From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90955C34026 for ; Tue, 18 Feb 2020 19:30:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5149321D56 for ; Tue, 18 Feb 2020 19:30:24 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5149321D56 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=namei.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48MWCf0gR6zDqrj for ; Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:30:22 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=namei.org (client-ip=65.99.196.166; helo=namei.org; envelope-from=jmorris@namei.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=namei.org Received: from namei.org (namei.org [65.99.196.166]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48MW4p72c3zDqgS for ; Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:24:26 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by namei.org (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id 01IJO3sT013441; Tue, 18 Feb 2020 19:24:03 GMT Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:24:03 +1100 (AEDT) From: James Morris To: Alexey Budankov Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support In-Reply-To: <5f961a07-36d0-d8f4-1895-6cfc38bcb81e@linux.intel.com> Message-ID: References: <5f961a07-36d0-d8f4-1895-6cfc38bcb81e@linux.intel.com> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LRH 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org, "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , Peter Zijlstra , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , Alexei Starovoitov , Stephane Eranian , Paul Mackerras , Jiri Olsa , Ingo Molnar , Andi Kleen , Will Deacon , Helge Deller , Igor Lubashev , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Stephen Smalley , Serge Hallyn , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arm-kernel , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option > to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance > monitoring and observability. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and > __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem > remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN > usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to > CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Reviewed-by: James Morris -- James Morris