From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] seccomp: kill the dead code in the !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER version of __secure_computing()
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 15:30:39 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250121143038.GB3422@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202501201353.168E6AAC8@keescook>
On 01/20, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 02:44:52PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > Depending on CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER, __secure_computing(NULL)
> > will crash or not, this is not consistent/safe.
>
> Right now this never happens because there are no callers.
>
> > Fortunately, if CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER=n, __secure_computing()
> > has no callers, these architectures use secure_computing_strict().
>
> As you say here.
>
> > Also, after the previous change __secure_computing(sd) is always called
> > with sd == NULL, so it is clear that we can remove the code which makes
> > no sense.
>
> However, after this change, if someone were to *add* a caller, it would
> bypass strict mode.
OK, thanks, I agree this is not consistent, even if I think that
!CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER arches should not add a new caller.
> Instead of "return 0", it seems like it'd be better
> to remove the function entirely (and maybe add a comment about calling
> secure_computing_strict() directly)?
This means that __secure_computing() will be defined even if !CONFIG_SECCOMP,
but it won't be defined if CONFIG_SECCOMP && !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.
How about
__secure_computing()
{
return secure_computing_strict(syscall_get_nr(...));
}
in the "#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER" section near
secure_computing_strict() in kernel/seccomp.c ?
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-21 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-20 13:44 [PATCH 0/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 13:44 ` [PATCH 1/4] seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:48 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-23 14:33 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2025-01-20 13:44 ` [PATCH 2/4] seccomp: kill the dead code in the !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER version of __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:54 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-21 14:30 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-01-27 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-20 13:44 ` [PATCH 3/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2025-01-20 13:45 ` [PATCH 4/4] seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter() Oleg Nesterov
2025-01-20 22:00 ` Kees Cook
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