From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mhocko@kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com,
paulus@samba.org, aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v6 21/62] powerpc: introduce execute-only pkey
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2017 13:14:02 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87d18fw9it.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87d18fu6o1.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:
> Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>> Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> writes:
> ...
>>> +
>>> + /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
>>> + if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
>>> + mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
>>> + return execute_only_pkey;
>>> +}
>>
>> If you follow the code flow in __execute_only_pkey, the AMR and UAMOR
>> are read 3 times in total, and AMR is written twice. IAMR is read and
>> written twice. Since they are SPRs and access to them is slow (or isn't
>> it?),
>
> SPRs read/writes are slow, but they're not *that* slow in comparison to
> a system call (which I think is where this code is being called?).
Yes, this code runs on mprotect and mmap syscalls if the memory is
requested to have execute but not read nor write permissions.
> So we should try to avoid too many SPR read/writes, but at the same time
> we can accept more than the minimum if it makes the code much easier to
> follow.
Ok. Ram had asked me to suggest a way to optimize the SPR reads and
writes and I came up with the patch below. Do you think it's worth it?
The patch applies on top of this series, but if Ram includes it I think
he would break it up and merge it into the other patches.
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
>From f6e73e67d325c4a1952c375072ca35156a9f2042 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 20:22:59 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: Cache protection key registers in
__execute_only_pkey
Pass around a struct with the contents of AMR, IAMR and AMOR, as well as
flags indicating whether those fields hold valid values and whether they
should be committed back to the registers.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 18 ++++--
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
index e61ed6c332db..66f15dbc5855 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -129,12 +129,15 @@ static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
mm_set_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey));
}
-extern void __arch_activate_pkey(int pkey);
+struct pkey_regs_cache;
+
+extern void __arch_activate_pkey(int pkey, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs);
extern void __arch_deactivate_pkey(int pkey);
/*
* Returns a positive, 5-bit key on success, or -1 on failure.
*/
-static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
+static inline int __mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
/*
* Note: this is the one and only place we make sure
@@ -162,10 +165,15 @@ static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
* enable the key in the hardware
*/
if (ret > 0)
- __arch_activate_pkey(ret);
+ __arch_activate_pkey(ret, regs);
return ret;
}
+static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ return __mm_pkey_alloc(mm, NULL);
+}
+
static inline int mm_pkey_free(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
{
if (!pkey_inited)
@@ -206,13 +214,13 @@ static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
- unsigned long init_val);
+ unsigned long init_val, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs);
static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
unsigned long init_val)
{
if (!pkey_inited)
return -EINVAL;
- return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
+ return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val, NULL);
}
static inline bool arch_pkeys_enabled(void)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
index 1424c79f45f6..718ea23f8184 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -22,52 +22,92 @@ u32 initial_allocation_mask; /* bits set for reserved keys */
#define PKEY_REG_BITS (sizeof(u64)*8)
#define pkeyshift(pkey) (PKEY_REG_BITS - ((pkey+1) * AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY))
-static bool is_pkey_enabled(int pkey)
+/*
+ * The registers controlling memory protection keys are expensive to access, so
+ * we want to cache their values in code paths that might need to use them more
+ * than once.
+ */
+struct pkey_regs_cache {
+ u64 amr;
+ u64 iamr;
+ u64 uamor;
+
+ bool amr_valid;
+ bool iamr_valid;
+ bool uamor_valid;
+
+ bool write_amr;
+ bool write_iamr;
+ bool write_uamor;
+};
+
+static bool is_pkey_enabled(int pkey, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
- return !!(read_uamor() & (0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey)));
+ u64 uamor = (regs && regs->uamor_valid) ? regs->uamor : read_uamor();
+ return !!(uamor & (0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey)));
}
-static inline void init_amr(int pkey, u8 init_bits)
+static inline void init_amr(int pkey, u8 init_bits,
+ struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
u64 new_amr_bits = (((u64)init_bits & 0x3UL) << pkeyshift(pkey));
- u64 old_amr = read_amr() & ~((u64)(0x3ul) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+ u64 amr = (regs && regs->amr_valid) ? regs->amr : read_amr();
+
+ amr = (amr & ~((u64)(0x3ul) << pkeyshift(pkey))) | new_amr_bits;
- write_amr(old_amr | new_amr_bits);
+ if (regs) {
+ regs->amr = amr;
+ regs->amr_valid = regs->write_amr = true;
+ } else
+ write_amr(amr);
}
-static inline void init_iamr(int pkey, u8 init_bits)
+static inline void init_iamr(int pkey, u8 init_bits,
+ struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
u64 new_iamr_bits = (((u64)init_bits & 0x3UL) << pkeyshift(pkey));
- u64 old_iamr = read_iamr() & ~((u64)(0x3ul) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+ u64 iamr = (regs && regs->iamr_valid) ? regs->iamr : read_iamr();
- write_iamr(old_iamr | new_iamr_bits);
+ iamr = (iamr & ~((u64)(0x3ul) << pkeyshift(pkey))) | new_iamr_bits;
+
+ if (regs) {
+ regs->iamr = iamr;
+ regs->iamr_valid = regs->write_iamr = true;
+ } else
+ write_iamr(iamr);
}
-static void pkey_status_change(int pkey, bool enable)
+static void pkey_status_change(int pkey, bool enable,
+ struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
- u64 old_uamor;
+ u64 uamor;
/* reset the AMR and IAMR bits for this key */
- init_amr(pkey, 0x0);
- init_iamr(pkey, 0x0);
+ init_amr(pkey, 0x0, regs);
+ init_iamr(pkey, 0x0, regs);
/* enable/disable key */
- old_uamor = read_uamor();
+ uamor = (regs && regs->uamor_valid) ? regs->uamor : read_uamor();
if (enable)
- old_uamor |= (0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey));
+ uamor |= (0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey));
else
- old_uamor &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey));
- write_uamor(old_uamor);
+ uamor &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey));
+
+ if (regs) {
+ regs->uamor = uamor;
+ regs->uamor_valid = regs->write_uamor = true;
+ } else
+ write_uamor(uamor);
}
-void __arch_activate_pkey(int pkey)
+void __arch_activate_pkey(int pkey, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
- pkey_status_change(pkey, true);
+ pkey_status_change(pkey, true, regs);
}
void __arch_deactivate_pkey(int pkey)
{
- pkey_status_change(pkey, false);
+ pkey_status_change(pkey, false, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -75,12 +115,12 @@ void __arch_deactivate_pkey(int pkey)
* for @pkey to that specified in @init_val.
*/
int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
- unsigned long init_val)
+ unsigned long init_val, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
u64 new_amr_bits = 0x0ul;
u64 new_iamr_bits = 0x0ul;
- if (!is_pkey_enabled(pkey))
+ if (!is_pkey_enabled(pkey, regs))
return -EINVAL;
/* Set the bits we need in AMR: */
@@ -89,23 +129,37 @@ int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
else if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
new_amr_bits |= AMR_WR_BIT;
- init_amr(pkey, new_amr_bits);
+ init_amr(pkey, new_amr_bits, regs);
if ((init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE))
new_iamr_bits |= IAMR_EX_BIT;
- init_iamr(pkey, new_iamr_bits);
+ init_iamr(pkey, new_iamr_bits, regs);
return 0;
}
-static inline bool pkey_allows_readwrite(int pkey)
+static inline bool pkey_allows_readwrite(int pkey, struct pkey_regs_cache *regs)
{
int pkey_shift = pkeyshift(pkey);
+ u64 uamor = (regs && regs->uamor_valid) ? regs->uamor : read_uamor();
+ u64 amr;
- if (!(read_uamor() & (0x3UL << pkey_shift)))
+ if (regs && !regs->uamor_valid) {
+ regs->uamor = uamor;
+ regs->uamor_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!(uamor & (0x3UL << pkey_shift)))
return true;
- return !(read_amr() & ((AMR_RD_BIT|AMR_WR_BIT) << pkey_shift));
+ amr = (regs && regs->amr_valid) ? regs->amr : read_amr();
+
+ if (regs && !regs->amr_valid) {
+ regs->amr = amr;
+ regs->amr_valid = true;
+ }
+
+ return !(amr & ((AMR_RD_BIT|AMR_WR_BIT) << pkey_shift));
}
int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -113,11 +167,12 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false;
int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
int ret;
+ struct pkey_regs_cache regs = { 0 };
/* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */
if (execute_only_pkey == -1) {
/* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */
- execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm);
+ execute_only_pkey = __mm_pkey_alloc(mm, ®s);
if (execute_only_pkey < 0)
return -1;
need_to_set_mm_pkey = true;
@@ -131,7 +186,7 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
* ourselves.
*/
if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey &&
- !pkey_allows_readwrite(execute_only_pkey))
+ !pkey_allows_readwrite(execute_only_pkey, ®s))
return execute_only_pkey;
/*
@@ -139,7 +194,7 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
* other than execution.
*/
ret = __arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey,
- (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+ (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE), ®s);
/*
* If the AMR-set operation failed somehow, just return
* 0 and effectively disable execute-only support.
@@ -149,6 +204,13 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
return -1;
}
+ if (regs.write_amr)
+ write_amr(regs.amr);
+ if (regs.write_iamr)
+ write_iamr(regs.iamr);
+ if (regs.write_uamor)
+ write_uamor(regs.uamor);
+
/* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */
if (need_to_set_mm_pkey)
mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
--
2.13.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-01 16:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-16 3:56 [RFC v6 00/62] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 01/62] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 4K backed HPTE pages Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:51 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-20 22:03 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 02/62] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K " Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 03/62] powerpc: introduce pte_set_hash_slot() helper Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:56 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 04/62] powerpc: introduce pte_get_hash_gslot() helper Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:57 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 05/62] powerpc: capture the PTE format changes in the dump pte report Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:56 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 06/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_64K() for 64K PTE Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:58 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 07/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_huge() " Ram Pai
2017-07-20 5:58 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 08/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_4K() " Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 09/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_4K() for 4K PTE Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 10/62] powerpc: use helper functions in flush_hash_page() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 11/62] powerpc: initial pkey plumbing Ram Pai
2017-07-20 6:04 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-20 22:11 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 12/62] mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 13/62] powerpc: track allocation status of all pkeys Ram Pai
2017-07-27 14:01 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-29 22:43 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-31 18:15 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 14/62] powerpc: helper function to read, write AMR, IAMR, UAMOR registers Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 15/62] powerpc: helper functions to initialize AMR, IAMR and UMOR registers Ram Pai
2017-07-27 20:40 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-30 0:38 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 16/62] powerpc: cleaup AMR, iAMR when a key is allocated or freed Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 17/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_set_user_pkey_access() Ram Pai
2017-07-27 14:15 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-29 22:59 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 18/62] powerpc: sys_pkey_alloc() and sys_pkey_free() system calls Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 19/62] powerpc: ability to create execute-disabled pkeys Ram Pai
2017-07-27 14:54 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-27 15:34 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-29 23:24 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-31 12:59 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 20/62] powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches Ram Pai
2017-07-27 17:32 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-29 23:31 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-31 13:00 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 21/62] powerpc: introduce execute-only pkey Ram Pai
2017-07-28 22:17 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-30 0:51 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-31 16:19 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-08-01 6:46 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-08-01 16:14 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann [this message]
2017-08-02 9:40 ` Michael Ellerman
[not found] ` <20170817233555.GC5427@ram.oc3035372033.ibm.com>
2017-08-17 23:42 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 22/62] powerpc: ability to associate pkey to a vma Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 23/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_override_mprotect_pkey() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 24/62] powerpc: map vma key-protection bits to pte key bits Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 25/62] powerpc: sys_pkey_mprotect() system call Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 26/62] powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits Ram Pai
2017-07-20 6:28 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 27/62] powerpc: helper to validate key-access permissions of a pte Ram Pai
2017-07-20 6:42 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-20 22:15 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-21 6:51 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2017-07-21 16:42 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-28 21:00 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-30 0:39 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 28/62] powerpc: check key protection for user page access Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 29/62] powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 30/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_vma_access_permitted() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 31/62] powerpc: Handle exceptions caused by pkey violation Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 32/62] powerpc: capture AMR register content on " Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 33/62] powerpc: introduce get_pte_pkey() helper Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 34/62] powerpc: capture the violated protection key on fault Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 35/62] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation Ram Pai
2017-08-19 19:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-08-22 18:06 ` Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 36/62] mm: introduce arch_pkeys_enabled() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 37/62] x86: implementation for arch_pkeys_enabled() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 38/62] powerpc: " Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 39/62] mm: display pkey in smaps if arch_pkeys_enabled() is true Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 40/62] x86: delete arch_show_smap() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 41/62] selftest/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 42/62] selftest/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 43/62] selftest/vm: move generic definitions to header file Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 44/62] selftest/vm: typecast the pkey register Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 45/62] selftest/vm: generics function to handle shadow key register Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 46/62] selftest/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 47/62] selftest/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 48/62] selftest/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 49/62] selftest/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 50/62] selftest/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 51/62] selftest/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 52/62] selftest/vm: generic cleanup Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 53/62] selftest/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 54/62] selftest/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 55/62] selftest/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 56/62] selftest/vm: detect no key violation on a freed key Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:56 ` [RFC v6 57/62] selftest/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:57 ` [RFC v6 58/62] selftest/vm: detect no write key-violation on a freed key Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:57 ` [RFC v6 59/62] selftest/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:57 ` [RFC v6 60/62] selftest/vm: sub-page allocator Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:57 ` [RFC v6 61/62] Documentation/x86: Move protecton key documentation to arch neutral directory Ram Pai
2017-07-16 3:57 ` [RFC v6 62/62] Documentation/vm: PowerPC specific updates to memory protection keys Ram Pai
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