* [powerpc:next] BUILD SUCCESS f1aa0e47c29268776205698f2453dc07fab49855
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-01-07 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman; +Cc: linuxppc-dev
tree/branch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next
branch HEAD: f1aa0e47c29268776205698f2453dc07fab49855 powerpc/xmon: Dump XIVE information for online-only processors.
elapsed time: 721m
configs tested: 122
configs skipped: 3
The following configs have been built successfully.
More configs may be tested in the coming days.
gcc tested configs:
arm defconfig
arm64 allyesconfig
arm allyesconfig
arm allmodconfig
arm64 defconfig
i386 randconfig-c001-20220106
s390 zfcpdump_defconfig
arm eseries_pxa_defconfig
powerpc adder875_defconfig
sh sh7785lcr_defconfig
powerpc klondike_defconfig
m68k atari_defconfig
m68k multi_defconfig
sh sh7763rdp_defconfig
sh shmin_defconfig
sh se7705_defconfig
powerpc tqm8xx_defconfig
sh se7206_defconfig
powerpc64 alldefconfig
arc axs101_defconfig
powerpc taishan_defconfig
sh edosk7705_defconfig
sh r7780mp_defconfig
mips loongson3_defconfig
ia64 gensparse_defconfig
openrisc or1ksim_defconfig
xtensa cadence_csp_defconfig
sh ap325rxa_defconfig
powerpc ep88xc_defconfig
m68k m5407c3_defconfig
mips cobalt_defconfig
sh se7721_defconfig
mips gpr_defconfig
arm randconfig-c002-20220106
ia64 allmodconfig
ia64 defconfig
ia64 allyesconfig
m68k allmodconfig
m68k defconfig
m68k allyesconfig
nios2 defconfig
arc allyesconfig
nds32 allnoconfig
nds32 defconfig
nios2 allyesconfig
csky defconfig
alpha defconfig
alpha allyesconfig
xtensa allyesconfig
h8300 allyesconfig
arc defconfig
sh allmodconfig
parisc defconfig
s390 allyesconfig
s390 allmodconfig
parisc allyesconfig
s390 defconfig
i386 allyesconfig
sparc allyesconfig
sparc defconfig
i386 defconfig
i386 debian-10.3-kselftests
i386 debian-10.3
mips allyesconfig
mips allmodconfig
powerpc allyesconfig
powerpc allmodconfig
powerpc allnoconfig
x86_64 randconfig-a012-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a015-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a014-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a013-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a011-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a016-20220106
i386 randconfig-a012-20220106
i386 randconfig-a016-20220106
i386 randconfig-a014-20220106
i386 randconfig-a015-20220106
i386 randconfig-a011-20220106
i386 randconfig-a013-20220106
s390 randconfig-r044-20220106
arc randconfig-r043-20220106
riscv randconfig-r042-20220106
riscv nommu_k210_defconfig
riscv allyesconfig
riscv nommu_virt_defconfig
riscv allnoconfig
riscv defconfig
riscv rv32_defconfig
riscv allmodconfig
x86_64 rhel-8.3-kselftests
um x86_64_defconfig
um i386_defconfig
x86_64 allyesconfig
x86_64 defconfig
x86_64 rhel-8.3
x86_64 rhel-8.3-func
x86_64 kexec
clang tested configs:
mips randconfig-c004-20220106
arm randconfig-c002-20220106
i386 randconfig-c001-20220106
riscv randconfig-c006-20220106
powerpc randconfig-c003-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-c007-20220106
s390 randconfig-c005-20220106
arm colibri_pxa300_defconfig
mips lemote2f_defconfig
mips tb0219_defconfig
powerpc xes_mpc85xx_defconfig
s390 alldefconfig
mips ip28_defconfig
mips bmips_stb_defconfig
i386 randconfig-a003-20220106
i386 randconfig-a005-20220106
i386 randconfig-a004-20220106
i386 randconfig-a006-20220106
i386 randconfig-a002-20220106
i386 randconfig-a001-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a005-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a001-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a004-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a006-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a002-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a003-20220106
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] soc: fsl: guts: Revert commit 3c0d64e867ed
From: Li Yang @ 2022-01-07 2:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe JAILLET
Cc: tyreld, kernel-janitors, linuxppc-dev,
moderated list:ARM/FREESCALE IMX / MXC ARM ARCHITECTURE, lkml
In-Reply-To: <1063e5a4738d897adcaffce2ab8e4e45f07998ff.1635969326.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 4:09 AM Christophe JAILLET
<christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
>
> This reverts commit 3c0d64e867ed
> ("soc: fsl: guts: reuse machine name from device tree").
>
> A following patch will fix the missing memory allocation failure check
> instead.
>
> Suggested-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Applied for next. Thanks.
> ---
> This is a follow-up of discussion in:
> https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-janitors/b12e8c5c5d6ab3061d9504de8fbaefcad6bbc385.1629321668.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr/
> ---
> drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c | 7 +++----
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c b/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> index 072473a16f4d..af7741eafc57 100644
> --- a/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> +++ b/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ struct fsl_soc_die_attr {
> static struct guts *guts;
> static struct soc_device_attribute soc_dev_attr;
> static struct soc_device *soc_dev;
> -static struct device_node *root;
>
>
> /* SoC die attribute definition for QorIQ platform */
> @@ -138,7 +137,7 @@ static u32 fsl_guts_get_svr(void)
>
> static int fsl_guts_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> {
> - struct device_node *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
> + struct device_node *root, *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
> struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
> const struct fsl_soc_die_attr *soc_die;
> const char *machine;
> @@ -159,8 +158,9 @@ static int fsl_guts_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> root = of_find_node_by_path("/");
> if (of_property_read_string(root, "model", &machine))
> of_property_read_string_index(root, "compatible", 0, &machine);
> + of_node_put(root);
> if (machine)
> - soc_dev_attr.machine = machine;
> + soc_dev_attr.machine = devm_kstrdup(dev, machine, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> svr = fsl_guts_get_svr();
> soc_die = fsl_soc_die_match(svr, fsl_soc_die);
> @@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ static int fsl_guts_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> static int fsl_guts_remove(struct platform_device *dev)
> {
> soc_device_unregister(soc_dev);
> - of_node_put(root);
> return 0;
> }
>
> --
> 2.30.2
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] soc: fsl: guts: Add a missing memory allocation failure check
From: Li Yang @ 2022-01-07 2:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe JAILLET
Cc: tyreld, kernel-janitors, linuxppc-dev,
moderated list:ARM/FREESCALE IMX / MXC ARM ARCHITECTURE, lkml
In-Reply-To: <4890990418ecbcfb8921efe8adb2019a03e5a1c1.1635969326.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 4:10 AM Christophe JAILLET
<christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> wrote:
>
> If 'devm_kstrdup()' fails, we should return -ENOMEM.
>
> While at it, move the 'of_node_put()' call in the error handling path and
> after the 'machine' has been copied.
> Better safe than sorry.
>
> Suggested-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Applied with Fixes tag and Depends-on tag added. Thanks.
> ---
> Not sure of which Fixes tag to add. Should be a6fc3b698130, but since
> another commit needs to be reverted for this patch to make sense, I'm
> unsure of what to do. :(
> So, none is given.
> ---
> drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c | 9 +++++++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c b/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> index af7741eafc57..5ed2fc1c53a0 100644
> --- a/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> +++ b/drivers/soc/fsl/guts.c
> @@ -158,9 +158,14 @@ static int fsl_guts_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> root = of_find_node_by_path("/");
> if (of_property_read_string(root, "model", &machine))
> of_property_read_string_index(root, "compatible", 0, &machine);
> - of_node_put(root);
> - if (machine)
> + if (machine) {
> soc_dev_attr.machine = devm_kstrdup(dev, machine, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!soc_dev_attr.machine) {
> + of_node_put(root);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + }
> + of_node_put(root);
>
> svr = fsl_guts_get_svr();
> soc_die = fsl_soc_die_match(svr, fsl_soc_die);
> --
> 2.30.2
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [powerpc:merge] BUILD SUCCESS 80fdcf45da5a677ff7f284210b0f86f443a836a0
From: kernel test robot @ 2022-01-07 2:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman; +Cc: linuxppc-dev
tree/branch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git merge
branch HEAD: 80fdcf45da5a677ff7f284210b0f86f443a836a0 Automatic merge of 'master' into merge (2021-12-29 09:33)
elapsed time: 734m
configs tested: 89
configs skipped: 3
The following configs have been built successfully.
More configs may be tested in the coming days.
gcc tested configs:
arm defconfig
arm allyesconfig
arm allmodconfig
arm64 defconfig
arm64 allyesconfig
arm lart_defconfig
arm iop32x_defconfig
powerpc wii_defconfig
powerpc chrp32_defconfig
arc vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig
sh secureedge5410_defconfig
arm viper_defconfig
arm sunxi_defconfig
arm randconfig-c002-20220106
ia64 allmodconfig
ia64 defconfig
ia64 allyesconfig
m68k allmodconfig
m68k defconfig
m68k allyesconfig
nios2 defconfig
arc allyesconfig
nds32 allnoconfig
nds32 defconfig
csky defconfig
alpha defconfig
alpha allyesconfig
nios2 allyesconfig
xtensa allyesconfig
h8300 allyesconfig
arc defconfig
sh allmodconfig
parisc defconfig
s390 allmodconfig
s390 defconfig
parisc allyesconfig
s390 allyesconfig
i386 allyesconfig
sparc allyesconfig
sparc defconfig
i386 defconfig
i386 debian-10.3-kselftests
i386 debian-10.3
mips allyesconfig
mips allmodconfig
powerpc allnoconfig
powerpc allmodconfig
powerpc allyesconfig
x86_64 randconfig-a012-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a014-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a013-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a011-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a016-20220106
x86_64 randconfig-a015-20220106
i386 randconfig-a012-20220106
i386 randconfig-a014-20220106
i386 randconfig-a011-20220106
i386 randconfig-a013-20220106
i386 randconfig-a016-20220106
i386 randconfig-a015-20220106
arc randconfig-r043-20220106
riscv randconfig-r042-20220106
s390 randconfig-r044-20220106
riscv nommu_k210_defconfig
riscv allyesconfig
riscv nommu_virt_defconfig
riscv allnoconfig
riscv defconfig
riscv rv32_defconfig
riscv allmodconfig
um x86_64_defconfig
um i386_defconfig
x86_64 defconfig
x86_64 rhel-8.3
x86_64 kexec
x86_64 allyesconfig
x86_64 rhel-8.3-func
x86_64 rhel-8.3-kselftests
clang tested configs:
arm colibri_pxa300_defconfig
mips lemote2f_defconfig
powerpc xes_mpc85xx_defconfig
i386 randconfig-a003-20220106
i386 randconfig-a002-20220106
i386 randconfig-a001-20220106
i386 randconfig-a004-20220106
i386 randconfig-a006-20220106
i386 randconfig-a005-20220106
hexagon randconfig-r041-20220106
hexagon randconfig-r045-20220106
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] fs: btrfs: Disable BTRFS on platforms having 256K pages
From: Hector Martin @ 2022-01-07 2:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Qu Wenruo, Neal Gompa
Cc: linux-hexagon, Josef Bacik, Linux Kernel Mailing List,
Chris Mason, David Sterba, linuxppc-dev, Btrfs BTRFS
In-Reply-To: <db88497c-ea17-27ca-6158-2a987acb7a1c@gmx.com>
On 2022/01/07 9:13, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>
>
> On 2022/1/7 00:31, Neal Gompa wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 5, 2022 at 7:05 AM Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Christophe,
>>>
>>> I'm recently enhancing the subpage support for btrfs, and my current
>>> branch should solve the problem for btrfs to support larger page sizes.
>>>
>>> But unfortunately my current test environment can only provide page size
>>> with 64K or 4K, no 16K or 128K/256K support.
>>>
>>> Mind to test my new branch on 128K page size systems?
>>> (256K page size support is still lacking though, which will be addressed
>>> in the future)
>>>
>>> https://github.com/adam900710/linux/tree/metadata_subpage_switch
>>>
>>
>> The Linux Asahi folks have a 16K page environment (M1 Macs)...
>
> Su Yue kindly helped me testing 16K page size, and it's pretty OK there.
>
> So I'm not that concerned.
>
> It's 128K page size that I'm a little concerned, and I have not machine
> supporting that large page size to do the test.
>
> Thanks,
> Qu
I'm happy to test things on 16K in the future if you need me to :-)
--
Hector Martin (marcan@marcan.st)
Public Key: https://mrcn.st/pub
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] fs: btrfs: Disable BTRFS on platforms having 256K pages
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2022-01-07 4:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Qu Wenruo, Neal Gompa
Cc: linux-hexagon, Hector Martin, Josef Bacik,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Chris Mason, David Sterba,
linuxppc-dev, Btrfs BTRFS
In-Reply-To: <db88497c-ea17-27ca-6158-2a987acb7a1c@gmx.com>
Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> writes:
> On 2022/1/7 00:31, Neal Gompa wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 5, 2022 at 7:05 AM Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Christophe,
>>>
>>> I'm recently enhancing the subpage support for btrfs, and my current
>>> branch should solve the problem for btrfs to support larger page sizes.
>>>
>>> But unfortunately my current test environment can only provide page size
>>> with 64K or 4K, no 16K or 128K/256K support.
>>>
>>> Mind to test my new branch on 128K page size systems?
>>> (256K page size support is still lacking though, which will be addressed
>>> in the future)
>>>
>>> https://github.com/adam900710/linux/tree/metadata_subpage_switch
>>>
>>
>> The Linux Asahi folks have a 16K page environment (M1 Macs)...
>
> Su Yue kindly helped me testing 16K page size, and it's pretty OK there.
>
> So I'm not that concerned.
>
> It's 128K page size that I'm a little concerned, and I have not machine
> supporting that large page size to do the test.
Did Christophe say he had a 128K system to test on?
In mainline powerpc only supports 4K/16K/64K/256K.
AFAIK there's no arch with 128K page size support, but that's only based
on some grepping, maybe it's hidden somewhere.
cheers
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] fs: btrfs: Disable BTRFS on platforms having 256K pages
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2022-01-07 5:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman, Qu Wenruo, Neal Gompa
Cc: linux-hexagon, Hector Martin, Josef Bacik,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Chris Mason, David Sterba,
linuxppc-dev, Btrfs BTRFS
In-Reply-To: <87bl0o2lgo.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
On 2022/1/7 12:55, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> writes:
>> On 2022/1/7 00:31, Neal Gompa wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 5, 2022 at 7:05 AM Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Christophe,
>>>>
>>>> I'm recently enhancing the subpage support for btrfs, and my current
>>>> branch should solve the problem for btrfs to support larger page sizes.
>>>>
>>>> But unfortunately my current test environment can only provide page size
>>>> with 64K or 4K, no 16K or 128K/256K support.
>>>>
>>>> Mind to test my new branch on 128K page size systems?
>>>> (256K page size support is still lacking though, which will be addressed
>>>> in the future)
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/adam900710/linux/tree/metadata_subpage_switch
>>>>
>>>
>>> The Linux Asahi folks have a 16K page environment (M1 Macs)...
>>
>> Su Yue kindly helped me testing 16K page size, and it's pretty OK there.
>>
>> So I'm not that concerned.
>>
>> It's 128K page size that I'm a little concerned, and I have not machine
>> supporting that large page size to do the test.
>
> Did Christophe say he had a 128K system to test on?
>
> In mainline powerpc only supports 4K/16K/64K/256K.
>
> AFAIK there's no arch with 128K page size support, but that's only based
> on some grepping, maybe it's hidden somewhere.
My bad, I thought there would be 128K since there is 256K and 64K
support, but that's totally wrong.
I'll get PPC guys informed when the 256K page size problem is solved,
and then ask for your help.
Thanks,
Qu
>
> cheers
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 00/13] powerpc/bpf: Some fixes and updates
From: Naveen N. Rao @ 2022-01-07 7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Michael Ellerman
Cc: ykaliuta, johan.almbladh, Jiri Olsa, song, bpf, linuxppc-dev,
Hari Bathini
In-Reply-To: <f4f3437d-084f-0858-8795-76e4a0fa5627@iogearbox.net>
Hi Daniel,
Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Hi Naveen,
>
> On 1/6/22 12:45 PM, Naveen N. Rao wrote:
>> A set of fixes and updates to powerpc BPF JIT:
>> - Patches 1-3 fix issues with the existing powerpc JIT and are tagged
>> for -stable.
>> - Patch 4 fixes a build issue with bpf selftests on powerpc.
>> - Patches 5-9 handle some corner cases and make some small improvements.
>> - Patches 10-13 optimize how function calls are handled in ppc64.
>>
>> Patches 7 and 8 were previously posted, and while patch 7 has no
>> changes, patch 8 has been reworked to handle BPF_EXIT differently.
>
> Is the plan to route these via ppc trees? Fwiw, patch 1 and 4 look generic
> and in general good to me, we could also take these two via bpf-next tree
> given outside of arch/powerpc/? Whichever works best.
Yes, I would like to route this through the powerpc tree. Though patches
1 and 4 are generic, they primarily affect powerpc and I do not see
conflicting changes in bpf-next. Request you to please ack those patches
so that Michael can take it through the powerpc tree.
Thanks!
- Naveen
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/ftrace: Handle large kernel configs
From: Naveen N. Rao @ 2022-01-07 7:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe Leroy
Cc: Michael Neuling, linuxppc-dev, Steven Rostedt, Nicholas Piggin
In-Reply-To: <e1397c7f-abbd-c5dc-1bf6-74f409b07b4c@csgroup.eu>
Hi Christophe,
Sorry for the delay, catching up with some of the earlier emails now..
Christophe Leroy wrote:
> Hi Naveen,
>
> Le 16/10/2018 à 22:25, Naveen N. Rao a écrit :
> ...
>
>> +/*
>> + * If this is a compiler generated long_branch trampoline (essentially, a
>> + * trampoline that has a branch to _mcount()), we re-write the branch to
>> + * instead go to ftrace_[regs_]caller() and note down the location of this
>> + * trampoline.
>> + */
>> +static int setup_mcount_compiler_tramp(unsigned long tramp)
>> +{
>> + int i, op;
>> + unsigned long ptr;
>> + static unsigned long ftrace_plt_tramps[NUM_FTRACE_TRAMPS];
>> +
>> + /* Is this a known long jump tramp? */
>> + for (i = 0; i < NUM_FTRACE_TRAMPS; i++)
>> + if (!ftrace_tramps[i])
>> + break;
>> + else if (ftrace_tramps[i] == tramp)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /* Is this a known plt tramp? */
>> + for (i = 0; i < NUM_FTRACE_TRAMPS; i++)
>> + if (!ftrace_plt_tramps[i])
>> + break;
>> + else if (ftrace_plt_tramps[i] == tramp)
>> + return -1;
>
> I don't understand how this is supposed to work.
> ftrace_plt_tramps[] being a static table, it is set to 0s at startup.
> So the above loop breaks at first round.
>
> Then ftrace_plt_tramps[i] is never/nowhere set.
>
> So I just see it as useless.
>
> Am I missing something ?
No, that's correct. I had posted a cleanup of this a year back as part
of the ftrace_direct enablement. I have updated that series and will be
posting it out soon (though I should rebase it atop your livepatch
series):
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdc3710137c4bda8393532a789558bed22507cfe.1606412433.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
- Naveen
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 00/13] powerpc/bpf: Some fixes and updates
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2022-01-07 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naveen N. Rao, Alexei Starovoitov, Michael Ellerman
Cc: ykaliuta, johan.almbladh, Jiri Olsa, song, bpf, linuxppc-dev,
Hari Bathini
In-Reply-To: <1641540707.ewk8tpqmvl.naveen@linux.ibm.com>
On 1/7/22 8:36 AM, Naveen N. Rao wrote:
> Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On 1/6/22 12:45 PM, Naveen N. Rao wrote:
>>> A set of fixes and updates to powerpc BPF JIT:
>>> - Patches 1-3 fix issues with the existing powerpc JIT and are tagged
>>> for -stable.
>>> - Patch 4 fixes a build issue with bpf selftests on powerpc.
>>> - Patches 5-9 handle some corner cases and make some small improvements.
>>> - Patches 10-13 optimize how function calls are handled in ppc64.
>>>
>>> Patches 7 and 8 were previously posted, and while patch 7 has no
>>> changes, patch 8 has been reworked to handle BPF_EXIT differently.
>>
>> Is the plan to route these via ppc trees? Fwiw, patch 1 and 4 look generic
>> and in general good to me, we could also take these two via bpf-next tree
>> given outside of arch/powerpc/? Whichever works best.
>
> Yes, I would like to route this through the powerpc tree. Though patches 1 and 4 are generic, they primarily affect powerpc and I do not see conflicting changes in bpf-next. Request you to please ack those patches so that Michael can take it through the powerpc tree.
Ok, works for me. I presume this will end up in the upcoming merge window
anyway, so not too long time until we can sync these back to bpf/bpf-next
trees then.
Thanks!
Daniel
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 04/13] tools/bpf: Rename 'struct event' to avoid naming conflict
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2022-01-07 10:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naveen N. Rao, Michael Ellerman, Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: ykaliuta, johan.almbladh, linuxppc-dev, song, bpf, Jiri Olsa,
Hari Bathini
In-Reply-To: <c13cb3767d26257ca4387b8296b632b433a58db6.1641468127.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On 1/6/22 12:45 PM, Naveen N. Rao wrote:
> On ppc64le, trying to build bpf seltests throws the below warning:
> In file included from runqslower.bpf.c:5:
> ./runqslower.h:7:8: error: redefinition of 'event'
> struct event {
> ^
> /home/naveen/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/tools/build/runqslower/vmlinux.h:156602:8:
> note: previous definition is here
> struct event {
> ^
>
> This happens since 'struct event' is defined in
> drivers/net/ethernet/alteon/acenic.h . Rename the one in runqslower to a
> more appropriate 'runq_event' to avoid the naming conflict.
>
> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 01/13] bpf: Guard against accessing NULL pt_regs in bpf_get_task_stack()
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2022-01-07 10:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naveen N. Rao, Michael Ellerman, Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: ykaliuta, johan.almbladh, linuxppc-dev, song, bpf, Jiri Olsa,
Hari Bathini
In-Reply-To: <d5ef83c361cc255494afd15ff1b4fb02a36e1dcf.1641468127.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On 1/6/22 12:45 PM, Naveen N. Rao wrote:
> task_pt_regs() can return NULL on powerpc for kernel threads. This is
> then used in __bpf_get_stack() to check for user mode, resulting in a
> kernel oops. Guard against this by checking return value of
> task_pt_regs() before trying to obtain the call chain.
>
> Fixes: fa28dcb82a38f8 ("bpf: Introduce helper bpf_get_task_stack()")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.9+
> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Linux kernel: powerpc: KVM guest can trigger host crash on Power8
From: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz @ 2022-01-07 11:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman; +Cc: debian-powerpc@lists.debian.org, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <87ilux2ksi.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
Hi Michael!
On 1/6/22 11:58, Michael Ellerman wrote:
>> We're currently running 5.15.x on the host system and the guests and the testsuite
>> for gcc-9 still reproducibly kills the KVM host.
>
> Have you been able to try the different -smp options I suggested?
>
> Can you separately test with (on the host):
>
> # echo 0 > /sys/module/kvm_hv/parameters/dynamic_mt_modes
I'm trying to turn off "dynamic_mt_modes" first and see if that makes any difference.
I will report back.
Adrian
--
.''`. John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
: :' : Debian Developer - glaubitz@debian.org
`. `' Freie Universitaet Berlin - glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de
`- GPG: 62FF 8A75 84E0 2956 9546 0006 7426 3B37 F5B5 F913
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 4/9] powerpc/bpf: Handle large branch ranges with BPF_EXIT
From: Naveen N. Rao @ 2022-01-07 11:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Christophe Leroy, Daniel Borkmann,
Johan Almbladh, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin
Cc: bpf, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <a63a7b97-08cd-b93e-bc12-d17cd6e94229@csgroup.eu>
Christophe Leroy wrote:
>
>
> Le 04/10/2021 à 20:24, Naveen N. Rao a écrit :
>> Christophe Leroy wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Le 01/10/2021 à 23:14, Naveen N. Rao a écrit :
>>>> In some scenarios, it is possible that the program epilogue is outside
>>>> the branch range for a BPF_EXIT instruction. Instead of rejecting such
>>>> programs, emit an indirect branch. We track the size of the bpf program
>>>> emitted after the initial run and do a second pass since BPF_EXIT can
>>>> end up emitting different number of instructions depending on the
>>>> program size.
>>>>
>>>> Suggested-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h | 3 +++
>>>> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +-
>>>> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 2 +-
>>>> 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
>>>> index 89bd744c2bffd4..4023de1698b9f5 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
>>>> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
>>>> #define SEEN_FUNC 0x20000000 /* might call external helpers */
>>>> #define SEEN_TAILCALL 0x40000000 /* uses tail calls */
>>>> +#define SEEN_BIG_PROG 0x80000000 /* large prog, >32MB */
>>>> #define SEEN_VREG_MASK 0x1ff80000 /* Volatile registers r3-r12 */
>>>> #define SEEN_NVREG_MASK 0x0003ffff /* Non volatile registers
>>>> r14-r31 */
>>>> @@ -179,6 +180,8 @@ int bpf_jit_build_body(struct bpf_prog *fp, u32
>>>> *image, struct codegen_context *
>>>> void bpf_jit_build_prologue(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx);
>>>> void bpf_jit_build_epilogue(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx);
>>>> void bpf_jit_realloc_regs(struct codegen_context *ctx);
>>>> +int bpf_jit_emit_exit_insn(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx,
>>>> + int tmp_reg, unsigned long exit_addr);
>>>> #endif
>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>>>> b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>>>> index fcbf7a917c566e..3204872fbf2738 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>>>> @@ -72,6 +72,21 @@ static int bpf_jit_fixup_subprog_calls(struct
>>>> bpf_prog *fp, u32 *image,
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>>> +int bpf_jit_emit_exit_insn(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx,
>>>> + int tmp_reg, unsigned long exit_addr)
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (!(ctx->seen & SEEN_BIG_PROG) &&
>>>> is_offset_in_branch_range(exit_addr)) {
>>>> + PPC_JMP(exit_addr);
>>>> + } else {
>>>> + ctx->seen |= SEEN_BIG_PROG;
>>>> + PPC_FUNC_ADDR(tmp_reg, (unsigned long)image + exit_addr);
>>>> + EMIT(PPC_RAW_MTCTR(tmp_reg));
>>>> + EMIT(PPC_RAW_BCTR());
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> struct powerpc64_jit_data {
>>>> struct bpf_binary_header *header;
>>>> u32 *addrs;
>>>> @@ -155,12 +170,17 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct
>>>> bpf_prog *fp)
>>>> goto out_addrs;
>>>> }
>>>> + if (!is_offset_in_branch_range((long)cgctx.idx * 4))
>>>> + cgctx.seen |= SEEN_BIG_PROG;
>>>> +
>>>> /*
>>>> * If we have seen a tail call, we need a second pass.
>>>> * This is because bpf_jit_emit_common_epilogue() is called
>>>> * from bpf_jit_emit_tail_call() with a not yet stable ctx->seen.
>>>> + * We also need a second pass if we ended up with too large
>>>> + * a program so as to fix branches.
>>>> */
>>>> - if (cgctx.seen & SEEN_TAILCALL) {
>>>> + if (cgctx.seen & (SEEN_TAILCALL | SEEN_BIG_PROG)) {
>>>> cgctx.idx = 0;
>>>> if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, 0, &cgctx, addrs, false)) {
>>>> fp = org_fp;
>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
>>>> b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
>>>> index a74d52204f8da2..d2a67574a23066 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
>>>> @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ int bpf_jit_build_body(struct bpf_prog *fp, u32
>>>> *image, struct codegen_context *
>>>> * we'll just fall through to the epilogue.
>>>> */
>>>> if (i != flen - 1)
>>>> - PPC_JMP(exit_addr);
>>>> + bpf_jit_emit_exit_insn(image, ctx, tmp_reg, exit_addr);
>>>
>>> On ppc32, if you use tmp_reg you must flag it. But I think you could
>>> use r0 instead.
>>
>> Indeed. Can we drop tracking of the temp registers and using them while
>> remapping registers? Are you seeing significant benefits with re-use of
>> those temp registers?
>>
>
> I'm not sure to follow you.
>
> On ppc32, all volatile registers are used for function arguments, so
> temp registers are necessarily non-volatile so we track them as all
> non-volatile registers we use.
>
> I think saving on stack only the non-volatile registers we use provides
> real benefit, otherwise you wouldn't have implemented it would you ?
You're right. I was wary of having to track temporary register usage,
which is a bit harder and prone to mistakes like the above. A related
concern was that the register remapping is only used if there are no
helper calls, which looks like a big limitation.
But, I do agree that it is worth the trouble for ppc32 given the
register usage.
>
> Anyway here you should use _R0 instead of tmp_reg.
Thanks,
Naveen
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 8/8] powerpc/bpf: Reallocate BPF registers to volatile registers when possible on PPC32
From: Naveen N. Rao @ 2022-01-07 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: andrii, ast, Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Christophe Leroy, daniel,
john.fastabend, kafai, kpsingh, Michael Ellerman, Paul Mackerras,
sandipan, songliubraving, yhs
Cc: netdev, bpf, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <b94562d7d2bb21aec89de0c40bb3cd91054b65a2.1616430991.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Christophe Leroy wrote:
> When the BPF routine doesn't call any function, the non volatile
> registers can be reallocated to volatile registers in order to
> avoid having to save them/restore on the stack.
>
> Before this patch, the test #359 ADD default X is:
>
> 0: 7c 64 1b 78 mr r4,r3
> 4: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0
> 8: 94 21 ff b0 stwu r1,-80(r1)
> c: 60 00 00 00 nop
> 10: 92 e1 00 2c stw r23,44(r1)
> 14: 93 01 00 30 stw r24,48(r1)
> 18: 93 21 00 34 stw r25,52(r1)
> 1c: 93 41 00 38 stw r26,56(r1)
> 20: 39 80 00 00 li r12,0
> 24: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 28: 3b 40 00 00 li r26,0
> 2c: 3b 20 00 00 li r25,0
> 30: 7c 98 23 78 mr r24,r4
> 34: 7c 77 1b 78 mr r23,r3
> 38: 39 80 00 42 li r12,66
> 3c: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 40: 7d 8c d2 14 add r12,r12,r26
> 44: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 48: 7d 83 63 78 mr r3,r12
> 4c: 82 e1 00 2c lwz r23,44(r1)
> 50: 83 01 00 30 lwz r24,48(r1)
> 54: 83 21 00 34 lwz r25,52(r1)
> 58: 83 41 00 38 lwz r26,56(r1)
> 5c: 38 21 00 50 addi r1,r1,80
> 60: 4e 80 00 20 blr
>
> After this patch, the same test has become:
>
> 0: 7c 64 1b 78 mr r4,r3
> 4: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0
> 8: 94 21 ff b0 stwu r1,-80(r1)
> c: 60 00 00 00 nop
> 10: 39 80 00 00 li r12,0
> 14: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 18: 39 00 00 00 li r8,0
> 1c: 38 e0 00 00 li r7,0
> 20: 7c 86 23 78 mr r6,r4
> 24: 7c 65 1b 78 mr r5,r3
> 28: 39 80 00 42 li r12,66
> 2c: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 30: 7d 8c 42 14 add r12,r12,r8
> 34: 39 60 00 00 li r11,0
> 38: 7d 83 63 78 mr r3,r12
> 3c: 38 21 00 50 addi r1,r1,80
> 40: 4e 80 00 20 blr
>
> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit64.h | 2 +-
> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 ++
> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 4 ++++
> 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
> index a45b8266355d..776abef4d2a0 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit.h
> @@ -116,6 +116,15 @@ static inline bool is_nearbranch(int offset)
> #define SEEN_STACK 0x40000000 /* uses BPF stack */
> #define SEEN_TAILCALL 0x80000000 /* uses tail calls */
>
> +#define SEEN_VREG_MASK 0x1ff80000 /* Volatile registers r3-r12 */
> +#define SEEN_NVREG_MASK 0x0003ffff /* Non volatile registers r14-r31 */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
> +extern const int b2p[MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 2];
> +#else
> +extern const int b2p[MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1];
> +#endif
> +
> struct codegen_context {
> /*
> * This is used to track register usage as well
> @@ -129,6 +138,7 @@ struct codegen_context {
> unsigned int seen;
> unsigned int idx;
> unsigned int stack_size;
> + int b2p[ARRAY_SIZE(b2p)];
> };
>
> static inline void bpf_flush_icache(void *start, void *end)
> @@ -147,11 +157,17 @@ static inline void bpf_set_seen_register(struct codegen_context *ctx, int i)
> ctx->seen |= 1 << (31 - i);
> }
>
> +static inline void bpf_clear_seen_register(struct codegen_context *ctx, int i)
> +{
> + ctx->seen &= ~(1 << (31 - i));
> +}
> +
> void bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx, u64 func);
> int bpf_jit_build_body(struct bpf_prog *fp, u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx,
> u32 *addrs, bool extra_pass);
> void bpf_jit_build_prologue(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx);
> void bpf_jit_build_epilogue(u32 *image, struct codegen_context *ctx);
> +void bpf_jit_realloc_regs(struct codegen_context *ctx);
>
> #endif
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit64.h b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit64.h
> index b05f2e67bba1..7b713edfa7e2 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit64.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit64.h
> @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
> #define TMP_REG_2 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1)
>
> /* BPF to ppc register mappings */
> -static const int b2p[] = {
> +const int b2p[MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 2] = {
> /* function return value */
> [BPF_REG_0] = 8,
> /* function arguments */
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> index efac89964873..798ac4350a82 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> }
>
> memset(&cgctx, 0, sizeof(struct codegen_context));
> + memcpy(cgctx.b2p, b2p, sizeof(cgctx.b2p));
>
> /* Make sure that the stack is quadword aligned. */
> cgctx.stack_size = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 16);
> @@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> }
> }
>
> + bpf_jit_realloc_regs(&cgctx);
> /*
> * Pretend to build prologue, given the features we've seen. This will
> * update ctgtx.idx as it pretends to output instructions, then we can
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> index 29ce802d7534..003843273b43 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
> @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
> #define TMP_REG (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 0)
>
> /* BPF to ppc register mappings */
> -static const int b2p[] = {
> +const int b2p[MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1] = {
> /* function return value */
> [BPF_REG_0] = 12,
> /* function arguments */
> @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static const int b2p[] = {
>
> static int bpf_to_ppc(struct codegen_context *ctx, int reg)
> {
> - return b2p[reg];
> + return ctx->b2p[reg];
> }
>
> /* PPC NVR range -- update this if we ever use NVRs below r17 */
> @@ -77,6 +77,32 @@ static int bpf_jit_stack_offsetof(struct codegen_context *ctx, int reg)
> return BPF_PPC_STACKFRAME(ctx) - 4;
> }
>
> +void bpf_jit_realloc_regs(struct codegen_context *ctx)
> +{
> + if (ctx->seen & SEEN_FUNC)
> + return;
Can't you remap BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_AX and TMP_REG regardless of
SEEN_FUNC?
- Naveen
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
Hello,
This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
with appended signatures in the kernel.
powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 +++++++
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 14 ++++++
arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 43 ++----------------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
include/linux/module_signature.h | 1 +
include/linux/verification.h | 4 ++
kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -
kernel/module.c | 12 +++--
kernel/module_signature.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 33 +++++++-------
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++--------
12 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Module verification already implements appeded signature check.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
Note: the kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some
cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or
EBADMSG instead.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of return value
---
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
struct module_signature *ms;
unsigned long sig_len;
+ int ret;
/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
kernel_len -= marker_len;
ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
- kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+ ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
- if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
- if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
- if (ms->algo != 0 ||
- ms->hash != 0 ||
- ms->signer_len != 0 ||
- ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
- ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
- ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
- ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
+ kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Copy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
based patforms using PE format).
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header for mod_check_sig
- Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
in kconfig text
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool KEXEC_FILE
+config KEXEC_SIG
+ bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+ depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ help
+ This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+ the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
+ In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+ verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+ loaded in order for this to work.
+
+ Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
+ verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
+ list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
+ blacklist by hash.
+
config RELOCATABLE
bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+ const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ struct module_signature *ms;
+ unsigned long sig_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (marker_len > kernel_len)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+ if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+ marker_len))
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ kernel_len -= marker_len;
+
+ ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
+ ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+ kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
+
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+ kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
+ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+
const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
.load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+ .verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
};
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on
MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
- Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 22 +++++-----------------
arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 21 ++++-----------------
include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++
kernel/module-internal.h | 2 --
kernel/module.c | 4 +++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
8 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
config KEXEC_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
- depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
help
This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 98d1cb5135b4..9442666ca69d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/module_signature.h>
static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -153,12 +154,10 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
+ size_t kernel_len = length;
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
- struct module_signature *ms;
- unsigned long sig_len;
- int ret;
if (marker_len > kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +167,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
kernel_len -= marker_len;
- ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
- ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
- kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
- NULL, NULL);
+ return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ "kexec_file");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
config KEXEC_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
- depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+ depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
help
This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c944d71316c7..75e0c17cf0eb 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
+ size_t kernel_len = length;
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
- struct module_signature *ms;
- unsigned long sig_len;
- int ret;
/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +43,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
kernel_len -= marker_len;
- ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
- ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
- kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
- NULL, NULL);
+ return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ "kexec_file");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..c1cf0582012a 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
enum key_being_used_for usage);
#endif
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys,
+ const char *what);
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
} index;
};
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
- err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+ err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
if (!err) {
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..f492e410564d 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,13 +14,19 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
*/
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
{
struct module_signature ms;
- size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+ size_t sig_len, modlen = *len;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -28,18 +34,18 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
return -EBADMSG;
- memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
- ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what);
if (ret)
return ret;
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
- info->len = modlen;
+ *len = modlen;
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+ trusted_keys,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
It is stripped by each caller separately.
Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
when the signature marker is missing.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
---
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 10 ----------
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 10 ----------
kernel/module.c | 7 +------
kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 9442666ca69d..e8dff6b23ac5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -157,15 +156,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
size_t kernel_len = length;
- const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
- if (marker_len > kernel_len)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
- if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
- marker_len))
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- kernel_len -= marker_len;
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
"kexec_file");
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 75e0c17cf0eb..3e3bc7bcae86 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -29,20 +28,11 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
size_t kernel_len = length;
- const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
if (!ipl_secure_flag)
return 0;
- if (marker_len > kernel_len)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
- if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
- marker_len))
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
"kexec_file");
}
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8481933dfa92..d91ca0f93a40 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
int err = -ENODATA;
- const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
const char *reason;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
* Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
* removed is no longer the module that was signed
*/
- if (flags == 0 &&
- info->len > markerlen &&
- memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
- /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
- info->len -= markerlen;
+ if (flags == 0) {
err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index f492e410564d..4c28cb55275f 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
#include "module-internal.h"
/**
- * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
- * signature marker stripped.
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
* @data: The data to be verified
* @len: Size of @data.
* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@
int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
{
+ const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
struct module_signature ms;
size_t sig_len, modlen = *len;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+ if (markerlen > modlen)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+ markerlen))
+ return -ENODATA;
+ modlen -= markerlen;
+
if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
return -EBADMSG;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
include/linux/verification.h | 3 ++-
kernel/module.c | 3 ++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++-----
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index e8dff6b23ac5..3aa5269f6e0f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
size_t kernel_len = length;
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- "kexec_file");
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 3e3bc7bcae86..18ba6df31d68 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
return 0;
return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- "kexec_file");
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig",
[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index c1cf0582012a..23748feb9e03 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
};
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
#endif
int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys,
- const char *what);
+ enum key_being_used_for purpose);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
*/
if (flags == 0) {
err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
if (!err) {
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 4c28cb55275f..cef72a6f6b5d 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
* @data: The data to be verified
* @len: Size of @data.
* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
*/
int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
- struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for purpose)
{
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
struct module_signature ms;
size_t sig_len, modlen = *len;
int ret;
- pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+ pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%zu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
if (markerlen > modlen)
return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
- ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what);
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
trusted_keys,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ purpose,
NULL, NULL);
}
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
From: Michal Suchanek @ 2022-01-07 11:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity
Cc: Nayna, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Mackerras,
Alexander Gordeev, Rob Herring, Herbert Xu, Baoquan He,
Christian Borntraeger, James Morris, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Michal Suchanek, Serge E. Hallyn, Vasily Gorbik, linux-s390,
Heiko Carstens, Dmitry Kasatkin, Hari Bathini, Daniel Axtens,
Christian Borntraeger, Philipp Rudo, Frank van der Linden, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Sven Schnelle,
linux-security-module, Jessica Yu, linuxppc-dev, David S. Miller,
Thiago Jung Bauermann, buendgen
In-Reply-To: <cover.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
Note: This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig
in the case the signature marker is missing.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
---
include/linux/module_signature.h | 1 +
kernel/module_signature.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 26 +++-----------
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++----------
4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
index 7eb4b00381ac..1343879b72b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/module_signature.h
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ struct module_signature {
int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
const char *name);
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
index 00132d12487c..b8eb30182183 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signature.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -8,14 +8,36 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig_marker - check that the given data has signature marker at the end
+ *
+ * @data: Data with appended signature
+ * @len: Length of data. Signature marker length is subtracted on success.
+ */
+static inline int mod_check_sig_marker(const void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+
+ if (markerlen > *len)
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ if (memcmp(data + *len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+ markerlen))
+ return -ENODATA;
+
+ *len -= markerlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
*
* @ms: Signature to check.
- * @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended (without the marker).
* @name: What is being checked. Used for error messages.
*/
int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
@@ -44,3 +66,35 @@ int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
return 0;
}
+
+/**
+ * mod_parse_sig - check that the given signature is sane and determine signature length
+ *
+ * @data: Data with appended signature.
+ * @len: Length of data. Signature and marker length is subtracted on success.
+ * @sig_len: Length of signature. Filled on success.
+ * @name: What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name)
+{
+ const struct module_signature *sig;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = mod_check_sig_marker(data, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (*len < sizeof(*sig))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ sig = (const struct module_signature *)(data + (*len - sizeof(*sig)));
+
+ rc = mod_check_sig(sig, *len, name);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+ *len -= *sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index cef72a6f6b5d..02bbca90f467 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -25,35 +25,17 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
struct key *trusted_keys,
enum key_being_used_for purpose)
{
- const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
struct module_signature ms;
- size_t sig_len, modlen = *len;
+ size_t sig_len;
int ret;
- pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%zu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
+ pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%zu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
- if (markerlen > modlen)
- return -ENODATA;
-
- if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
- markerlen))
- return -ENODATA;
- modlen -= markerlen;
-
- if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
-
- ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
+ ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
if (ret)
return ret;
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
- modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
- *len = modlen;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, *len, data + *len, sig_len,
trusted_keys,
purpose,
NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..46917eb37fd8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {
*
* Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
*/
-int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t len,
struct modsig **modsig)
{
- const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
- const struct module_signature *sig;
struct modsig *hdr;
- size_t sig_len;
- const void *p;
+ size_t sig_len, buf_len = len;
int rc;
- if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
- if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- buf_len -= marker_len;
- sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
-
- rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+ rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
if (rc)
return rc;
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
- buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
-
/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hdr)
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2 6/7] KVM: PPC: mmio: Return to guest after emulation failure
From: Fabiano Rosas @ 2022-01-07 13:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy, kvm-ppc; +Cc: linuxppc-dev, npiggin
In-Reply-To: <63f9a19c-0b5c-8746-7ef4-ab72cbda397c@ozlabs.ru>
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> writes:
> On 07/01/2022 07:03, Fabiano Rosas wrote:
>> If MMIO emulation fails we don't want to crash the whole guest by
>> returning to userspace.
>>
>> The original commit bbf45ba57eae ("KVM: ppc: PowerPC 440 KVM
>> implementation") added a todo:
>>
>> /* XXX Deliver Program interrupt to guest. */
>>
>> and later the commit d69614a295ae ("KVM: PPC: Separate loadstore
>> emulation from priv emulation") added the Program interrupt injection
>> but in another file, so I'm assuming it was missed that this block
>> needed to be altered.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
>
>
> Looks right.
> Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
>
> but this means if I want to keep debugging those kvm selftests in
> comfort, I'll have to have some exception handlers in the vm as
> otherwise the failing $pc is lost after this change :)
Yes! But that will be a problem for any test. These kinds of issues is
why I wanted a trial period before sending the test infrastructure
upstream. Maybe we don't need exception handlers, but just a way to
force the test to crash if it tries to fetch from 0x700.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3 RESEND 2/3] selftests/powerpc: Add test for real address error handling
From: Ganesh Goudar @ 2022-01-07 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev, mpe; +Cc: Ganesh Goudar, mahesh, npiggin, dja
In-Reply-To: <20220107141428.67862-1-ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com>
Add test for real address or control memory address access
error handling, using NX-GZIP engine.
The error is injected by accessing the control memory address
using illegal instruction, on successful handling the process
attempting to access control memory address using illegal
instruction receives SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar <ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/Makefile | 7 ++
.../selftests/powerpc/mce/inject-ra-err.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/vas-api.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/inject-ra-err.c
create mode 120000 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/vas-api.h
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile
index 0830e63818c1..4830372d7416 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/Makefile
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ SUB_DIRS = alignment \
vphn \
math \
ptrace \
- security
+ security \
+ mce
endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2424513982d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := inject-ra-err
+
+include ../../lib.mk
+
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): ../harness.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/inject-ra-err.c b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/inject-ra-err.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..94323c34d9a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/inject-ra-err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "vas-api.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static bool faulted;
+
+static void sigbus_handler(int n, siginfo_t *info, void *ctxt_v)
+{
+ ucontext_t *ctxt = (ucontext_t *)ctxt_v;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->uc_mcontext.regs;
+
+ faulted = true;
+ regs->nip += 4;
+}
+
+static int test_ra_error(void)
+{
+ struct vas_tx_win_open_attr attr;
+ int fd, *paste_addr;
+ char *devname = "/dev/crypto/nx-gzip";
+ struct sigaction act = {
+ .sa_sigaction = sigbus_handler,
+ .sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO,
+ };
+
+ memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
+ attr.version = 1;
+ attr.vas_id = 0;
+
+ SKIP_IF(access(devname, F_OK));
+
+ fd = open(devname, O_RDWR);
+ FAIL_IF(fd < 0);
+ FAIL_IF(ioctl(fd, VAS_TX_WIN_OPEN, &attr) < 0);
+ FAIL_IF(sigaction(SIGBUS, &act, NULL) != 0);
+
+ paste_addr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0ULL);
+
+ /* The following assignment triggers exception */
+ mb();
+ *paste_addr = 1;
+ mb();
+
+ FAIL_IF(!faulted);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ return test_harness(test_ra_error, "inject-ra-err");
+}
+
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/vas-api.h b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/vas-api.h
new file mode 120000
index 000000000000..1455c1bcd351
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mce/vas-api.h
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../../../../../arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v3 RESEND 1/3] powerpc/pseries: Parse control memory access error
From: Ganesh Goudar @ 2022-01-07 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev, mpe; +Cc: Ganesh Goudar, mahesh, npiggin, dja
Add support to parse and log control memory access
error for pseries. These changes are made according to
PAPR v2.11 10.3.2.2.12.
Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar <ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
index 56092dccfdb8..e62a0ca2611a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
@@ -60,11 +60,17 @@ struct pseries_mc_errorlog {
* XX 2: Reserved.
* XXX 3: Type of UE error.
*
- * For error_type != MC_ERROR_TYPE_UE
+ * For error_type == MC_ERROR_TYPE_SLB/ERAT/TLB
* XXXXXXXX
* X 1: Effective address provided.
* XXXXX 5: Reserved.
* XX 2: Type of SLB/ERAT/TLB error.
+ *
+ * For error_type == MC_ERROR_TYPE_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS
+ * XXXXXXXX
+ * X 1: Error causing address provided.
+ * XXX 3: Type of error.
+ * XXXX 4: Reserved.
*/
u8 sub_err_type;
u8 reserved_1[6];
@@ -80,6 +86,7 @@ struct pseries_mc_errorlog {
#define MC_ERROR_TYPE_TLB 0x04
#define MC_ERROR_TYPE_D_CACHE 0x05
#define MC_ERROR_TYPE_I_CACHE 0x07
+#define MC_ERROR_TYPE_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS 0x08
/* RTAS pseries MCE error sub types */
#define MC_ERROR_UE_INDETERMINATE 0
@@ -90,6 +97,7 @@ struct pseries_mc_errorlog {
#define UE_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED 0x40
#define UE_LOGICAL_ADDR_PROVIDED 0x20
+#define MC_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED 0x80
#define MC_ERROR_SLB_PARITY 0
#define MC_ERROR_SLB_MULTIHIT 1
@@ -103,6 +111,9 @@ struct pseries_mc_errorlog {
#define MC_ERROR_TLB_MULTIHIT 2
#define MC_ERROR_TLB_INDETERMINATE 3
+#define MC_ERROR_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS_PTABLE_WALK 0
+#define MC_ERROR_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS_OP_ACCESS 1
+
static inline u8 rtas_mc_error_sub_type(const struct pseries_mc_errorlog *mlog)
{
switch (mlog->error_type) {
@@ -112,6 +123,8 @@ static inline u8 rtas_mc_error_sub_type(const struct pseries_mc_errorlog *mlog)
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_ERAT:
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_TLB:
return (mlog->sub_err_type & 0x03);
+ case MC_ERROR_TYPE_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS:
+ return (mlog->sub_err_type & 0x70) >> 4;
default:
return 0;
}
@@ -656,7 +669,7 @@ static int mce_handle_err_virtmode(struct pt_regs *regs,
mce_err.u.slb_error_type = MCE_SLB_ERROR_INDETERMINATE;
break;
}
- if (mce_log->sub_err_type & 0x80)
+ if (mce_log->sub_err_type & MC_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED)
eaddr = be64_to_cpu(mce_log->effective_address);
break;
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_ERAT:
@@ -673,7 +686,7 @@ static int mce_handle_err_virtmode(struct pt_regs *regs,
mce_err.u.erat_error_type = MCE_ERAT_ERROR_INDETERMINATE;
break;
}
- if (mce_log->sub_err_type & 0x80)
+ if (mce_log->sub_err_type & MC_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED)
eaddr = be64_to_cpu(mce_log->effective_address);
break;
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_TLB:
@@ -690,7 +703,7 @@ static int mce_handle_err_virtmode(struct pt_regs *regs,
mce_err.u.tlb_error_type = MCE_TLB_ERROR_INDETERMINATE;
break;
}
- if (mce_log->sub_err_type & 0x80)
+ if (mce_log->sub_err_type & MC_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED)
eaddr = be64_to_cpu(mce_log->effective_address);
break;
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_D_CACHE:
@@ -699,6 +712,21 @@ static int mce_handle_err_virtmode(struct pt_regs *regs,
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_I_CACHE:
mce_err.error_type = MCE_ERROR_TYPE_ICACHE;
break;
+ case MC_ERROR_TYPE_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS:
+ mce_err.error_type = MCE_ERROR_TYPE_RA;
+ switch (err_sub_type) {
+ case MC_ERROR_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS_PTABLE_WALK:
+ mce_err.u.ra_error_type =
+ MCE_RA_ERROR_PAGE_TABLE_WALK_LOAD_STORE_FOREIGN;
+ break;
+ case MC_ERROR_CTRL_MEM_ACCESS_OP_ACCESS:
+ mce_err.u.ra_error_type =
+ MCE_RA_ERROR_LOAD_STORE_FOREIGN;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (mce_log->sub_err_type & MC_EFFECTIVE_ADDR_PROVIDED)
+ eaddr = be64_to_cpu(mce_log->effective_address);
+ break;
case MC_ERROR_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
default:
mce_err.error_type = MCE_ERROR_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
--
2.31.1
^ permalink raw reply related
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