* [PATCH v5 2/6] kexec: avoid compat_alloc_user_space
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller, x86,
Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar,
Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov,
Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Thomas Bogendoerfer,
linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel, Eric W. Biederman,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
kimage_alloc_init() expects a __user pointer, so compat_sys_kexec_load()
uses compat_alloc_user_space() to convert the layout and put it back
onto the user space caller stack.
Moving the user space access into the syscall handler directly actually
makes the code simpler, as the conversion for compat mode can now be
done on kernel memory.
Co-developed-by: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Co-developed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YPbtsU4GX6PL7%2F42@infradead.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/m1y2cbzmnw.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
kernel/kexec.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 9c7aef8f4bb6..b5e40f069768 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -19,26 +19,9 @@
#include "kexec_internal.h"
-static int copy_user_segment_list(struct kimage *image,
- unsigned long nr_segments,
- struct kexec_segment __user *segments)
-{
- int ret;
- size_t segment_bytes;
-
- /* Read in the segments */
- image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
- segment_bytes = nr_segments * sizeof(*segments);
- ret = copy_from_user(image->segment, segments, segment_bytes);
- if (ret)
- ret = -EFAULT;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
unsigned long nr_segments,
- struct kexec_segment __user *segments,
+ struct kexec_segment *segments,
unsigned long flags)
{
int ret;
@@ -58,10 +41,8 @@ static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
return -ENOMEM;
image->start = entry;
-
- ret = copy_user_segment_list(image, nr_segments, segments);
- if (ret)
- goto out_free_image;
+ image->nr_segments = nr_segments;
+ memcpy(image->segment, segments, nr_segments * sizeof(*segments));
if (kexec_on_panic) {
/* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */
@@ -104,7 +85,7 @@ static int kimage_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, unsigned long entry,
}
static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments,
- struct kexec_segment __user *segments, unsigned long flags)
+ struct kexec_segment *segments, unsigned long flags)
{
struct kimage **dest_image, *image;
unsigned long i;
@@ -250,7 +231,8 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
struct kexec_segment __user *, segments, unsigned long, flags)
{
- int result;
+ struct kexec_segment *ksegments;
+ unsigned long result;
result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags);
if (result)
@@ -261,7 +243,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) != KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT))
return -EINVAL;
- result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, segments, flags);
+ ksegments = memdup_user(segments, nr_segments * sizeof(ksegments[0]));
+ if (IS_ERR(ksegments))
+ return PTR_ERR(ksegments);
+
+ result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags);
+ kfree(ksegments);
return result;
}
@@ -273,7 +260,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, compat_ulong_t, entry,
compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
struct compat_kexec_segment in;
- struct kexec_segment out, __user *ksegments;
+ struct kexec_segment *ksegments;
unsigned long i, result;
result = kexec_load_check(nr_segments, flags);
@@ -286,24 +273,26 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, compat_ulong_t, entry,
if ((flags & KEXEC_ARCH_MASK) == KEXEC_ARCH_DEFAULT)
return -EINVAL;
- ksegments = compat_alloc_user_space(nr_segments * sizeof(out));
+ ksegments = kmalloc_array(nr_segments, sizeof(ksegments[0]),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ksegments)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
result = copy_from_user(&in, &segments[i], sizeof(in));
if (result)
- return -EFAULT;
+ goto fail;
- out.buf = compat_ptr(in.buf);
- out.bufsz = in.bufsz;
- out.mem = in.mem;
- out.memsz = in.memsz;
-
- result = copy_to_user(&ksegments[i], &out, sizeof(out));
- if (result)
- return -EFAULT;
+ ksegments[i].buf = compat_ptr(in.buf);
+ ksegments[i].bufsz = in.bufsz;
+ ksegments[i].mem = in.mem;
+ ksegments[i].memsz = in.memsz;
}
result = do_kexec_load(entry, nr_segments, ksegments, flags);
+fail:
+ kfree(ksegments);
return result;
}
#endif
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 3/6] mm: simplify compat_sys_move_pages
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, x86, Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens,
Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel,
Eric W. Biederman, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The compat move_pages() implementation uses compat_alloc_user_space()
for converting the pointer array. Moving the compat handling into
the function itself is a bit simpler and lets us avoid the
compat_alloc_user_space() call.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
mm/migrate.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index 34a9ad3e0a4f..60634d2653b9 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -1820,6 +1820,23 @@ static void do_pages_stat_array(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_pages,
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
}
+static int get_compat_pages_array(const void __user *chunk_pages[],
+ const void __user * __user *pages,
+ unsigned long chunk_nr)
+{
+ compat_uptr_t __user *pages32 = (compat_uptr_t __user *)pages;
+ compat_uptr_t p;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chunk_nr; i++) {
+ if (get_user(p, pages32 + i))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ chunk_pages[i] = compat_ptr(p);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Determine the nodes of a user array of pages and store it in
* a user array of status.
@@ -1839,8 +1856,15 @@ static int do_pages_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_pages,
if (chunk_nr > DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR)
chunk_nr = DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR;
- if (copy_from_user(chunk_pages, pages, chunk_nr * sizeof(*chunk_pages)))
- break;
+ if (in_compat_syscall()) {
+ if (get_compat_pages_array(chunk_pages, pages,
+ chunk_nr))
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (copy_from_user(chunk_pages, pages,
+ chunk_nr * sizeof(*chunk_pages)))
+ break;
+ }
do_pages_stat_array(mm, chunk_nr, chunk_pages, chunk_status);
@@ -1945,23 +1969,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, compat_ulong_t, nr_pages,
- compat_uptr_t __user *, pages32,
+ compat_uptr_t __user *, pages,
const int __user *, nodes,
int __user *, status,
int, flags)
{
- const void __user * __user *pages;
- int i;
-
- pages = compat_alloc_user_space(nr_pages * sizeof(void *));
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
- compat_uptr_t p;
-
- if (get_user(p, pages32 + i) ||
- put_user(compat_ptr(p), pages + i))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- return kernel_move_pages(pid, nr_pages, pages, nodes, status, flags);
+ return kernel_move_pages(pid, nr_pages,
+ (const void __user *__user *)pages,
+ nodes, status, flags);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, x86, Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens,
Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel,
Eric W. Biederman, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The compat implementations for mbind, get_mempolicy, set_mempolicy
and migrate_pages are just there to handle the subtly different
layout of bitmaps on 32-bit hosts.
The compat implementation however lacks some of the checks that
are present in the native one, in particular for checking that
the extra bits are all zero when user space has a larger mask
size than the kernel. Worse, those extra bits do not get cleared
when copying in or out of the kernel, which can lead to incorrect
data as well.
Unify the implementation to handle the compat bitmap layout directly
in the get_nodes() and copy_nodes_to_user() helpers. Splitting out
the get_bitmap() helper from get_nodes() also helps readability of the
native case.
On x86, two additional problems are addressed by this: compat tasks can
pass a bitmap at the end of a mapping, causing a fault when reading
across the page boundary for a 64-bit word. x32 tasks might also run
into problems with get_mempolicy corrupting data when an odd number of
32-bit words gets passed.
On parisc the migrate_pages() system call apparently had the wrong
calling convention, as big-endian architectures expect the words
inside of a bitmap to be swapped. This is not a problem though
since parisc has no NUMA support.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
include/linux/compat.h | 17 ++--
mm/mempolicy.c | 175 +++++++++++++----------------------------
2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index 8e0598c7d1d1..3a2ac5afee30 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -395,14 +395,6 @@ struct compat_kexec_segment;
struct compat_mq_attr;
struct compat_msgbuf;
-#define BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG (8*sizeof(compat_long_t))
-
-#define BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bits) DIV_ROUND_UP(bits, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG)
-
-long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask,
- unsigned long bitmap_size);
-long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask,
- unsigned long bitmap_size);
void copy_siginfo_to_external32(struct compat_siginfo *to,
const struct kernel_siginfo *from);
int copy_siginfo_from_user32(kernel_siginfo_t *to,
@@ -976,6 +968,15 @@ static inline bool in_compat_syscall(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+#define BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG (8*sizeof(compat_long_t))
+
+#define BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bits) DIV_ROUND_UP(bits, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG)
+
+long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask,
+ unsigned long bitmap_size);
+long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask,
+ unsigned long bitmap_size);
+
/*
* Some legacy ABIs like the i386 one use less than natural alignment for 64-bit
* types, and will need special compat treatment for that. Most architectures
diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index e32360e90274..9bc5dabdb7a7 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1362,16 +1362,33 @@ static long do_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
/*
* User space interface with variable sized bitmaps for nodelists.
*/
+static int get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
+ unsigned long maxnode)
+{
+ unsigned long nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(maxnode);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (in_compat_syscall())
+ ret = compat_get_bitmap(mask,
+ (const compat_ulong_t __user *)nmask,
+ maxnode);
+ else
+ ret = copy_from_user(mask, nmask,
+ nlongs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ if (ret)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (maxnode % BITS_PER_LONG)
+ mask[nlongs - 1] &= (1UL << (maxnode % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
/* Copy a node mask from user space. */
static int get_nodes(nodemask_t *nodes, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
unsigned long maxnode)
{
- unsigned long k;
- unsigned long t;
- unsigned long nlongs;
- unsigned long endmask;
-
--maxnode;
nodes_clear(*nodes);
if (maxnode == 0 || !nmask)
@@ -1379,49 +1396,29 @@ static int get_nodes(nodemask_t *nodes, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
if (maxnode > PAGE_SIZE*BITS_PER_BYTE)
return -EINVAL;
- nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(maxnode);
- if ((maxnode % BITS_PER_LONG) == 0)
- endmask = ~0UL;
- else
- endmask = (1UL << (maxnode % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1;
-
/*
* When the user specified more nodes than supported just check
- * if the non supported part is all zero.
- *
- * If maxnode have more longs than MAX_NUMNODES, check
- * the bits in that area first. And then go through to
- * check the rest bits which equal or bigger than MAX_NUMNODES.
- * Otherwise, just check bits [MAX_NUMNODES, maxnode).
+ * if the non supported part is all zero, one word at a time,
+ * starting at the end.
*/
- if (nlongs > BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)) {
- for (k = BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES); k < nlongs; k++) {
- if (get_user(t, nmask + k))
- return -EFAULT;
- if (k == nlongs - 1) {
- if (t & endmask)
- return -EINVAL;
- } else if (t)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES);
- endmask = ~0UL;
- }
+ while (maxnode > MAX_NUMNODES) {
+ unsigned long bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode, BITS_PER_LONG);
+ unsigned long t;
- if (maxnode > MAX_NUMNODES && MAX_NUMNODES % BITS_PER_LONG != 0) {
- unsigned long valid_mask = endmask;
-
- valid_mask &= ~((1UL << (MAX_NUMNODES % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1);
- if (get_user(t, nmask + nlongs - 1))
+ if (get_bitmap(&t, &nmask[maxnode / BITS_PER_LONG], bits))
return -EFAULT;
- if (t & valid_mask)
+
+ if (maxnode - bits >= MAX_NUMNODES) {
+ maxnode -= bits;
+ } else {
+ maxnode = MAX_NUMNODES;
+ t &= ~((1UL << (MAX_NUMNODES % BITS_PER_LONG)) - 1);
+ }
+ if (t)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (copy_from_user(nodes_addr(*nodes), nmask, nlongs*sizeof(unsigned long)))
- return -EFAULT;
- nodes_addr(*nodes)[nlongs-1] &= endmask;
- return 0;
+ return get_bitmap(nodes_addr(*nodes), nmask, maxnode);
}
/* Copy a kernel node mask to user space */
@@ -1430,6 +1427,10 @@ static int copy_nodes_to_user(unsigned long __user *mask, unsigned long maxnode,
{
unsigned long copy = ALIGN(maxnode-1, 64) / 8;
unsigned int nbytes = BITS_TO_LONGS(nr_node_ids) * sizeof(long);
+ bool compat = in_compat_syscall();
+
+ if (compat)
+ nbytes = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(nr_node_ids) * sizeof(compat_long_t);
if (copy > nbytes) {
if (copy > PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -1438,6 +1439,11 @@ static int copy_nodes_to_user(unsigned long __user *mask, unsigned long maxnode,
return -EFAULT;
copy = nbytes;
}
+
+ if (compat)
+ return compat_put_bitmap((compat_ulong_t __user *)mask,
+ nodes_addr(*nodes), maxnode);
+
return copy_to_user(mask, nodes_addr(*nodes), copy) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
@@ -1648,72 +1654,22 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode,
compat_ulong_t, addr, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
- long err;
- unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
- unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
- DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
-
- nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, nr_node_ids);
- alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
-
- if (nmask)
- nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
-
- err = kernel_get_mempolicy(policy, nm, nr_bits+1, addr, flags);
-
- if (!err && nmask) {
- unsigned long copy_size;
- copy_size = min_t(unsigned long, sizeof(bm), alloc_size);
- err = copy_from_user(bm, nm, copy_size);
- /* ensure entire bitmap is zeroed */
- err |= clear_user(nmask, ALIGN(maxnode-1, 8) / 8);
- err |= compat_put_bitmap(nmask, bm, nr_bits);
- }
-
- return err;
+ return kernel_get_mempolicy(policy, (unsigned long __user *)nmask,
+ maxnode, addr, flags);
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
- unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
- unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
- DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
-
- nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
- alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
-
- if (nmask) {
- if (compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits))
- return -EFAULT;
- nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
- if (copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- return kernel_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
+ return kernel_set_mempolicy(mode, (unsigned long __user *)nmask, maxnode);
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
- unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
- unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
- nodemask_t bm;
-
- nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
- alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
-
- if (nmask) {
- if (compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(bm), nmask, nr_bits))
- return -EFAULT;
- nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
- if (copy_to_user(nm, nodes_addr(bm), alloc_size))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- return kernel_mbind(start, len, mode, nm, nr_bits+1, flags);
+ return kernel_mbind(start, len, mode, (unsigned long __user *)nmask,
+ maxnode, flags);
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, compat_pid_t, pid,
@@ -1721,32 +1677,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, compat_pid_t, pid,
const compat_ulong_t __user *, old_nodes,
const compat_ulong_t __user *, new_nodes)
{
- unsigned long __user *old = NULL;
- unsigned long __user *new = NULL;
- nodemask_t tmp_mask;
- unsigned long nr_bits;
- unsigned long size;
-
- nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode - 1, MAX_NUMNODES);
- size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
- if (old_nodes) {
- if (compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(tmp_mask), old_nodes, nr_bits))
- return -EFAULT;
- old = compat_alloc_user_space(new_nodes ? size * 2 : size);
- if (new_nodes)
- new = old + size / sizeof(unsigned long);
- if (copy_to_user(old, nodes_addr(tmp_mask), size))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- if (new_nodes) {
- if (compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(tmp_mask), new_nodes, nr_bits))
- return -EFAULT;
- if (new == NULL)
- new = compat_alloc_user_space(size);
- if (copy_to_user(new, nodes_addr(tmp_mask), size))
- return -EFAULT;
- }
- return kernel_migrate_pages(pid, nr_bits + 1, old, new);
+ return kernel_migrate_pages(pid, maxnode,
+ (const unsigned long __user *)old_nodes,
+ (const unsigned long __user *)new_nodes);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 5/6] compat: remove some compat entry points
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, x86, Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens,
Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel,
Eric W. Biederman, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
These are all handled correctly when calling the native
system call entry point, so remove the special cases.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 10 +++---
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 10 +++---
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 10 +++---
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 8 ++---
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 10 +++---
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 10 +++---
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 10 +++---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 4 +--
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +-
include/linux/compat.h | 20 ------------
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 10 +++---
kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 ---
mm/mempolicy.c | 37 -----------------------
mm/migrate.c | 13 --------
14 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
index 99ffcafc736c..8a5cf6daf7c0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
@@ -649,11 +649,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_inotify_add_watch, sys_inotify_add_watch)
#define __NR_inotify_rm_watch 318
__SYSCALL(__NR_inotify_rm_watch, sys_inotify_rm_watch)
#define __NR_mbind 319
-__SYSCALL(__NR_mbind, compat_sys_mbind)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mbind, sys_mbind)
#define __NR_get_mempolicy 320
-__SYSCALL(__NR_get_mempolicy, compat_sys_get_mempolicy)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_get_mempolicy, sys_get_mempolicy)
#define __NR_set_mempolicy 321
-__SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy, compat_sys_set_mempolicy)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy, sys_set_mempolicy)
#define __NR_openat 322
__SYSCALL(__NR_openat, compat_sys_openat)
#define __NR_mkdirat 323
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_tee, sys_tee)
#define __NR_vmsplice 343
__SYSCALL(__NR_vmsplice, sys_vmsplice)
#define __NR_move_pages 344
-__SYSCALL(__NR_move_pages, compat_sys_move_pages)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_move_pages, sys_move_pages)
#define __NR_getcpu 345
__SYSCALL(__NR_getcpu, sys_getcpu)
#define __NR_epoll_pwait 346
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_rseq, sys_rseq)
#define __NR_io_pgetevents 399
__SYSCALL(__NR_io_pgetevents, compat_sys_io_pgetevents)
#define __NR_migrate_pages 400
-__SYSCALL(__NR_migrate_pages, compat_sys_migrate_pages)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_migrate_pages, sys_migrate_pages)
#define __NR_kexec_file_load 401
__SYSCALL(__NR_kexec_file_load, sys_kexec_file_load)
/* 402 is unused */
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
index c2d2e19abea8..c42378dbb1c2 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
@@ -239,9 +239,9 @@
228 n32 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep_time32
229 n32 tgkill sys_tgkill
230 n32 utimes sys_utimes_time32
-231 n32 mbind compat_sys_mbind
-232 n32 get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-233 n32 set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+231 n32 mbind sys_mbind
+232 n32 get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+233 n32 set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
234 n32 mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
235 n32 mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
236 n32 mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@
247 n32 inotify_init sys_inotify_init
248 n32 inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch
249 n32 inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch
-250 n32 migrate_pages compat_sys_migrate_pages
+250 n32 migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
251 n32 openat sys_openat
252 n32 mkdirat sys_mkdirat
253 n32 mknodat sys_mknodat
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
268 n32 sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range
269 n32 tee sys_tee
270 n32 vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-271 n32 move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+271 n32 move_pages sys_move_pages
272 n32 set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
273 n32 get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
274 n32 kexec_load compat_sys_kexec_load
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
index 253f2cd70b6b..5ff8ef9d8a04 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
@@ -279,9 +279,9 @@
265 o32 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep_time32
266 o32 tgkill sys_tgkill
267 o32 utimes sys_utimes_time32
-268 o32 mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-269 o32 get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-270 o32 set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+268 o32 mbind sys_mbind
+269 o32 get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+270 o32 set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
271 o32 mq_open sys_mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
272 o32 mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
273 o32 mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@
284 o32 inotify_init sys_inotify_init
285 o32 inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch
286 o32 inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch
-287 o32 migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages compat_sys_migrate_pages
+287 o32 migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
288 o32 openat sys_openat compat_sys_openat
289 o32 mkdirat sys_mkdirat
290 o32 mknodat sys_mknodat
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@
305 o32 sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range sys32_sync_file_range
306 o32 tee sys_tee
307 o32 vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-308 o32 move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+308 o32 move_pages sys_move_pages
309 o32 set_robust_list sys_set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
310 o32 get_robust_list sys_get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
311 o32 kexec_load sys_kexec_load compat_sys_kexec_load
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index e26187b9ab87..21be3d200e7b 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -292,9 +292,9 @@
258 32 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep_time32
258 64 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep
259 common tgkill sys_tgkill
-260 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-261 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-262 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+260 common mbind sys_mbind
+261 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+262 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
# 263 was vserver
264 common add_key sys_add_key
265 common request_key sys_request_key
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
292 64 sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range
293 common tee sys_tee
294 common vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-295 common move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+295 common move_pages sys_move_pages
296 common getcpu sys_getcpu
297 common epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait compat_sys_epoll_pwait
298 common statfs64 sys_statfs64 compat_sys_statfs64
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index aef2a290e71a..9e237232d108 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@
256 64 sys_debug_setcontext sys_ni_syscall
256 spu sys_debug_setcontext sys_ni_syscall
# 257 reserved for vserver
-258 nospu migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages compat_sys_migrate_pages
-259 nospu mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-260 nospu get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-261 nospu set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+258 nospu migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
+259 nospu mbind sys_mbind
+260 nospu get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+261 nospu set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
262 nospu mq_open sys_mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
263 nospu mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
264 32 mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@
298 common faccessat sys_faccessat
299 common get_robust_list sys_get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
300 common set_robust_list sys_set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
-301 common move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+301 common move_pages sys_move_pages
302 common getcpu sys_getcpu
303 nospu epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait compat_sys_epoll_pwait
304 32 utimensat sys_utimensat_time32
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 64d51ab5a8b4..81bff2ffe6c0 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -274,9 +274,9 @@
265 common statfs64 sys_statfs64 compat_sys_statfs64
266 common fstatfs64 sys_fstatfs64 compat_sys_fstatfs64
267 common remap_file_pages sys_remap_file_pages sys_remap_file_pages
-268 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+268 common mbind sys_mbind sys_mbind
+269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
271 common mq_open sys_mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
272 common mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
273 common mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@
284 common inotify_init sys_inotify_init sys_inotify_init
285 common inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch
286 common inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch
-287 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages compat_sys_migrate_pages
+287 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
288 common openat sys_openat compat_sys_openat
289 common mkdirat sys_mkdirat sys_mkdirat
290 common mknodat sys_mknodat sys_mknodat
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
307 common sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range compat_sys_s390_sync_file_range
308 common tee sys_tee sys_tee
309 common vmsplice sys_vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-310 common move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+310 common move_pages sys_move_pages sys_move_pages
311 common getcpu sys_getcpu sys_getcpu
312 common epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait compat_sys_epoll_pwait
313 common utimes sys_utimes sys_utimes_time32
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 603f5a821502..ea1660a933c0 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@
299 common unshare sys_unshare
300 common set_robust_list sys_set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
301 common get_robust_list sys_get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
-302 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages compat_sys_migrate_pages
-303 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-304 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-305 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+302 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
+303 common mbind sys_mbind
+304 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+305 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
306 common kexec_load sys_kexec_load compat_sys_kexec_load
-307 common move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+307 common move_pages sys_move_pages
308 common getcpu sys_getcpu
309 common epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait compat_sys_epoll_pwait
310 32 utimensat sys_utimensat_time32
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index ce763a12311c..f54c006603d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
272 i386 fadvise64_64 sys_ia32_fadvise64_64
273 i386 vserver
274 i386 mbind sys_mbind
-275 i386 get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
+275 i386 get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
276 i386 set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
277 i386 mq_open sys_mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
278 i386 mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@
314 i386 sync_file_range sys_ia32_sync_file_range
315 i386 tee sys_tee
316 i386 vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-317 i386 move_pages sys_move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+317 i386 move_pages sys_move_pages
318 i386 getcpu sys_getcpu
319 i386 epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait
320 i386 utimensat sys_utimensat_time32
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index f6b57799c1ea..f3dfb5b97e15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@
530 x32 set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
531 x32 get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
532 x32 vmsplice sys_vmsplice
-533 x32 move_pages compat_sys_move_pages
+533 x32 move_pages sys_move_pages
534 x32 preadv compat_sys_preadv64
535 x32 pwritev compat_sys_pwritev64
536 x32 rt_tgsigqueueinfo compat_sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index 3a2ac5afee30..2d42cebd1fb8 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -799,26 +799,6 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_execve(const char __user *filename, const compat_uptr
/* mm/fadvise.c: No generic prototype for fadvise64_64 */
/* mm/, CONFIG_MMU only */
-asmlinkage long compat_sys_mbind(compat_ulong_t start, compat_ulong_t len,
- compat_ulong_t mode,
- compat_ulong_t __user *nmask,
- compat_ulong_t maxnode, compat_ulong_t flags);
-asmlinkage long compat_sys_get_mempolicy(int __user *policy,
- compat_ulong_t __user *nmask,
- compat_ulong_t maxnode,
- compat_ulong_t addr,
- compat_ulong_t flags);
-asmlinkage long compat_sys_set_mempolicy(int mode, compat_ulong_t __user *nmask,
- compat_ulong_t maxnode);
-asmlinkage long compat_sys_migrate_pages(compat_pid_t pid,
- compat_ulong_t maxnode, const compat_ulong_t __user *old_nodes,
- const compat_ulong_t __user *new_nodes);
-asmlinkage long compat_sys_move_pages(pid_t pid, compat_ulong_t nr_pages,
- __u32 __user *pages,
- const int __user *nodes,
- int __user *status,
- int flags);
-
asmlinkage long compat_sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(compat_pid_t tgid,
compat_pid_t pid, int sig,
struct compat_siginfo __user *uinfo);
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index a9d6fcd95f42..cde0439913b4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -673,15 +673,15 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_madvise, sys_madvise)
#define __NR_remap_file_pages 234
__SYSCALL(__NR_remap_file_pages, sys_remap_file_pages)
#define __NR_mbind 235
-__SC_COMP(__NR_mbind, sys_mbind, compat_sys_mbind)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mbind, sys_mbind)
#define __NR_get_mempolicy 236
-__SC_COMP(__NR_get_mempolicy, sys_get_mempolicy, compat_sys_get_mempolicy)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_get_mempolicy, sys_get_mempolicy)
#define __NR_set_mempolicy 237
-__SC_COMP(__NR_set_mempolicy, sys_set_mempolicy, compat_sys_set_mempolicy)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy, sys_set_mempolicy)
#define __NR_migrate_pages 238
-__SC_COMP(__NR_migrate_pages, sys_migrate_pages, compat_sys_migrate_pages)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_migrate_pages, sys_migrate_pages)
#define __NR_move_pages 239
-__SC_COMP(__NR_move_pages, sys_move_pages, compat_sys_move_pages)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_move_pages, sys_move_pages)
#endif
#define __NR_rt_tgsigqueueinfo 240
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 30971b1dd4a9..52c27ecf5ff7 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -291,15 +291,10 @@ COND_SYSCALL(madvise);
COND_SYSCALL(process_madvise);
COND_SYSCALL(remap_file_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(mbind);
-COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(mbind);
COND_SYSCALL(get_mempolicy);
-COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(get_mempolicy);
COND_SYSCALL(set_mempolicy);
-COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(set_mempolicy);
COND_SYSCALL(migrate_pages);
-COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(migrate_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(move_pages);
-COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(move_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(perf_event_open);
COND_SYSCALL(accept4);
diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index 9bc5dabdb7a7..6fdfc8ab6770 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1647,43 +1647,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
return kernel_get_mempolicy(policy, nmask, maxnode, addr, flags);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
- compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
- compat_ulong_t, maxnode,
- compat_ulong_t, addr, compat_ulong_t, flags)
-{
- return kernel_get_mempolicy(policy, (unsigned long __user *)nmask,
- maxnode, addr, flags);
-}
-
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
- compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
-{
- return kernel_set_mempolicy(mode, (unsigned long __user *)nmask, maxnode);
-}
-
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
- compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
- compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
-{
- return kernel_mbind(start, len, mode, (unsigned long __user *)nmask,
- maxnode, flags);
-}
-
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, compat_pid_t, pid,
- compat_ulong_t, maxnode,
- const compat_ulong_t __user *, old_nodes,
- const compat_ulong_t __user *, new_nodes)
-{
- return kernel_migrate_pages(pid, maxnode,
- (const unsigned long __user *)old_nodes,
- (const unsigned long __user *)new_nodes);
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
-
bool vma_migratable(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index 60634d2653b9..266ae1837b6a 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -1967,19 +1967,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, nr_pages,
return kernel_move_pages(pid, nr_pages, pages, nodes, status, flags);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(move_pages, pid_t, pid, compat_ulong_t, nr_pages,
- compat_uptr_t __user *, pages,
- const int __user *, nodes,
- int __user *, status,
- int, flags)
-{
- return kernel_move_pages(pid, nr_pages,
- (const void __user *__user *)pages,
- nodes, status, flags);
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
/*
* Returns true if this is a safe migration target node for misplaced NUMA
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 6/6] arch: remove compat_alloc_user_space
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller, x86,
Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar,
Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov,
Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Thomas Bogendoerfer,
linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel, Eric W. Biederman,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
All users of compat_alloc_user_space() and copy_in_user() have been
removed from the kernel, only a few functions in sparc remain that can
be changed to calling arch_copy_in_user() instead.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h | 5 --
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 ----
arch/arm64/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 77 -------------------------
arch/mips/cavium-octeon/octeon-memcpy.S | 2 -
arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h | 8 ---
arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h | 26 ---------
arch/mips/lib/memcpy.S | 11 ----
arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h | 6 --
arch/parisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 -
arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c | 9 ---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h | 16 -----
arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h | 10 ----
arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 -
arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c | 63 --------------------
arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h | 19 ------
arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 12 ++--
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 8 +--
arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h | 13 -----
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 7 ---
include/linux/compat.h | 2 -
include/linux/uaccess.h | 10 ----
kernel/compat.c | 21 -------
24 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 333 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h
index 79c1a750e357..eaa6ca062d89 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -107,11 +107,6 @@ struct compat_statfs {
#define compat_user_stack_pointer() (user_stack_pointer(task_pt_regs(current)))
#define COMPAT_MINSIGSTKSZ 2048
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- return (void __user *)compat_user_stack_pointer() - len;
-}
-
struct compat_ipc64_perm {
compat_key_t key;
__compat_uid32_t uid;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index b5f08621fa29..190b494e22ab 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -430,17 +430,6 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi
__actu_ret; \
})
-extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-#define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \
-({ \
- unsigned long __aciu_ret; \
- uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \
- __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \
- __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \
- uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \
- __aciu_ret; \
-})
-
#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile
index 6dd56a49790a..0941180a86d3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
lib-y := clear_user.o delay.o copy_from_user.o \
- copy_to_user.o copy_in_user.o copy_page.o \
+ copy_to_user.o copy_page.o \
clear_page.o csum.o insn.o memchr.o memcpy.o \
memset.o memcmp.o strcmp.o strncmp.o strlen.o \
strnlen.o strchr.o strrchr.o tishift.o
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
deleted file mode 100644
index dbea3799c3ef..000000000000
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
-/*
- * Copy from user space to user space
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
- */
-
-#include <linux/linkage.h>
-
-#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h>
-#include <asm/assembler.h>
-#include <asm/cache.h>
-
-/*
- * Copy from user space to user space (alignment handled by the hardware)
- *
- * Parameters:
- * x0 - to
- * x1 - from
- * x2 - n
- * Returns:
- * x0 - bytes not copied
- */
- .macro ldrb1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9998f, ldtrb, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro strb1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9998f, sttrb, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro ldrh1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9997f, ldtrh, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro strh1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9997f, sttrh, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro ldr1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9997f, ldtr, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro str1 reg, ptr, val
- user_ldst 9997f, sttr, \reg, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro ldp1 reg1, reg2, ptr, val
- user_ldp 9997f, \reg1, \reg2, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
- .macro stp1 reg1, reg2, ptr, val
- user_stp 9997f, \reg1, \reg2, \ptr, \val
- .endm
-
-end .req x5
-srcin .req x15
-SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user)
- add end, x0, x2
- mov srcin, x1
-#include "copy_template.S"
- mov x0, #0
- ret
-SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user)
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user)
-
- .section .fixup,"ax"
- .align 2
-9997: cmp dst, dstin
- b.ne 9998f
- // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder
-USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin])
-USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst])
- add dst, dst, #1
-9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied
- ret
- .previous
diff --git a/arch/mips/cavium-octeon/octeon-memcpy.S b/arch/mips/cavium-octeon/octeon-memcpy.S
index 600d018cf354..0a515cde1c18 100644
--- a/arch/mips/cavium-octeon/octeon-memcpy.S
+++ b/arch/mips/cavium-octeon/octeon-memcpy.S
@@ -154,8 +154,6 @@ FEXPORT(__raw_copy_from_user)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_from_user)
FEXPORT(__raw_copy_to_user)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_to_user)
-FEXPORT(__raw_copy_in_user)
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_in_user)
/*
* Note: dst & src may be unaligned, len may be 0
* Temps
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h
index 53f015a1b0a7..bbb3bc5a42fd 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -96,14 +96,6 @@ struct compat_statfs {
#define COMPAT_OFF_T_MAX 0x7fffffff
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *)
- ((unsigned long) current_thread_info() + THREAD_SIZE - 32) - 1;
-
- return (void __user *) (regs->regs[29] - len);
-}
-
struct compat_ipc64_perm {
compat_key_t key;
__compat_uid32_t uid;
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 783fecce65c8..f8f74f9f5883 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -428,7 +428,6 @@ do { \
extern size_t __raw_copy_from_user(void *__to, const void *__from, size_t __n);
extern size_t __raw_copy_to_user(void *__to, const void *__from, size_t __n);
-extern size_t __raw_copy_in_user(void *__to, const void *__from, size_t __n);
static inline unsigned long
raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
@@ -480,31 +479,6 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
-static inline unsigned long
-raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
-{
- register void __user *__cu_to_r __asm__("$4");
- register const void __user *__cu_from_r __asm__("$5");
- register long __cu_len_r __asm__("$6");
-
- __cu_to_r = to;
- __cu_from_r = from;
- __cu_len_r = n;
-
- __asm__ __volatile__(
- ".set\tnoreorder\n\t"
- __MODULE_JAL(__raw_copy_in_user)
- ".set\tnoat\n\t"
- __UA_ADDU "\t$1, %1, %2\n\t"
- ".set\tat\n\t"
- ".set\treorder"
- : "+r" (__cu_to_r), "+r" (__cu_from_r), "+r" (__cu_len_r)
- :
- : "$8", "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$14", "$15", "$24", "$31",
- DADDI_SCRATCH, "memory");
- return __cu_len_r;
-}
-
extern __kernel_size_t __bzero(void __user *addr, __kernel_size_t size);
/*
diff --git a/arch/mips/lib/memcpy.S b/arch/mips/lib/memcpy.S
index e19fb98b5d38..277c32296636 100644
--- a/arch/mips/lib/memcpy.S
+++ b/arch/mips/lib/memcpy.S
@@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ FEXPORT(__raw_copy_from_user)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_from_user)
FEXPORT(__raw_copy_to_user)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_to_user)
-FEXPORT(__raw_copy_in_user)
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_in_user)
#endif
/* Legacy Mode, user <-> user */
__BUILD_COPY_USER LEGACY_MODE USEROP USEROP
@@ -703,13 +701,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_to_user)
__BUILD_COPY_USER EVA_MODE KERNELOP USEROP
END(__raw_copy_to_user)
-/*
- * __copy_in_user (EVA)
- */
-
-LEAF(__raw_copy_in_user)
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__raw_copy_in_user)
-__BUILD_COPY_USER EVA_MODE USEROP USEROP
-END(__raw_copy_in_user)
-
#endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h
index b5d90e82b65d..c04f5a637c39 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -163,12 +163,6 @@ struct compat_shmid64_ds {
#define COMPAT_ELF_NGREG 80
typedef compat_ulong_t compat_elf_gregset_t[COMPAT_ELF_NGREG];
-static __inline__ void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = ¤t->thread.regs;
- return (void __user *)regs->gr[30];
-}
-
static inline int __is_compat_task(struct task_struct *t)
{
return test_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_32BIT);
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ed2cd4fb479b..7c13314aae4a 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -215,8 +215,6 @@ unsigned long __must_check raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src,
unsigned long len);
unsigned long __must_check raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src,
unsigned long len);
-unsigned long __must_check raw_copy_in_user(void __user *dst, const void __user *src,
- unsigned long len);
#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
diff --git a/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c b/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
index 4b75388190b4..ea70a0e08321 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/lib/memcpy.c
@@ -38,14 +38,6 @@ unsigned long raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_from_user);
-unsigned long raw_copy_in_user(void __user *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long len)
-{
- mtsp(get_user_space(), 1);
- mtsp(get_user_space(), 2);
- return pa_memcpy((void __force *)dst, (void __force *)src, len);
-}
-
-
void * memcpy(void * dst,const void *src, size_t count)
{
mtsp(get_kernel_space(), 1);
@@ -54,7 +46,6 @@ void * memcpy(void * dst,const void *src, size_t count)
return dst;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_in_user);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy);
bool copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(const void *unsafe_src, size_t size)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h
index e33dcf134cdd..7afc96fb6524 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -83,22 +83,6 @@ struct compat_statfs {
#define COMPAT_OFF_T_MAX 0x7fffffff
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = current->thread.regs;
- unsigned long usp = regs->gpr[1];
-
- /*
- * We can't access below the stack pointer in the 32bit ABI and
- * can access 288 bytes in the 64bit big-endian ABI,
- * or 512 bytes with the new ELFv2 little-endian ABI.
- */
- if (!is_32bit_task())
- usp -= USER_REDZONE_SIZE;
-
- return (void __user *) (usp - len);
-}
-
/*
* ipc64_perm is actually 32/64bit clean but since the compat layer refers to
* it we may as well define it.
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
index 8d49505b4a43..cdc7ae72529d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -176,16 +176,6 @@ static inline int is_compat_task(void)
return test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT);
}
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- unsigned long stack;
-
- stack = KSTK_ESP(current);
- if (is_compat_task())
- stack &= 0x7fffffffUL;
- return (void __user *) (stack - len);
-}
-
#endif
struct compat_ipc64_perm {
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2316f2440881..98a1fce2ce67 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -227,9 +227,6 @@ static inline int __get_user_fn(void *x, const void __user *ptr, unsigned long s
__get_user(x, ptr); \
})
-unsigned long __must_check
-raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
-
/*
* Copy a null terminated string from userspace.
*/
diff --git a/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c b/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
index 7ec8b1fa0f08..0df833cedd2c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
@@ -204,69 +204,6 @@ unsigned long raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_to_user);
-static inline unsigned long copy_in_user_mvcos(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
- unsigned long size)
-{
- unsigned long tmp1, tmp2;
-
- tmp1 = -4096UL;
- /* FIXME: copy with reduced length. */
- asm volatile(
- " lgr 0,%[spec]\n"
- "0: .insn ss,0xc80000000000,0(%0,%1),0(%2),0\n"
- " jz 2f\n"
- "1: algr %0,%3\n"
- " slgr %1,%3\n"
- " slgr %2,%3\n"
- " j 0b\n"
- "2:slgr %0,%0\n"
- "3: \n"
- EX_TABLE(0b,3b)
- : "+a" (size), "+a" (to), "+a" (from), "+a" (tmp1), "=a" (tmp2)
- : [spec] "d" (0x810081UL)
- : "cc", "memory", "0");
- return size;
-}
-
-static inline unsigned long copy_in_user_mvc(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
- unsigned long size)
-{
- unsigned long tmp1;
-
- asm volatile(
- " sacf 256\n"
- " aghi %0,-1\n"
- " jo 5f\n"
- " bras %3,3f\n"
- "0: aghi %0,257\n"
- "1: mvc 0(1,%1),0(%2)\n"
- " la %1,1(%1)\n"
- " la %2,1(%2)\n"
- " aghi %0,-1\n"
- " jnz 1b\n"
- " j 5f\n"
- "2: mvc 0(256,%1),0(%2)\n"
- " la %1,256(%1)\n"
- " la %2,256(%2)\n"
- "3: aghi %0,-256\n"
- " jnm 2b\n"
- "4: ex %0,1b-0b(%3)\n"
- "5: slgr %0,%0\n"
- "6: sacf 768\n"
- EX_TABLE(1b,6b) EX_TABLE(2b,0b) EX_TABLE(4b,0b)
- : "+a" (size), "+a" (to), "+a" (from), "=a" (tmp1)
- : : "cc", "memory");
- return size;
-}
-
-unsigned long raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
-{
- if (copy_with_mvcos())
- return copy_in_user_mvcos(to, from, n);
- return copy_in_user_mvc(to, from, n);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(raw_copy_in_user);
-
static inline unsigned long clear_user_mvcos(void __user *to, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long tmp1, tmp2;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h
index 8b63410e830f..bd949fcf9d63 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -116,25 +116,6 @@ struct compat_statfs {
#define COMPAT_OFF_T_MAX 0x7fffffff
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = current_thread_info()->kregs;
- unsigned long usp = regs->u_regs[UREG_I6];
-
- if (test_thread_64bit_stack(usp))
- usp += STACK_BIAS;
-
- if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
- usp &= 0xffffffffUL;
-
- usp -= len;
- usp &= ~0x7UL;
-
- return (void __user *) usp;
-}
-#endif
-
struct compat_ipc64_perm {
compat_key_t key;
__compat_uid32_t uid;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
index d33c58a58d4f..4f5967ebf4e5 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static unsigned long clone_stackframe(unsigned long csp, unsigned long psp)
distance = fp - psp;
rval = (csp - distance);
- if (copy_in_user((void __user *) rval, (void __user *) psp, distance))
+ if (raw_copy_in_user((void __user *)rval, (void __user *)psp, distance))
rval = 0;
else if (!stack_64bit) {
if (put_user(((u32)csp),
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
index e9695a06492f..afd8455ea05f 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -435,9 +435,9 @@ static int setup_frame32(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
(_COMPAT_NSIG_WORDS - 1) * sizeof(unsigned int));
if (!wsaved) {
- err |= copy_in_user((u32 __user *)sf,
- (u32 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]),
- sizeof(struct reg_window32));
+ err |= raw_copy_in_user((u32 __user *)sf,
+ (u32 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]),
+ sizeof(struct reg_window32));
} else {
struct reg_window *rp;
@@ -567,9 +567,9 @@ static int setup_rt_frame32(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
err |= put_compat_sigset(&sf->mask, oldset, sizeof(compat_sigset_t));
if (!wsaved) {
- err |= copy_in_user((u32 __user *)sf,
- (u32 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]),
- sizeof(struct reg_window32));
+ err |= raw_copy_in_user((u32 __user *)sf,
+ (u32 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]),
+ sizeof(struct reg_window32));
} else {
struct reg_window *rp;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index a0eec62c825d..3bc4a25f7c25 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -406,10 +406,10 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
err |= copy_to_user(&sf->mask, sigmask_to_save(), sizeof(sigset_t));
if (!wsaved) {
- err |= copy_in_user((u64 __user *)sf,
- (u64 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] +
- STACK_BIAS),
- sizeof(struct reg_window));
+ err |= raw_copy_in_user((u64 __user *)sf,
+ (u64 __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] +
+ STACK_BIAS),
+ sizeof(struct reg_window));
} else {
struct reg_window *rp;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
index 4ae01cdb99de..7516e4199b3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -156,19 +156,6 @@ struct compat_shmid64_ds {
(!!(task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax & __X32_SYSCALL_BIT))
#endif
-static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
-{
- compat_uptr_t sp = task_pt_regs(current)->sp;
-
- /*
- * -128 for the x32 ABI redzone. For IA32, it is not strictly
- * necessary, but not harmful.
- */
- sp -= 128;
-
- return (void __user *)round_down(sp - len, 16);
-}
-
static inline bool in_x32_syscall(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index e7265a552f4f..45697e04d771 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -58,13 +58,6 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned long size)
return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
}
-static __always_inline __must_check
-unsigned long raw_copy_in_user(void __user *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size)
-{
- return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst,
- (__force void *)src, size);
-}
-
extern long __copy_user_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src,
unsigned size, int zerorest);
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index 2d42cebd1fb8..1c758b0e0359 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -511,8 +511,6 @@ extern long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
struct epoll_event; /* fortunately, this one is fixed-layout */
-extern void __user *compat_alloc_user_space(unsigned long len);
-
int compat_restore_altstack(const compat_stack_t __user *uss);
int __compat_save_altstack(compat_stack_t __user *, unsigned long);
#define unsafe_compat_save_altstack(uss, sp, label) do { \
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index c05e903cef02..ac0394087f7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -200,16 +200,6 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
return n;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
-copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
-{
- might_fault();
- if (access_ok(to, n) && access_ok(from, n))
- n = raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n);
- return n;
-}
-#endif
#ifndef copy_mc_to_kernel
/*
diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c
index 05adfd6fa8bf..55551989d9da 100644
--- a/kernel/compat.c
+++ b/kernel/compat.c
@@ -269,24 +269,3 @@ get_compat_sigset(sigset_t *set, const compat_sigset_t __user *compat)
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_compat_sigset);
-
-/*
- * Allocate user-space memory for the duration of a single system call,
- * in order to marshall parameters inside a compat thunk.
- */
-void __user *compat_alloc_user_space(unsigned long len)
-{
- void __user *ptr;
-
- /* If len would occupy more than half of the entire compat space... */
- if (unlikely(len > (((compat_uptr_t)~0) >> 1)))
- return NULL;
-
- ptr = arch_compat_alloc_user_space(len);
-
- if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
- return NULL;
-
- return ptr;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(compat_alloc_user_space);
--
2.29.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] compat: remove compat_alloc_user_space
From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2021-07-27 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller, x86,
Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar,
Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov,
Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Thomas Bogendoerfer,
linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel, Eric W. Biederman,
Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-1-arnd@kernel.org>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:48:53PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> Since these patches are now all that remains, it would be nice to
> merge it all through Andrew's Linux-mm tree, which is already based
> on top of linux-next.
Is it?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] arch: remove compat_alloc_user_space
From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2021-07-27 15:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller, x86,
Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar,
Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov,
Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Thomas Bogendoerfer,
linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel, Eric W. Biederman,
Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-7-arnd@kernel.org>
finally!
Looks good,
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Heiko Carstens @ 2021-07-27 17:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, x86, Christoph Hellwig, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas, Vasily Gorbik, Borislav Petkov,
Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Thomas Bogendoerfer,
linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel, Eric W. Biederman,
Andrew Morton, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727144859.4150043-5-arnd@kernel.org>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:48:57PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> ---
> include/linux/compat.h | 17 ++--
> mm/mempolicy.c | 175 +++++++++++++----------------------------
> 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
...
> +static int get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
> + unsigned long maxnode)
> +{
> + unsigned long nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(maxnode);
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (in_compat_syscall())
> + ret = compat_get_bitmap(mask,
> + (const compat_ulong_t __user *)nmask,
> + maxnode);
compat_ptr() conversion for e.g. nmask is missing with the next patch
which removes the compat system calls.
Is that intended or am I missing something?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 17:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heiko Carstens
Cc: Feng Tang, open list:BROADCOM NVRAM DRIVER, James E.J. Bottomley,
Linux-MM, Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, the arch/x86 maintainers, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner,
Linux ARM, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Parisc List, Linux API,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Eric W. Biederman, Andrew Morton,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <YQBB9yteAwtG2xyp@osiris>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 7:27 PM Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:48:57PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > ---
> > include/linux/compat.h | 17 ++--
> > mm/mempolicy.c | 175 +++++++++++++----------------------------
> > 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)
> ...
> > +static int get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
> > + unsigned long maxnode)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(maxnode);
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (in_compat_syscall())
> > + ret = compat_get_bitmap(mask,
> > + (const compat_ulong_t __user *)nmask,
> > + maxnode);
>
> compat_ptr() conversion for e.g. nmask is missing with the next patch
> which removes the compat system calls.
> Is that intended or am I missing something?
I don't think it's needed here, since the pointer comes from the system
call argument, which has the compat_ptr() conversion applied in
arch/s390/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h, not from a compat_uptr_t
that gets passed indirectly. The compat_get_bitmap() conversion
is only needed for byte order adjustment, not for converting pointers.
It's also possible that I'm the one who's missing something.
Arnd
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Heiko Carstens @ 2021-07-27 18:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Feng Tang, open list:BROADCOM NVRAM DRIVER, James E.J. Bottomley,
Linux-MM, Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, the arch/x86 maintainers, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner,
Linux ARM, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Parisc List, Linux API,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Eric W. Biederman, Andrew Morton,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <CAK8P3a3itgCyc4jDBodTOcwG+XXsDYspZqQVBmy88cGXevY5Yw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 07:40:05PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 7:27 PM Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > +static int get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
> > > + unsigned long maxnode)
> > > +{
> > > + unsigned long nlongs = BITS_TO_LONGS(maxnode);
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (in_compat_syscall())
> > > + ret = compat_get_bitmap(mask,
> > > + (const compat_ulong_t __user *)nmask,
> > > + maxnode);
> >
> > compat_ptr() conversion for e.g. nmask is missing with the next patch
> > which removes the compat system calls.
> > Is that intended or am I missing something?
>
> I don't think it's needed here, since the pointer comes from the system
> call argument, which has the compat_ptr() conversion applied in
> arch/s390/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h, not from a compat_uptr_t
> that gets passed indirectly. The compat_get_bitmap() conversion
> is only needed for byte order adjustment, not for converting pointers.
>
> It's also possible that I'm the one who's missing something.
What I was trying to say: this patch on its own is ok. However with
the next patch you remove the compat system calls and map the regular
system calls instead.
That is:
-COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
- compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
- compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
-{
- return kernel_mbind(start, len, mode, (unsigned long __user *)nmask,
- maxnode, flags);
-}
and this:
-268 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
-269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
-270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
+268 common mbind sys_mbind sys_mbind
+269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
+270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
would remove compat_ptr() conversion from nmask above if I'm not mistaken.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 18:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Heiko Carstens
Cc: Feng Tang, open list:BROADCOM NVRAM DRIVER, James E.J. Bottomley,
Linux-MM, Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, the arch/x86 maintainers, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner,
Linux ARM, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Parisc List, Linux API,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Eric W. Biederman, Andrew Morton,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <YQBSpxZR4P/Phpf1@osiris>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 8:38 PM Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> -268 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
> -269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
> -270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
> +268 common mbind sys_mbind sys_mbind
> +269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
> +270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
>
> would remove compat_ptr() conversion from nmask above if I'm not mistaken.
Maybe I'm misremembering how compat syscalls work on s390. Doesn't
SYSCALL_DEFINEx(sys_mbind) still create two entry points __s390x_sys_mbind()
and __s390_sys_mbind() with different argument conversion (__SC_CAST vs
__SC_COMPAT_CAST)? I thought that was the whole point of the macros.
Arnd
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] mm: simplify compat numa syscalls
From: Heiko Carstens @ 2021-07-27 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Feng Tang, open list:BROADCOM NVRAM DRIVER, James E.J. Bottomley,
Linux-MM, Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
Christoph Hellwig, linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann,
Helge Deller, the arch/x86 maintainers, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner,
Linux ARM, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Parisc List, Linux API,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Eric W. Biederman, Andrew Morton,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <CAK8P3a0WT36Lg4nRBWx_kqb9yKj0mHx8gTdzCsDfrx1tQSEqbA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 08:49:40PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 8:38 PM Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > -268 common mbind sys_mbind compat_sys_mbind
> > -269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy compat_sys_get_mempolicy
> > -270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy compat_sys_set_mempolicy
> > +268 common mbind sys_mbind sys_mbind
> > +269 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
> > +270 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
> >
> > would remove compat_ptr() conversion from nmask above if I'm not mistaken.
>
> Maybe I'm misremembering how compat syscalls work on s390. Doesn't
> SYSCALL_DEFINEx(sys_mbind) still create two entry points __s390x_sys_mbind()
> and __s390_sys_mbind() with different argument conversion (__SC_CAST vs
> __SC_COMPAT_CAST)? I thought that was the whole point of the macros.
You are remembering correctly, probably because you implemented it ;)
I totally forgot - sorry for the noise!
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] compat: remove compat_alloc_user_space
From: Andrew Morton @ 2021-07-27 20:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Feng Tang, linux-mips, James E.J. Bottomley, linux-mm,
Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller, x86,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro,
Thomas Gleixner, linux-arm-kernel, Arnd Bergmann,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, linux-parisc, linux-api, linux-kernel,
Eric W. Biederman, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <YQAfa6iObAwwIpzb@infradead.org>
On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 15:59:55 +0100 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:48:53PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > Since these patches are now all that remains, it would be nice to
> > merge it all through Andrew's Linux-mm tree, which is already based
> > on top of linux-next.
>
> Is it?
the -mm tree is structured as
<90% of stuff>
linux-next.patch
<the other 10% of stuff>
So things like Arnd's series which have a dependency on linux-next
material get added to the "other 10%" and are merged behind the
linux-next material and all is good.
If possible I'll queue things ahead of linux-next.patch. Those few
things which have dependencies on linux-next material get sent to Linus
after the required linux-next material is merged into mainline.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] compat: remove compat_alloc_user_space
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2021-07-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Feng Tang, open list:BROADCOM NVRAM DRIVER, James E.J. Bottomley,
Linux-MM, Paul Mackerras, H. Peter Anvin, sparclinux, Will Deacon,
linux-arch, linux-s390, Arnd Bergmann, Helge Deller,
the arch/x86 maintainers, Christoph Hellwig,
Christian Borntraeger, Ingo Molnar, Catalin Marinas,
Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Borislav Petkov, Al Viro,
Thomas Gleixner, Linux ARM, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Parisc List,
Linux API, Linux Kernel Mailing List, Eric W. Biederman,
linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20210727131017.f151a81fc69db8f45f81a2b3@linux-foundation.org>
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 10:11 PM Andrew Morton
<akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 15:59:55 +0100 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:48:53PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > > Since these patches are now all that remains, it would be nice to
> > > merge it all through Andrew's Linux-mm tree, which is already based
> > > on top of linux-next.
> >
> > Is it?
>
> the -mm tree is structured as
>
> <90% of stuff>
> linux-next.patch
> <the other 10% of stuff>
>
> So things like Arnd's series which have a dependency on linux-next
> material get added to the "other 10%" and are merged behind the
> linux-next material and all is good.
>
> If possible I'll queue things ahead of linux-next.patch. Those few
> things which have dependencies on linux-next material get sent to Linus
> after the required linux-next material is merged into mainline.
The first five patches in my series should apply cleanly on mainline
kernels and make sense by themselves, the last patch is the one that
depends on this series as well as another series in the netdev tree,
so that has to go behind linux-next.
I suppose I could also merge the first five through my asm-generic tree
and send you the last one if you prefer, but then again two of the patches
are actually memory management stuff.
Arnd
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 00/11] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Brijesh Singh, David Airlie,
Dave Hansen, Paul Mackerras, Will Deacon, Ard Biesheuvel,
Andi Kleen, Baoquan He, Joerg Roedel, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Dave Young, Tianyu Lan, Thomas Zimmermann,
Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra,
Daniel Vetter
This patch series provides a generic helper function, prot_guest_has(),
to replace the sme_active(), sev_active(), sev_es_active() and
mem_encrypt_active() functions.
It is expected that as new protected virtualization technologies are
added to the kernel, they can all be covered by a single function call
instead of a collection of specific function calls all called from the
same locations.
The powerpc and s390 patches have been compile tested only. Can the
folks copied on this series verify that nothing breaks for them.
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
Patches based on:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git master
commit 79e920060fa7 ("Merge branch 'WIP/fixes'")
Tom Lendacky (11):
mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection
features
x86/sev: Add an x86 version of prot_guest_has()
powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has()
x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has()
treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with
prot_guest_has()
mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
powerpc/pseries/svm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active()
function
s390/mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
arch/Kconfig | 3 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 --
arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 30 +++++++++++
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 -
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 13 +----
arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 27 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 19 +++----
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 9 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 6 +--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 16 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 60 +++++++++++++++-------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 ++--
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 8 +--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c | 6 +--
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 7 +--
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 3 +-
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c | 3 +-
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 3 +-
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 6 +--
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 4 --
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 37 +++++++++++++
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 4 +-
36 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/protected_guest.h
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 02/11] x86/sev: Add an x86 version of prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Introduce an x86 version of the prot_guest_has() function. This will be
used in the more generic x86 code to replace vendor specific calls like
sev_active(), etc.
While the name suggests this is intended mainly for guests, it will
also be used for host memory encryption checks in place of sme_active().
The amd_prot_guest_has() function does not use EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL for the
same reasons previously stated when changing sme_active(), sev_active and
sme_me_mask to EXPORT_SYBMOL:
commit 87df26175e67 ("x86/mm: Unbreak modules that rely on external PAGE_KERNEL availability")
commit 9d5f38ba6c82 ("x86/mm: Unbreak modules that use the DMA API")
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 5 +++++
5 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 49270655e827..e47213cbfc55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1514,6 +1514,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+ select ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
help
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 9c80c68d75b5..a46d47662772 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
+bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b4a267dddf93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+ if (sme_me_mask)
+ return amd_prot_guest_has(attr);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index ff08dc463634..7d3b2c6f5f88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -389,6 +390,30 @@ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
}
+bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+ switch (attr) {
+ case PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_me_mask != 0;
+
+ case PATTR_SME:
+ case PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_active();
+
+ case PATTR_SEV:
+ case PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sev_active();
+
+ case PATTR_SEV_ES:
+ case PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE:
+ return sev_es_active();
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(amd_prot_guest_has);
+
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/protected_guest.h b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
index f8ed7b72967b..7a7120abbb62 100644
--- a/include/linux/protected_guest.h
+++ b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
#define PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT 2 /* Guest encrypted memory */
#define PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE 3 /* Guest encrypted state */
+/* 0x800 - 0x8ff reserved for AMD */
+#define PATTR_SME 0x800
+#define PATTR_SEV 0x801
+#define PATTR_SEV_ES 0x802
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
#include <asm/protected_guest.h>
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 01/11] mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection features
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
In prep for other protected virtualization technologies, introduce a
generic helper function, prot_guest_has(), that can be used to check
for specific protection attributes, like memory encryption. This is
intended to eliminate having to add multiple technology-specific checks
to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() || tdx_active())).
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/Kconfig | 3 +++
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 129df498a8e1..a47cf283f2ff 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1231,6 +1231,9 @@ config RELR
config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool
+config ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
+ bool
+
config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
bool
help
diff --git a/include/linux/protected_guest.h b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f8ed7b72967b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#define PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT 0 /* Encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT 1 /* Host encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT 2 /* Guest encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE 3 /* Guest encrypted state */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
+
+#include <asm/protected_guest.h>
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST */
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/11] powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Paul Mackerras
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Introduce a powerpc version of the prot_guest_has() function. This will
be used to replace the powerpc mem_encrypt_active() implementation, so
the implementation will initially only support the PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT
attribute.
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 +
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce55c2c7e534
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+ switch (attr) {
+ case PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return is_secure_guest();
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
index 5e037df2a3a1..8ce5417d6feb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ config PPC_SVM
select SWIOTLB
select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
help
There are certain POWER platforms which support secure guests using
the Protected Execution Facility, with the help of an Ultravisor
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 04/11] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner,
Will Deacon
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sme_active() with the more generic prot_guest_has()
using PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT, except for in arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c
where PATTR_SME will be used. If future support is added for other memory
encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be
updated, as required, to use PATTR_SME.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 9 ++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 +++++-----
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 5 +++--
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 7 ++++---
10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 0a6e34b07017..11b7c06e2828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ relocate_kernel(unsigned long indirection_page,
unsigned long page_list,
unsigned long start_address,
unsigned int preserve_context,
- unsigned int sme_active);
+ unsigned int host_mem_enc_active);
#endif
#define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index a46d47662772..956338406cec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 131f30fdcfbd..8e7b517ad738 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
image->preserve_context,
- sme_active());
+ prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index c2cfa5e7c152..bd9a9cfbc9a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/swiotlb.h>
@@ -45,11 +45,10 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
swiotlb = 1;
/*
- * If SME is active then swiotlb will be set to 1 so that bounce
- * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
- * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
+ * Set swiotlb to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for
+ * devices that can't support DMA to encrypted memory.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index c53271aebb64..c8fe74a28143 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
* %rsi page_list
* %rdx start address
* %rcx preserve_context
- * %r8 sme_active
+ * %r8 host_mem_enc_active
*/
/* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 60ade7dd71bd..f899f02c0241 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
return false;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
return false;
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
encrypted_prot = true;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
encrypted_prot = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 7d3b2c6f5f88..d246a630feb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
/* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ bool sev_active(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
-bool sme_active(void)
+static bool sme_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
* device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
* encryption mask.
*/
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) {
u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
dev->bus_dma_limit);
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
/* Secure Memory Encryption */
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) {
/*
* SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
* features below.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 470b20208430..088c8ab7dcc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
unsigned long decrypted_base;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 6534c92d0f83..2109ae569c67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
if (sev_es_active()) {
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
* decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
* successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index 46280e6e1535..05e770e3e631 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool copy_device_table(void)
pr_err("The address of old device table is above 4G, not trustworthy!\n");
return false;
}
- old_devtb = (sme_active() && is_kdump_kernel())
+ old_devtb = (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && is_kdump_kernel())
? (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(old_devtb_phys,
dev_table_size)
: memremap(old_devtb_phys, dev_table_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
@@ -3022,7 +3022,8 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
static bool amd_iommu_sme_check(void)
{
- if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
return true;
/* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner,
Ard Biesheuvel
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sev_active() with the more generic prot_guest_has()
using PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT, except for in arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c
where PATTR_SEV will be used. If future support is added for other memory
encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be
updated, as required, to use PATTR_SEV.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 15 +++++++--------
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++++----
9 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 956338406cec..7e25de37c148 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
index 045e82e8945b..0cfe35f03e67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
unsigned long offset, int userbuf,
@@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0,
+ prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index a26643dc6bd6..9d08ad2f3faa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/swait.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
{
int cpu;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index ad273e5861c1..f7ba78a23dcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/kvmclock.h>
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void)
* hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must
* be mapped decrypted.
*/
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem,
1UL << order);
if (r) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 8e7b517ad738..66ff788b79c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
clear_page(level4p);
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
}
@@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
*/
int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
{
- if (sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
/*
- * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
- * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
+ * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec
+ * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
* pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
*/
return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
@@ -583,12 +583,12 @@ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
{
- if (sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
/*
- * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
- * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
+ * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back
+ * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
*/
set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 664d20f0689c..48c906f6593a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
return 0;
}
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) {
pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index f899f02c0241..0f2d5ace5986 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
*/
static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
switch (res->desc) {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
*/
static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
case E820_TYPE_NVS:
case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
/* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
break;
fallthrough;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index d246a630feb9..eb5cae93b238 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
}
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
unsigned long size;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
return;
/*
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
* the trampoline area must be encrypted.
*/
-bool sev_active(void)
+static bool sev_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
@@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ static bool sme_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
@@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
/*
* For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
*/
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
return true;
/*
@@ -479,7 +478,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
}
/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
pr_cont(" SEV");
/* Encrypted Register State */
@@ -502,7 +501,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
* but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !sev_es_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
@@ -510,6 +509,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
{
- return sev_active();
+ return amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 7515e78ef898..94737fcc1e21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+ md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with the more generic
prot_guest_has() using PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE, except for in
arch/x86/kernel/sev*.c and arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c where PATTR_SEV_ES
will be used. If future support is added for other memory encyrption
techonologies, the use of PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE can be updated, as
required, to specifically use PATTR_SEV_ES.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 7 +++----
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7e25de37c148..797146e0cd6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
static inline int __init
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index a6895e440bc3..66a4ab9d95d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
int cpu;
u64 pfn;
- if (!sev_es_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
return 0;
pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, ghcb_page) % PAGE_SIZE);
- if (!sev_es_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
return;
if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index eb5cae93b238..451de8e84fce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -383,8 +383,7 @@ static bool sme_active(void)
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
-/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
-bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
+static bool sev_es_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
}
@@ -482,7 +481,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
pr_cont(" SEV");
/* Encrypted Register State */
- if (sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
pr_cont("\n");
@@ -501,7 +500,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
* but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 2109ae569c67..7711d0071f41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
- if (sev_es_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE)) {
/*
* Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
* will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Daniel Vetter,
Baoquan He, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Zimmermann, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, David Airlie,
Dave Young, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski,
Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to prot_guest_has()
with the PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 ++---
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c | 4 +++-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c | 4 ++--
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 4 ++--
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c | 6 +++---
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 3 ++-
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c | 3 ++-
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 3 ++-
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 6 +++---
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 4 ++--
13 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index de01903c3735..cafed6456d45 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
* there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
* attribute.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 0f2d5ace5986..5e1c1f5cbbe8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
unsigned long flags)
{
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return true;
if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
{
bool encrypted_prot;
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return prot;
encrypted_prot = true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 451de8e84fce..0f1533dbe81c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -364,8 +364,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
/*
* SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
* times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
- * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
+ * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this.
*
* The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
* paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
@@ -451,7 +450,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
* The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
* attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (sme_me_mask) {
r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages);
if (r) {
pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index ad8a5c586a35..6925f2bb4be1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/libnvdimm.h>
#include <linux/vmstat.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1986,7 +1987,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
int ret;
/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
index abb928894eac..8407224717df 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <drm/drm_probe_helper.h>
#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include "amdgpu.h"
#include "amdgpu_irq.h"
@@ -1239,7 +1240,8 @@ static int amdgpu_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
* however, SME requires an indirect IOMMU mapping because the encryption
* bit is beyond the DMA mask of the chip.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active() && ((flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) == CHIP_RAVEN)) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+ ((flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) == CHIP_RAVEN)) {
dev_info(&pdev->dev,
"SME is not compatible with RAVEN\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
index 546599f19a93..4d01d44012fd 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-buf-map.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <drm/drm_cache.h>
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ bool drm_need_swiotlb(int dma_bits)
* Enforce dma_alloc_coherent when memory encryption is active as well
* for the same reasons as for Xen paravirtual hosts.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return true;
for (tmp = iomem_resource.child; tmp; tmp = tmp->sibling)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
index dde8b35bb950..06ec95a650ba 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.h>
#include <drm/drm_aperture.h>
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int vmw_dma_select_mode(struct vmw_private *dev_priv)
[vmw_dma_map_bind] = "Giving up DMA mappings early."};
/* TTM currently doesn't fully support SEV encryption. */
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return -EINVAL;
if (vmw_force_coherent)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
index 3d08f5700bdb..0c70573d3dce 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static unsigned long vmw_port_hb_out(struct rpc_channel *channel,
unsigned long msg_len = strlen(msg);
/* HB port can't access encrypted memory. */
- if (hb && !mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (hb && !prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
unsigned long bp = channel->cookie_high;
si = (uintptr_t) msg;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static unsigned long vmw_port_hb_in(struct rpc_channel *channel, char *reply,
unsigned long si, di, eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
/* HB port can't access encrypted memory */
- if (hb && !mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (hb && !prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
unsigned long bp = channel->cookie_low;
si = channel->cookie_high;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
index 811a49a95d04..def63a8deab4 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/io-pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -2178,7 +2179,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_def_domain_type(struct device *dev)
* active, because some of those devices (AMD GPUs) don't have the
* encryption bit in their DMA-mask and require remapping.
*/
- if (!mem_encrypt_active() && dev_data->iommu_v2)
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) && dev_data->iommu_v2)
return IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY;
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
index f8d4ad421e07..ac359bc98523 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include "amd_iommu.h"
@@ -741,7 +742,7 @@ int amd_iommu_init_device(struct pci_dev *pdev, int pasids)
* When memory encryption is active the device is likely not in a
* direct-mapped domain. Forbid using IOMMUv2 functionality for now.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return -ENODEV;
if (!amd_iommu_v2_supported())
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
index 5419c4b9f27a..ddbedb1b5b6b 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/property.h>
#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <trace/events/iommu.h>
static struct kset *iommu_group_kset;
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ static int __init iommu_subsys_init(void)
else
iommu_set_default_translated(false);
- if (iommu_default_passthrough() && mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (iommu_default_passthrough() && prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
pr_info("Memory encryption detected - Disabling default IOMMU Passthrough\n");
iommu_set_default_translated(false);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
index 9a15334da208..b466f543dc00 100644
--- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
*/
ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read_notes(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, mem_encrypt_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT));
}
/*
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static ssize_t __read_vmcore(char *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos,
buflen);
start = m->paddr + *fpos - m->offset;
tmp = read_from_oldmem(buffer, tsz, &start,
- userbuf, mem_encrypt_active());
+ userbuf, prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT));
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
buflen -= tsz;
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index e50df8d8f87e..2e8dee23a624 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,
if (!mem)
panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier and can't now provide you with the DMA bounce buffer");
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pr_warn_once("Memory encryption is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers\n");
if (mapping_size > alloc_size) {
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 08/11] mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 5c4a18a91f89..ae4526389261 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@
#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
-#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
-
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; }
-
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 09/11] x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 797146e0cd6b..94c089e9ea69 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -97,11 +97,6 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypted_unused[];
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
- return sme_me_mask;
-}
-
static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
{
return sme_me_mask;
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 10/11] powerpc/pseries/svm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-07-27 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Paul Mackerras
In-Reply-To: <cover.1627424773.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index ba9dab07c1be..2f26b8fc8d29 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -10,11 +10,6 @@
#include <asm/svm.h>
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
- return is_secure_guest();
-}
-
static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
return is_secure_guest();
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
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