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Tue, 4 Jun 2019 20:33:17 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83F4513605E; Tue, 4 Jun 2019 20:33:15 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.215.159]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 4 Jun 2019 20:33:15 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [WIP RFC PATCH 0/6] Generic Firmware Variable Filesystem To: Greg KH , Daniel Axtens References: <20190520062553.14947-1-dja@axtens.net> <316a0865-7e14-b36a-7e49-5113f3dfc35f@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87zhmzxkzz.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net> <20190603072916.GA7545@kroah.com> From: Nayna Message-ID: <90d3394f-c2e6-5d47-0ebd-0ddb28f3f883@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 16:33:14 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190603072916.GA7545@kroah.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-06-04_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1906040130 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: nayna@linux.ibm.com, cclaudio@linux.ibm.com, Mimi Zohar , George Wilson , Matthew Garrett , Elaine Palmer , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On 06/03/2019 03:29 AM, Greg KH wrote: > On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:04:32PM +1000, Daniel Axtens wrote: >> Hi Nayna, >> >>>> As PowerNV moves towards secure boot, we need a place to put secure >>>> variables. One option that has been canvassed is to make our secure >>>> variables look like EFI variables. This is an early sketch of another >>>> approach where we create a generic firmware variable file system, >>>> fwvarfs, and an OPAL Secure Variable backend for it. >>> Is there a need of new filesystem ? I am wondering why can't these be >>> exposed via sysfs / securityfs ? >>> Probably, something like... /sys/firmware/secureboot or >>> /sys/kernel/security/secureboot/  ? >> I suppose we could put secure variables in sysfs, but I'm not sure >> that's what sysfs was intended for. I understand sysfs as "a >> filesystem-based view of kernel objects" (from >> Documentation/filesystems/configfs/configfs.txt), and I don't think a >> secure variable is really a kernel object in the same way most other >> things in sysfs are... but I'm open to being convinced. > What makes them more "secure" than anything else that is in sysfs today? > I didn't see anything in this patchset that provided "additional > security", did I miss it? > >> securityfs seems to be reserved for LSMs, I don't think we can put >> things there. > Yeah, I wouldn't mess with that. Thanks Greg for clarifying!! I am curious, the TPM exposes the BIOS event log to userspace via securityfs. Is there a reason for not exposing these security variables to userspace via securityfs as well? Thanks & Regards, - Nayna