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From: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linuxram@us.ibm.com, cclaudio@linux.ibm.com,
	kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org, Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, jglisse@redhat.com,
	aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, paulus@au1.ibm.com,
	sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com, hch@lst.de
Subject: [PATCH v9 3/8] KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for secure guests
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 10:36:44 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190925050649.14926-4-bharata@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190925050649.14926-1-bharata@linux.ibm.com>

A secure guest will share some of its pages with hypervisor (Eg. virtio
bounce buffers etc). Support sharing of pages between hypervisor and
ultravisor.

Shared page is reachable via both HV and UV side page tables. Once a
secure page is converted to shared page, the device page that represents
the secure page is unmapped from the HV side page tables.

Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h  |  3 ++
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index 2595d0144958..4e98dd992bd1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@
 #define H_TLB_INVALIDATE	0xF808
 #define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST	0xF80C
 
+/* Flags for H_SVM_PAGE_IN */
+#define H_PAGE_IN_SHARED        0x1
+
 /* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */
 #define H_SVM_PAGE_IN		0xEF00
 #define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT		0xEF04
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
index 312f0fedde0b..5e5b5a3e9eec 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@
  * available in the platform for running secure guests is hotplugged.
  * Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this
  * private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page
- * on the HV side.
+ * on the HV side. Some pages (like virtio buffers, VPA pages etc) are
+ * shared between UV and HV. However such pages aren't represented by
+ * device private memory and mappings to shared memory exist in both
+ * UV and HV page tables.
  *
  * For each page that gets moved into secure memory, a device PFN is used
  * on the HV side and migration PTE corresponding to that PFN would be
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt {
 	unsigned long *rmap;
 	struct kvm *kvm;
 	unsigned long gpa;
+	bool skip_page_out;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -190,8 +194,70 @@ kvmppc_svm_page_in(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Shares the page with HV, thus making it a normal page.
+ *
+ * - If the page is already secure, then provision a new page and share
+ * - If the page is a normal page, share the existing page
+ *
+ * In the former case, uses dev_pagemap_ops.migrate_to_ram handler
+ * to unmap the device page from QEMU's page tables.
+ */
+static unsigned long
+kvmppc_share_page(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+
+	int ret = H_PARAMETER;
+	struct page *uvmem_page;
+	struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt *pvt;
+	unsigned long pfn;
+	unsigned long *rmap;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+	unsigned long gfn = gpa >> page_shift;
+	int srcu_idx;
+
+	srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+	if (!slot)
+		goto out;
+
+	rmap = &slot->arch.rmap[gfn - slot->base_gfn];
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock);
+	if (kvmppc_rmap_type(rmap) == KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN) {
+		uvmem_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN);
+		pvt = uvmem_page->zone_device_data;
+		pvt->skip_page_out = true;
+	}
+
+retry:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock);
+	pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn);
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+		goto out;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock);
+	if (kvmppc_rmap_type(rmap) == KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN) {
+		uvmem_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN);
+		pvt = uvmem_page->zone_device_data;
+		pvt->skip_page_out = true;
+		kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	if (!uv_page_in(kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift, gpa, 0, page_shift))
+		ret = H_SUCCESS;
+	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock);
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
+ *
+ * H_PAGE_IN_SHARED flag makes the page shared which means that the same
+ * memory in is visible from both UV and HV.
  */
 unsigned long
 kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
@@ -208,9 +274,12 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
 	if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
 		return H_P3;
 
-	if (flags)
+	if (flags & ~H_PAGE_IN_SHARED)
 		return H_P2;
 
+	if (flags & H_PAGE_IN_SHARED)
+		return kvmppc_share_page(kvm, gpa, page_shift);
+
 	ret = H_PARAMETER;
 	srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
 	down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
@@ -292,8 +361,17 @@ kvmppc_svm_page_out(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
 	pvt = spage->zone_device_data;
 	pfn = page_to_pfn(dpage);
 
-	ret = uv_page_out(pvt->kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift,
-			  pvt->gpa, 0, page_shift);
+	/*
+	 * This function is used in two cases:
+	 * - When HV touches a secure page, for which we do UV_PAGE_OUT
+	 * - When a secure page is converted to shared page, we *get*
+	 *   the page to essentially unmap the device page. In this
+	 *   case we skip page-out.
+	 */
+	if (!pvt->skip_page_out)
+		ret = uv_page_out(pvt->kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift,
+				  pvt->gpa, 0, page_shift);
+
 	if (ret == U_SUCCESS)
 		*mig.dst = migrate_pfn(pfn) | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED;
 	else {
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-09-25  5:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-25  5:06 [PATCH v9 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Define usage types for rmap array in guest memslot Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25 12:12   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-10-18  3:00   ` Paul Mackerras
2019-10-22  6:29     ` Bharata B Rao
2019-10-23  4:17       ` Paul Mackerras
2019-10-23  5:41         ` Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` Bharata B Rao [this message]
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] KVM: PPC: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] KVM: PPC: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] KVM: PPC: Radix changes for secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] KVM: PPC: Support reset of " Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25  5:06 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] KVM: PPC: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option Bharata B Rao
2019-09-25 12:14 ` [PATCH v9 0/8] KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest Jason Gunthorpe

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