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Thu, 4 Jun 2026 08:41:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1780562515; bh=VVvebO+W7fx9D2IfL+crQhesHqFusXbqI+VwgiWtJ48=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=RaYvx39TjVmbeoSK/kZjnLcTw6JXTrnumJD1Sy0TdQouE5NGrkNQ6cXppAC+lbyAv WupoLrOqwBPQTXuAWdLS4gUGo1ZGYNVF8A8flV4k16rk5xcLL+FABacY3w9cgCbG6e MpnimWXs7lnhMPWsNvD+QpsvKH0to7KO2ZczUH1oHx0fIbPfsqVXVL75tK34qBYPUZ AxyUXLcFsdJGQ+yH27c45lZcPHcv0fhYhzDQqe37MZE3V6hfvd2Ns1HPmy5FHfSRgM fctF0rPauJx076NvtSD6hV9ev8RJA7Kq09f4evhXptl7oC5XwBG2ynLhdJ2vELiC3Y vjgK8T8jzXFGg== From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" To: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" , Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Catalin Marinas , Jiri Pirko , Jason Gunthorpe , Mostafa Saleh , Petr Tesarik , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org, Jiri Pirko , Michael Kelley Subject: [PATCH v6 11/20] dma-direct: select DMA address encoding from DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 14:09:50 +0530 Message-ID: <20260604083959.1265923-12-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> References: <20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org List-Id: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Archive: , List-Subscribe: , , List-Unsubscribe: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Make the dma-direct helpers derive the DMA address encoding from DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED instead of implicitly relying on force_dma_unencrypted() inside phys_to_dma_direct() Pass an explicit unencrypted/decrypted state into phys_to_dma_direct(), make the alloc paths return DMA addresses that match the requested buffer encryption state. Also only call dma_set_decrypted() when DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED is actually set. Tested-by: Jiri Pirko Tested-by: Michael Kelley Tested-by: Mostafa Saleh Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) --- kernel/dma/direct.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c index 9ce4fff6c112..aa3489aa10a0 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c @@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ u64 zone_dma_limit __ro_after_init = DMA_BIT_MASK(24); static inline dma_addr_t phys_to_dma_direct(struct device *dev, - phys_addr_t phys) + phys_addr_t phys, bool unencrypted) { - if (force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) + if (unencrypted) return phys_to_dma_unencrypted(dev, phys); - return phys_to_dma(dev, phys); + return phys_to_dma_encrypted(dev, phys); } static inline struct page *dma_direct_to_page(struct device *dev, @@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ static inline struct page *dma_direct_to_page(struct device *dev, u64 dma_direct_get_required_mask(struct device *dev) { + bool require_decrypted = force_dma_unencrypted(dev); phys_addr_t phys = ((phys_addr_t)max_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1; - u64 max_dma = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, phys); + u64 max_dma = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, phys, require_decrypted); return (1ULL << (fls64(max_dma) - 1)) * 2 - 1; } @@ -69,7 +70,8 @@ static gfp_t dma_direct_optimal_gfp_mask(struct device *dev, u64 *phys_limit) bool dma_coherent_ok(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size) { - dma_addr_t dma_addr = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, phys); + bool require_decrypted = force_dma_unencrypted(dev); + dma_addr_t dma_addr = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, phys, require_decrypted); if (dma_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR) return false; @@ -79,17 +81,18 @@ bool dma_coherent_ok(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size) static int dma_set_decrypted(struct device *dev, void *vaddr, size_t size) { - if (!force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) - return 0; - return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, PFN_UP(size)); + int ret; + + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, PFN_UP(size)); + if (ret) + pr_warn_ratelimited("leaking DMA memory that can't be decrypted\n"); + return ret; } static int dma_set_encrypted(struct device *dev, void *vaddr, size_t size) { int ret; - if (!force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) - return 0; ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, PFN_UP(size)); if (ret) pr_warn_ratelimited("leaking DMA memory that can't be re-encrypted\n"); @@ -169,7 +172,8 @@ static void *dma_direct_alloc_from_pool(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_coherent_ok); if (!page) return NULL; - *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page)); + *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page), + !!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)); return ret; } @@ -185,9 +189,11 @@ static void *dma_direct_alloc_no_mapping(struct device *dev, size_t size, /* remove any dirty cache lines on the kernel alias */ if (!PageHighMem(page)) arch_dma_prep_coherent(page, size); - - /* return the page pointer as the opaque cookie */ - *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page)); + /* + * return the page pointer as the opaque cookie. + * Never used for unencrypted allocation + */ + *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_encrypted(dev, page_to_phys(page)); return page; } @@ -332,7 +338,8 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, ret = uncached_cpu_addr; } - *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page)); + *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page), + !!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)); return ret; @@ -455,11 +462,12 @@ struct page *dma_direct_alloc_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size, return NULL; ret = page_address(page); - if (dma_set_decrypted(dev, ret, size)) + if ((attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED) && dma_set_decrypted(dev, ret, size)) goto out_leak_pages; setup_page: memset(ret, 0, size); - *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page)); + *dma_handle = phys_to_dma_direct(dev, page_to_phys(page), + !!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)); return page; out_leak_pages: return NULL; -- 2.43.0