From: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sudhakar@linux.ibm.com, bgray@linux.ibm.com,
erichte@linux.ibm.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
nayna@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, gjoyce@linux.ibm.com,
gcwilson@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 21/24] powerpc/pseries: Pass PLPKS password on kexec
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 17:10:46 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230118061049.1006141-22-ajd@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230118061049.1006141-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com>
From: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Before interacting with the PLPKS, we ask the hypervisor to generate a
password for the current boot, which is then required for most further
PLPKS operations.
If we kexec into a new kernel, the new kernel will try and fail to
generate a new password, as the password has already been set.
Pass the password through to the new kernel via the device tree, in
/chosen/plpks-pw. Check for the presence of this property before trying
to generate a new password - if it exists, use the existing password and
remove it from the device tree.
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
---
v3: New patch
---
arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c
index af8854f9eae3..f0e25700ae77 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <asm/kexec_ranges.h>
#include <asm/crashdump-ppc64.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
+#include <asm/plpks.h>
struct umem_info {
u64 *buf; /* data buffer for usable-memory property */
@@ -1155,7 +1156,7 @@ int setup_new_fdt_ppc64(const struct kimage *image, void *fdt,
unsigned long initrd_len, const char *cmdline)
{
struct crash_mem *umem = NULL, *rmem = NULL;
- int i, nr_ranges, ret;
+ int i, nr_ranges, ret, chosen_node;
/*
* Restrict memory usage for kdump kernel by setting up
@@ -1230,6 +1231,20 @@ int setup_new_fdt_ppc64(const struct kimage *image, void *fdt,
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS
+ // If we have PLPKS active, we need to provide the password
+ if (plpks_is_available()) {
+ chosen_node = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+ if (!chosen_node) {
+ pr_err("Can't find chosen node: %s\n",
+ fdt_strerror(chosen_node));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = fdt_setprop(fdt, chosen_node, "ibm,plpks-pw",
+ plpks_get_password(), plpks_get_passwordlen());
+ }
+#endif // CONFIG_PSERIES_PLPKS
+
out:
kfree(rmem);
kfree(umem);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
index b3c7410a4f13..0350f10e1755 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/of.h>
#include <asm/hvcall.h>
#include <asm/machdep.h>
#include <asm/plpks.h>
@@ -126,7 +127,22 @@ static int plpks_gen_password(void)
{
unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
u8 *password, consumer = PLPKS_OS_OWNER;
- int rc;
+ struct property *prop;
+ int rc, len;
+
+ // Before we generate the password, we may have been booted by kexec and
+ // provided with a previous password. Check for that first.
+ prop = of_find_property(of_chosen, "ibm,plpks-pw", &len);
+ if (prop) {
+ ospasswordlength = (u16)len;
+ ospassword = kzalloc(ospasswordlength, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ospassword) {
+ of_remove_property(of_chosen, prop);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ memcpy(ospassword, prop->value, len);
+ return of_remove_property(of_chosen, prop);
+ }
// The password must not cross a page boundary, so we align to the next power of 2
password = kzalloc(roundup_pow_of_two(maxpwsize), GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.39.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-18 6:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-18 6:10 [PATCH v3 00/24] pSeries dynamic secure boot secvar interface + platform keyring loading Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] powerpc/secvar: Use u64 in secvar_operations Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] powerpc/secvar: WARN_ON_ONCE() if multiple secvar ops are set Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 0:59 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] powerpc/secvar: Use sysfs_emit() instead of sprintf() Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] powerpc/secvar: Handle format string in the consumer Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 1:02 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-19 1:17 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-20 0:51 ` Russell Currey
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] powerpc/secvar: Handle max object size " Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 21:18 ` Greg Joyce
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] powerpc/secvar: Clean up init error messages Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] powerpc/secvar: Extend sysfs to include config vars Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] powerpc/secvar: Allow backend to populate static list of variable names Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 1:10 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-20 6:20 ` Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] powerpc/secvar: Warn when PAGE_SIZE is smaller than max object size Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] powerpc/secvar: Don't print error on ENOENT when reading variables Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] powerpc/pseries: Move plpks.h to include directory Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] powerpc/pseries: Move PLPKS constants to header file Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] powerpc/pseries: Fix handling of PLPKS object flushing timeout Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 1:15 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] powerpc/pseries: Fix alignment of PLPKS structures and buffers Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] powerpc/pseries: Expose PLPKS config values, support additional fields Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] powerpc/pseries: Implement signed update for PLPKS objects Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-19 1:12 ` Nicholas Piggin
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] powerpc/pseries: Log hcall return codes for PLPKS debug Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 18/24] powerpc/pseries: Make caller pass buffer to plpks_read_var() Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] powerpc/pseries: Turn PSERIES_PLPKS into a hidden option Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] powerpc/pseries: Add helpers to get PLPKS password Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` Andrew Donnellan [this message]
2023-01-18 11:52 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] powerpc/pseries: Pass PLPKS password on kexec Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] powerpc/pseries: Implement secvars for dynamic secure boot Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 13:06 ` Stefan Berger
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] integrity/powerpc: Improve error handling & reporting when loading certs Andrew Donnellan
2023-01-18 6:10 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from pseries secvar Andrew Donnellan
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