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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Anjali K <anjalik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: naveen@kernel.org, christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu,
	gustavoars@kernel.org, npiggin@gmail.com, vishalc@linux.ibm.com,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2024 11:59:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202406201158.346A2BE@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <499f5305-eb54-43a7-9864-d032f29c445d@linux.ibm.com>

On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 10:58:49PM +0530, Anjali K wrote:
> However given that:                                                        
> (i) The dtl buffer is read-only. The dtl trace is a set of metrics which   
> are collected to be read by privileged users.                              
> (ii) Users usually reads all the dtl entries, not a subset.                                             
> (iii) Read overflows are unlikely to expose anything useful to attackers        
> since we are whitelisting the complete slub object and there are no        
> contiguous memory locations which need to be hidden.                       
> Can we go ahead with the whitelisting using kmem_cache_create_usercopy()   
> approach?                                                                  
> Or are there other reasons to prefer the bounce buffer approach?

Yeah, based on this and what mpe said, I have no objection to just
allowing it in kmem_cache_create_usercopy(). I was mainly just curious
what the threat model was. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-20 19:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-14 17:38 [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace Anjali K
2024-06-17 10:37 ` Srikar Dronamraju
2024-06-17 17:59 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-18  7:11   ` Michael Ellerman
2024-06-21  8:12     ` Anjali K
2024-06-21 11:38       ` Michael Ellerman
2024-06-20 17:28   ` Anjali K
2024-06-20 18:59     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-06-24 12:30 ` Michael Ellerman

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