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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon	 <will@kernel.org>,
	Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Ellerman	 <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev	 <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov	 <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"	
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Roberto Sassu	 <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn"	 <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"moderated list:ARM64 PORT (AARCH64 ARCHITECTURE)"	
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"	
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"open list:S390 ARCHITECTURE"	 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:EXTENSIBLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (EFI)"	
	<linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"	
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY"	 <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2026 08:11:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8bfa859ed3a4f1cf0db0ab64d8c1c3b24684582a.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXFXNo1-pMbo-VZrjQ3TYe1tufebrLr_avL12A0nHMSGnA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, 2026-01-16 at 10:41 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Thu, 15 Jan 2026 at 01:43, Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of
> > the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot
> > function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general,
> > integrity-wide function named arch_integrity_get_secureboot.
> > 
> > Define a new Kconfig option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, which is
> > automatically configured by the supported architectures. The existing
> > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT Kconfig loads the architecture specific
> > IMA policy based on the refactored secure boot status code.
> > 
> > Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/Kconfig                            |  1 +
> >  arch/powerpc/Kconfig                          |  1 +
> >  arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                  |  2 +-
> >  arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c                |  5 --
> >  arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c       | 13 +++++
> >  arch/s390/Kconfig                             |  1 +
> >  arch/s390/kernel/Makefile                     |  1 +
> >  arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c                   |  6 --
> >  arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c          |  9 +++
> >  arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  1 +
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h                    |  4 +-
> >  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c                   |  2 +-
> >  include/linux/ima.h                           |  7 +--
> >  include/linux/integrity.h                     |  8 +++
> >  security/integrity/Kconfig                    |  6 ++
> >  security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +
> >  security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c           | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c         |  2 +-
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c              | 47 +---------------
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c             |  4 +-
> >  security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c |  2 +-
> >  21 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
> >  create mode 100644 arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
> >  create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > index 93173f0a09c7..4c265b7386bb 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > @@ -2427,6 +2427,7 @@ config EFI
> >         select EFI_STUB
> >         select EFI_GENERIC_STUB
> >         imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
> > +       imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
> 
> This allows both to be en/disabled individually, which I don't think
> is what we want. It also results in more churn across the
> arch-specific Kconfigs than needed.
> 
> Wouldn't it be better if IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT 'select'ed
> INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT in its Kconfig definition?

As much as possible, EVM (and other LSMs) shouldn't be dependent on another LSM,
in this case IMA, being configured.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-16 13:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20260115004328.194142-1-coxu@redhat.com>
2026-01-15  0:43 ` [PATCH 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide Coiby Xu
2026-01-15 18:14   ` Mimi Zohar
2026-01-16  9:41   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-01-16 13:11     ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2026-01-16 13:18       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-01-16 16:38         ` Mimi Zohar
2026-01-16 17:27           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-01-18 18:25             ` Mimi Zohar
2026-01-19  4:04               ` Coiby Xu
2026-01-21 15:40                 ` Mimi Zohar
2026-01-21 16:25                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-01-24  0:18                     ` Coiby Xu
2026-02-25  0:03                     ` Mimi Zohar
2026-02-26 10:23                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-01-19 18:44               ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-21 15:29                 ` Mimi Zohar

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