From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 16:15:31 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <007c2e93-d5cd-7f7e-bd29-bfc0da4c18ba@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240628035217.GAZn4zcWMZy3mgCKky@fat_crate.local>
On 6/28/2024 9:22 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2024 at 06:08:46PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Currently, SEV guest driver retrieves the pointers to VMPCK and
>> os_area_msg_seqno from the secrets page. In order to get rid of this
>> dependency,
>
> And we do this because...?
Thinking more about this patch, I think I can drop this patch and retain
the VMPCK pointer and the os_area_msg_seqno.
In my v8 [1] and earlier series, I had dropped secrets pages pointer from
snp_guest_dev structure. But with newer changes in v9 secrets pages pointer
is retained so all these APIs will still be fine.
>
>> use vmpck_id to index the appropriate key and the corresponding
>> message sequence number.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Regards
Nikunj
1. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240215113128.275608-8-nikunj@amd.com/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-01 10:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-21 12:38 [PATCH v10 00/24] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/24] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/24] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/24] virt: sev-guest: Simplify VMPCK and sequence number assignments Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-25 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-28 4:25 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-28 5:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-28 3:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-07-01 10:45 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-07-01 12:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/24] virt: sev-guest: Take mutex in snp_send_guest_request() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-28 8:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/24] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP guest messaging init/exit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/24] x86/sev: Move core SEV guest driver routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/24] x86/sev: Replace dev_[err,alert] with pr_[err,alert] Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/24] x86/sev: Make snp_issue_guest_request() static Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/24] x86/sev: Make sev-guest driver functional again Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/24] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/24] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/24] x86/sev: Drop sev_guest_platform_data structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/24] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/24] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/24] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/24] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 21/24] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 22/24] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 23/24] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-21 12:39 ` [PATCH v10 24/24] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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