From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 961E3C433ED for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 10:03:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [112.213.38.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0C0D4613CD for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 10:03:37 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0C0D4613CD Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4FgnL04QM6z306C for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 20:03:36 +1000 (AEST) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=suse.com header.i=@suse.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=susede1 header.b=Bt3HWyrB; dkim-atps=neutral Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=suse.com (client-ip=195.135.220.15; helo=mx2.suse.de; envelope-from=jgross@suse.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=suse.com header.i=@suse.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=susede1 header.b=Bt3HWyrB; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from mx2.suse.de (mx2.suse.de [195.135.220.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FgnKT04gqz2xVt for ; Thu, 13 May 2021 20:03:08 +1000 (AEST) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1620900185; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=mSXvMzPiVbs1p8U5teTrqe++A9Kur1ffFfsRtolTEq4=; b=Bt3HWyrBQzhFA/VHRnLOrbIQmpMXluR0avJegIDgYP/25lKg9FIZAPmZkKNNj4Tn46vHsx DqH+iMtGCUU89BF3407TPvLq70y+9QiQwuomJ/KD69JlH6Mpq8EAgwwGKMJeCtvkebsFoG WMLd9rAM4L+C5WZX30UyH56rbG89gqM= Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85808AFE5; Thu, 13 May 2021 10:03:05 +0000 (UTC) From: Juergen Gross To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Subject: [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 12:02:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20210513100302.22027-1-jgross@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Juergen Gross , Jens Axboe , Stefano Stabellini , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Jakub Kicinski , Boris Ostrovsky , Jiri Slaby , "David S. Miller" , =?UTF-8?q?Roger=20Pau=20Monn=C3=A9?= Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0 user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest). Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most important frontends: console, disk and network. It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret. Juergen Gross (8): xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly xen/netfront: read response from backend only once xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 118 +++++++++----- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 184 ++++++++++++++------- drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 15 +- include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) -- 2.26.2