* [PATCH] crypto: vmx - Document CTR mode counter width quirks
From: Daniel Axtens @ 2019-06-11 1:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mpe, ebiggers, linux-crypto, Herbert Xu
Cc: leo.barbosa, Stephan Mueller, nayna, omosnacek, leitao, pfsmorigo,
marcelo.cerri, gcwilson, linuxppc-dev
The CTR code comes from OpenSSL, where it does a 32-bit counter.
The kernel has a 128-bit counter. This difference has lead to
issues.
Document it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
---
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
index 9c6b5c1d6a1a..db874367b602 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
@@ -1286,6 +1286,24 @@ ___
#########################################################################
{{{ # CTR procedure[s] #
+
+####################### WARNING: Here be dragons! #######################
+#
+# This code is written as 'ctr32', based on a 32-bit counter used
+# upstream. The kernel does *not* use a 32-bit counter. The kernel uses
+# a 128-bit counter.
+#
+# This leads to subtle changes from the upstream code: the counter
+# is incremented with vaddu_q_m rather than vaddu_w_m. This occurs in
+# both the bulk (8 blocks at a time) path, and in the individual block
+# path. Be aware of this when doing updates.
+#
+# See:
+# 1d4aa0b4c181 ("crypto: vmx - Fixing AES-CTR counter bug")
+# 009b30ac7444 ("crypto: vmx - CTR: always increment IV as quadword")
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8942
+#
+#########################################################################
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp,$x10,$rounds,$idx)=map("r$_",(3..10));
my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout,$tmp)= map("v$_",(0..3));
my ($ivec,$inptail,$inpperm,$outhead,$outperm,$outmask,$keyperm,$one)=
@@ -1357,7 +1375,7 @@ Loop_ctr32_enc:
addi $idx,$idx,16
bdnz Loop_ctr32_enc
- vadduqm $ivec,$ivec,$one
+ vadduqm $ivec,$ivec,$one # Kernel change for 128-bit
vmr $dat,$inptail
lvx $inptail,0,$inp
addi $inp,$inp,16
@@ -1501,7 +1519,7 @@ Load_ctr32_enc_key:
$SHL $len,$len,4
vadduqm $out1,$ivec,$one # counter values ...
- vadduqm $out2,$ivec,$two
+ vadduqm $out2,$ivec,$two # (do all ctr adds as 128-bit)
vxor $out0,$ivec,$rndkey0 # ... xored with rndkey[0]
le?li $idx,8
vadduqm $out3,$out1,$two
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/2] tools/perf: Add arch neutral function to choose event for perf kvm record
From: Ravi Bangoria @ 2019-06-11 2:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Anju T Sudhakar
Cc: Ravi Bangoria, maddy, peterz, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel,
alexander.shishkin, namhyung, jolsa
In-Reply-To: <20190610151642.GT21245@kernel.org>
On 6/10/19 8:46 PM, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> Em Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 12:15:17PM +0530, Anju T Sudhakar escreveu:
>> 'perf kvm record' uses 'cycles'(if the user did not specify any event) as
>> the default event to profile the guest.
>> This will not provide any proper samples from the guest incase of
>> powerpc architecture, since in powerpc the PMUs are controlled by
>> the guest rather than the host.
>>
>> Patch adds a function to pick an arch specific event for 'perf kvm record',
>> instead of selecting 'cycles' as a default event for all architectures.
>>
>> For powerpc this function checks for any user specified event, and if there
>> isn't any it returns invalid instead of proceeding with 'cycles' event.
>
> Michael, Ravi, Maddy, could you please provide an Acked-by, Reviewed-by
> or Tested-by?
Code looks fine to me but cross-build fails for aarch64:
builtin-kvm.c:1513:12: error: no previous prototype for 'kvm_add_default_arch_event' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
int __weak kvm_add_default_arch_event(int *argc __maybe_unused,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
mv: cannot stat './.builtin-kvm.o.tmp': No such file or directory
With the build fix:
Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH kernel] powerpc/powernv/ioda: Fix race in TCE level allocation
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy @ 2019-06-11 2:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: Jose Ricardo Ziviani, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple,
Daniel Henrique Barboza, kvm-ppc, Sam Bobroff, Paul Mackerras,
stable, Oliver O'Halloran, David Gibson
pnv_tce() returns a pointer to a TCE entry and originally a TCE table
would be pre-allocated. For the default case of 2GB window the table
needs only a single level and that is fine. However if more levels are
requested, it is possible to get a race when 2 threads want a pointer
to a TCE entry from the same page of TCEs.
This adds a spinlock to handle the race. The alloc==true case is not
possible in the real mode so spinlock is safe for KVM as well.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Fixes: a68bd1267b72 ("powerpc/powernv/ioda: Allocate indirect TCE levels on demand")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
---
This fixes EEH's from
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/list/?series=110810
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c | 21 ++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
index 2c1845e5e851..1825b4cc0097 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct iommu_table {
struct iommu_table_ops *it_ops;
struct kref it_kref;
int it_nid;
+ spinlock_t it_lock;
};
#define IOMMU_TABLE_USERSPACE_ENTRY_RO(tbl, entry) \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
index e28f03e1eb5e..9a19d61e2b12 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void pnv_pci_setup_iommu_table(struct iommu_table *tbl,
tbl->it_size = tce_size >> 3;
tbl->it_busno = 0;
tbl->it_type = TCE_PCI;
+ spin_lock_init(&tbl->it_lock);
}
static __be64 *pnv_alloc_tce_level(int nid, unsigned int shift)
@@ -60,18 +61,22 @@ static __be64 *pnv_tce(struct iommu_table *tbl, bool user, long idx, bool alloc)
unsigned long tce;
if (tmp[n] == 0) {
- __be64 *tmp2;
-
if (!alloc)
return NULL;
- tmp2 = pnv_alloc_tce_level(tbl->it_nid,
- ilog2(tbl->it_level_size) + 3);
- if (!tmp2)
- return NULL;
+ spin_lock(&tbl->it_lock);
+ if (tmp[n] == 0) {
+ __be64 *tmp2;
- tmp[n] = cpu_to_be64(__pa(tmp2) |
- TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE);
+ tmp2 = pnv_alloc_tce_level(tbl->it_nid,
+ ilog2(tbl->it_level_size) + 3);
+ if (tmp2)
+ tmp[n] = cpu_to_be64(__pa(tmp2) |
+ TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE);
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&tbl->it_lock);
+ if (tmp[n] == 0)
+ return NULL;
}
tce = be64_to_cpu(tmp[n]);
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RESEND] Powerpc/Watchpoint: Restore nvgprs while returning from exception
From: Ravi Bangoria @ 2019-06-11 3:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mpe
Cc: mikey, linux-kernel, npiggin, paulus, mahesh, naveen.n.rao,
linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <a2696037-539c-2f37-3b2f-7288a58fbfe7@linux.ibm.com>
Powerpc hw triggers watchpoint before executing the instruction. To
make trigger-after-execute behavior, kernel emulates the instruction.
If the instruction is 'load something into non-volatile register',
exception handler should restore emulated register state while
returning back, otherwise there will be register state corruption.
Ex, Adding a watchpoint on a list can corrput the list:
# cat /proc/kallsyms | grep kthread_create_list
c00000000121c8b8 d kthread_create_list
Add watchpoint on kthread_create_list->prev:
# perf record -e mem:0xc00000000121c8c0
Run some workload such that new kthread gets invoked. Ex, I just
logged out from console:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (c000000001214e00), \
but was c00000000121c8b8. (next=c00000000121c8b8).
WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 309 at lib/list_debug.c:25 __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
CPU: 59 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/59:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #69
...
NIP __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
LR __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0
Call Trace:
__list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0 (unreliable)
__kthread_create_on_node+0xe0/0x260
kthread_create_on_node+0x34/0x50
create_worker+0xe8/0x260
worker_thread+0x444/0x560
kthread+0x160/0x1a0
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70
List corruption happened because it uses 'load into non-volatile
register' instruction:
Snippet from __kthread_create_on_node:
c000000000136be8: addis r29,r2,-19
c000000000136bec: ld r29,31424(r29)
if (!__list_add_valid(new, prev, next))
c000000000136bf0: mr r3,r30
c000000000136bf4: mr r5,r28
c000000000136bf8: mr r4,r29
c000000000136bfc: bl c00000000059a2f8 <__list_add_valid+0x8>
Register state from WARN_ON():
GPR00: c00000000059a3a0 c000007ff23afb50 c000000001344e00 0000000000000075
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000001852af8bc1 0000000000000000
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000006 00000000000004aa
GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000007ffffeb080 c000000000137038 c000005ff62aaa00
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000007fffbe7600 c000007fffbe7370
GPR20: c000007fffbe7320 c000007fffbe7300 c000000001373a00 0000000000000000
GPR24: fffffffffffffef7 c00000000012e320 c000007ff23afcb0 c000000000cb8628
GPR28: c00000000121c8b8 c000000001214e00 c000007fef5b17e8 c000007fef5b17c0
Watchpoint hit at 0xc000000000136bec.
addis r29,r2,-19
=> r29 = 0xc000000001344e00 + (-19 << 16)
=> r29 = 0xc000000001214e00
ld r29,31424(r29)
=> r29 = *(0xc000000001214e00 + 31424)
=> r29 = *(0xc00000000121c8c0)
0xc00000000121c8c0 is where we placed a watchpoint and thus this
instruction was emulated by emulate_step. But because handle_dabr_fault
did not restore emulated register state, r29 still contains stale
value in above register state.
Fixes: 5aae8a5370802 ("powerpc, hw_breakpoints: Implement hw_breakpoints for 64-bit server processors")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.36+
Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
index 6b86055e5251..0e649d980ec3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
@@ -1761,7 +1761,7 @@ handle_dabr_fault:
ld r5,_DSISR(r1)
addi r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
bl do_break
-12: b ret_from_except_lite
+12: b ret_from_except
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH kernel] powerpc/powernv/ioda: Fix race in TCE level allocation
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy @ 2019-06-11 4:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: Jose Ricardo Ziviani, Sam Bobroff, Alistair Popple,
Daniel Henrique Barboza, kvm-ppc, Paul Mackerras, stable,
Oliver O'Halloran, David Gibson
In-Reply-To: <20190611023103.86977-1-aik@ozlabs.ru>
Please ignore this (causes lockdep warnings), v2 is coming.
On 11/06/2019 12:31, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> pnv_tce() returns a pointer to a TCE entry and originally a TCE table
> would be pre-allocated. For the default case of 2GB window the table
> needs only a single level and that is fine. However if more levels are
> requested, it is possible to get a race when 2 threads want a pointer
> to a TCE entry from the same page of TCEs.
>
> This adds a spinlock to handle the race. The alloc==true case is not
> possible in the real mode so spinlock is safe for KVM as well.
>
> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
> Fixes: a68bd1267b72 ("powerpc/powernv/ioda: Allocate indirect TCE levels on demand")
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> ---
>
> This fixes EEH's from
> https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/list/?series=110810
>
>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c | 21 ++++++++++++-------
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
> index 2c1845e5e851..1825b4cc0097 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/iommu.h
> @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct iommu_table {
> struct iommu_table_ops *it_ops;
> struct kref it_kref;
> int it_nid;
> + spinlock_t it_lock;
> };
>
> #define IOMMU_TABLE_USERSPACE_ENTRY_RO(tbl, entry) \
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
> index e28f03e1eb5e..9a19d61e2b12 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void pnv_pci_setup_iommu_table(struct iommu_table *tbl,
> tbl->it_size = tce_size >> 3;
> tbl->it_busno = 0;
> tbl->it_type = TCE_PCI;
> + spin_lock_init(&tbl->it_lock);
> }
>
> static __be64 *pnv_alloc_tce_level(int nid, unsigned int shift)
> @@ -60,18 +61,22 @@ static __be64 *pnv_tce(struct iommu_table *tbl, bool user, long idx, bool alloc)
> unsigned long tce;
>
> if (tmp[n] == 0) {
> - __be64 *tmp2;
> -
> if (!alloc)
> return NULL;
>
> - tmp2 = pnv_alloc_tce_level(tbl->it_nid,
> - ilog2(tbl->it_level_size) + 3);
> - if (!tmp2)
> - return NULL;
> + spin_lock(&tbl->it_lock);
> + if (tmp[n] == 0) {
> + __be64 *tmp2;
>
> - tmp[n] = cpu_to_be64(__pa(tmp2) |
> - TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE);
> + tmp2 = pnv_alloc_tce_level(tbl->it_nid,
> + ilog2(tbl->it_level_size) + 3);
> + if (tmp2)
> + tmp[n] = cpu_to_be64(__pa(tmp2) |
> + TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE);
> + }
> + spin_unlock(&tbl->it_lock);
> + if (tmp[n] == 0)
> + return NULL;
> }
> tce = be64_to_cpu(tmp[n]);
>
>
--
Alexey
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC V3] mm: Generalize and rename notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault()
From: Christophe Leroy @ 2019-06-11 4:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Anshuman Khandual, linux-kernel, linux-mm
Cc: Mark Rutland, Michal Hocko, linux-ia64, linux-sh, Peter Zijlstra,
Catalin Marinas, Dave Hansen, Heiko Carstens, Paul Mackerras,
Matthew Wilcox, sparclinux, linux-s390, Yoshinori Sato, x86,
Russell King, Will Deacon, Ingo Molnar, Fenghua Yu,
Stephen Rothwell, Andrey Konovalov, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Tony Luck, Martin Schwidefsky,
Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <97e9c9b3-89c8-d378-4730-841a900e6800@arm.com>
Le 10/06/2019 à 04:39, Anshuman Khandual a écrit :
>
>
> On 06/07/2019 09:01 PM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 07/06/2019 à 12:34, Anshuman Khandual a écrit :
>>> Very similar definitions for notify_page_fault() are being used by multiple
>>> architectures duplicating much of the same code. This attempts to unify all
>>> of them into a generic implementation, rename it as kprobe_page_fault() and
>>> then move it to a common header.
>>>
>>> kprobes_built_in() can detect CONFIG_KPROBES, hence new kprobe_page_fault()
>>> need not be wrapped again within CONFIG_KPROBES. Trap number argument can
>>> now contain upto an 'unsigned int' accommodating all possible platforms.
>>>
>>> kprobe_page_fault() goes the x86 way while dealing with preemption context.
>>> As explained in these following commits the invoking context in itself must
>>> be non-preemptible for kprobes processing context irrespective of whether
>>> kprobe_running() or perhaps smp_processor_id() is safe or not. It does not
>>> make much sense to continue when original context is preemptible. Instead
>>> just bail out earlier.
>>>
>>> commit a980c0ef9f6d
>>> ("x86/kprobes: Refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()")
>>>
>>> commit b506a9d08bae ("x86: code clarification patch to Kprobes arch code")
>>>
>>> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
>>> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
>>> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
>>> Cc: x86@kernel.org
>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>>> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
>>> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
>>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
>>> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
>>> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
>>> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
>>> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
>>> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
>>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
>>> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
>>> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
>>> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
>>> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
>>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
>>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> Testing:
>>>
>>> - Build and boot tested on arm64 and x86
>>> - Build tested on some other archs (arm, sparc64, alpha, powerpc etc)
>>>
>>> Changes in RFC V3:
>>>
>>> - Updated the commit message with an explaination for new preemption behaviour
>>> - Moved notify_page_fault() to kprobes.h with 'static nokprobe_inline' per Matthew
>>> - Changed notify_page_fault() return type from int to bool per Michael Ellerman
>>> - Renamed notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault() per Peterz
>>>
>>> Changes in RFC V2: (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10974221/)
>>>
>>> - Changed generic notify_page_fault() per Mathew Wilcox
>>> - Changed x86 to use new generic notify_page_fault()
>>> - s/must not/need not/ in commit message per Matthew Wilcox
>>>
>>> Changes in RFC V1: (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10968273/)
>>>
>>> arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>> arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>> arch/ia64/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>> arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 23 ++---------------------
>>> arch/s390/mm/fault.c | 16 +---------------
>>> arch/sh/mm/fault.c | 18 ++----------------
>>> arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c | 16 +---------------
>>> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 21 ++-------------------
>>> include/linux/kprobes.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>> 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/kprobes.h b/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>> index 443d980..064dd15 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>> @@ -458,4 +458,20 @@ static inline bool is_kprobe_optinsn_slot(unsigned long addr)
>>> }
>>> #endif
>>> +static nokprobe_inline bool kprobe_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
>>> + unsigned int trap)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret = 0;
>>
>> ret is pointless.
>>
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * To be potentially processing a kprobe fault and to be allowed
>>> + * to call kprobe_running(), we have to be non-preemptible.
>>> + */
>>> + if (kprobes_built_in() && !preemptible() && !user_mode(regs)) {
>>> + if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trap))
>>
>> don't need an 'if A if B', can do 'if A && B'
>
> Which will make it a very lengthy condition check.
Yes. But is that a problem at all ?
For me the following would be easier to read.
if (kprobes_built_in() && !preemptible() && !user_mode(regs) &&
kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trap))
ret = 1;
Christophe
>
>>
>>> + ret = 1;
>>
>> can do 'return true;' directly here
>>
>>> + }
>>> + return ret;
>>
>> And 'return false' here.
>
> Makes sense, will drop ret.
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH kernel v2] powerpc/powernv/ioda: Fix race in TCE level allocation
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy @ 2019-06-11 5:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: Jose Ricardo Ziviani, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple,
Daniel Henrique Barboza, kvm-ppc, Sam Bobroff, Paul Mackerras,
stable, Oliver O'Halloran, Reza Arbab, David Gibson
pnv_tce() returns a pointer to a TCE entry and originally a TCE table
would be pre-allocated. For the default case of 2GB window the table
needs only a single level and that is fine. However if more levels are
requested, it is possible to get a race when 2 threads want a pointer
to a TCE entry from the same page of TCEs.
This adds cmpxchg to handle the race. Note that once a TCE is non-zero,
it cannot become zero again.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Fixes: a68bd1267b72 ("powerpc/powernv/ioda: Allocate indirect TCE levels on demand")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
---
The race occurs about 30 times in the first 3 minutes of copying files
via rsync and that's about it.
This fixes EEH's from
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/list/?series=110810
---
Changes:
v2:
* replaced spin_lock with cmpxchg+readonce
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
index e28f03e1eb5e..8d6569590161 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda-tce.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ static __be64 *pnv_alloc_tce_level(int nid, unsigned int shift)
return addr;
}
+static void pnv_pci_ioda2_table_do_free_pages(__be64 *addr,
+ unsigned long size, unsigned int levels);
+
static __be64 *pnv_tce(struct iommu_table *tbl, bool user, long idx, bool alloc)
{
__be64 *tmp = user ? tbl->it_userspace : (__be64 *) tbl->it_base;
@@ -57,9 +60,9 @@ static __be64 *pnv_tce(struct iommu_table *tbl, bool user, long idx, bool alloc)
while (level) {
int n = (idx & mask) >> (level * shift);
- unsigned long tce;
+ unsigned long oldtce, tce = be64_to_cpu(READ_ONCE(tmp[n]));
- if (tmp[n] == 0) {
+ if (!tce) {
__be64 *tmp2;
if (!alloc)
@@ -70,10 +73,15 @@ static __be64 *pnv_tce(struct iommu_table *tbl, bool user, long idx, bool alloc)
if (!tmp2)
return NULL;
- tmp[n] = cpu_to_be64(__pa(tmp2) |
- TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE);
+ tce = __pa(tmp2) | TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE;
+ oldtce = be64_to_cpu(cmpxchg(&tmp[n], 0,
+ cpu_to_be64(tce)));
+ if (oldtce) {
+ pnv_pci_ioda2_table_do_free_pages(tmp2,
+ ilog2(tbl->it_level_size) + 3, 1);
+ tce = oldtce;
+ }
}
- tce = be64_to_cpu(tmp[n]);
tmp = __va(tce & ~(TCE_PCI_READ | TCE_PCI_WRITE));
idx &= ~mask;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC V3] mm: Generalize and rename notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault()
From: Anshuman Khandual @ 2019-06-11 5:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Leonardo Bras, Christophe Leroy, linux-kernel, linux-mm
Cc: Mark Rutland, Michal Hocko, linux-ia64, linux-sh, Peter Zijlstra,
Catalin Marinas, Dave Hansen, Heiko Carstens, Paul Mackerras,
sparclinux, linux-s390, Yoshinori Sato, x86, Russell King,
Matthew Wilcox, Ingo Molnar, Andrey Konovalov, Fenghua Yu,
Stephen Rothwell, Will Deacon, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner,
linux-arm-kernel, Tony Luck, Martin Schwidefsky, Andrew Morton,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <8dd6168592437378ff4a7c204e0f2962d002b44f.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 06/10/2019 08:57 PM, Leonardo Bras wrote:
> On Mon, 2019-06-10 at 08:09 +0530, Anshuman Khandual wrote:
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * To be potentially processing a kprobe fault and to be allowed
>>>> + * to call kprobe_running(), we have to be non-preemptible.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (kprobes_built_in() && !preemptible() && !user_mode(regs)) {
>>>> + if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trap))
>>>
>>> don't need an 'if A if B', can do 'if A && B'
>>
>> Which will make it a very lengthy condition check.
>
> Well, is there any problem line-breaking the if condition?
>
> if (A && B && C &&
> D && E )
>
> Also, if it's used only to decide the return value, maybe would be fine
> to do somethink like that:
>
> return (A && B && C &&
> D && E );
Got it. But as Dave and Matthew had pointed out earlier, the current x86
implementation has better readability. Hence will probably stick with it.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC V3] mm: Generalize and rename notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault()
From: Anshuman Khandual @ 2019-06-11 5:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe Leroy, linux-kernel, linux-mm
Cc: Mark Rutland, Michal Hocko, linux-ia64, linux-sh, Peter Zijlstra,
Catalin Marinas, Dave Hansen, Heiko Carstens, Paul Mackerras,
Matthew Wilcox, sparclinux, linux-s390, Yoshinori Sato, x86,
Russell King, Will Deacon, Ingo Molnar, Fenghua Yu,
Stephen Rothwell, Andrey Konovalov, Andy Lutomirski,
Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Tony Luck, Martin Schwidefsky,
Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <f6d295c8-574d-3e64-79ae-2f7d3ff4c9f0@c-s.fr>
On 06/11/2019 10:16 AM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>
>
> Le 10/06/2019 à 04:39, Anshuman Khandual a écrit :
>>
>>
>> On 06/07/2019 09:01 PM, Christophe Leroy wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Le 07/06/2019 à 12:34, Anshuman Khandual a écrit :
>>>> Very similar definitions for notify_page_fault() are being used by multiple
>>>> architectures duplicating much of the same code. This attempts to unify all
>>>> of them into a generic implementation, rename it as kprobe_page_fault() and
>>>> then move it to a common header.
>>>>
>>>> kprobes_built_in() can detect CONFIG_KPROBES, hence new kprobe_page_fault()
>>>> need not be wrapped again within CONFIG_KPROBES. Trap number argument can
>>>> now contain upto an 'unsigned int' accommodating all possible platforms.
>>>>
>>>> kprobe_page_fault() goes the x86 way while dealing with preemption context.
>>>> As explained in these following commits the invoking context in itself must
>>>> be non-preemptible for kprobes processing context irrespective of whether
>>>> kprobe_running() or perhaps smp_processor_id() is safe or not. It does not
>>>> make much sense to continue when original context is preemptible. Instead
>>>> just bail out earlier.
>>>>
>>>> commit a980c0ef9f6d
>>>> ("x86/kprobes: Refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()")
>>>>
>>>> commit b506a9d08bae ("x86: code clarification patch to Kprobes arch code")
>>>>
>>>> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
>>>> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
>>>> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
>>>> Cc: x86@kernel.org
>>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>>>> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
>>>> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
>>>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>>> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
>>>> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
>>>> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
>>>> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
>>>> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
>>>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
>>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>>>> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
>>>> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
>>>> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
>>>> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
>>>> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
>>>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>>> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
>>>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>>>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>>>> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> Testing:
>>>>
>>>> - Build and boot tested on arm64 and x86
>>>> - Build tested on some other archs (arm, sparc64, alpha, powerpc etc)
>>>>
>>>> Changes in RFC V3:
>>>>
>>>> - Updated the commit message with an explaination for new preemption behaviour
>>>> - Moved notify_page_fault() to kprobes.h with 'static nokprobe_inline' per Matthew
>>>> - Changed notify_page_fault() return type from int to bool per Michael Ellerman
>>>> - Renamed notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault() per Peterz
>>>>
>>>> Changes in RFC V2: (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10974221/)
>>>>
>>>> - Changed generic notify_page_fault() per Mathew Wilcox
>>>> - Changed x86 to use new generic notify_page_fault()
>>>> - s/must not/need not/ in commit message per Matthew Wilcox
>>>>
>>>> Changes in RFC V1: (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10968273/)
>>>>
>>>> arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>>> arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>>> arch/ia64/mm/fault.c | 24 +-----------------------
>>>> arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c | 23 ++---------------------
>>>> arch/s390/mm/fault.c | 16 +---------------
>>>> arch/sh/mm/fault.c | 18 ++----------------
>>>> arch/sparc/mm/fault_64.c | 16 +---------------
>>>> arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 21 ++-------------------
>>>> include/linux/kprobes.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>>> 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/kprobes.h b/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>>> index 443d980..064dd15 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/kprobes.h
>>>> @@ -458,4 +458,20 @@ static inline bool is_kprobe_optinsn_slot(unsigned long addr)
>>>> }
>>>> #endif
>>>> +static nokprobe_inline bool kprobe_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
>>>> + unsigned int trap)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int ret = 0;
>>>
>>> ret is pointless.
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * To be potentially processing a kprobe fault and to be allowed
>>>> + * to call kprobe_running(), we have to be non-preemptible.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (kprobes_built_in() && !preemptible() && !user_mode(regs)) {
>>>> + if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trap))
>>>
>>> don't need an 'if A if B', can do 'if A && B'
>>
>> Which will make it a very lengthy condition check.
>
> Yes. But is that a problem at all ?
Probably not.
>
> For me the following would be easier to read.
>
> if (kprobes_built_in() && !preemptible() && !user_mode(regs) &&
> kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trap))
> ret = 1;
As mentioned before will stick with current x86 implementation.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy rules
From: Satheesh Rajendran @ 2019-06-11 5:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nayna Jain
Cc: linux-efi, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar,
Claudio Carvalho, Matthew Garret, linuxppc-dev, Paul Mackerras,
Jeremy Kerr, linux-integrity
In-Reply-To: <1560198837-18857-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 04:33:57PM -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> PowerNV secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to
> perform the OS kernel image signature verification. Since each secure
> boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of
> the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is
> required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled,
> only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are
> defined.
>
> This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the
> secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy
> rules.
>
> This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> config is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 14 +++++++++
> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-
> 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
Hi,
This series failed to build against linuxppc/merge tree with `ppc64le_defconfig`,
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c:14:6: error: redefinition of 'get_powerpc_sb_mode'
14 | bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c:11:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h:15:20: note: previous definition of 'get_powerpc_sb_mode' was here
15 | static inline bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:278: arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.o] Error 1
make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:489: arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv] Error 2
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:489: arch/powerpc/platforms] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:1071: arch/powerpc] Error 2
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Regards,
-Satheesh
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index 8c1c636308c8..9de77bb14f54 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -902,6 +902,20 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS
>
> If unsure, say y.
>
> +config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> + prompt "Enable PowerPC Secure Boot"
> + bool
> + default n
> + depends on PPC64
> + depends on OPAL_SECVAR
> + depends on IMA
> + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + help
> + Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define
> + security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config
> + allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
> + have firmware secure boot support.
> +
> endmenu
>
> config ISA_DMA_API
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> index 0ea6c4aa3a20..75c929b41341 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> obj-y += ima_kexec.o
> endif
> endif
> +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += ima_arch.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
> obj64-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += compat_audit.o
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1767bf6e6550
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> + *
> + * ima_arch.c
> + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include <asm/secboot.h>
> +
> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> +{
> + bool sb_mode;
> +
> + sb_mode = get_powerpc_sb_mode();
> + if (sb_mode)
> + return true;
> + else
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements
> + */
> +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = {
> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + NULL
> +};
> +
> +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */
> +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = {
> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig template=ima-modsig",
> +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig template=ima-modsig",
> +#endif
> + NULL
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list
> + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. Signature verification
> + * is conditionally enabled based on the secure boot state.
> + */
> +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> +{
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> + return sb_arch_rules;
> + return default_arch_rules;
> +}
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index fd9f7cf4cdf5..a01df076ecae 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
> extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
> #endif
>
> -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390)
> +#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \
> + || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)
> extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
> extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
> #else
> --
> 2.20.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/4] mm: Move ioremap page table mapping function to mm/
From: Christophe Leroy @ 2019-06-11 5:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicholas Piggin, linux-mm; +Cc: linuxppc-dev, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20190610043838.27916-1-npiggin@gmail.com>
Le 10/06/2019 à 06:38, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
> ioremap_page_range is a generic function to create a kernel virtual
> mapping, move it to mm/vmalloc.c and rename it vmap_range.
>
> For clarity with this move, also:
> - Rename vunmap_page_range (vmap_range's inverse) to vunmap_range.
> - Rename vmap_page_range (which takes a page array) to vmap_pages.
Maybe it would be easier to follow the change if the name change was
done in another patch than the move.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Fixed up the arm64 compile errors, fixed a few bugs, and tidied
> things up a bit more.
>
> Have tested powerpc and x86 but not arm64, would appreciate a review
> and test of the arm64 patch if possible.
>
> include/linux/vmalloc.h | 3 +
> lib/ioremap.c | 173 +++---------------------------
> mm/vmalloc.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 3 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 175 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> index 51e131245379..812bea5866d6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> @@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ extern struct vm_struct *find_vm_area(const void *addr);
> extern int map_vm_area(struct vm_struct *area, pgprot_t prot,
> struct page **pages);
> #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
> +extern int vmap_range(unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift);
Drop extern keyword here.
As checkpatch tells you, 'CHECK:AVOID_EXTERNS: extern prototypes should
be avoided in .h files'
Christophe
> extern int map_kernel_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
> pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages);
> extern void unmap_kernel_range_noflush(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size);
> diff --git a/lib/ioremap.c b/lib/ioremap.c
> index 063213685563..e13946da8ec3 100644
> --- a/lib/ioremap.c
> +++ b/lib/ioremap.c
> @@ -58,165 +58,24 @@ static inline int ioremap_pud_enabled(void) { return 0; }
> static inline int ioremap_pmd_enabled(void) { return 0; }
> #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
>
> -static int ioremap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - pte_t *pte;
> - u64 pfn;
> -
> - pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> - pte = pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, addr);
> - if (!pte)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - do {
> - BUG_ON(!pte_none(*pte));
> - set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
> - pfn++;
> - } while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int ioremap_try_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr,
> - pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - if (!ioremap_pmd_enabled())
> - return 0;
> -
> - if ((end - addr) != PMD_SIZE)
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, PMD_SIZE))
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (pmd_present(*pmd) && !pmd_free_pte_page(pmd, addr))
> - return 0;
> -
> - return pmd_set_huge(pmd, phys_addr, prot);
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ioremap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - pmd_t *pmd;
> - unsigned long next;
> -
> - pmd = pmd_alloc(&init_mm, pud, addr);
> - if (!pmd)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - do {
> - next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
> -
> - if (ioremap_try_huge_pmd(pmd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - continue;
> -
> - if (ioremap_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - } while (pmd++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int ioremap_try_huge_pud(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr,
> - pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - if (!ioremap_pud_enabled())
> - return 0;
> -
> - if ((end - addr) != PUD_SIZE)
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, PUD_SIZE))
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (pud_present(*pud) && !pud_free_pmd_page(pud, addr))
> - return 0;
> -
> - return pud_set_huge(pud, phys_addr, prot);
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ioremap_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - pud_t *pud;
> - unsigned long next;
> -
> - pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, addr);
> - if (!pud)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - do {
> - next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
> -
> - if (ioremap_try_huge_pud(pud, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - continue;
> -
> - if (ioremap_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - } while (pud++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static int ioremap_try_huge_p4d(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr,
> - pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - if (!ioremap_p4d_enabled())
> - return 0;
> -
> - if ((end - addr) != P4D_SIZE)
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, P4D_SIZE))
> - return 0;
> -
> - if (p4d_present(*p4d) && !p4d_free_pud_page(p4d, addr))
> - return 0;
> -
> - return p4d_set_huge(p4d, phys_addr, prot);
> -}
> -
> -static inline int ioremap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> - unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> -{
> - p4d_t *p4d;
> - unsigned long next;
> -
> - p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, addr);
> - if (!p4d)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - do {
> - next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
> -
> - if (ioremap_try_huge_p4d(p4d, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - continue;
> -
> - if (ioremap_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - } while (p4d++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> int ioremap_page_range(unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> {
> - pgd_t *pgd;
> - unsigned long start;
> - unsigned long next;
> - int err;
> -
> - might_sleep();
> - BUG_ON(addr >= end);
> -
> - start = addr;
> - pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> - do {
> - next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
> - err = ioremap_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot);
> - if (err)
> - break;
> - } while (pgd++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> -
> - flush_cache_vmap(start, end);
> + unsigned int max_page_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Due to the max_page_shift parameter to vmap_range, platforms must
> + * enable all smaller sizes to take advantage of a given size,
> + * otherwise fall back to small pages.
> + */
> + if (ioremap_pmd_enabled()) {
> + max_page_shift = PMD_SHIFT;
> + if (ioremap_pud_enabled()) {
> + max_page_shift = PUD_SHIFT;
> + if (ioremap_p4d_enabled())
> + max_page_shift = P4D_SHIFT;
> + }
> + }
>
> - return err;
> + return vmap_range(addr, end, phys_addr, prot, max_page_shift);
> }
> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> index 233af6936c93..dd27cfb29b10 100644
> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void vunmap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
> } while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end);
> }
>
> -static void vunmap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
> +static void vunmap_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
> {
> pgd_t *pgd;
> unsigned long next;
> @@ -135,6 +135,198 @@ static void vunmap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
> }
>
> static int vmap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
> +{
> + pte_t *pte;
> + u64 pfn;
> +
> + pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + pte = pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, addr);
> + if (!pte)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + do {
> + BUG_ON(!pte_none(*pte));
> + set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
> + pfn++;
> + } while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int vmap_try_huge_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (max_page_shift < PMD_SHIFT)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if ((end - addr) != PMD_SIZE)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, PMD_SIZE))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (pmd_present(*pmd) && !pmd_free_pte_page(pmd, addr))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return pmd_set_huge(pmd, phys_addr, prot);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int vmap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + pmd_t *pmd;
> + unsigned long next;
> +
> + pmd = pmd_alloc(&init_mm, pud, addr);
> + if (!pmd)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + do {
> + next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
> +
> + if (vmap_try_huge_pmd(pmd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift))
> + continue;
> +
> + if (vmap_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + } while (pmd++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int vmap_try_huge_pud(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (max_page_shift < PUD_SHIFT)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if ((end - addr) != PUD_SIZE)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, PUD_SIZE))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (pud_present(*pud) && !pud_free_pmd_page(pud, addr))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return pud_set_huge(pud, phys_addr, prot);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int vmap_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + pud_t *pud;
> + unsigned long next;
> +
> + pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, addr);
> + if (!pud)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + do {
> + next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
> +
> + if (vmap_try_huge_pud(pud, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift))
> + continue;
> +
> + if (vmap_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + } while (pud++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int vmap_try_huge_p4d(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (max_page_shift < P4D_SHIFT)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if ((end - addr) != P4D_SIZE)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr, P4D_SIZE))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (p4d_present(*p4d) && !p4d_free_pud_page(p4d, addr))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return p4d_set_huge(p4d, phys_addr, prot);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int vmap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + p4d_t *p4d;
> + unsigned long next;
> +
> + p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, addr);
> + if (!p4d)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + do {
> + next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
> +
> + if (vmap_try_huge_p4d(p4d, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift))
> + continue;
> +
> + if (vmap_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift))
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + } while (p4d++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int vmap_range_noflush(unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + pgd_t *pgd;
> + unsigned long start;
> + unsigned long next;
> + int err;
> +
> + might_sleep();
> + BUG_ON(addr >= end);
> +
> + start = addr;
> + pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> + do {
> + next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
> + err = vmap_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, phys_addr, prot,
> + max_page_shift);
> + if (err)
> + break;
> + } while (pgd++, phys_addr += (next - addr), addr = next, addr != end);
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +int vmap_range(unsigned long addr,
> + unsigned long end, phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot,
> + unsigned int max_page_shift)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = vmap_range_noflush(addr, end, phys_addr, prot, max_page_shift);
> + flush_cache_vmap(addr, end);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int vmap_pages_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long end, pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> {
> pte_t *pte;
> @@ -160,7 +352,7 @@ static int vmap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> +static int vmap_pages_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long end, pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> {
> pmd_t *pmd;
> @@ -171,13 +363,13 @@ static int vmap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
> return -ENOMEM;
> do {
> next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (vmap_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> + if (vmap_pages_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> return -ENOMEM;
> } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmap_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> +static int vmap_pages_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long end, pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> {
> pud_t *pud;
> @@ -188,13 +380,13 @@ static int vmap_pud_range(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
> return -ENOMEM;
> do {
> next = pud_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (vmap_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> + if (vmap_pages_pmd_range(pud, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> return -ENOMEM;
> } while (pud++, addr = next, addr != end);
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> +static int vmap_pages_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long end, pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages, int *nr)
> {
> p4d_t *p4d;
> @@ -205,7 +397,7 @@ static int vmap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> return -ENOMEM;
> do {
> next = p4d_addr_end(addr, end);
> - if (vmap_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> + if (vmap_pages_pud_range(p4d, addr, next, prot, pages, nr))
> return -ENOMEM;
> } while (p4d++, addr = next, addr != end);
> return 0;
> @@ -217,7 +409,7 @@ static int vmap_p4d_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
> *
> * Ie. pte at addr+N*PAGE_SIZE shall point to pfn corresponding to pages[N]
> */
> -static int vmap_page_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> +static int vmap_pages_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages)
> {
> pgd_t *pgd;
> @@ -230,7 +422,7 @@ static int vmap_page_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> do {
> next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
> - err = vmap_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, prot, pages, &nr);
> + err = vmap_pages_p4d_range(pgd, addr, next, prot, pages, &nr);
> if (err)
> return err;
> } while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
> @@ -238,12 +430,12 @@ static int vmap_page_range_noflush(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> return nr;
> }
>
> -static int vmap_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> +static int vmap_pages_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages)
> {
> int ret;
>
> - ret = vmap_page_range_noflush(start, end, prot, pages);
> + ret = vmap_pages_range_noflush(start, end, prot, pages);
> flush_cache_vmap(start, end);
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -1148,7 +1340,7 @@ static void free_vmap_area(struct vmap_area *va)
> */
> static void unmap_vmap_area(struct vmap_area *va)
> {
> - vunmap_page_range(va->va_start, va->va_end);
> + vunmap_range(va->va_start, va->va_end);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -1586,7 +1778,7 @@ static void vb_free(const void *addr, unsigned long size)
> rcu_read_unlock();
> BUG_ON(!vb);
>
> - vunmap_page_range((unsigned long)addr, (unsigned long)addr + size);
> + vunmap_range((unsigned long)addr, (unsigned long)addr + size);
>
> if (debug_pagealloc_enabled())
> flush_tlb_kernel_range((unsigned long)addr,
> @@ -1736,7 +1928,7 @@ void *vm_map_ram(struct page **pages, unsigned int count, int node, pgprot_t pro
> addr = va->va_start;
> mem = (void *)addr;
> }
> - if (vmap_page_range(addr, addr + size, prot, pages) < 0) {
> + if (vmap_pages_range(addr, addr + size, prot, pages) < 0) {
> vm_unmap_ram(mem, count);
> return NULL;
> }
> @@ -1903,7 +2095,7 @@ void __init vmalloc_init(void)
> int map_kernel_range_noflush(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages)
> {
> - return vmap_page_range_noflush(addr, addr + size, prot, pages);
> + return vmap_pages_range_noflush(addr, addr + size, prot, pages);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1922,7 +2114,7 @@ int map_kernel_range_noflush(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> */
> void unmap_kernel_range_noflush(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> {
> - vunmap_page_range(addr, addr + size);
> + vunmap_range(addr, addr + size);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unmap_kernel_range_noflush);
>
> @@ -1939,7 +2131,7 @@ void unmap_kernel_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> unsigned long end = addr + size;
>
> flush_cache_vunmap(addr, end);
> - vunmap_page_range(addr, end);
> + vunmap_range(addr, end);
> flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, end);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unmap_kernel_range);
> @@ -1950,7 +2142,7 @@ int map_vm_area(struct vm_struct *area, pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages)
> unsigned long end = addr + get_vm_area_size(area);
> int err;
>
> - err = vmap_page_range(addr, end, prot, pages);
> + err = vmap_pages_range(addr, end, prot, pages);
>
> return err > 0 ? 0 : err;
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 4/4] mm/vmalloc: Hugepage vmalloc mappings
From: Christophe Leroy @ 2019-06-11 5:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicholas Piggin, linux-mm, Russell Currey; +Cc: linuxppc-dev, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20190610043838.27916-4-npiggin@gmail.com>
Le 10/06/2019 à 06:38, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
> For platforms that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP, have vmap allow vmalloc to
> allocate huge pages and map them
Will this be compatible with Russell's series
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1099857/ for the implementation of
STRICT_MODULE_RWX ?
I see that apply_to_page_range() have things like BUG_ON(pud_huge(*pud));
Might also be an issue for arm64 as I think Russell's implementation
comes from there.
>
> This brings dTLB misses for linux kernel tree `git diff` from 45,000 to
> 8,000 on a Kaby Lake KVM guest with 8MB dentry hash and mitigations=off
> (performance is in the noise, under 1% difference, page tables are likely
> to be well cached for this workload). Similar numbers are seen on POWER9.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> ---
> include/asm-generic/4level-fixup.h | 1 +
> include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h | 1 +
> include/linux/vmalloc.h | 1 +
> mm/vmalloc.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 4 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/4level-fixup.h b/include/asm-generic/4level-fixup.h
> index e3667c9a33a5..3cc65a4dd093 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/4level-fixup.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/4level-fixup.h
> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
> #define pud_none(pud) 0
> #define pud_bad(pud) 0
> #define pud_present(pud) 1
> +#define pud_large(pud) 0
> #define pud_ERROR(pud) do { } while (0)
> #define pud_clear(pud) pgd_clear(pud)
> #define pud_val(pud) pgd_val(pud)
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h b/include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h
> index bb6cb347018c..c4377db09a4f 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/5level-fixup.h
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
> #define p4d_none(p4d) 0
> #define p4d_bad(p4d) 0
> #define p4d_present(p4d) 1
> +#define p4d_large(p4d) 0
> #define p4d_ERROR(p4d) do { } while (0)
> #define p4d_clear(p4d) pgd_clear(p4d)
> #define p4d_val(p4d) pgd_val(p4d)
> diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> index 812bea5866d6..4c92dc608928 100644
> --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct vm_struct {
> unsigned long size;
> unsigned long flags;
> struct page **pages;
> + unsigned int page_shift;
> unsigned int nr_pages;
> phys_addr_t phys_addr;
> const void *caller;
> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> index dd27cfb29b10..0cf8e861caeb 100644
> --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
> #include <linux/rbtree_augmented.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> #include <asm/shmparam.h>
>
> @@ -440,6 +441,41 @@ static int vmap_pages_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
> +static int vmap_hpages_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> + pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages,
> + unsigned int page_shift)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr = start;
> + unsigned int i, nr = (end - start) >> (PAGE_SHIFT + page_shift);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
> + int err;
> +
> + err = vmap_range_noflush(addr,
> + addr + (PAGE_SIZE << page_shift),
> + __pa(page_address(pages[i])), prot,
> + PAGE_SHIFT + page_shift);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + addr += PAGE_SIZE << page_shift;
> + }
> + flush_cache_vmap(start, end);
> +
> + return nr;
> +}
> +#else
> +static int vmap_hpages_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> + pgprot_t prot, struct page **pages,
> + unsigned int page_shift)
> +{
> + BUG_ON(page_shift != PAGE_SIZE);
Do we really need a BUG_ON() there ? What happens if this condition is
true ?
> + return vmap_pages_range(start, end, prot, pages);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +
> int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)
> {
> /*
> @@ -462,7 +498,7 @@ struct page *vmalloc_to_page(const void *vmalloc_addr)
> {
> unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) vmalloc_addr;
> struct page *page = NULL;
> - pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> + pgd_t *pgd;
> p4d_t *p4d;
> pud_t *pud;
> pmd_t *pmd;
> @@ -474,27 +510,38 @@ struct page *vmalloc_to_page(const void *vmalloc_addr)
> */
> VIRTUAL_BUG_ON(!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(vmalloc_addr));
>
> + pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> if (pgd_none(*pgd))
> return NULL;
> +
> p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
> if (p4d_none(*p4d))
> return NULL;
> - pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
Do we really need that ifdef ? Won't p4d_large() always return 0 when is
not set ?
Otherwise, could we use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP) instead ?
Same several places below.
> + if (p4d_large(*p4d))
> + return p4d_page(*p4d) + ((addr & ~P4D_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +#endif
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(p4d_bad(*p4d)))
> + return NULL;
>
> - /*
> - * Don't dereference bad PUD or PMD (below) entries. This will also
> - * identify huge mappings, which we may encounter on architectures
> - * that define CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP=y. Such regions will be
> - * identified as vmalloc addresses by is_vmalloc_addr(), but are
> - * not [unambiguously] associated with a struct page, so there is
> - * no correct value to return for them.
> - */
> - WARN_ON_ONCE(pud_bad(*pud));
> - if (pud_none(*pud) || pud_bad(*pud))
> + pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
> + if (pud_none(*pud))
> + return NULL;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
> + if (pud_large(*pud))
> + return pud_page(*pud) + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +#endif
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pud_bad(*pud)))
> return NULL;
> +
> pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
> - WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_bad(*pmd));
> - if (pmd_none(*pmd) || pmd_bad(*pmd))
> + if (pmd_none(*pmd))
> + return NULL;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
> + if (pmd_large(*pmd))
> + return pmd_page(*pmd) + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +#endif
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
> return NULL;
>
> ptep = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
> @@ -502,6 +549,7 @@ struct page *vmalloc_to_page(const void *vmalloc_addr)
> if (pte_present(pte))
> page = pte_page(pte);
> pte_unmap(ptep);
> +
> return page;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(vmalloc_to_page);
> @@ -2185,8 +2233,9 @@ static struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_node(unsigned long size,
> return NULL;
>
> if (flags & VM_IOREMAP)
> - align = 1ul << clamp_t(int, get_count_order_long(size),
> - PAGE_SHIFT, IOREMAP_MAX_ORDER);
> + align = max(align,
> + 1ul << clamp_t(int, get_count_order_long(size),
> + PAGE_SHIFT, IOREMAP_MAX_ORDER));
>
> area = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*area), gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK, node);
> if (unlikely(!area))
> @@ -2398,7 +2447,7 @@ static void __vunmap(const void *addr, int deallocate_pages)
> struct page *page = area->pages[i];
>
> BUG_ON(!page);
> - __free_pages(page, 0);
> + __free_pages(page, area->page_shift);
> }
>
> kvfree(area->pages);
> @@ -2541,14 +2590,17 @@ static void *__vmalloc_area_node(struct vm_struct *area, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> pgprot_t prot, int node)
> {
> struct page **pages;
> + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)area->addr;
> + unsigned long size = get_vm_area_size(area);
> + unsigned int page_shift = area->page_shift;
> + unsigned int shift = page_shift + PAGE_SHIFT;
> unsigned int nr_pages, array_size, i;
> const gfp_t nested_gfp = (gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK) | __GFP_ZERO;
> const gfp_t alloc_mask = gfp_mask | __GFP_NOWARN;
> const gfp_t highmem_mask = (gfp_mask & (GFP_DMA | GFP_DMA32)) ?
> - 0 :
> - __GFP_HIGHMEM;
> + 0 : __GFP_HIGHMEM;
This patch is already quite big, shouldn't this kind of unrelated
cleanups be in another patch ?
>
> - nr_pages = get_vm_area_size(area) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + nr_pages = size >> shift;
> array_size = (nr_pages * sizeof(struct page *));
>
> area->nr_pages = nr_pages;
> @@ -2569,10 +2621,8 @@ static void *__vmalloc_area_node(struct vm_struct *area, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++) {
> struct page *page;
>
> - if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
> - page = alloc_page(alloc_mask|highmem_mask);
> - else
> - page = alloc_pages_node(node, alloc_mask|highmem_mask, 0);
> + page = alloc_pages_node(node,
> + alloc_mask|highmem_mask, page_shift);
This is also nice cleanup, but does it really belong to this patch ?
>
> if (unlikely(!page)) {
> /* Successfully allocated i pages, free them in __vunmap() */
> @@ -2584,8 +2634,9 @@ static void *__vmalloc_area_node(struct vm_struct *area, gfp_t gfp_mask,
> cond_resched();
> }
>
> - if (map_vm_area(area, prot, pages))
> + if (vmap_hpages_range(addr, addr + size, prot, pages, page_shift) < 0)
> goto fail;
> +
Cleanup ?
> return area->addr;
>
> fail:
> @@ -2619,22 +2670,39 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
> pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
> const void *caller)
> {
> - struct vm_struct *area;
> + struct vm_struct *area = NULL;
> void *addr;
> unsigned long real_size = size;
> + unsigned long real_align = align;
> + unsigned int shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
> if (!size || (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > totalram_pages())
> goto fail;
>
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP)) {
> + unsigned long size_per_node;
> +
> + size_per_node = size;
> + if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
> + size_per_node /= num_online_nodes();
> + if (size_per_node >= PMD_SIZE)
> + shift = PMD_SHIFT;
> + }
> +again:
> + align = max(real_align, 1UL << shift);
> + size = ALIGN(real_size, align);
> +
> area = __get_vm_area_node(size, align, VM_ALLOC | VM_UNINITIALIZED |
> vm_flags, start, end, node, gfp_mask, caller);
> if (!area)
> goto fail;
>
> + area->page_shift = shift - PAGE_SHIFT;
> +
> addr = __vmalloc_area_node(area, gfp_mask, prot, node);
> if (!addr)
> - return NULL;
> + goto fail;
>
> /*
> * In this function, newly allocated vm_struct has VM_UNINITIALIZED
> @@ -2648,8 +2716,16 @@ void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
> return addr;
>
> fail:
> - warn_alloc(gfp_mask, NULL,
> + if (shift == PMD_SHIFT) {
> + shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
> + goto again;
> + }
> +
> + if (!area) {
> + /* Warn for area allocation, page allocations already warn */
> + warn_alloc(gfp_mask, NULL,
> "vmalloc: allocation failure: %lu bytes", real_size);
> + }
> return NULL;
> }
>
>
Christophe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] powerpc/eeh: Improve debug messages around device addition
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy @ 2019-06-11 5:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sam Bobroff, linuxppc-dev; +Cc: oohall, tyreld
In-Reply-To: <8deaedffad8ed3327f296a561c2a31c930c65f88.1557203383.git.sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
On 07/05/2019 14:30, Sam Bobroff wrote:
> Also remove useless comment.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c | 14 ++++++++----
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-----
> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c
> index 8d3c36a1f194..b14d89547895 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c
> @@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ void eeh_add_device_late(struct pci_dev *dev)
> pdn = pci_get_pdn_by_devfn(dev->bus, dev->devfn);
> edev = pdn_to_eeh_dev(pdn);
> if (edev->pdev == dev) {
> - pr_debug("EEH: Already referenced !\n");
> + pr_debug("EEH: Device %s already referenced!\n", pci_name(dev));
> return;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c
> index 6fc1a463b796..0e374cdba961 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c
> @@ -50,10 +50,7 @@ void pnv_pcibios_bus_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> if (!pdev->is_virtfn)
> return;
>
> - /*
> - * The following operations will fail if VF's sysfs files
> - * aren't created or its resources aren't finalized.
> - */
> + pr_debug("%s: EEH: Setting up device %s.\n", __func__, pci_name(pdev));
dev_dbg() seems more appropriate.
> eeh_add_device_early(pdn);
> eeh_add_device_late(pdev);
> eeh_sysfs_add_device(pdev);
> @@ -397,6 +394,10 @@ static void *pnv_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
> int ret;
> int config_addr = (pdn->busno << 8) | (pdn->devfn);
>
> + pr_debug("%s: probing %04x:%02x:%02x.%01x\n",
> + __func__, hose->global_number, pdn->busno,
> + PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn), PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn));
> +
> /*
> * When probing the root bridge, which doesn't have any
> * subordinate PCI devices. We don't have OF node for
> @@ -491,6 +492,11 @@ static void *pnv_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
> /* Save memory bars */
> eeh_save_bars(edev);
>
> + pr_debug("%s: EEH enabled on %02x:%02x.%01x PHB#%x-PE#%x\n",
> + __func__, pdn->busno, PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn),
> + PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn), edev->pe->phb->global_number,
> + edev->pe->addr);
> +
> return NULL;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
> index 7aa50258dd42..ae06878fbdea 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
> @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void pseries_pcibios_bus_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> if (!pdev->is_virtfn)
> return;
>
> + pr_debug("%s: EEH: Setting up device %s.\n", __func__, pci_name(pdev));
> +
> pdn->device_id = pdev->device;
> pdn->vendor_id = pdev->vendor;
> pdn->class_code = pdev->class;
> @@ -251,6 +253,10 @@ static void *pseries_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
> int enable = 0;
> int ret;
>
> + pr_debug("%s: probing %04x:%02x:%02x.%01x\n",
> + __func__, pdn->phb->global_number, pdn->busno,
> + PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn), PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn));
> +
> /* Retrieve OF node and eeh device */
> edev = pdn_to_eeh_dev(pdn);
> if (!edev || edev->pe)
> @@ -294,7 +300,12 @@ static void *pseries_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
>
> /* Enable EEH on the device */
> ret = eeh_ops->set_option(&pe, EEH_OPT_ENABLE);
> - if (!ret) {
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_debug("%s: EEH failed to enable on %02x:%02x.%01x PHB#%x-PE#%x (code %d)\n",
> + __func__, pdn->busno, PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn),
> + PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn), pe.phb->global_number,
> + pe.addr, ret);
> + } else {
edev!=NULL here so you could do dev_dbg(&edev->pdev->dev,...) and skip
PCI_SLOT/PCI_FUNC. Or is (edev!=NULL && edev->pdev==NULL) possible (it
could be, just asking)?
> /* Retrieve PE address */
> edev->pe_config_addr = eeh_ops->get_pe_addr(&pe);
> pe.addr = edev->pe_config_addr;
> @@ -310,11 +321,6 @@ static void *pseries_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
> if (enable) {
> eeh_add_flag(EEH_ENABLED);
> eeh_add_to_parent_pe(edev);
> -
> - pr_debug("%s: EEH enabled on %02x:%02x.%01x PHB#%x-PE#%x\n",
> - __func__, pdn->busno, PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn),
> - PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn), pe.phb->global_number,
> - pe.addr);
> } else if (pdn->parent && pdn_to_eeh_dev(pdn->parent) &&
> (pdn_to_eeh_dev(pdn->parent))->pe) {
> /* This device doesn't support EEH, but it may have an
> @@ -323,6 +329,11 @@ static void *pseries_eeh_probe(struct pci_dn *pdn, void *data)
> edev->pe_config_addr = pdn_to_eeh_dev(pdn->parent)->pe_config_addr;
> eeh_add_to_parent_pe(edev);
> }
> + pr_debug("%s: EEH %s on %02x:%02x.%01x PHB#%x-PE#%x (code %d)\n",
> + __func__, (enable ? "enabled" : "unsupported"),
> + pdn->busno, PCI_SLOT(pdn->devfn),
> + PCI_FUNC(pdn->devfn), pe.phb->global_number,
> + pe.addr, ret);
Same here. I understand though this one is a cut-n-paste :)
> }
>
> /* Save memory bars */
>
--
Alexey
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [BISECTED REGRESSION] b43legacy broken on G4 PowerBook
From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt @ 2019-06-11 5:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Larry Finger, Aaro Koskinen, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Zigotzky, Michael Ellerman
Cc: linux-wireless, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <3ed1ccfe-d7ca-11b9-17b3-303d1ae1bb0f@lwfinger.net>
On Mon, 2019-06-10 at 13:44 -0500, Larry Finger wrote:
> On 6/7/19 11:21 PM, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> >
> > > Please try the attached patch. I'm not really pleased with it and I will
> > > continue to determine why the fallback to a 30-bit mask fails, but at least this
> > > one works for me.
> >
> > Your patch only makes sense if the device is indeed capable of
> > addressing 31-bits.
> >
> > So either the driver is buggy and asks for a too small mask in which
> > case your patch is ok, or it's not and you're just going to cause all
> > sort of interesting random problems including possible memory
> > corruption.
>
> Of course the driver may be buggy, but it asks for the correct mask.
>
> This particular device is not capable of handling 32-bit DMA. The driver detects
> the 32-bit failure and falls back to 30 bits. It works on x86, and did on PPC32
> until 5.1. As Christoph said, it should always be possible to use fewer bits
> than the maximum.
No, I don't think it *worked* on ppc32 before Christoph patch. I think
it "mostly sort-of worked" :-)
The reason I'm saying that is if your system has more than 1GB of RAM,
then you'll have chunks of memory that the device simply cannot
address.
Before Christoph patches, we had no ZONE_DMA or ZONE_DMA32 covering the
30-bit limited space, so any memory allocation could in theory land
above 30-bits, causing all sort of horrible things to happen with that
driver.
The reason I think it sort-of-mostly-worked is that to get more than
1GB of RAM, those machines use CONFIG_HIGHMEM. And *most* network
buffers aren't allocated in Highmem.... so you got lucky.
That said, there is such as thing as no-copy send on network, so I
wouldn't be surprised if some things would still have failed, just not
frequent enough for you to notice.
> Similar devices that are new enough to use b43 rather than b43legacy work with
> new kernels; however, they have and use 32-bit DMA.
Cheres,
Ben.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [BISECTED REGRESSION] b43legacy broken on G4 PowerBook
From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2019-06-11 6:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Larry Finger
Cc: Aaro Koskinen, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, Christian Zigotzky,
linuxppc-dev, Christoph Hellwig
In-Reply-To: <153c13f5-a829-1eab-a3c5-fecfb84127ff@lwfinger.net>
On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 11:09:47AM -0500, Larry Finger wrote:
>>> return -EIO;
>>>
>>> For b43legacy, dev->dma_mask is 0xc265684800000000.
>>> dma_supported(dev, mask) is 0xc08b000000000000, mask is 0x3fffffff, and
>>> the routine returns -EIO.
>>>
>>> For b43, dev->dma_mask is 0xc265684800000001,
>>> dma_supported(dev, mask) is 0xc08b000000000000, mask is 0x77777777, and
>>> the routine returns 0.
>>
>> I don't fully understand what values the above map to. Can you send
>> me your actual debugging patch as well?
>
> I do not understand why the if statement returns true as neither of the
> values is zero. After seeing the x86 output shown below, I also do not
> understand all the trailing zeros.
>
> My entire patch is attached. That output came from this section:
What might be confusing in your output is that dev->dma_mask is a pointer,
and we are setting it in dma_set_mask. That is before we only check
if the pointer is set, and later we override it. Of course this doesn't
actually explain the failure. But what is even more strange to me
is that you get a return value from dma_supported() that isn't 0 or 1,
as that function is supposed to return a boolean, and I really can't see
how mask >= __phys_to_dma(dev, min_mask), would return anything but 0
or 1. Does the output change if you use the correct printk specifiers?
i.e. with a debug patch like this:
diff --git a/kernel/dma/direct.c b/kernel/dma/direct.c
index 2c2772e9702a..9e5b30b12b10 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/direct.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/direct.c
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_direct_map_resource);
int dma_direct_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
{
u64 min_mask;
+ bool ret;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA))
min_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(ARCH_ZONE_DMA_BITS);
@@ -391,7 +392,12 @@ int dma_direct_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
* use __phys_to_dma() here so that the SME encryption mask isn't
* part of the check.
*/
- return mask >= __phys_to_dma(dev, min_mask);
+ ret = (mask >= __phys_to_dma(dev, min_mask));
+ if (!ret)
+ dev_info(dev,
+ "%s: failed (mask = 0x%llx, min_mask = 0x%llx/0x%llx, dma bits = %d\n",
+ __func__, mask, min_mask, __phys_to_dma(dev, min_mask), ARCH_ZONE_DMA_BITS);
+ return ret;
}
size_t dma_direct_max_mapping_size(struct device *dev)
diff --git a/kernel/dma/mapping.c b/kernel/dma/mapping.c
index f7afdadb6770..6c57ccdee2ae 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/mapping.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/mapping.c
@@ -317,8 +317,14 @@ void arch_dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask);
int dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
{
- if (!dev->dma_mask || !dma_supported(dev, mask))
+ if (!dev->dma_mask) {
+ dev_info(dev, "no DMA mask set!\n");
return -EIO;
+ }
+ if (!dma_supported(dev, mask)) {
+ printk("DMA not supported\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
arch_dma_set_mask(dev, mask);
dma_check_mask(dev, mask);
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [BISECTED REGRESSION] b43legacy broken on G4 PowerBook
From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2019-06-11 6:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Benjamin Herrenschmidt
Cc: Aaro Koskinen, linux-wireless, linux-kernel, Christian Zigotzky,
linuxppc-dev, Christoph Hellwig, Larry Finger
In-Reply-To: <c91ccbddd6a58dbee5705f10ed1d98fb44bd8f8d.camel@kernel.crashing.org>
On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 03:56:33PM +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> The reason I think it sort-of-mostly-worked is that to get more than
> 1GB of RAM, those machines use CONFIG_HIGHMEM. And *most* network
> buffers aren't allocated in Highmem.... so you got lucky.
>
> That said, there is such as thing as no-copy send on network, so I
> wouldn't be surprised if some things would still have failed, just not
> frequent enough for you to notice.
Unless NETIF_F_HIGHDMA is set on a netdev, the core networkign code
will bounce buffer highmem pages for the driver under all circumstances.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 4/4] mm/vmalloc: Hugepage vmalloc mappings
From: Anshuman Khandual @ 2019-06-11 6:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicholas Piggin, Mark Rutland; +Cc: linux-mm, linuxppc-dev, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1560177786.t6c5cn5hw4.astroid@bobo.none>
On 06/10/2019 08:14 PM, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
> Mark Rutland's on June 11, 2019 12:10 am:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 02:38:38PM +1000, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
>>> For platforms that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP, have vmap allow vmalloc to
>>> allocate huge pages and map them
>>>
>>> This brings dTLB misses for linux kernel tree `git diff` from 45,000 to
>>> 8,000 on a Kaby Lake KVM guest with 8MB dentry hash and mitigations=off
>>> (performance is in the noise, under 1% difference, page tables are likely
>>> to be well cached for this workload). Similar numbers are seen on POWER9.
>>
>> Do you happen to know which vmalloc mappings these get used for in the
>> above case? Where do we see vmalloc mappings that large?
>
> Large module vmalloc could be subject to huge mappings.
>
>> I'm worried as to how this would interact with the set_memory_*()
>> functions, as on arm64 those can only operate on page-granular mappings.
>> Those may need fixing up to handle huge mappings; certainly if the above
>> is all for modules.
>
> Good point, that looks like it would break on arm64 at least. I'll
> work on it. We may have to make this opt in beyond HUGE_VMAP.
This is another reason we might need to have an arch opt-ins like the one
I mentioned before.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] powerpc/64: __ioremap_at clean up in the error case
From: Christophe Leroy @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicholas Piggin, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <20190610030818.17965-1-npiggin@gmail.com>
Le 10/06/2019 à 05:08, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
> __ioremap_at error handling is wonky, it requires caller to clean up
> after it. Implement a helper that does the map and error cleanup and
> remove the requirement from the caller.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> This series is a different approach to the problem, using the generic
> ioremap_page_range directly which reduces added code, and moves
> the radix specific code into radix files. Thanks to Christophe for
> pointing out various problems with the previous patch.
>
> arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_64.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_64.c
> index d2d976ff8a0e..6bd3660388aa 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable_64.c
> @@ -108,14 +108,30 @@ unsigned long ioremap_bot;
> unsigned long ioremap_bot = IOREMAP_BASE;
> #endif
>
> +static int ioremap_range(unsigned long ea, phys_addr_t pa, unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot, int nid)
> +{
> + unsigned long i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < size; i += PAGE_SIZE) {
> + int err = map_kernel_page(ea + i, pa + i, prot);
Missing a blank line
> + if (err) {
I'd have done the following to reduce indentation depth
if (!err)
continue
> + if (slab_is_available())
> + unmap_kernel_range(ea, size);
Shouldn't it be unmap_kernel_range(ea, i) ?
Christophe
> + else
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); /* Should clean up */
> + return err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * __ioremap_at - Low level function to establish the page tables
> * for an IO mapping
> */
> void __iomem *__ioremap_at(phys_addr_t pa, void *ea, unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot)
> {
> - unsigned long i;
> -
> /* We don't support the 4K PFN hack with ioremap */
> if (pgprot_val(prot) & H_PAGE_4K_PFN)
> return NULL;
> @@ -129,9 +145,8 @@ void __iomem *__ioremap_at(phys_addr_t pa, void *ea, unsigned long size, pgprot_
> WARN_ON(((unsigned long)ea) & ~PAGE_MASK);
> WARN_ON(size & ~PAGE_MASK);
>
> - for (i = 0; i < size; i += PAGE_SIZE)
> - if (map_kernel_page((unsigned long)ea + i, pa + i, prot))
> - return NULL;
> + if (ioremap_range((unsigned long)ea, pa, size, prot, NUMA_NO_NODE))
> + return NULL;
>
> return (void __iomem *)ea;
> }
> @@ -182,8 +197,6 @@ void __iomem * __ioremap_caller(phys_addr_t addr, unsigned long size,
>
> area->phys_addr = paligned;
> ret = __ioremap_at(paligned, area->addr, size, prot);
> - if (!ret)
> - vunmap(area->addr);
> } else {
> ret = __ioremap_at(paligned, (void *)ioremap_bot, size, prot);
> if (ret)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v11 00/13] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
Hello,
Nothing big in this version. Noteworthy changes are:
1. Fixes for two bugs in ima_appraise_measurements() which were spotted and
resolved by Mimi Zohar. The changelog points them out.
2. One bugfix in process_measurement() which would cause all files
appraised with modsig to be measured as well, even if the policy didn't
request it.
3. Adapted to work with per policy rule template formats.
Plus small cosmetic changes in some places. The changelog has the details.
This has been tested with signed modules and with signed kernels loaded via
kexec_file_load().
Many thanks to Mimi Zohar for her help with the development of this patch
series.
The patches apply on today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.
Original cover letter:
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are
signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature
format as signed kernel modules.
This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures.
It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot
kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the
signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Changes since v10:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT definition before its use. Suggested by
Mimi Zohar.
- Added missing kerneldoc for @name parameter. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Bugfix: don't check status variable when deciding whether to verify
modsig in ima_appraise_measurement(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Bugfix: verify the modsig in ima_appraise_measurement() if the xattr
contains a digest. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize() to ima_get_raw_modsig().
- Renamed check_current_template_modsig() to check_template_modsig().
- Fixed outdated comment in ima_eventmodsig_init(). Suggested by Mimi
Zohar.
- Check either the global or the per-rule template when an appraisal rule
allows modsig. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Bugfix: Only re-measure file containing modsig if it was measured
before.
- Check for modsig-related fields in the template_desc obtained in
process_measurement() which can be a per-rule template. Suggested by Mimi
Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well"
- New patch. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
Changes since v9:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved mod_check_sig() to a new file so that CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
doesn't have to depend on CONFIG_MODULES.
- Changed scripts/Makefile to build sign-file if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
is set.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()"
- Don't add function pkcs7_get_message_sig() anymore, since it's not
needed in the current version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Changed 'len' argument from 'u8 *' to 'u32 *'.
- Added 'hash_algo' argument to obtain the algo used for the digest.
- Don't check whether 'buf', 'len' and 'hash_algo' output arguments are NULL,
since the function's only caller always sets them.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed integrity_keyring_from_id() to a static function (suggested by Mimi
Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Introduce is_signed()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Renamed 'struct modsig_hdr' to 'struct modsig'.
- Added integrity_modsig_verify() to integrity/digsig.c so that it's not
necessary to export integrity_keyring_from_id() (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Don't add functions ima_xattr_sig_known_key() and
modsig_has_known_key() since they're not necessary anymore.
- Added modsig argument to ima_appraise_measurement().
- Verify modsig in a separate function called by ima_appraise_measurement().
- Renamed ima_read_collect_modsig() to ima_read_modsig(), with a separate
collect function added in patch "ima: Collect modsig" (suggested by Mimi
Zohar).
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved code saving of raw PKCS7 data to 'struct
modsig' to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved all parts related to the modsig hash to
patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), don't check if the buf pointer is NULL since it's
never supposed to happen.
- Renamed ima_free_xattr_data() to ima_free_modsig().
- No need to check for modsig in ima_read_xattr() and
ima_inode_set_xattr() anymore.
- In ima_modsig_verify(), don't check if the modsig pointer is NULL since
it's not supposed to happen.
- Don't define IMA_MODSIG element in enum evm_ima_xattr_type.
- Patch "ima: Collect modsig"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Patch renamed from "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- Renamed 'd-sig' template field to 'd-modsig'.
- Added 'modsig' template field.
- Added 'ima-modsig' defined template descriptor.
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize_data() to ima_modsig_serialize().
- Renamed ima_get_modsig_hash() to ima_get_modsig_digest(). Also the
function is a lot simpler now since what it used to do is now done in
ima_collect_modsig() and pkcs7_get_digest().
- Added check for failed modsig collection in ima_eventdigest_modsig_init().
- Added modsig argument to ima_store_measurement().
- Added 'modsig' field to struct ima_event_data.
- Removed check for modsig == NULL in ima_get_modsig_digest() and in
ima_modsig_serialize_data() since their callers already performs that
check.
- Moved check_current_template_modsig() to this patch, previously was in
"ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig".
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Renamed ima_template_has_sig() to ima_template_has_modsig().
- Added a change to ima_collect_measurement(), making it to call
ima_collect_modsig() even if IMA_COLLECT is set in iint->flags.
- Removed IMA_READ_MEASURE flag.
- Renamed template_has_sig global variable to template_has_modsig.
- Renamed find_sig_in_template() to find_modsig_in_template().
Thiago Jung Bauermann (13):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +-
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 7 +-
certs/system_keyring.c | 61 +++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 ++++
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 +
include/linux/module.h | 3 -
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++
include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++
init/Kconfig | 6 +-
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 1 +
kernel/module_signature.c | 46 +++++
kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +-----
scripts/Makefile | 2 +-
security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 43 ++++-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 +-
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 13 ++
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 60 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 34 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 199 ++++++++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 68 +++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 26 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 60 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 +
security/integrity/integrity.h | 26 +++
30 files changed, 840 insertions(+), 181 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v11 01/13] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export
the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the
appended signature trailer is valid.
Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it
and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/module.h | 3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig | 6 +++-
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 1 +
kernel/module_signature.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile | 2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <asm/module.h>
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
/* Not Yet Implemented */
#define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..523617fc5b6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Module signature handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+#define _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+
+/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
+#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
+
+enum pkey_id_type {
+ PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
+ PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+ PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module signature information block.
+ *
+ * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
+ *
+ * - Signer's name
+ * - Key identifier
+ * - Signature data
+ * - Information block
+ */
+struct module_signature {
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ u8 __pad[3];
+ __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+ const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
default 0 if BASE_FULL
default 1 if !BASE_FULL
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ def_bool n
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
menuconfig MODULES
bool "Enable loadable module support"
option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
- select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4224a1086b7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Module signature checker
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
+ *
+ * @ms: Signature to check.
+ * @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @name: What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+ pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
+ name);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ if (ms->algo != 0 ||
+ ms->hash != 0 ||
+ ms->signer_len != 0 ||
+ ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
+ name);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 6b9a926fd86b..cdd04a6b8074 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -11,37 +11,13 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
-enum pkey_id_type {
- PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
- PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
- PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
-};
-
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- * - Signer's name
- * - Key identifier
- * - Signature data
- * - Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
- u8 __pad[3];
- __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
-};
-
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
@@ -49,6 +25,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
{
struct module_signature ms;
size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+ int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -56,32 +33,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
return -EBADMSG;
memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
- modlen -= sizeof(ms);
+
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, info->name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
- if (sig_len >= modlen)
- return -EBADMSG;
- modlen -= sig_len;
+ modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
info->len = modlen;
- if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
- pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
- info->name);
- return -ENOPKG;
- }
-
- if (ms.algo != 0 ||
- ms.hash != 0 ||
- ms.signer_len != 0 ||
- ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
- pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
- info->name);
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
-
return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v11 02/13] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed.
For this reason, factor out the code which does that from
verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct
pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
---
certs/system_keyring.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index c05c29ae4d5d..4ba82e52e4b4 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
/**
- * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
- * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
- * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
* @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
-int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
- struct key *trusted_keys,
- enum key_being_used_for usage,
- int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
- const void *data, size_t len,
- size_t asn1hdrlen),
- void *ctx)
+int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
{
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
int ret;
- pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
- if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
- return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
}
error:
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
+ */
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
+ view_content, ctx);
+
pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 018fb5f13d44..5e1d41f2b336 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx);
+extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx);
#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v11 03/13] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by
the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce
pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already
calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that
sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which
allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info())
use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index f7b0980bf02d..3243981152b5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/asn1.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
@@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+ /* The digest was calculated already. */
+ if (sig->digest)
+ return 0;
+
if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
return -ENOPKG;
@@ -121,6 +126,34 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return ret;
}
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+ enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ /*
+ * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+ */
+ if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ *buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+ *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
+ *hash_algo = i;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
* uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 583f199400a3..3bfe6829eaae 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
struct key;
@@ -44,4 +45,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf,
+ u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo);
+
#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v11 04/13] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a
SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean
"type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real
size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.
The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the
definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data.
So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from
the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the
element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a
digest.
A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of
evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that
definition, specifically the EVM HMAC code.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++---
security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index b6d9f14bc234..588f22f1b5bd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
- if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
+ if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
goto out;
}
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
xattr_value_len, &digest);
if (rc)
break;
- rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest,
+ rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
struct xattr *evm_xattr)
{
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
+ struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
int rc;
if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
if (!xattr_data)
return -ENOMEM;
- xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+ xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2f6536ab69e8..18bbe753421a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return sig->hash_algo;
break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
- ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
+ /* first byte contains algorithm id */
+ ret = xattr_value->data[0];
if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ret;
break;
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
/* this is for backward compatibility */
if (xattr_len == 21) {
unsigned int zero = 0;
- if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4))
+ if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4))
return HASH_ALGO_MD5;
else
return HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
*/
- rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start],
+ rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
iint->ima_hash->digest,
iint->ima_hash->length);
else
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7de59f44cba3..88a29f72a74f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
struct evm_ima_xattr_data {
u8 type;
+ u8 data[];
+} __packed;
+
+/* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */
+struct evm_xattr {
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data data;
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v11 06/13] ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Designated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct
that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.
This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in ima_add_boot_aggregate)
and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update
all struct initializations.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 13 +++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 78eb11c7ac07..c0cf4bcfc82f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0,
- cause};
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+ .file = file,
+ .filename = filename,
+ .violation = cause };
int violation = 1;
int result;
@@ -294,8 +296,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
int result = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
- struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value,
- xattr_len, NULL};
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+ .file = file,
+ .filename = filename,
+ .xattr_value = xattr_value,
+ .xattr_len = xattr_len };
int violation = 0;
if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 993d0f1915ff..368ef658a1cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
- struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
- NULL, 0, NULL};
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
+ .filename = boot_aggregate_name };
int result = -ENOMEM;
int violation = 0;
struct {
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v11 05/13] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-11 6:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190611062817.18412-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 3ba1168b1756..93d73902c571 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY
config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
- depends on KEYS
default n
+ select KEYS
select SIGNATURE
help
This option enables digital signature verification support
^ permalink raw reply related
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