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Tue, 09 Jun 2026 05:18:22 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 14:18:14 +0200 From: Petr Tesarik To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Catalin Marinas , Jiri Pirko , Jason Gunthorpe , Mostafa Saleh , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org, Jiri Pirko , Michael Kelley Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/20] dma-direct: use DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED in alloc/free paths Message-ID: <20260609141814.413c1f2f@mordecai> In-Reply-To: <20260604083959.1265923-4-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> References: <20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260604083959.1265923-4-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 4.4.0 (GTK 3.24.52; x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) X-Mailing-List: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org List-Id: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Archive: , List-Subscribe: , , List-Unsubscribe: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Thu, 4 Jun 2026 14:09:42 +0530 "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" wrote: > Propagate force_dma_unencrypted() into DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED in the > dma-direct allocation path and use the attribute to drive the related > decisions. > > This updates dma_direct_alloc(), dma_direct_free(), and > dma_direct_alloc_pages() to fold the forced unencrypted case into attrs. > > Tested-by: Jiri Pirko > Tested-by: Michael Kelley > Tested-by: Mostafa Saleh > Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) Reviewed-by: Petr Tesarik Petr T > --- > kernel/dma/direct.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c > index a741c8a2ee66..90dc5057a0c0 100644 > --- a/kernel/dma/direct.c > +++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c > @@ -193,16 +193,31 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, > dma_addr_t *dma_handle, gfp_t gfp, unsigned long attrs) > { > bool remap = false, set_uncached = false; > - bool mark_mem_decrypt = true; > + bool mark_mem_decrypt = false; > struct page *page; > void *ret; > > + /* > + * DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED is not a caller-visible dma_alloc_*() > + * attribute. The direct allocator uses it internally after it has > + * decided that the backing pages must be shared/decrypted, so the > + * rest of the allocation path can consistently select DMA addresses, > + * choose compatible pools and restore encryption on free. > + */ > + if (attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED) > + return NULL; > + > + if (force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) { > + attrs |= DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED; > + mark_mem_decrypt = true; > + } > + > size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); > if (attrs & DMA_ATTR_NO_WARN) > gfp |= __GFP_NOWARN; > > - if ((attrs & DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING) && > - !force_dma_unencrypted(dev) && !is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev)) > + if (((attrs & (DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING | DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)) == > + DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING) && !is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev)) > return dma_direct_alloc_no_mapping(dev, size, dma_handle, gfp); > > if (!dev_is_dma_coherent(dev)) { > @@ -236,7 +251,7 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size, > * Remapping or decrypting memory may block, allocate the memory from > * the atomic pools instead if we aren't allowed block. > */ > - if ((remap || force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) && > + if ((remap || (attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)) && > dma_direct_use_pool(dev, gfp)) > return dma_direct_alloc_from_pool(dev, size, dma_handle, gfp); > > @@ -312,12 +327,24 @@ void dma_direct_free(struct device *dev, size_t size, > void *cpu_addr, dma_addr_t dma_addr, unsigned long attrs) > { > phys_addr_t phys; > - bool mark_mem_encrypted = true; > + bool mark_mem_encrypted = false; > struct io_tlb_pool *swiotlb_pool; > unsigned int page_order = get_order(size); > > - if ((attrs & DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING) && > - !force_dma_unencrypted(dev) && !is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev)) { > + /* see dma_direct_alloc() for details */ > + WARN_ON(attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED); > + > + /* > + * if the device had requested for an unencrypted buffer, > + * convert it to encrypted on free > + */ > + if (force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) { > + attrs |= DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED; > + mark_mem_encrypted = true; > + } > + > + if (((attrs & (DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING | DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED)) == > + DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING) && !is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev)) { > /* cpu_addr is a struct page cookie, not a kernel address */ > dma_free_contiguous(dev, cpu_addr, size); > return; > @@ -366,10 +393,14 @@ void dma_direct_free(struct device *dev, size_t size, > struct page *dma_direct_alloc_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size, > dma_addr_t *dma_handle, enum dma_data_direction dir, gfp_t gfp) > { > + unsigned long attrs = 0; > struct page *page; > void *ret; > > - if (force_dma_unencrypted(dev) && dma_direct_use_pool(dev, gfp)) > + if (force_dma_unencrypted(dev)) > + attrs |= DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED; > + > + if ((attrs & DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED) && dma_direct_use_pool(dev, gfp)) > return dma_direct_alloc_from_pool(dev, size, dma_handle, gfp); > > if (is_swiotlb_for_alloc(dev)) { > @@ -403,7 +434,11 @@ void dma_direct_free_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size, > phys_addr_t phys; > void *vaddr = page_address(page); > struct io_tlb_pool *swiotlb_pool; > - bool mark_mem_encrypted = true; > + /* > + * if the device had requested for an unencrypted buffer, > + * convert it to encrypted on free > + */ > + bool mark_mem_encrypted = force_dma_unencrypted(dev); > > /* If cpu_addr is not from an atomic pool, dma_free_from_pool() fails */ > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMA_COHERENT_POOL) &&