mm: Move the DSISR_PROTFAULT sanity check")
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
index 1697e903bbf2..46f280068c45 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
@@ -342,8 +342,21 @@ static inline void cmo_account_page_fault(void) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_SMLPAR */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU
-static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, unsigned long error_code)
+static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, bool is_user,
+			       unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 {
+	/*
+	 * userspace trying to access kernel address, we get PROTFAULT for that.
+	 */
+	if (is_user && address >= TASK_SIZE) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_CRIT "%s[%d]: "
+				   "User access of kernel address (%lx) - "
+				   "exploit attempt? (uid: %d)\n",
+				   current->comm, current->pid, address,
+				   from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * For hash translation mode, we should never get a
 	 * PROTFAULT. Any update to pte to reduce access will result in us
@@ -373,11 +386,17 @@ static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, unsigned long error_code)
 	 * For radix, we can get prot fault for autonuma case, because radix
 	 * page table will have them marked noaccess for user.
 	 */
-	if (!radix_enabled() && !is_write)
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT);
+	if (radix_enabled() || is_write)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT);
 }
 #else
-static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, unsigned long error_code) { }
+static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, bool is_user,
+			       unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
+{
+
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU */
 
 /*
@@ -435,7 +454,7 @@ static int __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 	}
 
 	/* Additional sanity check(s) */
-	sanity_check_fault(is_write, error_code);
+	sanity_check_fault(is_write, is_user, error_code, address);
 
 	/*
 	 * The kernel should never take an execute fault nor should it
-- 
2.19.1


             reply	other threads:[~2018-11-26 14:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-26 14:35 Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2018-11-27 17:22 ` [PATCH] powerpc/mm/hash: Hand user access of kernel address gracefully Breno Leitao
2018-12-13  2:15   ` Michael Ellerman
2018-12-22  9:54 ` Michael Ellerman

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