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From: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com,
	erichte@linux.ibm.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 15:03:38 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200710180338.GA10547@glitch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1594401804.14405.8.camel@linux.ibm.com>

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On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > enabled.
> 
> > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > integrity.
> > 
> > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> 
> Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> 
> The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> IMA architecture specific policies are enabled.  This prevents
> properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> supported, but not enabled on the platform.  Only when secure boot is
> enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> 
> This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> 

Sounds good to me.

> <snip>
> 
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> >  static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> 
> > har *str)
> >  {
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > +	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > +		pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> 
> Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> option being denied?  Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> ignoring %s boot command line option"
> 
> Mimi
> 

Yes, sure.

Thanks!

> > +		return 1;
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> >  		ima_appraise = 0;
> >  	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> 

-- 
bmeneg 
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-10 18:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-09 16:46 [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime Bruno Meneguele
2020-07-10 17:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-10 18:03   ` Bruno Meneguele [this message]
2020-07-10 18:34     ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-07-10 18:54       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-10 19:25         ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-07-13 15:03           ` Bruno Meneguele

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