* Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 20:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill A. Shutemov
Cc: Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan, linux-efi, Brijesh Singh, kvm,
Peter Zijlstra, Dave Hansen, dri-devel, platform-driver-x86,
Will Deacon, linux-s390, Andi Kleen, Baoquan He, Joerg Roedel,
x86, amd-gfx, David Airlie, Ingo Molnar,
linux-graphics-maintainer, Dave Young, Tianyu Lan,
Thomas Zimmermann, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, kexec,
linux-kernel, iommu, Daniel Vetter, linux-fsdevel, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <943223d5-5949-6aba-8a49-0b07078d68e1@amd.com>
On 8/13/21 12:08 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 8/12/21 5:07 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 10:52:55AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 8/11/21 7:19 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 02:48:54PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>>> On 8/10/21 1:45 PM, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> ...
>>>> Looking at code agains, now I *think* the reason is accessing a global
>>>> variable from __startup_64() inside TDX version of prot_guest_has().
>>>>
>>>> __startup_64() is special. If you access any global variable you need to
>>>> use fixup_pointer(). See comment before __startup_64().
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure how you get away with accessing sme_me_mask directly from
>>>> there. Any clues? Maybe just a luck and complier generates code just
>>>> right
>>>> for your case, I donno.
>>>
>>> Hmm... yeah, could be that the compiler is using rip-relative addressing
>>> for it because it lives in the .data section?
>>
>> I guess. It has to be fixed. It may break with complier upgrade or any
>> random change around the code.
>
> I'll look at doing that separate from this series.
>
>>
>> BTW, does it work with clang for you?
>
> I haven't tried with clang, I'll check on that.
Just as an fyi, clang also uses rip relative addressing for those
variables. No issues booting SME and SEV guests built with clang.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] ppc: add "-z notext" flag to disable diagnostic
From: Fangrui Song @ 2021-08-13 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Axtens
Cc: Nick Desaulniers, linux-kernel, Nathan Chancellor,
clang-built-linux, Paul Mackerras, Bill Wendling, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <87sfzde8lk.fsf@linkitivity.dja.id.au>
On 2021-08-14, Daniel Axtens wrote:
>Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> writes:
>
>> The "-z notext" flag disables reporting an error if DT_TEXTREL is set on
>> PPC with CONFIG=kdump:
>>
>> ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against
>> local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC
>> or pass '-Wl,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
>> >>> defined in built-in.a(arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o)
>> >>> referenced by arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o:(.text+0x20) in archive
>> built-in.a
>>
>> The BFD linker disables this by default (though it's configurable in
>> current versions). LLD enables this by default. So we add the flag to
>> keep LLD from emitting the error.
>
>You didn't provide a huge amount of context but I was able to reproduce
>a similar set of errors with pseries_le_defconfig and
>
>make ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64-linux-gnu- CC="ccache clang-11" LD=ld.lld-11 AR=llvm-ar-11 -j4 vmlinux
>
>I also checked the manpage, and indeed the system ld does not issue this
>warning/error by default.
>
>> ---
>> arch/powerpc/Makefile | 1 +
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
>> index 6505d66f1193..17a9fbf9b789 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
>> @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ endif
>>
>> LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y := -Bstatic
>> LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) := -pie
>> +LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) += -z notext
>
>Is there any reason this should be gated on CONFIG_RELOCATABLE? (I tried
>without it and got different but possibly related linker errors...)
>
>Also, is this behaviour new?
This is a longstanding behavior.
https://maskray.me/blog/2020-12-19-lld-and-gnu-linker-incompatibilities
See "Text relocations"
.o files used to link .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1 have many R_PPC64_ADDR64
relocations in non-SHF_WRITE sections. There are many text relocations (e.g. in
.rela___ksymtab_gpl+* and .rela__mcount_loc sections) in a -pie link and are
disallowed by LLD:
ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC or pass '-Wl,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
>>> defined in arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o
>>> referenced by arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o:(__restart_table+0x10)
Newer GNU ld configured with --enable-textrel-check=error will report an error
as well:
ld/ld-new: read-only segment has dynamic relocations
Text relocations are considered very awful by linker developers.
binutils 2.35 added --enable-textrel-check={no,warn,error}
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=20824
I can imagine that in the future some Linux distributions (especially those
focusing on security) will default their binutils to use
--enable-textrel-check={no,warn,error}. CONFIG_RELOCATABLE build will break
sooner or later.
In -no-pie links, R_PPC64_ADDR64 relocations are link-time constants.
There are no text relocations, therefore no need for -z notext.
>Kind regards,
>Daniel
>
>> LDFLAGS_vmlinux := $(LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y)
>>
>> ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
>> --
>> 2.33.0.rc1.237.g0d66db33f3-goog
>
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^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2] ppc: add "-z notext" flag to disable diagnostic
From: Bill Wendling @ 2021-08-13 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman, Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Paul Mackerras,
Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel,
clang-built-linux, Daniel Axtens, Fangrui Song
Cc: Itaru Kitayama, Bill Wendling
In-Reply-To: <20210812204951.1551782-1-morbo@google.com>
From: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Object files used to link .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1 have many R_PPC64_ADDR64
relocations in non-SHF_WRITE sections. There are many text relocations (e.g. in
.rela___ksymtab_gpl+* and .rela__mcount_loc sections) in a -pie link and are
disallowed by LLD:
ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC or pass '-Wl,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
>>> defined in arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o
>>> referenced by arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o:(__restart_table+0x10)
Newer GNU ld configured with "--enable-textrel-check=error" will report an
error as well:
$ ld-new -EL -m elf64lppc -pie ... -o .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1 ...
ld-new: read-only segment has dynamic relocations
Add "-z notext" to suppress the errors. Non-CONFIG_RELOCATABLE builds use the
default -no-pie mode and thus R_PPC64_ADDR64 relocations can be resolved at
link-time.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/811
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Reported-by: Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@riken.jp>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
---
v2:
- Assign "Fangrui Song" as the proper author.
- Improve the commit message to add more context.
- Appending tags from original patch's review.
---
arch/powerpc/Makefile | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
index 6505d66f1193..17a9fbf9b789 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ endif
LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y := -Bstatic
LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) := -pie
+LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) += -z notext
LDFLAGS_vmlinux := $(LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y)
ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
--
2.33.0.rc1.237.g0d66db33f3-goog
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] ppc: add "-z notext" flag to disable diagnostic
From: Nick Desaulniers @ 2021-08-13 18:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bill Wendling
Cc: Fangrui Song, LKML, Nathan Chancellor, clang-built-linux,
Paul Mackerras, linuxppc-dev, Daniel Axtens
In-Reply-To: <CAGG=3QUz2LNgC8Hn6rU68ejjv4=J9Uidef0oH9A7=sKTs+vf7g@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 11:24 AM Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> wrote:
>
> BTW, this patch should more properly be attributed to Fangrui Song. I
> can send a follow-up patch that reflects this and adds more context to
> the commit message.
Sounds good to me. The TL;DR is that LLD has a different implicit
default for `-z text` vs `-z notext` than BFD. We can emulate the
behavior or BFD by simply being explicit about `-z notext` always.
Or we can dig through why there are relocations in read only sections,
fix those, then enable `-z text` for all linkers. My recommendation
would be get the thing building, then go digging time permitting.
--
Thanks,
~Nick Desaulniers
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] ppc: add "-z notext" flag to disable diagnostic
From: Bill Wendling @ 2021-08-13 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Axtens, Fangrui Song
Cc: Nick Desaulniers, LKML, Nathan Chancellor, clang-built-linux,
Paul Mackerras, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <87sfzde8lk.fsf@linkitivity.dja.id.au>
On Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 7:13 AM Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote:
>
> Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> writes:
>
> > The "-z notext" flag disables reporting an error if DT_TEXTREL is set on
> > PPC with CONFIG=kdump:
> >
> > ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against
> > local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC
> > or pass '-Wl,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
> > >>> defined in built-in.a(arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o)
> > >>> referenced by arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o:(.text+0x20) in archive
> > built-in.a
> >
> > The BFD linker disables this by default (though it's configurable in
> > current versions). LLD enables this by default. So we add the flag to
> > keep LLD from emitting the error.
>
> You didn't provide a huge amount of context but I was able to reproduce
> a similar set of errors with pseries_le_defconfig and
>
My apologies for the lack of context. We discovered this issue when
moving to use LLD instead of BFD for our linker. This change suggested
by Fangrui Song. Here's his comments from
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/811. (Nick Desaulniers
added a "Link" tag with his review.)
```
The text relocations are real. lld can link .tmp_vmlinux1 smoothly if
you pass -z notext. Though, it will still be insightful to investigate
where these text relocations come from. I believe there are only 2
categories.
(a) For a CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS=y build (x86 and arm64
select the option by default), ___ksymtab+* sections (non-SHF_WRITE)
contains entries relocated by PC relative relocations. These entries
do not need dynamic relocations.
out/powerpc64le/.config generated by ppc64le_defconfig does not enable
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS=y.
% readelf -r out/x86_64/entry/entry_64.o
...
Relocation section '.rela___ksymtab+native_load_gs_index' at offset
0x6460 contains 2 entries:
Offset Info Type Symbol's
Value Symbol's Name + Addend
0000000000000000 0000007a00000002 R_X86_64_PC32
0000000000000ea0 native_load_gs_index + 0
0000000000000004 0000001d00000002 R_X86_64_PC32
0000000000000000 __ksymtab_strings + 0
include/asm-generic/export.h
ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against
local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC or
pass '-Wl
,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
>>> defined in init/built-in.a(do_mounts.o)
>>> referenced by do_mounts.c
>>> do_mounts.o:(__ksymtab_name_to_dev_t) in archive init/built-in.a
(b) R_PPC64_ADDR64 in __mcount_loc sections.
ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against
local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC or
pass '-Wl
,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
>>> defined in init/built-in.a(do_mounts_rd.o)
>>> referenced by do_mounts_rd.c
>>> do_mounts_rd.o:(__mcount_loc+0x0) in archive init/built-in.a
This section is generated by ./scripts/recordmcount
"init/do_mounts_rd.o". The tool hard codes R_PPC64_ADDR64.
% grep PPC64 scripts/recordmcount.c
case EM_PPC64: reltype = R_PPC64_ADDR64; break;
```
> make ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64-linux-gnu- CC="ccache clang-11" LD=ld.lld-11 AR=llvm-ar-11 -j4 vmlinux
>
> I also checked the manpage, and indeed the system ld does not issue this
> warning/error by default.
>
It should be noted that the BFD linker can emit this warning/error if
binutils is configured with
"--enable-textrel-check={warning,error,yes}".
> > ---
> > arch/powerpc/Makefile | 1 +
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> > index 6505d66f1193..17a9fbf9b789 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ endif
> >
> > LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y := -Bstatic
> > LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) := -pie
> > +LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) += -z notext
>
> Is there any reason this should be gated on CONFIG_RELOCATABLE? (I tried
> without it and got different but possibly related linker errors...)
>
My understanding is that '-z notext' allows (i.e. doesn't emit
warnings/errors for) relocations against read-only segments. So it's
not really relevant to non-relocatable builds.
Unrelated question: Should the "-pie" flag be added with "+= -pie"
(note the plus sign)?
> Also, is this behaviour new?
>
I don't believe so. It's only when we wanted to use LLD that it was noticed.
BTW, this patch should more properly be attributed to Fangrui Song. I
can send a follow-up patch that reflects this and adds more context to
the commit message.
-bw
> Kind regards,
> Daniel
>
> > LDFLAGS_vmlinux := $(LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y)
> >
> > ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
> > --
> > 2.33.0.rc1.237.g0d66db33f3-goog
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 00/12] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 17:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Brijesh Singh, David Airlie,
Dave Hansen, Paul Mackerras, Will Deacon, Ard Biesheuvel,
Andi Kleen, Baoquan He, Joerg Roedel, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Dave Young, Tianyu Lan, Thomas Zimmermann,
Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra,
Daniel Vetter
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 8/13/21 11:59 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> This patch series provides a generic helper function, prot_guest_has(),
> to replace the sme_active(), sev_active(), sev_es_active() and
> mem_encrypt_active() functions.
>
> It is expected that as new protected virtualization technologies are
> added to the kernel, they can all be covered by a single function call
> instead of a collection of specific function calls all called from the
> same locations.
>
> The powerpc and s390 patches have been compile tested only. Can the
> folks copied on this series verify that nothing breaks for them.
There are some patches related to PPC that added new calls to the
mem_encrypt_active() function that are not yet in the tip tree. After the
merge window, I'll need to send a v3 with those additional changes before
this series can be applied.
Thanks,
Tom
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 02/12] mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection features
From: Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan @ 2021-08-13 17:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu,
kvm, linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh
In-Reply-To: <482fe51f1671c1cd081039801b03db7ec0036332.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 8/13/21 9:59 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> In prep for other protected virtualization technologies, introduce a
> generic helper function, prot_guest_has(), that can be used to check
> for specific protection attributes, like memory encryption. This is
> intended to eliminate having to add multiple technology-specific checks
> to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() || tdx_active())).
>
> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel<jroedel@suse.de>
> Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen<ak@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen<ak@linux.intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/Kconfig | 3 +++
> include/linux/protected_guest.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/protected_guest.h
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
--
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 17:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill A. Shutemov
Cc: Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan, linux-efi, Brijesh Singh, kvm,
Peter Zijlstra, Dave Hansen, dri-devel, platform-driver-x86,
Will Deacon, linux-s390, Andi Kleen, Baoquan He, Joerg Roedel,
x86, amd-gfx, David Airlie, Ingo Molnar,
linux-graphics-maintainer, Dave Young, Tianyu Lan,
Thomas Zimmermann, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, kexec,
linux-kernel, iommu, Daniel Vetter, linux-fsdevel, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <20210812100724.t4cdh7xbkuqgnsc3@box.shutemov.name>
On 8/12/21 5:07 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 10:52:55AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 8/11/21 7:19 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 02:48:54PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> On 8/10/21 1:45 PM, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
...
>>> Looking at code agains, now I *think* the reason is accessing a global
>>> variable from __startup_64() inside TDX version of prot_guest_has().
>>>
>>> __startup_64() is special. If you access any global variable you need to
>>> use fixup_pointer(). See comment before __startup_64().
>>>
>>> I'm not sure how you get away with accessing sme_me_mask directly from
>>> there. Any clues? Maybe just a luck and complier generates code just right
>>> for your case, I donno.
>>
>> Hmm... yeah, could be that the compiler is using rip-relative addressing
>> for it because it lives in the .data section?
>
> I guess. It has to be fixed. It may break with complier upgrade or any
> random change around the code.
I'll look at doing that separate from this series.
>
> BTW, does it work with clang for you?
I haven't tried with clang, I'll check on that.
Thanks,
Tom
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 12/12] s390/mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Vasily Gorbik,
Joerg Roedel, Christian Borntraeger, Borislav Petkov,
Brijesh Singh, Heiko Carstens
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation. Since the default implementation of the
prot_guest_has() matches the s390 implementation of mem_encrypt_active(),
prot_guest_has() does not need to be implemented in s390 (the config
option ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST is not set).
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 2542cbf7e2d1..08a8b96606d7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; }
-
int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 11/12] powerpc/pseries/svm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Paul Mackerras
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index ba9dab07c1be..2f26b8fc8d29 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -10,11 +10,6 @@
#include <asm/svm.h>
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
- return is_secure_guest();
-}
-
static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
return is_secure_guest();
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 09/12] mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 5c4a18a91f89..ae4526389261 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@
#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
-#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
-
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; }
-
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 10/12] x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Joerg Roedel, Brijesh Singh,
Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The mem_encrypt_active() function has been replaced by prot_guest_has(),
so remove the implementation.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 797146e0cd6b..94c089e9ea69 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -97,11 +97,6 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypted_unused[];
-static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
-{
- return sme_me_mask;
-}
-
static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
{
return sme_me_mask;
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 08/12] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Daniel Vetter,
Baoquan He, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Zimmermann, Joerg Roedel,
Dave Hansen, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, David Airlie,
Dave Young, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski,
Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of mem_encrypt_active() with calls to prot_guest_has()
with the PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 ++---
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c | 4 +++-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c | 4 ++--
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 4 ++--
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c | 6 +++---
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 3 ++-
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c | 3 ++-
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 3 ++-
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 6 +++---
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 4 ++--
13 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index de01903c3735..cafed6456d45 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
* there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
* attribute.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__end_bss_decrypted;
for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PMD_SIZE) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 3ed0f28f12af..7f012fc1b600 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
unsigned long flags)
{
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return true;
if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
{
bool encrypted_prot;
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return prot;
encrypted_prot = true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 38dfa84b77a1..69aed9935b5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -364,8 +364,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
/*
* SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
* times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
- * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
+ * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this.
*
* The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
* paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
@@ -451,7 +450,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
* The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
* attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages);
if (r) {
pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index ad8a5c586a35..6925f2bb4be1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/libnvdimm.h>
#include <linux/vmstat.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1986,7 +1987,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
int ret;
/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
- if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
index 971c5b8e75dc..21c1e3056070 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <drm/drm_probe_helper.h>
#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include "amdgpu.h"
#include "amdgpu_irq.h"
@@ -1250,7 +1251,8 @@ static int amdgpu_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
* however, SME requires an indirect IOMMU mapping because the encryption
* bit is beyond the DMA mask of the chip.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active() && ((flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) == CHIP_RAVEN)) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+ ((flags & AMD_ASIC_MASK) == CHIP_RAVEN)) {
dev_info(&pdev->dev,
"SME is not compatible with RAVEN\n");
return -ENOTSUPP;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
index 546599f19a93..4d01d44012fd 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-buf-map.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <drm/drm_cache.h>
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ bool drm_need_swiotlb(int dma_bits)
* Enforce dma_alloc_coherent when memory encryption is active as well
* for the same reasons as for Xen paravirtual hosts.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return true;
for (tmp = iomem_resource.child; tmp; tmp = tmp->sibling)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
index 45aeeca9b8f6..498f52ba08ea 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <drm/drm_aperture.h>
#include <drm/drm_drv.h>
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int vmw_dma_select_mode(struct vmw_private *dev_priv)
[vmw_dma_map_bind] = "Giving up DMA mappings early."};
/* TTM currently doesn't fully support SEV encryption. */
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return -EINVAL;
if (vmw_force_coherent)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
index 3d08f5700bdb..0c70573d3dce 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static unsigned long vmw_port_hb_out(struct rpc_channel *channel,
unsigned long msg_len = strlen(msg);
/* HB port can't access encrypted memory. */
- if (hb && !mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (hb && !prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
unsigned long bp = channel->cookie_high;
si = (uintptr_t) msg;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static unsigned long vmw_port_hb_in(struct rpc_channel *channel, char *reply,
unsigned long si, di, eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
/* HB port can't access encrypted memory */
- if (hb && !mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (hb && !prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
unsigned long bp = channel->cookie_low;
si = channel->cookie_high;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
index 811a49a95d04..def63a8deab4 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/irqdomain.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/io-pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -2178,7 +2179,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_def_domain_type(struct device *dev)
* active, because some of those devices (AMD GPUs) don't have the
* encryption bit in their DMA-mask and require remapping.
*/
- if (!mem_encrypt_active() && dev_data->iommu_v2)
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) && dev_data->iommu_v2)
return IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY;
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
index f8d4ad421e07..ac359bc98523 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include "amd_iommu.h"
@@ -741,7 +742,7 @@ int amd_iommu_init_device(struct pci_dev *pdev, int pasids)
* When memory encryption is active the device is likely not in a
* direct-mapped domain. Forbid using IOMMUv2 functionality for now.
*/
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return -ENODEV;
if (!amd_iommu_v2_supported())
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
index 5419c4b9f27a..ddbedb1b5b6b 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/property.h>
#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <trace/events/iommu.h>
static struct kset *iommu_group_kset;
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ static int __init iommu_subsys_init(void)
else
iommu_set_default_translated(false);
- if (iommu_default_passthrough() && mem_encrypt_active()) {
+ if (iommu_default_passthrough() && prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
pr_info("Memory encryption detected - Disabling default IOMMU Passthrough\n");
iommu_set_default_translated(false);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
index 9a15334da208..b466f543dc00 100644
--- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c
+++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
*/
ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read_notes(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, mem_encrypt_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT));
}
/*
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static ssize_t __read_vmcore(char *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos,
buflen);
start = m->paddr + *fpos - m->offset;
tmp = read_from_oldmem(buffer, tsz, &start,
- userbuf, mem_encrypt_active());
+ userbuf, prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT));
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
buflen -= tsz;
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index e50df8d8f87e..2e8dee23a624 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,
if (!mem)
panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier and can't now provide you with the DMA bounce buffer");
- if (mem_encrypt_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pr_warn_once("Memory encryption is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers\n");
if (mapping_size > alloc_size) {
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 07/12] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with the more generic
prot_guest_has() using PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE, except for in
arch/x86/kernel/sev*.c and arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c where PATTR_SEV_ES
will be used. If future support is added for other memory encyrption
techonologies, the use of PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE can be updated, as
required, to specifically use PATTR_SEV_ES.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 7 +++----
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7e25de37c148..797146e0cd6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -74,7 +73,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
static inline int __init
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index a6895e440bc3..66a4ab9d95d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
int cpu;
u64 pfn;
- if (!sev_es_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
return 0;
pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, ghcb_page) % PAGE_SIZE);
- if (!sev_es_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
return;
if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 83bc928f529e..38dfa84b77a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -383,8 +383,7 @@ static bool sme_active(void)
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
-/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
-bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
+static bool sev_es_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
}
@@ -482,7 +481,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
pr_cont(" SEV");
/* Encrypted Register State */
- if (sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
pr_cont("\n");
@@ -501,7 +500,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
* but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV_ES))
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 2109ae569c67..7711d0071f41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
- if (sev_es_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE)) {
/*
* Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it
* will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet.
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 06/12] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner,
Joerg Roedel, Ard Biesheuvel
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sev_active() with the more generic prot_guest_has()
using PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT, except for in arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c
where PATTR_SEV will be used. If future support is added for other memory
encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be
updated, as required, to use PATTR_SEV.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 15 +++++++--------
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++++----
9 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 956338406cec..7e25de37c148 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
index 045e82e8945b..0cfe35f03e67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
unsigned long offset, int userbuf,
@@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0,
+ prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index a26643dc6bd6..9d08ad2f3faa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/swait.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
{
int cpu;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index ad273e5861c1..f7ba78a23dcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/kvmclock.h>
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void)
* hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must
* be mapped decrypted.
*/
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem,
1UL << order);
if (r) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 8e7b517ad738..66ff788b79c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
clear_page(level4p);
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
}
@@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
*/
int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
{
- if (sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
/*
- * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
- * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
+ * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec
+ * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
* pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
*/
return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
@@ -583,12 +583,12 @@ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
{
- if (sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
/*
- * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
- * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
+ * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back
+ * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
*/
set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e8ccab50ebf6..b69f5ac622d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
return 0;
}
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) {
pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 583afd54c7e1..3ed0f28f12af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
*/
static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
switch (res->desc) {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
*/
static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
case E820_TYPE_NVS:
case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
/* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
break;
fallthrough;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 5635ca9a1fbe..83bc928f529e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
}
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
unsigned long size;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
return;
/*
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
* the trampoline area must be encrypted.
*/
-bool sev_active(void)
+static bool sev_active(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
@@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ static bool sme_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
@@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
/*
* For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
*/
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
return true;
/*
@@ -479,7 +478,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
}
/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV))
pr_cont(" SEV");
/* Encrypted Register State */
@@ -502,7 +501,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
* but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV) && !sev_es_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
@@ -510,6 +509,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
{
- return sev_active();
+ return amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 7515e78ef898..94737fcc1e21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+ md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 05/12] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner,
Will Deacon
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Replace occurrences of sme_active() with the more generic prot_guest_has()
using PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT, except for in arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt*.c
where PATTR_SME will be used. If future support is added for other memory
encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be
updated, as required, to use PATTR_SME.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 9 ++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 +++++-----
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 5 +++--
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 7 ++++---
10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 0a6e34b07017..11b7c06e2828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ relocate_kernel(unsigned long indirection_page,
unsigned long page_list,
unsigned long start_address,
unsigned int preserve_context,
- unsigned int sme_active);
+ unsigned int host_mem_enc_active);
#endif
#define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index a46d47662772..956338406cec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 131f30fdcfbd..8e7b517ad738 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
image->preserve_context,
- sme_active());
+ prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index c2cfa5e7c152..bd9a9cfbc9a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/swiotlb.h>
@@ -45,11 +45,10 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
swiotlb = 1;
/*
- * If SME is active then swiotlb will be set to 1 so that bounce
- * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
- * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
+ * Set swiotlb to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for
+ * devices that can't support DMA to encrypted memory.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index c53271aebb64..c8fe74a28143 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
* %rsi page_list
* %rdx start address
* %rcx preserve_context
- * %r8 sme_active
+ * %r8 host_mem_enc_active
*/
/* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index ccff76cedd8f..583afd54c7e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
return false;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
return false;
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
encrypted_prot = true;
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size))
encrypted_prot = false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index edc67ddf065d..5635ca9a1fbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
/* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
struct boot_params *boot_data;
unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
__sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ bool sev_active(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
}
-bool sme_active(void)
+static bool sme_active(void)
{
return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
}
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
* device does not support DMA to addresses that include the
* encryption mask.
*/
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) {
u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask));
u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask,
dev->bus_dma_limit);
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
/* Secure Memory Encryption */
- if (sme_active()) {
+ if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) {
/*
* SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
* features below.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 470b20208430..088c8ab7dcc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
unsigned long decrypted_base;
- if (!sme_active())
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME))
return;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index 6534c92d0f83..2109ae569c67 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void)
static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
if (sev_es_active()) {
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
* decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
* successfully. This is not needed for SEV.
*/
- if (sme_active())
+ if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
index 46280e6e1535..05e770e3e631 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool copy_device_table(void)
pr_err("The address of old device table is above 4G, not trustworthy!\n");
return false;
}
- old_devtb = (sme_active() && is_kdump_kernel())
+ old_devtb = (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && is_kdump_kernel())
? (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(old_devtb_phys,
dev_table_size)
: memremap(old_devtb_phys, dev_table_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
@@ -3022,7 +3022,8 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
static bool amd_iommu_sme_check(void)
{
- if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
+ if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
return true;
/* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 04/12] powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Paul Mackerras
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Introduce a powerpc version of the prot_guest_has() function. This will
be used to replace the powerpc mem_encrypt_active() implementation, so
the implementation will initially only support the PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT
attribute.
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 +
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce55c2c7e534
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+ switch (attr) {
+ case PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return is_secure_guest();
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _POWERPC_PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
index 5e037df2a3a1..8ce5417d6feb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ config PPC_SVM
select SWIOTLB
select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
help
There are certain POWER platforms which support secure guests using
the Protected Execution Facility, with the help of an Ultravisor
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 03/12] x86/sev: Add an x86 version of prot_guest_has()
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner,
Joerg Roedel
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Introduce an x86 version of the prot_guest_has() function. This will be
used in the more generic x86 code to replace vendor specific calls like
sev_active(), etc.
While the name suggests this is intended mainly for guests, it will
also be used for host memory encryption checks in place of sme_active().
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 5 +++++
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 421fa9e38c60..82e5fb713261 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1514,6 +1514,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
+ select ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
help
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 9c80c68d75b5..a46d47662772 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
bool sme_active(void);
bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
+bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
static inline int __init
early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51e4eefd9542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ if (sme_me_mask)
+ return amd_prot_guest_has(attr);
+#endif
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _X86_PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index ff08dc463634..edc67ddf065d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
+#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -389,6 +390,30 @@ bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
}
+bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr)
+{
+ switch (attr) {
+ case PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_me_mask != 0;
+
+ case PATTR_SME:
+ case PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sme_active();
+
+ case PATTR_SEV:
+ case PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+ return sev_active();
+
+ case PATTR_SEV_ES:
+ case PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE:
+ return sev_es_active();
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_prot_guest_has);
+
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/protected_guest.h b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
index 43d4dde94793..5ddef1b6a2ea 100644
--- a/include/linux/protected_guest.h
+++ b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@
#define PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT 2 /* Guest encrypted memory */
#define PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE 3 /* Guest encrypted state */
+/* 0x800 - 0x8ff reserved for AMD */
+#define PATTR_SME 0x800
+#define PATTR_SEV 0x801
+#define PATTR_SEV_ES 0x802
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
#include <asm/protected_guest.h>
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 02/12] mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection features
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan, Joerg Roedel,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
In prep for other protected virtualization technologies, introduce a
generic helper function, prot_guest_has(), that can be used to check
for specific protection attributes, like memory encryption. This is
intended to eliminate having to add multiple technology-specific checks
to the code (e.g. if (sev_active() || tdx_active())).
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/Kconfig | 3 +++
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/protected_guest.h
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 98db63496bab..bd4f60c581f1 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -1231,6 +1231,9 @@ config RELR
config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool
+config ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
+ bool
+
config HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR
bool
help
diff --git a/include/linux/protected_guest.h b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..43d4dde94793
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/protected_guest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Protected Guest (and Host) Capability checks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+#define _PROTECTED_GUEST_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+
+#define PATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT 0 /* Encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT 1 /* Host encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT 2 /* Guest encrypted memory */
+#define PATTR_GUEST_PROT_STATE 3 /* Guest encrypted state */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST
+
+#include <asm/protected_guest.h>
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST */
+
+static inline bool prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PROTECTED_GUEST */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _PROTECTED_GUEST_H */
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 01/12] x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Andi Kleen, Tianyu Lan,
Peter Zijlstra, Joerg Roedel, Dave Hansen, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner
In-Reply-To: <cover.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
In prep for other uses of the prot_guest_has() function besides AMD's
memory encryption support, selectively build the AMD memory encryption
architecture override functions only when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y. These
functions are:
- early_memremap_pgprot_adjust()
- arch_memremap_can_ram_remap()
Additionally, routines that are only invoked by these architecture
override functions can also be conditionally built. These functions are:
- memremap_should_map_decrypted()
- memremap_is_efi_data()
- memremap_is_setup_data()
- early_memremap_is_setup_data()
And finally, phys_mem_access_encrypted() is conditionally built as well,
but requires a static inline version of it when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is
not set.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index 841a5d104afa..5c6a4af0b911 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ extern void arch_io_free_memtype_wc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size)
#define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
unsigned long size,
unsigned long flags);
@@ -398,6 +399,13 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
extern bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
+#else
+static inline bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
/**
* iosubmit_cmds512 - copy data to single MMIO location, in 512-bit units
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 60ade7dd71bd..ccff76cedd8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
memunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
/*
* Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
* that should be mapped decrypted. If the memory is not part of the
@@ -746,7 +747,6 @@ bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
return arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(phys_addr, size, 0);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
/* Remap memory with encryption */
void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size)
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 00/12] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2021-08-13 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, iommu, kvm,
linux-efi, platform-driver-x86, linux-graphics-maintainer,
amd-gfx, dri-devel, kexec, linux-fsdevel
Cc: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy, Brijesh Singh, David Airlie,
Dave Hansen, Paul Mackerras, Will Deacon, Ard Biesheuvel,
Andi Kleen, Baoquan He, Joerg Roedel, Christian Borntraeger,
Ingo Molnar, Dave Young, Tianyu Lan, Thomas Zimmermann,
Vasily Gorbik, Heiko Carstens, Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra,
Daniel Vetter
This patch series provides a generic helper function, prot_guest_has(),
to replace the sme_active(), sev_active(), sev_es_active() and
mem_encrypt_active() functions.
It is expected that as new protected virtualization technologies are
added to the kernel, they can all be covered by a single function call
instead of a collection of specific function calls all called from the
same locations.
The powerpc and s390 patches have been compile tested only. Can the
folks copied on this series verify that nothing breaks for them.
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
Patches based on:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git master
0b52902cd2d9 ("Merge branch 'efi/urgent'")
Changes since v1:
- Move some arch ioremap functions within #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
in prep for use of prot_guest_has() by TDX.
- Add type includes to the the protected_guest.h header file to prevent
build errors outside of x86.
- Make amd_prot_guest_has() EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL
- Use amd_prot_guest_has() in place of checking sme_me_mask in the
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c file.
Tom Lendacky (12):
x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions
mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection
features
x86/sev: Add an x86 version of prot_guest_has()
powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has()
x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has()
x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has()
treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with
prot_guest_has()
mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
powerpc/pseries/svm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active()
function
s390/mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function
arch/Kconfig | 3 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 --
arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 30 +++++++++++
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 -
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 8 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 13 +----
arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h | 29 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 19 +++----
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 9 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 6 +--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 +++----
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 60 +++++++++++++++-------
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 ++--
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 8 +--
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_cache.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 4 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_msg.c | 6 +--
drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 7 +--
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 3 +-
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu_v2.c | 3 +-
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 3 +-
fs/proc/vmcore.c | 6 +--
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 4 --
include/linux/protected_guest.h | 40 +++++++++++++++
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 4 +-
37 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/protected_guest.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/protected_guest.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/protected_guest.h
--
2.32.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/svm: Don't issue ultracalls if !mem_encrypt_active()
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-08-13 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Cc: Sachin Sant, Tom Lendacky, Will Deacon, linux-kernel,
Nicholas Piggin, Nathan Chancellor, iommu, Claire Chang,
linuxppc-dev, Christoph Hellwig, Robin Murphy
In-Reply-To: <871r7cks8x.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
On Mon, Aug 02, 2021 at 09:20:30PM +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> writes:
> > Commit ad6c00283163 ("swiotlb: Free tbl memory in swiotlb_exit()")
> > introduced a set_memory_encrypted() call to swiotlb_exit() so that the
> > buffer pages are returned to an encrypted state prior to being freed.
> >
> > Sachin reports that this leads to the following crash on a Power server:
> >
> > [ 0.010799] software IO TLB: tearing down default memory pool
> > [ 0.010805] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [ 0.010808] kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:98!
> >
> > Nick spotted that this is because set_memory_encrypted() is issuing an
> > ultracall which doesn't exist for the processor, and should therefore
> > be gated by mem_encrypt_active() to mirror the x86 implementation.
> >
> > Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
> > Cc: Claire Chang <tientzu@chromium.org>
> > Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
> > Fixes: ad6c00283163 ("swiotlb: Free tbl memory in swiotlb_exit()")
> > Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
> > Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1905CD70-7656-42AE-99E2-A31FC3812EAC@linux.vnet.ibm.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> Thanks.
>
> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
>
>
> I assume Konrad will take this via the swiotlb tree?
Btw, we're currently reworking that whole "am I running as a
confidential guest" querying, see:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/029791b24c6412f9427cfe6ec598156c64395964.1627424774.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
for example.
I see Konrad has queued this for 5.15 in his devel/for-linus-5.15 branch
so if he sends it to Linus in the upcoming merge window (right Konrad?)
then I can base the rework ontop, once 5.15-rc1 releases, so that there
are no build breakages...
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v6 1/2] tty: hvc: pass DMA capable memory to put_chars()
From: Xianting TIan @ 2021-08-13 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Slaby, gregkh, amit, arnd, osandov
Cc: clang-built-linux, kbuild-all, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel,
virtualization
In-Reply-To: <0c808001-7643-fdcf-66ba-738654ec0c21@kernel.org>
在 2021/8/13 下午1:53, Jiri Slaby 写道:
> Hi,
>
> On 12. 08. 21, 14:26, kernel test robot wrote:
>>>> drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c:190:26: warning: variable 'hp' is
>>>> uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized]
>> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hp->c_lock, flags);
>> ^~
>> drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c:149:23: note: initialize the
>> variable 'hp' to silence this warning
>> struct hvc_struct *hp;
>> ^
>> = NULL
>
> So you clearly didn't test your change as it would crash quite
> instantly. I wonder, where do you intend to get hp from in the
> console::print() hook?
>
> thanks,
According to analysis, this issue may can be solved just by adjust the
alignment to L1_CACHE_BYTES:
#define __ALIGNED__ __attribute__((__aligned__(L1_CACHE_BYTES)))
Our analysis as below, the original __ALIGNED__ is sizeof(long) which is
8 for 64bit cpu.
char c[N_OUTBUF] __ALIGNED__; //c[16] __ALIGNED__;
For 4K page, c[16] may cross the page when alignemnt is 8.
In the case the physical address of c[16] is noncontiguous.
|------8----|..........|-----8-----| PAGE_1
..........................|-----------16----------| c[16]
.........................................|-----8-----|.............|-----8-----|
PAGE_2
But when the alignment is L1_CACHE_BYTES(eg, 64), or at least
N_OUTBUF(16), we have no dma issue as c[16] won't cross the page, the
physical address of c[16] is contiguous.
|--------64--------|.........|--------64---------| PAGE_3
..................................|--c[16]--|
Could you help comments this? thanks
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] ppc: add "-z notext" flag to disable diagnostic
From: Daniel Axtens @ 2021-08-13 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bill Wendling, Michael Ellerman, Benjamin Herrenschmidt,
Paul Mackerras, Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers, linuxppc-dev,
linux-kernel, clang-built-linux
Cc: Bill Wendling
In-Reply-To: <20210812204951.1551782-1-morbo@google.com>
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> writes:
> The "-z notext" flag disables reporting an error if DT_TEXTREL is set on
> PPC with CONFIG=kdump:
>
> ld.lld: error: can't create dynamic relocation R_PPC64_ADDR64 against
> local symbol in readonly segment; recompile object files with -fPIC
> or pass '-Wl,-z,notext' to allow text relocations in the output
> >>> defined in built-in.a(arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o)
> >>> referenced by arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.o:(.text+0x20) in archive
> built-in.a
>
> The BFD linker disables this by default (though it's configurable in
> current versions). LLD enables this by default. So we add the flag to
> keep LLD from emitting the error.
You didn't provide a huge amount of context but I was able to reproduce
a similar set of errors with pseries_le_defconfig and
make ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64-linux-gnu- CC="ccache clang-11" LD=ld.lld-11 AR=llvm-ar-11 -j4 vmlinux
I also checked the manpage, and indeed the system ld does not issue this
warning/error by default.
> ---
> arch/powerpc/Makefile | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> index 6505d66f1193..17a9fbf9b789 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
> @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ endif
>
> LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y := -Bstatic
> LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) := -pie
> +LDFLAGS_vmlinux-$(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE) += -z notext
Is there any reason this should be gated on CONFIG_RELOCATABLE? (I tried
without it and got different but possibly related linker errors...)
Also, is this behaviour new?
Kind regards,
Daniel
> LDFLAGS_vmlinux := $(LDFLAGS_vmlinux-y)
>
> ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
> --
> 2.33.0.rc1.237.g0d66db33f3-goog
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc/xive: Do not skip CPU-less nodes when creating the IPIs
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2021-08-13 11:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev, Cédric Le Goater
Cc: Laurent Vivier, Geetika Moolchandani, Srikar Dronamraju, stable
In-Reply-To: <20210807072057.184698-1-clg@kaod.org>
On Sat, 7 Aug 2021 09:20:57 +0200, Cédric Le Goater wrote:
> On PowerVM, CPU-less nodes can be populated with hot-plugged CPUs at
> runtime. Today, the IPI is not created for such nodes, and hot-plugged
> CPUs use a bogus IPI, which leads to soft lockups.
>
> We can not directly allocate and request the IPI on demand because
> bringup_up() is called under the IRQ sparse lock. The alternative is
> to allocate the IPIs for all possible nodes at startup and to request
> the mapping on demand when the first CPU of a node is brought up.
Applied to powerpc/fixes.
[1/1] powerpc/xive: Do not skip CPU-less nodes when creating the IPIs
https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/cbc06f051c524dcfe52ef0d1f30647828e226d30
cheers
^ permalink raw reply
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