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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	keescook@chromium.org,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	airlied@linux.ie, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	daniel@ffwll.ch, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 18:50:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200402175032.GH23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <67e21b65-0e2d-7ca5-7518-cec1b7abc46c@c-s.fr>

On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 07:03:28PM +0200, Christophe Leroy wrote:

> user_access_begin() grants both read and write.
> 
> This patch adds user_read_access_begin() and user_write_access_begin() but
> it doesn't remove user_access_begin()

Ouch...  So the most generic name is for the rarest case?
 
> > What should we do about that?  Do we prohibit such blocks outside
> > of arch?
> > 
> > What should we do about arm and s390?  There we want a cookie passed
> > from beginning of block to its end; should that be a return value?
> 
> That was the way I implemented it in January, see
> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1227926/
> 
> There was some discussion around that and most noticeable was:
> 
> H. Peter (hpa) said about it: "I have *deep* concern with carrying state in
> a "key" variable: it's a direct attack vector for a crowbar attack,
> especially since it is by definition live inside a user access region."

> This patch minimises the change by just adding user_read_access_begin() and
> user_write_access_begin() keeping the same parameters as the existing
> user_access_begin().

Umm...  What about the arm situation?  The same concerns would apply there,
wouldn't they?  Currently we have
static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
        unsigned int old_domain = get_domain();

        /* Set the current domain access to permit user accesses */
        set_domain((old_domain & ~domain_mask(DOMAIN_USER)) |
                   domain_val(DOMAIN_USER, DOMAIN_CLIENT));

        return old_domain;
#else
        return 0;
#endif
}
and
static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
        /* Restore the user access mask */
        set_domain(flags);
#endif
}

How much do we need nesting on those, anyway?  rmk?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-02 17:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-02  7:34 [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:34 ` [PATCH RESEND 2/4] uaccess: Selectively open read or write user access Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:51   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02  8:00     ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:34 ` [PATCH RESEND 3/4] drm/i915/gem: Replace user_access_begin by user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02  7:59     ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:34 ` [PATCH RESEND 4/4] powerpc/uaccess: Implement user_read_access_begin and user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02  7:52   ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02  7:46 ` [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Kees Cook
2020-04-02 16:29 ` Al Viro
2020-04-02 17:03   ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02 17:38     ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 17:50     ` Al Viro [this message]
2020-04-02 18:35       ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-02 18:35       ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 19:26         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-02 20:27           ` Kees Cook
2020-04-02 20:47             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-03  0:58         ` Al Viro
2020-04-03  9:49           ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2020-04-03 11:26           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-04-03 13:37             ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2020-04-03 17:26               ` Al Viro
2020-04-03 10:02         ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin

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