From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 29/37] powerpc/nohash: Replace pte_user() by pte_read()
Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 15:53:42 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8734xa9ck1.fsf@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a67c0d93-f4e9-d5c5-a5ee-3347c80f0a64@csgroup.eu>
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> writes:
> Le 07/11/2023 à 14:34, Aneesh Kumar K.V a écrit :
>> Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> writes:
>>
>>> Le 31/10/2023 à 11:15, Aneesh Kumar K.V a écrit :
>>>> Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> writes:
....
>>
>>
>> We are adding the pte flags check not the map addr check there. Something like this?
>
> Well, ok, but then why do we want to do that check for ioremap() and not
> for everything else ? vmap() for instance will not perform any such
> check. All it does is to clear the EXEC bit.
>
> As far as I can see, no other architecture does such a check, so why is
> it needed on powerpc at all ?
>
> Regardless, comments below.
>
Looking at ioremap_prot() I am not clear whether we can really use the
flag value argument as is. For ex: x86 does
pgprot2cachemode(__pgprot(prot_val))
I see that we use ioremap_prot() for generic_access_phys() and with
/dev/mem and __access_remote_vm() we can get called with a user pte
mapping prot flags?
If such an prot value can be observed then the original change to clear
EXEC and mark it privileged is required?
/* we don't want to let _PAGE_USER and _PAGE_EXEC leak out */
pte = pte_exprotect(pte);
pte = pte_mkprivileged(pte);
We already handle exec in pgprot_nx() and we need add back
pte_mkprivileged()?
-aneesh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-13 10:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-25 18:31 [PATCH v2 00/37] Implement execute-only protection on powerpc Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/37] powerpc/8xx: Fix pte_access_permitted() for PAGE_NONE Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/37] powerpc/64e: Fix wrong test in __ptep_test_and_clear_young() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/37] powerpc/40x: Remove stale PTE_ATOMIC_UPDATES macro Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/37] powerpc: Remove pte_ERROR() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/37] powerpc: Deduplicate prototypes of ptep_set_access_flags() and phys_mem_access_prot() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/37] powerpc: Refactor update_mmu_cache_range() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/37] powerpc: Untangle fixmap.h and pgtable.h and mmu.h Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/37] powerpc/nohash: Remove {pte/pmd}_protnone() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor declaration of {map/unmap}_kernel_page() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/37] powerpc/nohash: Move 8xx version of pte_update() into pte-8xx.h Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/37] powerpc/nohash: Replace #ifdef CONFIG_44x by IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_44x) in pgtable.h Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor pte_update() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor checking of no-change in pte_update() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 14/37] powerpc/nohash: Deduplicate _PAGE_CHG_MASK Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 15/37] powerpc/nohash: Deduplicate pte helpers Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 16/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor ptep_test_and_clear_young() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 17/37] powerpc/nohash: Deduplicate ptep_set_wrprotect() and ptep_get_and_clear() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 18/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor pte_clear() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 19/37] powerpc/nohash: Refactor __ptep_set_access_flags() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 20/37] powerpc/e500: Simplify pte_mkexec() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 21/37] powerpc: Implement and use pgprot_nx() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 22/37] powerpc: Fail ioremap() instead of silently ignoring flags when PAGE_USER is set Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 23/37] powerpc: Remove pte_mkuser() and pte_mkpriviledged() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 24/37] powerpc: Rely on address instead of pte_user() Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 25/37] powerpc: Refactor permission masks used for __P/__S table and kernel memory flags Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 26/37] powerpc/8xx: Use generic permission masks Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 27/37] powerpc/64s: " Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 28/37] powerpc/nohash: Add _PAGE_WRITE to supplement _PAGE_RW Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 29/37] powerpc/nohash: Replace pte_user() by pte_read() Christophe Leroy
2023-10-31 10:15 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2023-11-06 13:21 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-11-07 13:34 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2023-11-09 18:20 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-11-13 10:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2023-11-23 15:55 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 30/37] powerpc/e500: Introduce _PAGE_READ and remove _PAGE_USER Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 31/37] powerpc/44x: " Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 32/37] powerpc/40x: " Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 33/37] powerpc/32s: Add _PAGE_WRITE to supplement _PAGE_RW Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 34/37] powerpc/32s: Introduce _PAGE_READ and remove _PAGE_USER Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 35/37] powerpc/ptdump: Display _PAGE_READ and _PAGE_WRITE Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 36/37] powerpc: Finally remove _PAGE_USER Christophe Leroy
2023-09-25 18:31 ` [PATCH v2 37/37] powerpc: Support execute-only on all powerpc Christophe Leroy
2023-11-02 5:39 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2023-11-06 13:23 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-11-07 6:15 ` Aneesh Kumar K V
2023-11-09 17:38 ` Christophe Leroy
2023-10-15 10:00 ` (subset) [PATCH v2 00/37] Implement execute-only protection on powerpc Michael Ellerman
2023-10-27 9:59 ` Michael Ellerman
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