From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/2] uaccess: Add __user_write_access_begin().
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 00:04:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251023000535.2897002-2-kuniyu@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251023000535.2897002-1-kuniyu@google.com>
In epoll_wait(2), ep_check_params() performs a bulk check for
the passed user address:
if (!access_ok(evs, maxevents * sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
And later, epoll_put_uevent() uses __put_user() twice to copy
2 data into the region.
unsafe_put_user() can be used to save a stac/clac pair, but
masked_user_access_begin() or user_access_begin() introduces
an unnecessary address masking or access_ok().
Add a low-level helper for such a use case.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 13 ++++++++++---
arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 1 +
include/linux/uaccess.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 1aa4ecb73429..30726ce182cb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *pt
}
#define user_access_begin(a,b) user_access_begin(a,b)
#define user_access_end() uaccess_ttbr0_disable()
+#define __user_write_access_begin(a,b) uaccess_ttbr0_enable()
#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \
__raw_put_mem("sttr", x, uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr), label, U)
#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label) \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 4f5a46a77fa2..910bf469128d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -437,15 +437,22 @@ user_read_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
#define user_read_access_begin user_read_access_begin
#define user_read_access_end prevent_current_read_from_user
+static __always_inline void
+__user_write_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ might_fault();
+
+ allow_write_to_user((void __user *)ptr, len);
+}
+#define __user_write_access_begin __user_write_access_begin
+
static __must_check __always_inline bool
user_write_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
return false;
- might_fault();
-
- allow_write_to_user((void __user *)ptr, len);
+ __user_write_access_begin(ptr, len);
return true;
}
#define user_write_access_begin user_write_access_begin
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
index f5f4f7f85543..9adc8f0dd1c8 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *pt
}
#define user_access_begin user_access_begin
#define user_access_end __disable_user_access
+#define __user_write_access_begin(a,b) __enable_user_access()
static inline unsigned long user_access_save(void) { return 0UL; }
static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long enabled) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 91a3fb8ae7ff..23edbaef9f71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -524,6 +524,7 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *pt
}
#define user_access_begin(a,b) user_access_begin(a,b)
#define user_access_end() __uaccess_end()
+#define __user_write_access_begin(a,b) __uaccess_begin()
#define user_access_save() smap_save()
#define user_access_restore(x) smap_restore(x)
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index 1beb5b395d81..a6e32784e6cd 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ do { \
#ifndef user_access_begin
#define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len)
#define user_access_end() do { } while (0)
+#define __user_write_access_begin(ptr,len) do { } while (0)
#define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (0)
#define unsafe_get_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__get_user(x,p),e)
#define unsafe_put_user(x,p,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__put_user(x,p),e)
--
2.51.1.814.gb8fa24458f-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-23 4:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-23 0:04 [PATCH v1 0/2] epoll: Save one stac/clac pair in epoll_put_uevent() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-23 0:04 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2025-10-23 5:37 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] uaccess: Add __user_write_access_begin() Linus Torvalds
2025-10-23 8:29 ` David Laight
2025-10-24 5:31 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-23 0:04 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] epoll: Use __user_write_access_begin() and unsafe_put_user() in epoll_put_uevent() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-23 19:40 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-24 5:16 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-24 14:05 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-24 14:47 ` David Laight
2025-10-28 5:32 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-28 9:54 ` David Laight
2025-10-28 16:42 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-10-28 16:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-10-29 1:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-28 22:30 ` David Laight
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