Re: [PATCH 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide

Coiby Xu
2026-01-19T04:06:09Z

On Sun, Jan 18, 2026 at 01:25:52PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>On Fri, 2026-01-16 at 18:27 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:

Hi Ard and Mimi,

Thanks for your discussion on improving the patch!

>> On Fri, 16 Jan 2026 at 17:39, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > On Fri, 2026-01-16 at 14:18 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> > > On Fri, 16 Jan 2026 at 14:11, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>> > > >
>> > > > On Fri, 2026-01-16 at 10:41 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> > > > > On Thu, 15 Jan 2026 at 01:43, Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of
>> > > > > > the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot
>> > > > > > function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general,
>> > > > > > integrity-wide function named arch_integrity_get_secureboot.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Define a new Kconfig option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, which is
>> > > > > > automatically configured by the supported architectures. The existing
>> > > > > > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT Kconfig loads the architecture specific
>> > > > > > IMA policy based on the refactored secure boot status code.
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> > > > > > Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
>> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
>> > > > > > ---
>> > > > > > arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
>> > > > > > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 +
>> > > > > > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
>> > > > > > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 --
>> > > > > > arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 13 +++++
>> > > > > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
>> > > > > > arch/s390/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
>> > > > > > arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 --
>> > > > > > arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 9 +++
>> > > > > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
>> > > > > > arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 4 +-
>> > > > > > arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +-
>> > > > > > include/linux/ima.h | 7 +--
>> > > > > > include/linux/integrity.h | 8 +++
>> > > > > > security/integrity/Kconfig | 6 ++
>> > > > > > security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +
>> > > > > > security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
>> > > > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
>> > > > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 47 +---------------
>> > > > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
>> > > > > > security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +-
>> > > > > > 21 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
>> > > > > > create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
>> > > > > > create mode 100644 arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
>> > > > > > create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
>> > > > > >
>> > > > > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> > > > > > index 93173f0a09c7..4c265b7386bb 100644
>> > > > > > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> > > > > > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> > > > > > @@ -2427,6 +2427,7 @@ config EFI
>> > > > > > select EFI_STUB
>> > > > > > select EFI_GENERIC_STUB
>> > > > > > imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
>> > > > > > + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
>> > > > >
>> > > > > This allows both to be en/disabled individually, which I don't think
>> > > > > is what we want. It also results in more churn across the
>> > > > > arch-specific Kconfigs than needed.
>> > > > >
>> > > > > Wouldn't it be better if IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT 'select'ed
>> > > > > INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT in its Kconfig definition?
>> > > >
>> > > > As much as possible, EVM (and other LSMs) shouldn't be dependent on another LSM,
>> > > > in this case IMA, being configured.
>> > >
>> > > Sure, but that is not my point.
>> > >
>> > > This arrangement allows for IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT to be
>> > > enabled without INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, resulting in the stub
>> > > implementation of arch_integrity_get_secureboot() being used, which
>> > > always returns false.

Since both INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT and IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
don't define a prompt, they are not user-configurable and will always be
enable/disabled together with arch-specific secure boot feature. So
despite the "imply" key word, the case where
IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT is enabled whereas INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
is disabled won't happen.

But I agree an arch may not care much about INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT so it
may be a churn. So limiting it to the scope of the integrity subsystem
can be a better idea.

>> >
>> > I understand your concern, but instead of "select"ing INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT from
>> > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT, how making IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
>> > dependent on both IMA_ARCH_POLICY and INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT.
>> >
>>
>> Given that INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT has no dependencies of its own,
>> afaict, selecting it is the least disruptive option, as otherwise,
>> existing configs will disable IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT as the
>> kernel is being upgraded. But conceptually, I agree that they are
>> equivalent.

As already pointed out on by Mimi, INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT depend on
arch-specific secure boot feature. So we can't say INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
has no dependencies.

>>
>> > Including the "imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT" here in the arch Kconfig allows EVM
>> > to query the secure boot state without relying on IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
>> > being configured.
>>
>> Yes, I understand that this is the whole point of the exercise. But
>> 'imply' should be used with care, and in this case, implying both from
>> CONFIG_EFI really makes little sense. INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT should be
>> selected by options that need the functionality, not 'implied' by
>> options that might provide it.

But again I agree INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT should "not 'implied' by options
that might provide it".

>
>As not all arch's implement arch_integrity_get_secureboot, the definition in
>include/linux/integrity.h would need to be updated. Something like:
>
>-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
>+#if (defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT) && \
>+ (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \
>+ || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT))
>
>Then IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT and EVM could select INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT,
>as suggested.

Since INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT has a dependency, select doesn't seem to be
a good choice. If EVM does select INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT,
INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT will be enabled even if arch-specific secure boot
feature is disabled and this can lead to a building failure. How about
always enabling INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT when secure boot feature is
enabled and also making IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT depend on
INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT?

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 916d4f2bfc44..cd44b46d0325 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX
will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the
.platform keyring.

+config INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT
+ def_bool y
+ depends on EFI || PPC_SECURE_BOOT || S390
+ help
+ Provide secure boot related helper functions like querying the
+ secure boot status.
+

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 976e75f9b9ba..5dce572192d6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS
config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
bool
depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ depends on INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT

Another idea is make a tree-wide arch_get_secureboot i.e. to move
current arch_ima_get_secureboot code to arch-specific secure boot
implementation. By this way, there will no need for a new Kconfig option
INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT. But I'm not sure if there is any unforeseen
concern.

--
Best regards,
Coiby