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From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
To: GONG Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Lu Jialin <lujialin4@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2025 14:29:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <683380bb-ef1b-44ab-b7df-83c23dd76ff7@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <362b3e8a-0949-42d1-a1d0-90bd12d86b09@huawei.com>


On 7/17/25 8:29 AM, GONG Ruiqi wrote:
> On 7/8/2025 4:35 AM, Nayna Jain wrote:
>> On 7/2/25 10:07 PM, GONG Ruiqi wrote:
>>> ...
>>>
>>> "We encountered a boot failure issue in an in-house testing, where the
>>> kernel refused to load its modules since it couldn't verify their
>>> signature. The root cause turned out to be the early return of
>>> load_uefi_certs(), where arch_ima_get_secureboot() returned false
>>> unconditionally due to CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT=n, even
>>> though the secure boot was enabled.
>> Thanks for sharing additional details.
>>
>>  From x86 Kconfig:
>>
>> /For config x86:
>>
>>      imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT    if EFI
>> /
>> And IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT is dependent on IMA_ARCH_POLICY .
>>
>> And from Linux Kernel Kbuild documentation( https://docs.kernel.org/
>> kbuild/kconfig-language.html) :
>>
>> /weak reverse dependencies: “imply” <symbol> [“if” <expr>]
>>
>> This is similar to “select” as it enforces a lower limit on another
>> symbol except that the “implied” symbol’s value may still be set to n
>> from a direct dependency or with a visible prompt.
>>
>> /Following the example from the documentation, if  it is EFI enabled and
>> IMA_ARCH_POLICY is set to y then this config should be default enabled.
>>
>> If it is EFI enabled and IMA_ARCH_POLICY is set to N, then the setting
>> for IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT should be prompted during the build.
>> The default setting for prompt is N. So, the person doing the build
>> should actually select Y to enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY.
>>
>> Wondering what is the scenario for you? Unless you have IMA_ARCH_POLICY
>> set to N, this config should have been ideally enabled. If you have
>> explicitly set it to N, am curious any specific reason for that.
> Hi Nayna. Sorry for the late reply. Super busy these days...
>
> Yes, IMA_ARCH_POLICY was not set. The testing was conducted on
> openEuler[1], a Linux distro mainly for arm64 & x86, and the kernel was
> compiled based on its own openeuler_defconfig[2], which set
> IMA_ARCH_POLICY to N.

Thanks Ruiqi for the response.

It seems the main cause of the problem was that IMA_ARCH_POLICY config 
wasn't enabled; and it sounds like you don't need IMA arch policies but 
you do need the arch specific function to get the secure boot status.

In that case, removing IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT config dependency 
on IMA_ARCH_POLICY config and updating the corresponding help is all 
that is needed.

The help text can be updated to:
This option is selected by architectures to detect systems with secure 
and/or trusted boot enabled, in order to load the appropriate IMA 
runtime policies and keys.

Thanks & Regards,

     - Nayna



  reply	other threads:[~2025-07-25 18:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-28  6:32 [PATCH v2] integrity: Extract secure boot enquiry function out of IMA GONG Ruiqi
2025-06-30  3:48 ` kernel test robot
2025-07-03  1:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-07-03  2:07   ` GONG Ruiqi
2025-07-03  3:35     ` Mimi Zohar
2025-07-03  5:19       ` GONG Ruiqi
2025-07-07 20:35     ` Nayna Jain
2025-07-17 12:29       ` GONG Ruiqi
2025-07-25 18:29         ` Nayna Jain [this message]
2025-07-28 12:17           ` GONG Ruiqi
2025-08-01 14:34             ` Nayna Jain

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