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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Mackerras" <paulus@samba.org>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Radim Krcmár" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Piotr Luc" <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Dave Airlie" <airlied@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Reza Arbab" <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Ard.Biesheuvel@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 15:07:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201707261927.v6QJR228008075@mail.zytor.com>



On 07/26/2017 02:26 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>>>>>                                                                     
>>    \
>>>>>    static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned
>> long count) \
>>>>>    {
>>>
>>> This will clash with a fix I did to add a "memory" clobber
>>> for the traditional implementation, see
>>> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9854573/
>>>
>>>> Is it even worth leaving these as inline functions?
>>>> Given the speed of IO cycles it is unlikely that the cost of calling
>> a real
>>>> function will be significant.
>>>> The code bloat reduction will be significant.
>>>
>>> I think the smallest code would be the original "rep insb" etc, which
>>> should be smaller than a function call, unlike the loop. Then again,
>>> there is a rather small number of affected device drivers, almost all
>>> of them for ancient hardware that you won't even build in a 64-bit
>>> x86 kernel, see the list below. The only user I found that is
>> actually
>>> still relevant is drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c, which uses it for the
>> early
>>> console.
>>
>>
>> There are some indirect user of string I/O functions. The following
>> functions
>> defined in lib/iomap.c calls rep version of ins and outs.
>>
>> - ioread8_rep, ioread16_rep, ioread32_rep
>> - iowrite8_rep, iowrite16_rep, iowrite32_rep
>>
>> I found that several drivers use above functions.
>>
>> Here is one approach to convert it into non-inline functions. In this
>> approach,
>> I have added a new file arch/x86/kernel/io.c which provides non rep
>> version of
>> string I/O routines. The file gets built and used only when
>> AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is
>> enabled. On positive side, if we don't build kernel with
>> AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT support
>> then we use inline routines, when AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is built then we make
>> a function
>> call. Inside the function we unroll only when SEV is active.
>>
>> Do you see any issue with this approach ? thanks
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> index e080a39..104927d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
>> @@ -323,8 +323,9 @@ static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port)
>>                 \
>>       unsigned type value = in##bwl(port);                            \
>>       slow_down_io();                                                 \
>>       return value;                                                   \
>> -}
>> \
>> -
>> \
>> +}
>> +
>> +#define BUILDIO_REP(bwl, bw, type)
>> \
>> static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>> count) \
>> {
>> \
>>       asm volatile("rep; outs" #bwl                                   \
>> @@ -335,12 +336,31 @@ static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr,
>> unsigned long count)    \
>> {
>> \
>>       asm volatile("rep; ins" #bwl                                    \
>>                    : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) : "d"(port));            \
>> -}
>> +}
>> \
>>   
>>   BUILDIO(b, b, char)
>>   BUILDIO(w, w, short)
>>   BUILDIO(l, , int)
>>   
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>> +extern void outsb_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>> count);
>> +extern void insb_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>> +extern void outsw_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>> count);
>> +extern void insw_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>> +extern void outsl_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long
>> count);
>> +extern void insl_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count);
>> +#define outsb  outsb_try_rep
>> +#define insb   insb_try_rep
>> +#define outsw  outsw_try_rep
>> +#define insw   insw_try_rep
>> +#define outsl  outsl_try_rep
>> +#define insl   insl_try_rep
>> +#else
>> +BUILDIO_REP(b, b, char)
>> +BUILDIO_REP(w, w, short)
>> +BUILDIO_REP(l, , int)
>> +#endif
>> +
>>   extern void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys);
>>   extern void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr);
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> index a01892b..3b6e2a3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ CFLAGS_irq.o := -I$(src)/../include/asm/trace
>>   
>>   obj-y                  := process_$(BITS).o signal.o
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT)   += signal_compat.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += io.o
>> obj-y                  += traps.o irq.o irq_$(BITS).o
>> dumpstack_$(BITS).o
>>   obj-y                  += time.o ioport.o dumpstack.o nmi.o
>>   obj-$(CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL)       += ldt.o
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/io.c b/arch/x86/kernel/io.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..f58afa9
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/io.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +#include <linux/io.h>
>> +#include <asm/io.h>
>> +
>> +void outsb_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned char *value = (unsigned char *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       outb(*value, port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; outsb" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
>> +
>> +void insb_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned char *value = (unsigned char *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       *value = inb(port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; insb" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
>> +
>> +void outsw_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned short *value = (unsigned short *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       outw(*value, port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; outsw" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
>> +void insw_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned short *value = (unsigned short *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       *value = inw(port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; insw" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
>> +
>> +void outsl_try_rep(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned int *value = (unsigned int *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       outl(*value, port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; outsl" : "+S"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
>> +
>> +void insl_try_rep(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)
>> +{
>> +       if (sev_active()) {
>> +               unsigned int *value = (unsigned int *)addr;
>> +               while (count) {
>> +                       *value = inl(port);
>> +                       value++;
>> +                       count--;
>> +               }
>> +       } else {
>> +               asm volatile("rep; insl" : "+D"(addr), "+c"(count) :
>> "d"(port));
>> +       }
>> +}
> 
> What the heck?
> 

I am not sure if I understand your concern.

Are you commenting on amount of code duplication ? If so, I can certainly improve
and use the similar macro used into header file to generate the functions body.

Are you commenting that we should not attempt to make those functions non-inline
and you prefer them to stay inline ?

thanks

  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-26 20:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  5:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25 10:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 14:36       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26  4:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-27 13:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 14:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47     ` David Laight
2017-08-17 18:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 10:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:55     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-08-02  4:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-26 19:24       ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07           ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-07-27  7:45             ` David Laight
2017-08-22 16:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 16:22                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 16:27                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-25 12:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-09-03  2:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-04 17:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-31 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov

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