From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Linus Torvalds' <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Pawan Gupta" <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in 64-bit __get_user()
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2024 21:38:35 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4055e18be7ff4f1f83fb9a4b6a8bc312@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgLCzEwa=S4hZFGeOPjix-1_fDrsqR-QLaBcDM-fgkvhw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Linus Torvalds
> Sent: 16 November 2024 01:27
>
> On Fri, 15 Nov 2024 at 15:06, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > It's sad that __get_user() is now slower than get_user() on x86, it kind
> > of defeats the whole point!
>
> Well, honestly, we've been trying to get away from __get_user() and
> __put_user() for a long long time.
>
> With CLAC/STAC, it's been probably a decade or two since __get_user()
> and friends were actually a worthwhile optimization, so let's just
> strive to get rid of the ones that matter.
Thinks....
If __get_user() is the same as get_user() then all the access_ok()
outside of get/put_user() and copy_to/from_user() can be removed
because they are pointless (anyone that brave?).
There is no point optimising the code to fast-path bad user pointers.
> We already have this with user_access_begin() + unsafe_get_user().
> There's also a version which masks the address: masked_user_access_begin().
That sounds as though it is begging for a simple to use:
masked_addr = user_access_begin(addr, size, error_label);
and
val = unsafe_get_user(masked_addr, error_label);
form?
Probably with objtool checking they are all in a valid sequence
with no functions calls (etc).
If address masking isn't needed (by an architecture) the address can be left
unchanged.
A quick grep shows access_ok() in 66 .c and 8 .h files outside the arch code.
And 69 .c file in arch, most of the arch .h are uaccess.h and futex.h.
I suspect the audit wouldn't tale that long.
Getting any patches accepted is another matter.
David
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Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-16 21:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-29 1:56 [PATCH v3 0/6] x86/uaccess: avoid barrier_nospec() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in 64-bit copy_from_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 8:13 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2024-10-30 2:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-10-30 4:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in 64-bit __get_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 3:27 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-08 17:12 ` David Laight
2024-11-15 23:06 ` 'Josh Poimboeuf'
2024-11-16 1:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-16 21:38 ` David Laight [this message]
2024-11-16 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-21 21:40 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-21 22:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 0:12 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-22 1:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 3:11 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-22 3:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 9:06 ` Christophe Leroy
2024-11-22 18:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 19:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 19:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-24 16:11 ` David Laight
2024-11-24 18:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-22 9:38 ` David Laight
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in 32-bit copy_from_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] x86/uaccess: Convert 32-bit get_user() to unconditional pointer masking Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in 32-bit __get_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-29 1:56 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/uaccess: Converge [__]get_user() implementations Josh Poimboeuf
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