From: madvenka@linux.microsoft.com
To: broonie@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com, jpoimboe@redhat.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nobuta.keiya@fujitsu.com,
sjitindarsingh@gmail.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
will@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
live-patching@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
madvenka@linux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 16:07:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220617210717.27126-5-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220617210717.27126-1-madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
There are some kernel features and conditions that make a stack trace
unreliable. Callers may require the unwinder to detect these cases.
E.g., livepatch.
Introduce a new function called unwind_check_reliability() that will
detect these cases and set a flag in the stack frame. Call
unwind_check_reliability() for every frame in unwind().
Introduce the first reliability check in unwind_check_reliability() - If
a return PC is not a valid kernel text address, consider the stack
trace unreliable. It could be some generated code. Other reliability checks
will be added in the future.
Let unwind() return a boolean to indicate if the stack trace is
reliable.
Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
index c749129aba5a..5ef2ce217324 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
* @final_fp: Pointer to the final frame.
*
* @failed: Unwind failed.
+ *
+ * @reliable: Stack trace is reliable.
*/
struct unwind_state {
unsigned long fp;
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ struct unwind_state {
struct task_struct *task;
unsigned long final_fp;
bool failed;
+ bool reliable;
};
static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ static void unwind_init_common(struct unwind_state *state,
state->prev_fp = 0;
state->prev_type = STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
state->failed = false;
+ state->reliable = true;
/* Stack trace terminates here. */
state->final_fp = (unsigned long)task_pt_regs(task)->stackframe;
@@ -242,11 +246,34 @@ static void notrace unwind_next(struct unwind_state *state)
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind_next);
-static void notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
+/*
+ * Check the stack frame for conditions that make further unwinding unreliable.
+ */
+static void unwind_check_reliability(struct unwind_state *state)
+{
+ if (state->fp == state->final_fp) {
+ /* Final frame; no more unwind, no need to check reliability */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the PC is not a known kernel text address, then we cannot
+ * be sure that a subsequent unwind will be reliable, as we
+ * don't know that the code follows our unwind requirements.
+ */
+ if (!__kernel_text_address(state->pc))
+ state->reliable = false;
+}
+
+static bool notrace unwind(struct unwind_state *state,
stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie)
{
- while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie))
+ unwind_check_reliability(state);
+ while (unwind_continue(state, consume_entry, cookie)) {
unwind_next(state);
+ unwind_check_reliability(state);
+ }
+ return !state->failed && state->reliable;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unwind);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-17 21:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <ff68fb850d42e1adaa6a0a6c9c258acabb898b24>
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 1/6] arm64: Split unwind_init() madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 2/6] arm64: Copy the task argument to unwind_state madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 3/6] arm64: Make the unwind loop in unwind() similar to other architectures madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 5/6] arm64: Create a list of SYM_CODE functions, check return PC against list madvenka
2022-06-17 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH v15 6/6] arm64: Introduce arch_stack_walk_reliable() madvenka
2022-06-17 20:50 ` [RFC PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 13:00 ` Will Deacon
2022-06-27 17:06 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH " madvenka
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 1/6] arm64: Split unwind_init() madvenka
2022-06-26 7:39 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 2/6] arm64: Copy the task argument to unwind_state madvenka
2022-06-26 7:39 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 3/6] arm64: Make the unwind loop in unwind() similar to other architectures madvenka
2022-06-26 8:21 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 4:51 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` madvenka [this message]
2022-06-26 8:32 ` [PATCH v15 4/6] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:01 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 5/6] arm64: Create a list of SYM_CODE functions, check return PC against list madvenka
2022-06-26 8:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:06 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-17 21:07 ` [PATCH v15 6/6] arm64: Introduce arch_stack_walk_reliable() madvenka
2022-06-26 8:57 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 5:53 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-23 17:32 ` [PATCH v15 0/6] arm64: Reorganize the unwinder and implement stack trace reliability checks Will Deacon
2022-06-24 5:19 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-24 5:27 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-26 9:18 ` Mark Rutland
2022-06-27 4:33 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 16:32 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-06-27 17:04 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 4:48 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2022-06-27 9:42 ` Will Deacon
2022-06-24 11:42 ` Mark Brown
2022-06-24 22:15 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
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