From: "张静(长谷)" <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
To: "'Andy Lutomirski'" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"'Peter Zijlstra'" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "'Valdis Kletnieks'" <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"'Paul Mackerras'" <paulus@samba.org>,
"'Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo'" <acme@kernel.org>,
"'Ingo Molnar'" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"'Kees Cook'" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"'Andrea Arcangeli'" <aarcange@redhat.com>,
"'Vince Weaver'" <vince@deater.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 15:16:55 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <00cd01cff1b5$fda5a660$f8f0f320$@alibaba-inc.com> (raw)
>
> We currently allow any process to use rdpmc. This significantly
> weakens the protection offered by PR_TSC_DISABLED, and it could be
> helpful to users attempting to exploit timing attacks.
>
> Since we can't enable access to individual counters, use a very
> coarse heuristic to limit access to rdpmc: allow access only when
> a perf_event is mmapped. This protects seccomp sandboxes.
>
> There is plenty of room to further tighen these restrictions. For
> example, this allows rdpmc for any x86_pmu event, but it's only
> useful for self-monitoring tasks.
>
> As a side effect, cap_user_rdpmc will now be false for AMD uncore
> events. This isn't a real regression, since .event_idx is disabled
> for these events anyway for the time being. Whenever that gets
> re-added, the cap_user_rdpmc code can be adjusted or refactored
> accordingly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 16 +++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> index 876e74e8eec7..09b9620a73b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ typedef struct {
>
> struct mutex lock;
> void __user *vdso;
> +
> + atomic_t perf_rdpmc_allowed; /* nonzero if rdpmc is allowed */
> } mm_context_t;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> index 23697f74b372..ccad8d616038 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,18 @@ static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
> }
> #endif /* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
> +static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + if (atomic_read(&mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
> + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
> + else
> + cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void load_mm_cr4(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Used for LDT copy/destruction.
> */
> @@ -53,6 +65,9 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> /* Stop flush ipis for the previous mm */
> cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(prev));
>
> + /* Load per-mm CR4 state */
> + load_mm_cr4(next);
> +
> /*
> * Load the LDT, if the LDT is different.
> *
> @@ -88,6 +103,7 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> */
> load_cr3(next->pgd);
> trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
> + load_mm_cr4(next);
> load_LDT_nolock(&next->context);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> index 00fbab7aa587..3e875b3b30f2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> #include <asm/nmi.h>
> #include <asm/smp.h>
> #include <asm/alternative.h>
> +#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> #include <asm/timer.h>
> #include <asm/desc.h>
> @@ -1336,8 +1337,6 @@ x86_pmu_notifier(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
> break;
>
> case CPU_STARTING:
> - if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
> - cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
> if (x86_pmu.cpu_starting)
> x86_pmu.cpu_starting(cpu);
> break;
> @@ -1813,14 +1812,44 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> event->destroy(event);
> }
>
> + if (ACCESS_ONCE(x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc))
> + event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED;
> +
> return err;
> }
>
> +static void refresh_pce(void *ignored)
> +{
> + if (current->mm)
> + load_mm_cr4(current->mm);
> +}
> +
> +static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event)
> +{
> + if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
> + return;
> +
> + if (atomic_inc_return(¤t->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed) == 1)
> + on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
> +}
> +
> +static void x86_pmu_event_unmapped(struct perf_event *event)
> +{
> + if (!current->mm)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
> + return;
> +
> + if (atomic_dec_and_test(¤t->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed))
> + on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
The current task(T-a on CPU A) is asking CPUs(A, B, C, D) to refresh pce, and looks
the current task(T-d on CPU D) is disturbed if T-d loaded CR4 when going on CPU D.
Hillf
> +}
> +
> static int x86_pmu_event_idx(struct perf_event *event)
> {
> int idx = event->hw.idx;
>
> - if (!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc)
> + if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
> return 0;
>
> if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed && idx >= INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
> @@ -1838,16 +1867,6 @@ static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
> return snprintf(buf, 40, "%d\n", x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc);
> }
>
> -static void change_rdpmc(void *info)
> -{
> - bool enable = !!(unsigned long)info;
> -
> - if (enable)
> - cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
> - else
> - cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCE);
> -}
> -
> static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
> struct device_attribute *attr,
> const char *buf, size_t count)
> @@ -1862,11 +1881,7 @@ static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *cdev,
> if (x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc_broken)
> return -ENOTSUPP;
>
> - if (!!val != !!x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc) {
> - x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
> - on_each_cpu(change_rdpmc, (void *)val, 1);
> - }
> -
> + x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc = !!val;
> return count;
> }
>
> @@ -1909,6 +1924,9 @@ static struct pmu pmu = {
>
> .event_init = x86_pmu_event_init,
>
> + .event_mapped = x86_pmu_event_mapped,
> + .event_unmapped = x86_pmu_event_unmapped,
> +
> .add = x86_pmu_add,
> .del = x86_pmu_del,
> .start = x86_pmu_start,
> @@ -1930,7 +1948,8 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event,
>
> userpg->cap_user_time = 0;
> userpg->cap_user_time_zero = 0;
> - userpg->cap_user_rdpmc = x86_pmu.attr_rdpmc;
> + userpg->cap_user_rdpmc =
> + !!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED);
> userpg->pmc_width = x86_pmu.cntval_bits;
>
> if (!sched_clock_stable())
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> index d98a34d435d7..f6868186e67b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
> @@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ struct event_constraint {
> #define PERF_X86_EVENT_COMMITTED 0x8 /* event passed commit_txn */
> #define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_LD_HSW 0x10 /* haswell style datala, load */
> #define PERF_X86_EVENT_PEBS_NA_HSW 0x20 /* haswell style datala, unknown */
> +#define PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED 0x40 /* grant rdpmc permission */
> +
>
> struct amd_nb {
> int nb_id; /* NorthBridge id */
> --
> 1.9.3
next reply other threads:[~2014-10-27 7:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-27 7:16 张静(长谷) [this message]
2014-10-27 15:45 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-28 3:35 ` Hillf Danton
2014-10-28 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-28 4:07 ` Hillf Danton
2014-10-28 4:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-10-24 22:58 [PATCH v2 0/8] CR4 handling improvements Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-24 22:58 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86, perf: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-31 17:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-10-31 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
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