* [PATCHv3 2/2] PCI: layerscape: Add CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE_EP to build EP/RC separately
From: Xiaowei Bao @ 2019-06-28 1:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bhelgaas, robh+dt, mark.rutland, shawnguo, leoyang.li, kishon,
lorenzo.pieralisi, arnd, gregkh, minghuan.Lian, mingkai.hu,
roy.zang, kstewart, pombredanne, shawn.lin, linux-pci, devicetree,
linux-kernel, linux-arm-kernel, linuxppc-dev
Cc: Xiaowei Bao
In-Reply-To: <20190628013826.4705-1-xiaowei.bao@nxp.com>
Add CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE_EP to build EP/RC separately.
Signed-off-by: Xiaowei Bao <xiaowei.bao@nxp.com>
---
v2:
- No change.
v3:
- modify the commit message.
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Makefile | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig
index a6ce1ee..a41ccf5 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig
@@ -131,13 +131,29 @@ config PCI_KEYSTONE_EP
DesignWare core functions to implement the driver.
config PCI_LAYERSCAPE
- bool "Freescale Layerscape PCIe controller"
+ bool "Freescale Layerscape PCIe controller - Host mode"
depends on OF && (ARM || ARCH_LAYERSCAPE || COMPILE_TEST)
depends on PCI_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN
select MFD_SYSCON
select PCIE_DW_HOST
help
- Say Y here if you want PCIe controller support on Layerscape SoCs.
+ Say Y here if you want to enable PCIe controller support on Layerscape
+ SoCs to work in Host mode.
+ This controller can work either as EP or RC. The RCW[HOST_AGT_PEX]
+ determines which PCIe controller works in EP mode and which PCIe
+ controller works in RC mode.
+
+config PCI_LAYERSCAPE_EP
+ bool "Freescale Layerscape PCIe controller - Endpoint mode"
+ depends on OF && (ARM || ARCH_LAYERSCAPE || COMPILE_TEST)
+ depends on PCI_ENDPOINT
+ select PCIE_DW_EP
+ help
+ Say Y here if you want to enable PCIe controller support on Layerscape
+ SoCs to work in Endpoint mode.
+ This controller can work either as EP or RC. The RCW[HOST_AGT_PEX]
+ determines which PCIe controller works in EP mode and which PCIe
+ controller works in RC mode.
config PCI_HISI
depends on OF && (ARM64 || COMPILE_TEST)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Makefile b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Makefile
index b085dfd..824fde7 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Makefile
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_EXYNOS) += pci-exynos.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_IMX6) += pci-imx6.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCIE_SPEAR13XX) += pcie-spear13xx.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_KEYSTONE) += pci-keystone.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE) += pci-layerscape.o pci-layerscape-ep.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE) += pci-layerscape.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE_EP) += pci-layerscape-ep.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCIE_QCOM) += pcie-qcom.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCIE_ARMADA_8K) += pcie-armada8k.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PCIE_ARTPEC6) += pcie-artpec6.o
--
1.7.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 1:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael S. Tsirkin
Cc: Mike Anderson, Michael Roth, Jean-Philippe Brucker, Jason Wang,
Alexey Kardashevskiy, Ram Pai, linux-kernel, virtualization,
iommu, linuxppc-dev, Christoph Hellwig, David Gibson
In-Reply-To: <20190603211528-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> writes:
> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 10:13:59PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>
>>
>> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> writes:
>>
>> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>> >> I rephrased it in terms of address translation. What do you think of
>> >> this version? The flag name is slightly different too:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This feature has the same
>> >> meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set,
>> >> with the exception that address translation is guaranteed to be
>> >> unnecessary when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device
>> >> by the driver. Which is to say, the device will always use physical
>> >> addresses matching addresses used by the driver (typically meaning
>> >> physical addresses used by the CPU) and not translated further. This
>> >> flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to allow for
>> >> backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it to be
>> >> left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag and
>> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>> >
>> >
>> > OK so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is designed to allow unpriveledged
>> > drivers. This is why devices fail when it's not negotiated.
>>
>> Just to clarify, what do you mean by unprivileged drivers? Is it drivers
>> implemented in guest userspace such as with VFIO? Or unprivileged in
>> some other sense such as needing to use bounce buffers for some reason?
>
> I had drivers in guest userspace in mind.
Great. Thanks for clarifying.
I don't think this flag would work for guest userspace drivers. Should I
add a note about that in the flag definition?
>> > This confuses me.
>> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with this flag?
>> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that corrupt kernel
>> > memory?
>>
>> Not needing address translation doesn't necessarily mean that there's no
>> IOMMU. On powerpc we don't use VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM but there's
>> always an IOMMU present. And we also support VFIO drivers. The VFIO API
>> for pseries (sPAPR section in Documentation/vfio.txt) has extra ioctls
>> to program the IOMMU.
>>
>> For our use case, we don't need address translation because we set up an
>> identity mapping in the IOMMU so that the device can use guest physical
>> addresses.
>
> And can it access any guest physical address?
Sorry, I was mistaken. We do support VFIO in guests but not for virtio
devices, only for regular PCI devices. In which case they will use
address translation.
>> If the guest kernel is concerned that an unprivileged driver could
>> jeopardize its integrity it should not negotiate this feature flag.
>
> Unfortunately flag negotiation is done through config space
> and so can be overwritten by the driver.
Ok, so the guest kernel has to forbid VFIO access on devices where this
flag is advertised.
>> Perhaps there should be a note about this in the flag definition? This
>> concern is platform-dependant though. I don't believe it's an issue in
>> pseries.
>
> Again ACCESS_PLATFORM has a pretty open definition. It does actually
> say it's all up to the platform.
>
> Specifically how will VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION be
> implemented portably? virtio has no portable way to know
> whether DMA API bypasses translation.
The fact that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION is set
communicates that knowledge to virtio. There is a shared understanding
between the guest and the host about what this flag being set means.
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH RFC] generic ELF support for kexec
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2019-06-28 2:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sven Schnelle, kexec; +Cc: linux-s390, deller, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <20190625185433.GA10934@t470p.stackframe.org>
Hi Sven,
Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> writes:
> Hi List,
>
> i recently started working on kexec for PA-RISC. While doing so, i figured
> that powerpc already has support for reading ELF images inside of the Kernel.
> My first attempt was to steal the source code and modify it for PA-RISC, but
> it turned out that i didn't had to change much. Only ARM specific stuff like
> fdt blob fetching had to be removed.
>
> So instead of duplicating the code, i thought about moving the ELF stuff to
> the core kexec code, and exposing several function to use that code from the
> arch specific code.
>
> I'm attaching the patch to this Mail. What do you think about that change?
> s390 also uses ELF files, and (maybe?) could also switch to this implementation.
> But i don't know anything about S/390 and don't have one in my basement. So
> i'll leave s390 to the IBM folks.
It looks mostly OK, a few comments below.
> I haven't really tested PowerPC yet. Can anyone give me a helping hand what
> would be a good target to test this code in QEMU? Or even better, test this
> code on real Hardware?
There's some info on using qemu here:
https://github.com/linuxppc/wiki/wiki/Booting-with-Qemu
But I'm not sure where you get a version of kexec that uses kexec_file().
We can probably work out those details though.
> If that change is acceptable i would finish the patch and submit it. I think
> best would be to push this change through Helge's parisc tree, so we don't
> have any dependencies to sort out.
That will work for you but could cause us problems if we have any
changes that touch that code.
It's easy enough to create a topic branch with just that patch that both
of us merge.
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index c47b328eada0..de7520100136 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ config KEXEC_CORE
> select CRASH_CORE
> bool
>
> +config KEXEC_FILE_ELF
> + bool
We could probably just call it KEXEC_ELF I think? The functions are
called that after all.
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/kexec_elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kexec_elf_64.c
> index ba4f18a43ee8..0059e36913e9 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/kexec_elf_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kexec_elf_64.c
> @@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
> * GNU General Public License for more details.
> */
>
> -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_elf: " fmt
> -
Please don't remove that, there are still some prints left in this file
that use it.
> #include <linux/elf.h>
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/libfdt.h>
> @@ -31,540 +29,6 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
>
> -#define PURGATORY_STACK_SIZE (16 * 1024)
This is unused AFAICS. We should probably remove it explicitly rather
than as part of this patch.
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file_elf.c b/kernel/kexec_file_elf.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..bb966c93492c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file_elf.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
> +/*
> + * Load ELF vmlinux file for the kexec_file_load syscall.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2004 Adam Litke (agl@us.ibm.com)
> + * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corp.
> + * Copyright (C) 2005 R Sharada (sharada@in.ibm.com)
> + * Copyright (C) 2006 Mohan Kumar M (mohan@in.ibm.com)
> + * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation
> + *
> + * Based on kexec-tools' kexec-elf-exec.c and kexec-elf-ppc64.c.
> + * Heavily modified for the kernel by
> + * Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>.
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
> + * the Free Software Foundation (version 2 of the License).
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
You shouldn't be adding new license text. Instead remove those two
paragraphs and use a SPDX tag.
If you look at the file in master it already has the tag.
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec_elf: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/elf.h>
> +#include <linux/kexec.h>
> +#include <linux/libfdt.h>
You don't need that do you?
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
Or that.
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +#define elf_addr_to_cpu elf64_to_cpu
Why are we doing that rather than just using elf64_to_cpu directly?
> +#ifndef Elf_Rel
> +#define Elf_Rel Elf64_Rel
> +#endif /* Elf_Rel */
And that?
cheers
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V2] crypto/NX: Set receive window credits to max number of CRBs in RxFIFO
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-06-28 2:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman; +Cc: stable, linuxppc-dev, linux-crypto, Haren Myneni
In-Reply-To: <87tvcascwb.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 11:43:16AM +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
>
> No. I assumed you'd take it because it's in drivers/crypto.
>
> If you want me to take it that's fine, just let me know.
No that's fine Michael. I'll pick it up.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v12 00/11] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
Hello,
This version is essentially identical to the last one.
It is only a rebase on top of today's linux-integrity/next-queued-testing,
prompted by conflicts with Prakhar Srivastava's patches to measure the
kernel command line. It also drops two patches that are already present in
that branch.
As I mentioned in an earlier email, I believe Mimi is happy with this
version but before she can accept it I still need acks from maintainers of
the module and asymmetric keys subsystems for the first three patches.
Many thanks to Mimi Zohar for her help with the development of this patch
series.
This patch which I sent earlier today needs to be applied first:
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
Original cover letter:
On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
Since the kernel image on Power servers is an ELF binary, kernels are
signed using the scripts/sign-file tool and thus use the same signature
format as signed kernel modules.
This patch series adds support in IMA for verifying those signatures.
It adds flexibility to OpenPOWER secure boot, because it allows it to boot
kernels with the signature appended to them as well as kernels where the
signature is stored in the IMA extended attribute.
Changes since v11:
- Patch "integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr"
- Dropped since it's already in linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.
- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- Dropped since it's already in linux-integrity/next-queued-testing.
Changes since v10:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT definition before its use. Suggested by
Mimi Zohar.
- Added missing kerneldoc for @name parameter. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Bugfix: don't check status variable when deciding whether to verify
modsig in ima_appraise_measurement(). Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Bugfix: verify the modsig in ima_appraise_measurement() if the xattr
contains a digest. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize() to ima_get_raw_modsig().
- Renamed check_current_template_modsig() to check_template_modsig().
- Fixed outdated comment in ima_eventmodsig_init(). Suggested by Mimi
Zohar.
- Check either the global or the per-rule template when an appraisal rule
allows modsig. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Bugfix: Only re-measure file containing modsig if it was measured
before.
- Check for modsig-related fields in the template_desc obtained in
process_measurement() which can be a per-rule template. Suggested by Mimi
Zohar.
- Patch "ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well"
- New patch. Suggested by Mimi Zohar.
Changes since v9:
- Patch "MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions"
- Moved mod_check_sig() to a new file so that CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
doesn't have to depend on CONFIG_MODULES.
- Changed scripts/Makefile to build sign-file if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
is set.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()"
- Don't add function pkcs7_get_message_sig() anymore, since it's not
needed in the current version.
- Patch "PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()"
- Changed 'len' argument from 'u8 *' to 'u32 *'.
- Added 'hash_algo' argument to obtain the algo used for the digest.
- Don't check whether 'buf', 'len' and 'hash_algo' output arguments are NULL,
since the function's only caller always sets them.
- Removed Mimi's Reviewed-by because of the changes in this version.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Changed integrity_keyring_from_id() to a static function (suggested by Mimi
Zohar).
- Patch "ima: Introduce is_signed()"
- Dropped.
- Patch "ima: Export func_tokens"
- Squashed into "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Patch "ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures"
- Renamed 'struct modsig_hdr' to 'struct modsig'.
- Added integrity_modsig_verify() to integrity/digsig.c so that it's not
necessary to export integrity_keyring_from_id() (Suggested by Mimi Zohar).
- Don't add functions ima_xattr_sig_known_key() and
modsig_has_known_key() since they're not necessary anymore.
- Added modsig argument to ima_appraise_measurement().
- Verify modsig in a separate function called by ima_appraise_measurement().
- Renamed ima_read_collect_modsig() to ima_read_modsig(), with a separate
collect function added in patch "ima: Collect modsig" (suggested by Mimi
Zohar).
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved code saving of raw PKCS7 data to 'struct
modsig' to patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), moved all parts related to the modsig hash to
patch "ima: Collect modsig".
- In ima_read_modsig(), don't check if the buf pointer is NULL since it's
never supposed to happen.
- Renamed ima_free_xattr_data() to ima_free_modsig().
- No need to check for modsig in ima_read_xattr() and
ima_inode_set_xattr() anymore.
- In ima_modsig_verify(), don't check if the modsig pointer is NULL since
it's not supposed to happen.
- Don't define IMA_MODSIG element in enum evm_ima_xattr_type.
- Patch "ima: Collect modsig"
- New patch.
- Patch "ima: Define ima-modsig template"
- Patch renamed from "ima: Add new "d-sig" template field"
- Renamed 'd-sig' template field to 'd-modsig'.
- Added 'modsig' template field.
- Added 'ima-modsig' defined template descriptor.
- Renamed ima_modsig_serialize_data() to ima_modsig_serialize().
- Renamed ima_get_modsig_hash() to ima_get_modsig_digest(). Also the
function is a lot simpler now since what it used to do is now done in
ima_collect_modsig() and pkcs7_get_digest().
- Added check for failed modsig collection in ima_eventdigest_modsig_init().
- Added modsig argument to ima_store_measurement().
- Added 'modsig' field to struct ima_event_data.
- Removed check for modsig == NULL in ima_get_modsig_digest() and in
ima_modsig_serialize_data() since their callers already performs that
check.
- Moved check_current_template_modsig() to this patch, previously was in
"ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig".
- Patch "ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig"
- Renamed ima_template_has_sig() to ima_template_has_modsig().
- Added a change to ima_collect_measurement(), making it to call
ima_collect_modsig() even if IMA_COLLECT is set in iint->flags.
- Removed IMA_READ_MEASURE flag.
- Renamed template_has_sig global variable to template_has_modsig.
- Renamed find_sig_in_template() to find_modsig_in_template().
Thiago Jung Bauermann (11):
MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended
signatures
ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
ima: Collect modsig
ima: Define ima-modsig template
ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +-
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 3 +
certs/system_keyring.c | 61 +++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 ++++
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 +
include/linux/module.h | 3 -
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++
include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++
init/Kconfig | 6 +-
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 1 +
kernel/module_signature.c | 46 +++++
kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +------
scripts/Makefile | 2 +-
security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 43 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 13 ++
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 60 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 23 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 194 ++++++++++++++--------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 68 +++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 26 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 64 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 +
security/integrity/integrity.h | 20 +++
28 files changed, 819 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/module_signature.h
create mode 100644 kernel/module_signature.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v12 02/11] PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed.
For this reason, factor out the code which does that from
verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct
pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
---
certs/system_keyring.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index c05c29ae4d5d..4ba82e52e4b4 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -194,33 +194,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
/**
- * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
- * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
- * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
* @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
-int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
- struct key *trusted_keys,
- enum key_being_used_for usage,
- int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
- const void *data, size_t len,
- size_t asn1hdrlen),
- void *ctx)
+int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
{
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
int ret;
- pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
- if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
- return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
@@ -273,6 +267,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
}
error:
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
+ */
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage,
+ view_content, ctx);
+
pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 018fb5f13d44..5e1d41f2b336 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
struct key;
+struct pkcs7_message;
extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx);
+extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx);
#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 04/11] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 3ba1168b1756..93d73902c571 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY
config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings"
- depends on KEYS
default n
+ select KEYS
select SIGNATURE
help
This option enables digital signature verification support
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 03/11] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by
the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce
pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose.
Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already
calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that
sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which
allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info())
use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index f7b0980bf02d..3243981152b5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/asn1.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
@@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+ /* The digest was calculated already. */
+ if (sig->digest)
+ return 0;
+
if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
return -ENOPKG;
@@ -121,6 +126,34 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return ret;
}
+int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
+ enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ /*
+ * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
+ */
+ if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ *buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
+ *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
+ *hash_algo = i;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
* uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 583f199400a3..3bfe6829eaae 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
struct key;
@@ -44,4 +45,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf,
+ u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo);
+
#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 01/11] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export
the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the
appended signature trailer is valid.
Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it
and be able to use mod_check_sig() without having to depend on either
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG or CONFIG_MODULES.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/module.h | 3 --
include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
init/Kconfig | 6 +++-
kernel/Makefile | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 1 +
kernel/module_signature.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module_signing.c | 56 +++++---------------------------
scripts/Makefile | 2 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 188998d3dca9..aa56f531cf1e 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <asm/module.h>
-/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
-#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
-
/* Not Yet Implemented */
#define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..523617fc5b6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Module signature handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+#define _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H
+
+/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
+#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
+
+enum pkey_id_type {
+ PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
+ PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+ PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module signature information block.
+ *
+ * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
+ *
+ * - Signer's name
+ * - Key identifier
+ * - Signature data
+ * - Information block
+ */
+struct module_signature {
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ u8 __pad[3];
+ __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+ const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 8b9ffe236e4f..c2286a3c74c5 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1852,6 +1852,10 @@ config BASE_SMALL
default 0 if BASE_FULL
default 1 if !BASE_FULL
+config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ def_bool n
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
menuconfig MODULES
bool "Enable loadable module support"
option modules
@@ -1929,7 +1933,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
- select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 33824f0385b3..f29ae2997a43 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 6e6712b3aaf5..2712f4d217f5 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/moduleloader.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4224a1086b7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Module signature checker
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
+ *
+ * @ms: Signature to check.
+ * @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @name: What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+ pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
+ name);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ if (ms->algo != 0 ||
+ ms->hash != 0 ||
+ ms->signer_len != 0 ||
+ ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
+ ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
+ name);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 6b9a926fd86b..cdd04a6b8074 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -11,37 +11,13 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
-enum pkey_id_type {
- PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
- PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
- PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
-};
-
-/*
- * Module signature information block.
- *
- * The constituents of the signature section are, in order:
- *
- * - Signer's name
- * - Key identifier
- * - Signature data
- * - Information block
- */
-struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
- u8 __pad[3];
- __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
-};
-
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
@@ -49,6 +25,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
{
struct module_signature ms;
size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+ int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -56,32 +33,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
return -EBADMSG;
memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
- modlen -= sizeof(ms);
+
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, info->name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
- if (sig_len >= modlen)
- return -EBADMSG;
- modlen -= sig_len;
+ modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
info->len = modlen;
- if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
- pr_err("%s: Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n",
- info->name);
- return -ENOPKG;
- }
-
- if (ms.algo != 0 ||
- ms.hash != 0 ||
- ms.signer_len != 0 ||
- ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
- ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
- pr_err("%s: PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n",
- info->name);
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
-
return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 9d442ee050bd..52098b080ab7 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 05/11] ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that
a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended
to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended
attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if
appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation
will be introduced separately.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 ++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++++++--
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index fc376a323908..29ebe9afdac4 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Description:
euid:= decimal value
fowner:= decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
- option: appraise_type:= [imasig]
+ option: appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
template:= name of a defined IMA template type
(eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure".
pcr:= decimal value
@@ -105,3 +105,7 @@ Description:
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5
+
+ Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures:
+
+ appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index df65d2d41905..6fa78fbc8c30 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -232,6 +232,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
(eg. fix, log) from the boot command line.
+config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+ bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+ default n
+ help
+ Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
+ appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules.
+ The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook
+ to accept such signatures.
+
config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index d921dc4f9eb0..31d57cdf2421 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o
ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 6aa28ab53d27..904f7dd78007 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -306,6 +306,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..87503bfe8c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/**
+ * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
+ *
+ * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
+ * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
+ * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
+ * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
+ */
+bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ switch (func) {
+ case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+ case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+ case MODULE_CHECK:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a3058b03a955..ac258df2f1f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1132,6 +1132,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) &&
+ strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+ IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
else
result = -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -1451,8 +1455,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
if (entry->template)
seq_printf(m, "template=%s ", entry->template->name);
- if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
- seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+ seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
+ else
+ seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
+ }
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 88a29f72a74f..0e7330a36a9d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 06/11] ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in
ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also
verify an appended module signature.
The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to
dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers),
and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 141 +++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 18bbe753421a..5d4772f39757 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -202,6 +202,83 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the hash or signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+ enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+ int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+
+ switch (xattr_value->type) {
+ case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
+ /* first byte contains algorithm id */
+ hash_start = 1;
+ /* fall through */
+ case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
+ iint->ima_hash->length)
+ /*
+ * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
+ * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
+ */
+ rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
+ iint->ima_hash->digest,
+ iint->ima_hash->length);
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "invalid-hash";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ break;
+ case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+ (const char *)xattr_value,
+ xattr_len,
+ iint->ima_hash->digest,
+ iint->ima_hash->length);
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ *status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+ func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+ (const char *)xattr_value,
+ xattr_len,
+ iint->ima_hash->digest,
+ iint->ima_hash->length);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ *status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ *cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
@@ -221,7 +298,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
+ int rc = xattr_len;
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -259,65 +336,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
}
- switch (xattr_value->type) {
- case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
- /* first byte contains algorithm id */
- hash_start = 1;
- /* fall through */
- case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
- if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- cause = "IMA-signature-required";
- status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
- break;
- }
- clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
- if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
- iint->ima_hash->length)
- /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
- version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
- */
- rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start],
- iint->ima_hash->digest,
- iint->ima_hash->length);
- else
- rc = -EINVAL;
- if (rc) {
- cause = "invalid-hash";
- status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
- break;
- }
- status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
- break;
- case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
- set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
- rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
- (const char *)xattr_value,
- xattr_len,
- iint->ima_hash->digest,
- iint->ima_hash->length);
- if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
- status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
- func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
- rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
- (const char *)xattr_value,
- xattr_len,
- iint->ima_hash->digest,
- iint->ima_hash->length);
- if (rc) {
- cause = "invalid-signature";
- status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
- } else {
- status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
- }
- break;
- default:
- status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- cause = "unknown-ima-data";
- break;
- }
+ if (xattr_value)
+ rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status,
+ &cause);
out:
/*
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 08/11] ima: Collect modsig
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in
ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index fa188de1cef6..baf2ffd52a41 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum hash_algo algo);
+ enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -328,6 +329,11 @@ static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
+ loff_t size)
+{
+}
+
static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
{
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d426d4d1fe04..ac35bc3d6e35 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
*/
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum hash_algo algo)
+ enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
{
const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
iint->version = i_version;
+ if (modsig)
+ ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
if (!result)
iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 70252ac3321d..aa14e3fe25d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
!(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
return;
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 309058c1d50e..cc4500f93408 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
- rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
goto out_locked;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index f41ebe370fa0..d438b87dba89 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -17,6 +17,19 @@
struct modsig {
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg;
+
+ enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+
+ /* This digest will go in the 'd-modsig' field of the IMA template. */
+ const u8 *digest;
+ u32 digest_size;
+
+ /*
+ * This is what will go to the measurement list if the template requires
+ * storing the signature.
+ */
+ int raw_pkcs7_len;
+ u8 raw_pkcs7[];
};
/**
@@ -71,7 +84,8 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
- hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
+ hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -81,11 +95,45 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
return PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg);
}
+ memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7, buf + buf_len, sig_len);
+ hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;
+
+ /* We don't know the hash algorithm yet. */
+ hdr->hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
+
*modsig = hdr;
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * ima_collect_modsig - Calculate the file hash without the appended signature.
+ *
+ * Since the modsig is part of the file contents, the hash used in its signature
+ * isn't the same one ordinarily calculated by IMA. Therefore PKCS7 code
+ * calculates a separate one for signature verification.
+ */
+void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Provide the file contents (minus the appended sig) so that the PKCS7
+ * code can calculate the file hash.
+ */
+ size -= modsig->raw_pkcs7_len + strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING) +
+ sizeof(struct module_signature);
+ rc = pkcs7_supply_detached_data(modsig->pkcs7_msg, buf, size);
+ if (rc)
+ return;
+
+ /* Ask the PKCS7 code to calculate the file hash. */
+ rc = pkcs7_get_digest(modsig->pkcs7_msg, &modsig->digest,
+ &modsig->digest_size, &modsig->hash_algo);
+ if (rc)
+ return;
+}
+
int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
{
return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring,
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 07/11] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and
verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will
only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature
isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.
Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id
to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in
digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/digsig.c | 43 ++++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 22 ++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++---
security/integrity/integrity.h | 19 +++++++
8 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 37869214c243..1c353b1a6ec5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
#endif
-int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
- const char *digest, int digestlen)
+static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id)
{
- if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!keyring[id]) {
keyring[id] =
@@ -56,23 +55,49 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
}
+ return keyring[id];
+}
+
+int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *digest, int digestlen)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ if (siglen < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
switch (sig[1]) {
case 1:
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
- return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
+ digestlen);
case 2:
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
- digest, digestlen);
+ return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
+ digestlen);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+int integrity_modsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ struct key *keyring;
+
+ keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring))
+ return PTR_ERR(keyring);
+
+ return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, modsig);
+}
+
static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
key_perm_t perm,
struct key_restriction *restriction)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 6fa78fbc8c30..5a109707e907 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
default n
help
Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 904f7dd78007..fa188de1cef6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -200,6 +200,10 @@ enum ima_hooks {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
};
+extern const char *const func_tokens[];
+
+struct modsig;
+
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
@@ -253,7 +257,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len);
+ int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -269,7 +273,8 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len)
+ int xattr_len,
+ const struct modsig *modsig)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
@@ -308,11 +313,24 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+ struct modsig **modsig);
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
{
return false;
}
+
+static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
+ loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5d4772f39757..70252ac3321d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -279,6 +279,33 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * modsig_verify - verify modsig signature
+ *
+ * Verify whether the signature matches the file contents.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
+ enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, modsig);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
+ func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ rc = integrity_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+ modsig);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
*
@@ -291,7 +318,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len)
+ int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
{
static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
const char *cause = "unknown";
@@ -299,11 +326,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
int rc = xattr_len;
+ bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig;
- if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+ /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */
+ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- if (rc <= 0) {
+ /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */
+ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) {
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;
@@ -326,6 +356,10 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
break;
case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */
+ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */
+ if (try_modsig)
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */
cause = "missing-HMAC";
goto out;
@@ -340,6 +374,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status,
&cause);
+ /*
+ * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't
+ * known, then try verifying the modsig.
+ */
+ if (try_modsig &&
+ (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type == IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG ||
+ rc == -ENOKEY))
+ rc = modsig_verify(func, modsig, &status, &cause);
+
out:
/*
* File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
@@ -356,7 +399,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
op, cause, rc, 0);
} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig &&
(!xattr_value ||
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 317c4b6f2c18..309058c1d50e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+ struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -306,10 +307,15 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
}
if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
- strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+ strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
/* read 'security.ima' */
xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
+ /* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
+ ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+ }
+
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
inode_lock(inode);
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
- xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (!rc)
rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
@@ -343,6 +349,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
rc = -EACCES;
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
kfree(xattr_value);
+ ima_free_modsig(modsig);
out:
if (pathbuf)
__putname(pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index 87503bfe8c8b..f41ebe370fa0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -8,8 +8,17 @@
* Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
*/
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+
#include "ima.h"
+struct modsig {
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg;
+};
+
/**
* ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
*
@@ -29,3 +38,65 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
return false;
}
}
+
+/*
+ * ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+ struct modsig **modsig)
+{
+ const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
+ const struct module_signature *sig;
+ struct modsig *hdr;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ const void *p;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
+ if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ buf_len -= marker_len;
+ sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
+
+ rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+ buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+ hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hdr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + buf_len, sig_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) {
+ kfree(hdr);
+ return PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg);
+ }
+
+ *modsig = hdr;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ if (!modsig)
+ return;
+
+ pkcs7_free_message(modsig->pkcs7_msg);
+ kfree(modsig);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index ac258df2f1f4..4c5b968c4721 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
}
}
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
+
+const char *const func_tokens[] = {
+ __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
enum {
mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
@@ -1272,12 +1278,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
"^MAY_APPEND"
};
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
-
-static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
- __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
-};
-
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t l = *pos;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0e7330a36a9d..c6e7f41db470 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -153,10 +153,13 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+struct modsig;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen);
+int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id, const struct modsig *modsig);
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
@@ -171,6 +174,12 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline int integrity_modsig_verify(unsigned int id,
+ const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
return 0;
@@ -196,6 +205,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
+int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig);
+#else
+static inline int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct modsig *modsig)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
void __init ima_load_x509(void);
#else
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 10/11] ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the
modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file
containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be
appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig
because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule
triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because
the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with
the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a
modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3293dd07b6c9..01a7a140bb4a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
int *num_fields);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name);
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template);
int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf);
int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 9d1fe712a6cc..3a78373d835c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -223,6 +223,14 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
} hash;
+ /*
+ * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
+ * the file digest without collecting the modsig in a previous
+ * measurement rule.
+ */
+ if (modsig)
+ ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
+
if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
goto out;
@@ -256,9 +264,6 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
iint->version = i_version;
- if (modsig)
- ima_collect_modsig(modsig, buf, size);
-
/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
if (!result)
iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
@@ -308,7 +313,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
.modsig = modsig };
int violation = 0;
- if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
+ /*
+ * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because
+ * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of
+ * appraisal, but a file measurement from earlier might already exist in
+ * the measurement list.
+ */
+ if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig)
return;
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 8b35a200e0cc..e855a4658425 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -311,9 +311,18 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
/* read 'security.ima' */
xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
- /* Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy. */
- if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
- ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+ /*
+ * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
+ * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
+ * template format and whether the file was already measured.
+ */
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+ rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
+
+ if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
+ iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+ action |= IMA_MEASURE;
+ }
}
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index ac526b34973f..536205735456 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -62,6 +62,25 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
+/**
+ * ima_template_has_modsig - Check whether template has modsig-related fields.
+ * @ima_template: IMA template to check.
+ *
+ * Tells whether the given template has fields referencing a file's appended
+ * signature.
+ */
+bool ima_template_has_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *ima_template)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ima_template->num_fields; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig") ||
+ !strcmp(ima_template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 09/11] ima: Define ima-modsig template
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 3 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 20 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 19 +++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 41 +++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 7 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++
9 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
index 3d1cca287aa4..c5a8432972ef 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
+ - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- 'sig': the file signature;
+ - 'modsig' the appended file signature;
- 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations;
@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
- "ima-ng" (default): its format is ``d-ng|n-ng``;
- "ima-sig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig``;
- "ima-buf": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|buf``;
+ - "ima-modsig": its format is ``d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig``;
Use
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index baf2ffd52a41..3293dd07b6c9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_event_data {
const unsigned char *filename;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
int xattr_len;
+ const struct modsig *modsig;
const char *violation;
const void *buf;
int buf_len;
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, int pcr,
+ int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
@@ -316,6 +317,10 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig);
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+ const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size);
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+ u32 *data_len);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -334,6 +339,19 @@ static inline void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf,
{
}
+static inline int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig,
+ enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **digest,
+ u32 *digest_size)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig,
+ const void **data, u32 *data_len)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
{
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ac35bc3d6e35..9d1fe712a6cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, int pcr,
+ int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
{
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
.file = file,
.filename = filename,
.xattr_value = xattr_value,
- .xattr_len = xattr_len };
+ .xattr_len = xattr_len,
+ .modsig = modsig };
int violation = 0;
if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cc4500f93408..8b35a200e0cc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
- xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr,
+ xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
template_desc);
if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
inode_lock(inode);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index d438b87dba89..b01bbfeb1d98 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -140,6 +140,25 @@ int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const struct modsig *modsig)
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
}
+int ima_get_modsig_digest(const struct modsig *modsig, enum hash_algo *algo,
+ const u8 **digest, u32 *digest_size)
+{
+ *algo = modsig->hash_algo;
+ *digest = modsig->digest;
+ *digest_size = modsig->digest_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
+ u32 *data_len)
+{
+ *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7;
+ *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
{
if (!modsig)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4c5b968c4721..4fc13e591f1d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
* - initialize default measure policy rules
*
*/
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -847,6 +850,38 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL);
}
+/*
+ * Validating the appended signature included in the measurement list requires
+ * the file hash calculated without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-modsig'
+ * field). Therefore, notify the user if they have the 'modsig' field but not
+ * the 'd-modsig' field in the template.
+ */
+static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
+{
+#define MSG "template with 'modsig' field also needs 'd-modsig' field\n"
+ bool has_modsig, has_dmodsig;
+ static bool checked;
+ int i;
+
+ /* We only need to notify the user once. */
+ if (checked)
+ return;
+
+ has_modsig = has_dmodsig = false;
+ for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++) {
+ if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "modsig"))
+ has_modsig = true;
+ else if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "d-modsig"))
+ has_dmodsig = true;
+ }
+
+ if (has_modsig && !has_dmodsig)
+ pr_notice(MSG);
+
+ checked = true;
+#undef MSG
+}
+
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1189,6 +1224,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
+ if (!result && entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
+ template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
+ ima_template_desc_current();
+ check_template_modsig(template_desc);
+ }
+
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 7343e8e0ae2f..ac526b34973f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
+ {.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
{.name = "", .fmt = ""}, /* placeholder for a custom format */
};
@@ -46,6 +47,10 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
.field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
{.field_id = "buf", .field_init = ima_eventbuf_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_buf},
+ {.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init,
+ .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+ {.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init,
+ .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
};
/*
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
* need to be accounted for since they shouldn't be defined in the same template
* description as 'd-ng' and 'n-ng' respectively.
*/
-#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf")
+#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf|d-modisg|modsig")
static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index baf4de45c5aa..22e71cd5ca02 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
return 0;
}
-static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
+static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
+ u8 hash_algo,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
/*
@@ -332,6 +333,41 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
hash_algo, field_data);
}
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of the file which is expected to match the
+ * digest contained in the file's appended signature.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+ const u8 *cur_digest;
+ u32 cur_digestsize;
+
+ if (!event_data->modsig)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (event_data->violation) {
+ /* Recording a violation. */
+ hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ cur_digest = NULL;
+ cur_digestsize = 0;
+ } else {
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ima_get_modsig_digest(event_data->modsig, &hash_algo,
+ &cur_digest, &cur_digestsize);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ else if (hash_algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST || cur_digestsize == 0)
+ /* There was some error collecting the digest. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+ hash_algo, field_data);
+}
+
static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data,
bool size_limit)
@@ -410,3 +446,29 @@ int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
event_data->buf_len, DATA_FMT_HEX,
field_data);
}
+
+/*
+ * ima_eventmodsig_init - include the appended file signature as part of the
+ * template data
+ */
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ const void *data;
+ u32 data_len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!event_data->modsig)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * modsig is a runtime structure containing pointers. Get its raw data
+ * instead.
+ */
+ rc = ima_get_raw_modsig(event_data->modsig, &data, &data_len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return ima_write_template_field_data(data, data_len, DATA_FMT_HEX,
+ field_data);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 12f1a8578b31..6544eac1c77d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -40,10 +40,14 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v12 11/11] ima: Allow template= option for appraise rules as well
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-28 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Herbert Xu, linux-doc, Dmitry Kasatkin, David S. Miller,
Jonathan Corbet, linux-kernel, Mimi Zohar, James Morris,
David Howells, AKASHI, Takahiro, linux-security-module, keyrings,
linux-crypto, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David Woodhouse,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, Serge E. Hallyn
In-Reply-To: <20190628021934.4260-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
It's useful being able to specify a different IMA template on appraise
policy rules, so allow it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4fc13e591f1d..46ed31a0adfe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_template:
ima_log_string(ab, "template", args[0].from);
- if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+ if (entry->action != MEASURE &&
+ entry->action != APPRAISE) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 27/27] sound: ppc: remove unneeded memset after dma_alloc_coherent
From: Fuqian Huang @ 2019-06-28 2:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: Rob Herring, alsa-devel, linux-kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Takashi Iwai, Jaroslav Kysela, Richard Fontana, Paul Mackerras,
Fuqian Huang, Thomas Gleixner, linuxppc-dev, Allison Randal
In commit af7ddd8a627c
("Merge tag 'dma-mapping-4.21' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping"),
dma_alloc_coherent has already zeroed the memory.
So memset is not needed.
Signed-off-by: Fuqian Huang <huangfq.daxian@gmail.com>
---
sound/ppc/pmac.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/ppc/pmac.c b/sound/ppc/pmac.c
index 1b11e53f6a62..1ab12f4f8631 100644
--- a/sound/ppc/pmac.c
+++ b/sound/ppc/pmac.c
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ static int snd_pmac_dbdma_alloc(struct snd_pmac *chip, struct pmac_dbdma *rec, i
if (rec->space == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
rec->size = size;
- memset(rec->space, 0, rsize);
rec->cmds = (void __iomem *)DBDMA_ALIGN(rec->space);
rec->addr = rec->dma_base + (unsigned long)((char *)rec->cmds - (char *)rec->space);
--
2.11.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: power9 NUMA crash while reading debugfs imc_cmd
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2019-06-28 3:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Qian Cai, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar; +Cc: linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1561670472.5154.98.camel@lca.pw>
Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> writes:
> Read of debugfs imc_cmd file for a memory-less node will trigger a crash below
> on this power9 machine which has the following NUMA layout.
What type of machine is it?
cheers
> I don't understand why I only saw it recently on linux-next where it
> was tested everyday. I can reproduce it back to 4.20 where 4.18 seems
> work fine.
>
> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/imc_cmd_252 (On a 4.18-based kernel)
> 0x0000000000000000
>
> # numactl -H
> available: 6 nodes (0,8,252-255)
> node 0 cpus: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
> 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
> 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
> node 0 size: 130210 MB
> node 0 free: 128406 MB
> node 8 cpus: 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
> 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
> 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
> node 8 size: 130784 MB
> node 8 free: 130051 MB
> node 252 cpus:
> node 252 size: 0 MB
> node 252 free: 0 MB
> node 253 cpus:
> node 253 size: 0 MB
> node 253 free: 0 MB
> node 254 cpus:
> node 254 size: 0 MB
> node 254 free: 0 MB
> node 255 cpus:
> node 255 size: 0 MB
> node 255 free: 0 MB
> node distances:
> node 0 8 252 253 254 255
> 0: 10 40 80 80 80 80
> 8: 40 10 80 80 80 80
> 252: 80 80 10 80 80 80
> 253: 80 80 80 10 80 80
> 254: 80 80 80 80 10 80
> 255: 80 80 80 80 80 10
>
> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/imc_cmd_252
>
> [ 1139.415461][ T5301] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000d0d58
> [ 1139.415492][ T5301] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> [ 1139.415509][ T5301] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=256
> DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NUMA PowerNV
> [ 1139.415542][ T5301] Modules linked in: i2c_opal i2c_core ip_tables x_tables
> xfs sd_mod bnx2x mdio ahci libahci tg3 libphy libata firmware_class dm_mirror
> dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
> [ 1139.415595][ T5301] CPU: 67 PID: 5301 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-next-
> 20190627+ #19
> [ 1139.415634][ T5301] NIP: c0000000000d0d58 LR: c00000000049aa18 CTR:
> c0000000000d0d50
> [ 1139.415675][ T5301] REGS: c00020194548f9e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.2.0-
> rc6-next-20190627+)
> [ 1139.415705][ T5301] MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR:
> 28022822 XER: 00000000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] CFAR: c00000000049aa14 DAR: 000000000003fc08 DSISR:
> 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR00: c00000000049aa18 c00020194548fc70 c0000000016f8b00
> 000000000003fc08
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR04: c00020194548fcd0 0000000000000000 0000000014884e73
> ffffffff00011eaa
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR08: 000000007eea5a52 c0000000000d0d50 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR12: c0000000000d0d50 c000201fff7f8c00 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR16: 000000000000000d 00007fffeb0c3368 ffffffffffffffff
> 0000000000000000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
> 0000000000020000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000020000
> 000000010ec90000
> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR28: c00020194548fdf0 c00020049a584ef8 0000000000000000
> c00020049a584ea8
> [ 1139.416116][ T5301] NIP [c0000000000d0d58] imc_mem_get+0x8/0x20
> [ 1139.416143][ T5301] LR [c00000000049aa18] simple_attr_read+0x118/0x170
> [ 1139.416158][ T5301] Call Trace:
> [ 1139.416182][ T5301] [c00020194548fc70] [c00000000049a970]
> simple_attr_read+0x70/0x170 (unreliable)
> [ 1139.416255][ T5301] [c00020194548fd10] [c00000000054385c]
> debugfs_attr_read+0x6c/0xb0
> [ 1139.416305][ T5301] [c00020194548fd60] [c000000000454c1c]
> __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
> [ 1139.416363][ T5301] [c00020194548fd80] [c000000000454d0c] vfs_read+0xbc/0x1a0
> [ 1139.416392][ T5301] [c00020194548fdd0] [c00000000045519c]
> ksys_read+0x7c/0x140
> [ 1139.416434][ T5301] [c00020194548fe20] [c00000000000b108]
> system_call+0x5c/0x70
> [ 1139.416473][ T5301] Instruction dump:
> [ 1139.416511][ T5301] 4e800020 60000000 7c0802a6 60000000 7c801d28 38600000
> 4e800020 60000000
> [ 1139.416572][ T5301] 60000000 60000000 7c0802a6 60000000 <7d201c28> 38600000
> f9240000 4e800020
> [ 1139.416636][ T5301] ---[ end trace c44d1fb4ace04784 ]---
> [ 1139.520686][ T5301]
> [ 1140.520820][ T5301] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: power9 NUMA crash while reading debugfs imc_cmd
From: Qian Cai @ 2019-06-28 3:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <87lfxms8r3.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
> On Jun 27, 2019, at 11:12 PM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> wrote:
>
> Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> writes:
>> Read of debugfs imc_cmd file for a memory-less node will trigger a crash below
>> on this power9 machine which has the following NUMA layout.
>
> What type of machine is it?
description: PowerNV
product: 8335-GTH (ibm,witherspoon)
vendor: IBM
width: 64 bits
capabilities: smp powernv opal
>
> cheers
>
>> I don't understand why I only saw it recently on linux-next where it
>> was tested everyday. I can reproduce it back to 4.20 where 4.18 seems
>> work fine.
>>
>> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/imc_cmd_252 (On a 4.18-based kernel)
>> 0x0000000000000000
>>
>> # numactl -H
>> available: 6 nodes (0,8,252-255)
>> node 0 cpus: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
>> 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
>> 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
>> node 0 size: 130210 MB
>> node 0 free: 128406 MB
>> node 8 cpus: 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
>> 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
>> 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127
>> node 8 size: 130784 MB
>> node 8 free: 130051 MB
>> node 252 cpus:
>> node 252 size: 0 MB
>> node 252 free: 0 MB
>> node 253 cpus:
>> node 253 size: 0 MB
>> node 253 free: 0 MB
>> node 254 cpus:
>> node 254 size: 0 MB
>> node 254 free: 0 MB
>> node 255 cpus:
>> node 255 size: 0 MB
>> node 255 free: 0 MB
>> node distances:
>> node 0 8 252 253 254 255
>> 0: 10 40 80 80 80 80
>> 8: 40 10 80 80 80 80
>> 252: 80 80 10 80 80 80
>> 253: 80 80 80 10 80 80
>> 254: 80 80 80 80 10 80
>> 255: 80 80 80 80 80 10
>>
>> # cat /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/imc_cmd_252
>>
>> [ 1139.415461][ T5301] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000d0d58
>> [ 1139.415492][ T5301] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
>> [ 1139.415509][ T5301] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=256
>> DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NUMA PowerNV
>> [ 1139.415542][ T5301] Modules linked in: i2c_opal i2c_core ip_tables x_tables
>> xfs sd_mod bnx2x mdio ahci libahci tg3 libphy libata firmware_class dm_mirror
>> dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
>> [ 1139.415595][ T5301] CPU: 67 PID: 5301 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-next-
>> 20190627+ #19
>> [ 1139.415634][ T5301] NIP: c0000000000d0d58 LR: c00000000049aa18 CTR:
>> c0000000000d0d50
>> [ 1139.415675][ T5301] REGS: c00020194548f9e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.2.0-
>> rc6-next-20190627+)
>> [ 1139.415705][ T5301] MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR:
>> 28022822 XER: 00000000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] CFAR: c00000000049aa14 DAR: 000000000003fc08 DSISR:
>> 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR00: c00000000049aa18 c00020194548fc70 c0000000016f8b00
>> 000000000003fc08
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR04: c00020194548fcd0 0000000000000000 0000000014884e73
>> ffffffff00011eaa
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR08: 000000007eea5a52 c0000000000d0d50 0000000000000000
>> 0000000000000000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR12: c0000000000d0d50 c000201fff7f8c00 0000000000000000
>> 0000000000000000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR16: 000000000000000d 00007fffeb0c3368 ffffffffffffffff
>> 0000000000000000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
>> 0000000000020000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000020000
>> 000000010ec90000
>> [ 1139.415777][ T5301] GPR28: c00020194548fdf0 c00020049a584ef8 0000000000000000
>> c00020049a584ea8
>> [ 1139.416116][ T5301] NIP [c0000000000d0d58] imc_mem_get+0x8/0x20
>> [ 1139.416143][ T5301] LR [c00000000049aa18] simple_attr_read+0x118/0x170
>> [ 1139.416158][ T5301] Call Trace:
>> [ 1139.416182][ T5301] [c00020194548fc70] [c00000000049a970]
>> simple_attr_read+0x70/0x170 (unreliable)
>> [ 1139.416255][ T5301] [c00020194548fd10] [c00000000054385c]
>> debugfs_attr_read+0x6c/0xb0
>> [ 1139.416305][ T5301] [c00020194548fd60] [c000000000454c1c]
>> __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
>> [ 1139.416363][ T5301] [c00020194548fd80] [c000000000454d0c] vfs_read+0xbc/0x1a0
>> [ 1139.416392][ T5301] [c00020194548fdd0] [c00000000045519c]
>> ksys_read+0x7c/0x140
>> [ 1139.416434][ T5301] [c00020194548fe20] [c00000000000b108]
>> system_call+0x5c/0x70
>> [ 1139.416473][ T5301] Instruction dump:
>> [ 1139.416511][ T5301] 4e800020 60000000 7c0802a6 60000000 7c801d28 38600000
>> 4e800020 60000000
>> [ 1139.416572][ T5301] 60000000 60000000 7c0802a6 60000000 <7d201c28> 38600000
>> f9240000 4e800020
>> [ 1139.416636][ T5301] ---[ end trace c44d1fb4ace04784 ]---
>> [ 1139.520686][ T5301]
>> [ 1140.520820][ T5301] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] powerpc/pseries: Update SCM hcall op-codes in hvcall.h
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2019-06-28 3:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Vaibhav Jain, linuxppc-dev
Cc: Vaibhav Jain, Laurent Dufour, Oliver O'Halloran,
Aneesh Kumar K . V, David Gibson
In-Reply-To: <20190626140404.27448-2-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com>
Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> Update the hvcalls.h to include op-codes for new hcalls introduce to
> manage SCM memory. Also update existing hcall definitions to reflect
> current papr specification for SCM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> Change-log:
>
> v3:
> * Added updated opcode for H_SCM_HEALTH [Oliver]
>
> v2:
> * None new patch in this series.
> ---
> arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 11 ++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
> index 463c63a9fcf1..11112023e327 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
> @@ -302,9 +302,14 @@
> #define H_SCM_UNBIND_MEM 0x3F0
> #define H_SCM_QUERY_BLOCK_MEM_BINDING 0x3F4
> #define H_SCM_QUERY_LOGICAL_MEM_BINDING 0x3F8
> -#define H_SCM_MEM_QUERY 0x3FC
> -#define H_SCM_BLOCK_CLEAR 0x400
> -#define MAX_HCALL_OPCODE H_SCM_BLOCK_CLEAR
> +#define H_SCM_UNBIND_ALL 0x3FC
> +#define H_SCM_HEALTH 0x400
> +#define H_SCM_PERFORMANCE_STATS 0x418
> +#define MAX_HCALL_OPCODE H_SCM_PERFORMANCE_STATS
How can we be changing the meaning of HCALL numbers without breaking all
existing usages?
Where are these hypervisor calls documented?
cheers
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/64s/radix: Define arch_ioremap_p4d_supported()
From: Anshuman Khandual @ 2019-06-28 3:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman, linux-mm
Cc: Stephen Rothwell, linux-kernel, Nicholas Piggin, linux-next,
Paul Mackerras, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <87d0iztz0f.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
On 06/27/2019 10:18 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> writes:
>> Recent core ioremap changes require HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP subscribing archs
>> provide arch_ioremap_p4d_supported() failing which will result in a build
>> failure like the following.
>>
>> ld: lib/ioremap.o: in function `.ioremap_huge_init':
>> ioremap.c:(.init.text+0x3c): undefined reference to
>> `.arch_ioremap_p4d_supported'
>>
>> This defines a stub implementation for arch_ioremap_p4d_supported() keeping
>> it disabled for now to fix the build problem.
>
> The easiest option is for this to be folded into your patch that creates
> the requirement for arch_ioremap_p4d_supported().
>
> Andrew might do that for you, or you could send a v2.
>
> This looks fine from a powerpc POV:
>
> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
>
> cheers
Hello Stephen/Michael/Andrew,
On linux-next (next-20190627) this change has already been applied though a
merge commit 153083a99fe431 ("Merge branch 'akpm-current/current'"). So we
are good on this ? Or shall I send out a V2 for the original patch. Please
suggest. Thank you.
- Anshuman
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] PCI: rpaphp: Avoid a sometimes-uninitialized warning
From: Joel Savitz @ 2019-06-28 2:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Tyrel Datwyler, Nick Desaulniers, linux-pci, clang-built-linux,
Paul Mackerras, Bjorn Helgaas, Nathan Chancellor, linuxppc-dev,
Joel Savitz
In-Reply-To: <20190603221157.58502-1-natechancellor@gmail.com>
>On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 03:11:58PM -0700, Nathan Chancellor wrote:
>> When building with -Wsometimes-uninitialized, clang warns:
>>
>> drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:243:14: warning: variable 'fndit' is
>> used uninitialized whenever 'for' loop exits because its condition is
>> false [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
>> for (j = 0; j < entries; j++) {
>> ^~~~~~~~~~~
>> drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:256:6: note: uninitialized use occurs
>> here
>> if (fndit)
>> ^~~~~
>> drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:243:14: note: remove the condition if
>> it is always true
>> for (j = 0; j < entries; j++) {
>> ^~~~~~~~~~~
>> drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:233:14: note: initialize the variable
>> 'fndit' to silence this warning
>> int j, fndit;
>> ^
>> = 0
>>
>> fndit is only used to gate a sprintf call, which can be moved into the
>> loop to simplify the code and eliminate the local variable, which will
>> fix this warning.
>>
>> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/504
>> Fixes: 2fcf3ae508c2 ("hotplug/drc-info: Add code to search ibm,drc-info property")
>> Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
>> ---
>>
>> v1 -> v2:
>>
>> * Eliminate fndit altogether by shuffling the sprintf call into the for
>> loop and changing the if conditional, as suggested by Nick.
>
>> drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c | 18 +++++++-----------
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>> Gentle ping, can someone pick this up?
Looks a good simplification of somewhat convoluted control flow.
Acked-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/eeh_cache: fix a W=1 kernel-doc warning
From: Russell Currey @ 2019-06-28 3:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Qian Cai, mpe; +Cc: sbobroff, linux-kernel, oohall, paulus, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <1559767579-7151-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw>
On Wed, 2019-06-05 at 16:46 -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
> The opening comment mark "/**" is reserved for kernel-doc comments,
> so
> it will generate a warning with "make W=1".
>
> arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_cache.c:37: warning: cannot understand
> function
> prototype: 'struct pci_io_addr_range
>
> Since this is not a kernel-doc for the struct below, but rather an
> overview of this source eeh_cache.c, just use the free-form comments
> kernel-doc syntax instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Looks good to me.
Acked-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/64s/radix: Define arch_ioremap_p4d_supported()
From: Stephen Rothwell @ 2019-06-28 4:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Anshuman Khandual
Cc: linux-kernel, Nicholas Piggin, linux-mm, linux-next,
Paul Mackerras, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <6d201cb8-4c39-b7ea-84e6-f84607cc8b4f@arm.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 428 bytes --]
Hi Anshuman,
On Fri, 28 Jun 2019 09:14:46 +0530 Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> wrote:
>
> On linux-next (next-20190627) this change has already been applied though a
> merge commit 153083a99fe431 ("Merge branch 'akpm-current/current'"). So we
> are good on this ? Or shall I send out a V2 for the original patch. Please
> suggest. Thank you.
Please send Andrew a v2.
--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell
[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: talitos - eliminate unneeded 'done' functions at build time
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-06-28 4:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe Leroy
Cc: linux-kernel, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller, horia.geanta,
linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2cb226d8a3e4876ff3d66c32aa4de9c0008b6cb8.1560805489.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 09:14:45PM +0000, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> When building for SEC1 only, talitos2_done functions are unneeded
> and should go away.
>
> For this, use has_ftr_sec1() which will always return true when only
> SEC1 support is being built, allowing GCC to drop TALITOS2 functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> ---
> taken out of the "Additional fixes on Talitos driver" series as it can be applied independently
>
> drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Patch applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
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