From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA7EFC3A5A1 for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 04:09:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3077D20830 for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 04:09:59 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3077D20830 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=buserror.net Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46JC1x0lBczDr0X for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 14:09:57 +1000 (AEST) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=buserror.net (client-ip=165.227.176.147; helo=baldur.buserror.net; envelope-from=oss@buserror.net; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=buserror.net Received: from baldur.buserror.net (baldur.buserror.net [165.227.176.147]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46JBzY1BctzDqvt for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 14:07:52 +1000 (AEST) Received: from [2601:449:8400:7293:12bf:48ff:fe84:c9a0] by baldur.buserror.net with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1i2pDA-0007By-1u; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 23:05:32 -0500 Message-ID: From: Scott Wood To: Jason Yan , mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, christophe.leroy@c-s.fr, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, npiggin@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 23:05:30 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20190809100800.5426-1-yanaijie@huawei.com> References: <20190809100800.5426-1-yanaijie@huawei.com> Organization: Red Hat Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.28.5-0ubuntu0.18.04.1 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2601:449:8400:7293:12bf:48ff:fe84:c9a0 X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: yanaijie@huawei.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, christophe.leroy@c-s.fr, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, npiggin@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jingxiangfeng@huawei.com, zhaohongjiang@huawei.com, thunder.leizhen@huawei.com, fanchengyang@huawei.com, yebin10@huawei.com X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: oss@buserror.net Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32 X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Tue, 02 Aug 2016 21:08:31 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on baldur.buserror.net) X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jingxiangfeng@huawei.com, zhaohongjiang@huawei.com, thunder.leizhen@huawei.com, fanchengyang@huawei.com, yebin10@huawei.com Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote: > This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security > feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location > of kernel internals. > > Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is > map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. Have you tested this with a kernel that was loaded at a non-zero address? I tried loading a kernel at 0x04000000 (by changing the address in the uImage, and setting bootm_low to 04000000 in U-Boot), and it works without CONFIG_RANDOMIZE and fails with. > Freescale Book-E > parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1 > entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized > region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to > relocate. > > Entropy is derived from the banner and timer base, which will change every > build and boot. This not so much safe so additionally the bootloader may > pass entropy via the /chosen/kaslr-seed node in device tree. How complicated would it be to directly access the HW RNG (if present) that early in the boot? It'd be nice if a U-Boot update weren't required (and particularly concerning that KASLR would appear to work without a U-Boot update, but without decent entropy). -Scott