From: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com>
To: mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: kees@kernel.org, npiggin@gmail.com, naveen@kernel.org,
christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu, gustavoars@kernel.org,
anjalik@linux.ibm.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
vishalc@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 23:08:44 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240614173844.746818-1-anjalik@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
shown below.
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85
Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000e
CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
[ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
Call Trace:
usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
__check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
ksys_read+0x84/0x144
system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
--- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34
Commit 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
entire object.
Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
index 284a6fa04b0c..cba40d9d1284 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static int alloc_dispatch_log_kmem_cache(void)
{
void (*ctor)(void *) = get_dtl_cache_ctor();
- dtl_cache = kmem_cache_create("dtl", DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES,
- DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, 0, ctor);
+ dtl_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("dtl", DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES,
+ DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, 0, 0, DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, ctor);
if (!dtl_cache) {
pr_warn("Failed to create dispatch trace log buffer cache\n");
pr_warn("Stolen time statistics will be unreliable\n");
base-commit: 83a7eefedc9b56fe7bfeff13b6c7356688ffa670
--
2.39.3
next reply other threads:[~2024-06-14 17:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-14 17:38 Anjali K [this message]
2024-06-17 10:37 ` [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace Srikar Dronamraju
2024-06-17 17:59 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-18 7:11 ` Michael Ellerman
2024-06-21 8:12 ` Anjali K
2024-06-21 11:38 ` Michael Ellerman
2024-06-20 17:28 ` Anjali K
2024-06-20 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-24 12:30 ` Michael Ellerman
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